

## Council on International Educational Exchange



November 12, 1990

Walter H. Capps  
Professor of Religious Studies  
University of California, Santa Barbara  
Santa Barbara, CA 93106

Dear Dr. Capps:

We are pleased to inform you that you have been selected from over 70 applicants to participate in the upcoming International Faculty Development Seminar in Vietnam, "Understanding Vietnam's Historical Perspectives."

At this time we are able to confirm that the program will proceed as scheduled. We regret the delay in notification and appreciate your patience. We hope that it will not affect your ability to participate in this program.

### Travel Arrangements

As many of you are aware, there are severe space limitations on the few air carriers serving Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. In order to be assured of space for all participants on Thai International Airways to and from Vietnam, we must require all participants to fly as a group from the U.S. on that same airline. For this reason, we have arranged the following group flight:

Thai Air 761	January 03	Seattle/Bangkok	dep. 1:15 pm	arr. 9:55 pm (Jan 04)
Thai Air 762	January 17	Bangkok/Seattle	dep. 10:30 am	arr. 10:35 am

The cost of this flight is \$950 round trip, including overnight accommodations in Bangkok on January 16, airport transfers in Bangkok, and U.S. departure tax.

It may be possible for participants to prolong their stay in Asia (though not in Vietnam), however the details need to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. We have designated a special contact for flight arrangements for this seminar. For more information, please contact Ms. Ana Badua at (212) 661-1414, ext. 1202/1204. Ms. Badua may also be contacted to arrange low-cost connecting domestic flights from your home airport to Seattle and back.

### Response Form

Since there is a waiting list of applicants who wish to attend this seminar, we are asking you to return the attached response form to us. Please be sure to include the information requested on the bottom of the form. We must receive it no later than Friday, November 16. We understand that this is very short notice, but we must begin immediately to arrange for visas with the Vietnamese government. This form should be faxed to me or Steve Gatland at (212) 972-3231.

Visa

Enclosed in this mailing (under separate cover) you will find an application form for an entry visa into Vietnam. Please fill out the form (a photocopy of the form is also acceptable), attach a passport size photo, and in addition a photocopy of the two information pages of your passport. We will make the necessary arrangements to obtain a visa for all participants in this seminar. We must receive these documents no later than Monday, December 17.


The following information will be of use to you in answering some of the application questions:

Address in Bangkok:	SASA International House Soi Chulalongkorn 12(2) Phyathai Road, Bangkok 10500 Tel: 214 2581-2
Purpose of Journey:	Educational seminar
Date of entry:	January 6, 1991
Port of entry:	Ho Chi Minh City
Date of exit:	January 16, 1991
Port of exit:	Hanoi
Organization applicant will contact:	Ministry of Training and Education, Ho Chi Minh City University
Mark of identification:	May be left blank (or "none")

In the coming weeks you will be receiving more information, including a participant list, a rooming list, a suggested reading list, and other orientation materials.

Thank you very much for your patience and cooperation. Please be sure to return the response form by November 16.

Sincerely,



Mark Gross  
Administrator  
Professional Programs

Encl.

**Council on International Educational Exchange**



**TO:** All Participants in the Vietnam Faculty Development Seminar  
**FROM:** Mark Gross, Administrator  
Professional Programs  
**DATE:** December 14, 1990

Enclosed you will find the following:

- Invoice for balance of seminar costs
- Accommodation list
- Notes on travel to Vietnam
- U.S. State Department Travel Advisory

Invoice

Kindly read the invoice carefully to make certain that it is correct. You may disregard the top portion of the invoice, as it is used for administrative purposes only. The pink copy of the invoice should be returned to Steve Gatland along with your remittance. We would appreciate your taking care of this matter prior to your departure.

Airline Tickets

The tickets are being printed this week. We will be mailing your ticket to you at your home address.

Accommodations at Seattle Airport

For those of you who are in need of a room in Seattle on January 2, here are a few of the many hotels located at or near the airport:

Airport Plaza Hotel  
800-356-10000  
\$44 & up

Quality Inn at Seattle-Tacoma Airport  
800-228-5050  
\$59 & up

Best Western Airport Executel  
800-334-7234  
\$67 & up

Ramada Inn at Seattle-Tacoma Airport  
800-228-3838  
\$70 & up

Holiday Inn Seattle-Tacoma Airport  
800-HOLIDAY  
\$78 & up

Seattle Airport Hilton  
800-HILTONS  
\$99 & up

#### Arrival in Bangkok

We have arranged for a group transfer from the airport to the SASA International House in Bangkok. Dr. Keith Taylor of Cornell University will be traveling with you from Seattle and will accompany you for the duration of the program. Please try to gather as a group outside of customs at the airport in Bangkok.

#### Emergency Contact

As you may be aware, it is illegal to communicate directly with Vietnam from the United States. In the event of an extreme emergency, I can be reached at the office (212) 661-1414, ext. 1110, Monday - Friday, 9 am - 5 pm (EST), and at home at (718) 728-4757. It may or may be possible for us to reach participants in Vietnam, but it is exceedingly difficult.

#### Other Information

We are unable to provide you with an updated schedule at this time. It will be mailed to you at your home address along with your ticket next week.

For those participants who will be staying overnight in Bangkok on January 16, rooms are being reserved at the Regina Palace Hotel. We will provide you with the address and telephone number of the hotel next week.

We wish you a happy holiday and a safe and pleasant trip to Vietnam.

### Travel Arrangements

As noted in the acceptance letter of November 12, all U.S. participants will be required to fly as a group on Thai International Airlines. Kindly confirm your travel plans as soon as possible with Ms. Ana Badua at (212) 661-1414, ext. 1202/04.

### Hotel Arrangements

Due to the nature of this program, there will be no single rooms available. If this affects your decision to participate in the seminar, kindly notify us immediately.

### Reading List

Enclosed in this mailing is a list of suggested books on various aspects of Vietnam. In addition, we strongly recommend that you read Barabara Cohen's The Vietnam Handbook, which provides very useful background information for travelers to Vietnam.

In the coming weeks you will receive an invoice for the balance of the seminar costs, including airfare.

Please feel free to contact me at ext. 1110 or Steve Gatland at ext. 1219 if you have any other questions about the program.

Thank you for your cooperation.

# Council on International Educational Exchange



## INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS

### Notes for Participants in Vietnam Seminar

We hope that you have been doing some advance reading about Vietnam in preparation for your trip. Any international journey exposes one to different cultures and lifestyles, but a visit to the developing world can arouse particularly intense forms of "culture shock." Advance preparation can help considerably in reducing the negative aspects of an encounter with an unfamiliar and exotic new culture.

Walking down a street in Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi can involve an assault on all the senses. Despite the scarcity of automobiles, you will be struck by the din--and the dust--raised by the continuous traffic of passing bicycles and motorscooters, with the occasional truck, bus or even ox-drawn cart. As a Westerner, moreover, you will be the object of great curiosity and attention from passersby, as you struggle to get your bearings in a sea of unfamiliar sights and sounds.

Over the past two years, Council staff members have traveled back and forth to Vietnam several times in preparation for both the faculty seminar and the fall 1991 opening of an undergraduate student program at the University of Hanoi. This paper is an attempt to distill from their experiences some suggestions and comments that may be useful to participants in the faculty seminar in Vietnam.

#### Accommodations and Creature Comforts:

By any economic measure, Vietnam is currently among the world's poorest nations, having been ravaged by decades of war, socialist mismanagement and isolation from global commerce. The average citizen's annual per capita income hovers around U.S. \$200. Enormous strides have been taken with market reforms introduced in the last couple of years--and given the country's large petroleum and mineral resources, there is reason to be hopeful about the future--but severe shortages in basic infrastructure are readily apparent.

For obvious reasons, facilities for tourists are given priority in the allocation of scarce resources, but you nonetheless need to be prepared for more spartan accommodations than you may have encountered traveling anywhere else in the world. Bathing facilities may consist of a faucet--a hand-held shower, if you are lucky--set on a bathroom wall without a curtain or divider. Telephone service and hot water are sporadic at best, and power outages are common (take a small flashlight). A variety of insects (or harmless lizards) may share your living quarters (be sure to take along insect repellent and make use of mosquito nets where provided). Tap water is not potable, and you will need to rely upon purchasing bottled water or using the boiled water provided in a carafe in your room.

In Ho Chi Minh City, the university has made arrangements for you to stay in a hotel complex (Ky Hoa Hotel) which is quite luxurious by local standards. The double-occupancy rooms themselves are somewhat modest, but the hotel is part of a large municipally-owned complex currently being developed into an exhibition/convention facility. Built on the lakeside site of a former military fort, the complex includes recreational facilities (children's amusement park, small zoo, tennis courts, theater).

Except for on-site visits scheduled as part of the seminar or possible encounters with Vietnamese families who come into the complex to use these facilities, you will be somewhat isolated from the daily life of Ho Chi Minh City. We urge you to take advantage of any free time to explore outside the gates of the complex, either on foot or by hiring a pedicab or taxi.

Your accommodations in Hanoi will be less fancy; you will be housed in one of the government ministry-operated guesthouses, most likely in rooms that will have been temporarily vacated for you by longer-term residents such as foreign teachers. An advantage here, however, is that you will be living in closer proximity to the ongoing life of the city, right on a busy street near the center of Hanoi.

#### Meals:

Breakfasts and lunches will be provided every day during the seminar, generally at your hotel. Coffee (with sweetened condensed milk) and bread with jam are usually available for breakfast, vestiges of French colonial influence. For lunch you will often have a choice of Vietnamese or Western menus.

Vietnamese cuisine is delightful--somewhat like Chinese food but far less oily--and you will have plenty to eat. Those of you not skilled in the use of chopsticks may want to practice ahead of time!

When eating outside hotels or tourist restaurants, you will want to exercise some caution: Avoid uncooked vegetables, peel all fruit, and do not drink unboiled water or use ice made from tap water. The latter precaution can leave travelers dehydrated, so be sure to substitute plenty of bottled mineral water, boiled tea, canned sodas or beer.

#### Weather:

January is part of Vietnam's dry season, and you are likely to encounter little rain. Ho Chi Minh City has a year-round pattern of warm tropical weather, with an average January temperature of 70-89 degrees F. (21-32 degrees C.). Hanoi, some 1000 miles (1750 km) distant, has a distinct winter season, with an average January temperature of 56-68 degrees F. (13-20 degrees C.) and fairly high humidity. The lack of central heating, coupled with the humidity, can make Hanoi fairly cold in January, so you will want to be prepared with warm clothes (layers of clothing may work best).

Clothing:

Patterns of dress in Vietnam are fairly informal. Women most often wear trousers, and men rarely put on ties and jackets. One "semi-formal" outfit will be sufficient for any special occasions such as welcome or farewell banquets. Shorts, heavy make-up and excessive jewelry should all be avoided. Be sure to take a pair of comfortable walking shoes; you will be doing a fair amount of walking over unpaved surfaces even in downtown urban areas.

You should expect to carry your own luggage at all times, so it is important that you PACK LIGHT! In planning your wardrobe, keep in mind that laundry service will be readily available.

Photography/Videotaping:

If you enjoy taking photographs, the Vietnam seminar will offer a wealth of "photo opportunities." It is a good idea to take plenty of film (and extra batteries) with you, as it may be difficult or expensive to obtain there. Beware of subjecting your film to x-ray equipment in Southeast Asian airports; use a lead-lined bag or, better yet, request hand inspection each time you need to pass through airport security.

Certain sites are off-limits to photographers (generally, sites that have potential military significance, such as bridges, police stations, etc.). When in doubt, ask your local hosts for specific advice.

For those of you who have expressed an interest in making videotapes of seminar presentations, common courtesy dictates that you ask advance permission from each speaker or presenter. There may be sensitivities of which you are unaware.

Money Matters:

Your out-of-pocket expenses during the seminar should be fairly minimal. Basically, you will need to cover the cost of dinners in Bangkok and Vietnam, plus any personal expenses such as laundry, telephone calls or shopping.

There is very little acceptance of credit cards or travelers' cheques in Vietnam, and even where credit cards are honored, those issued through American banks are not allowed (due to the U.S. trade embargo). You will therefore need to carry small denominations of U.S. or other foreign currency to cover your incidental charges. Many restaurants or merchants will accept U.S. dollars, but it will be up to you to negotiate the exchange rate.

Foreign currency can be exchanged for Vietnamese dong at government banks and some hotels. During October 1990, the rate varied from 6,076-6,200 dong per U.S. dollar, depending upon the total number of dollars being converted. Upon entering Vietnam you will be asked to fill out a customs declaration form stating the amount(s) of foreign currency you are



bringing into the country; when you exit, you will need to complete a similar statement, so be prepared to show receipts for money converted or expended.

Prices in Vietnam are extremely low; a multi-course dinner with wine in a fancy restaurant may cost no more than U.S. \$3-5. Be careful not to convert more foreign currency than you can spend; not only will you have problems reconverting it, but it will also be inconvenient for you to carry around the equivalent Vietnamese currency, which comes in denominations ranging from 50 dong (less than \$.01!) to 5,000 dong (roughly \$.80) bills.

If you plan to do any shopping, those of you from the U.S. will need to remember the U.S. trade embargo and the concomitant restrictions on what Americans may bring back to the U.S. from Vietnam. The U.S. Treasury Dept. brochure distributed previously details all of the regulations, but the most essential point is that U.S. citizens may not return to the U.S. with merchandise worth in excess of U.S. \$100. All items must have been purchased for personal use (i.e., not for resale) and must accompany you in your baggage. Reference or research materials do not have to be included in the \$100 limitation. Keep your receipts!

#### Gifts:

Although your stay in Vietnam will be brief, the quality of your interactions with local faculty members may be unusually intense, given Vietnam's comparative isolation and the political and economic gulfs that separate it from the West, especially the U.S. You will quickly become aware of how significant your presence on campus is viewed at both universities, as a bridge to expanding contacts with the outside world for their faculty and students alike.

You are likely to feel that you want to reciprocate the enthusiasm and hospitality shown by your hosts at Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi Universities. Given the stark contrast between the Vietnamese universities' impressive intellectual resources and their meager physical assets, one of the most useful ways you can express thanks would be to make a contribution of a textbook or two to the faculty you meet or the university libraries. A book you have authored or an important basic text in your field would make an excellent and very much appreciated gift at either or both site(s). Other suggestions include back issues of journals in your field or TEFL (Teaching English as a Foreign Language) materials. Mail between the U.S. and Vietnam is extremely erratic, so it will be difficult to send such materials after you return home.

#### Communicating Through an Interpreter:

You need to be prepared to deal with linguistic—as well as cultural—barriers in Vietnam. While growing in popularity, English is not widely spoken, even on university campuses. Many of the current generation of university faculty were trained in the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, so any of you who speak Russian or Eastern

European languages will find opportunities to communicate. French is not as widely spoken as you might expect; today, nearly four decades after the end of French colonial rule, only the elderly generation is conversant in French.

Many of the seminar presentations, like much of your interaction with Vietnamese faculty, will need to be conducted through interpreters, who will not necessarily be professionally trained. This will require a good deal of patience and extra attention on your part.

Following are some points which it may be helpful for you to keep in mind, especially if you have not previously had the experience of working through an interpreter. Remember that the burden of communication is on your shoulders. The way in which you communicate can do a great deal to maximize the effectiveness--and minimize the weaknesses--of any interpreter.

- Watch the length of your speech units. Avoid speaking in long, rambling sentences, forgetting to pause for translation. Pace your comments in terms of short paragraphs, rather than long pages, giving the interpreter an opportunity to translate meaningful units of thought.
- Avoid colloquialisms. Be prepared to speak slowly and clearly, and to paraphrase where necessary to get your point across.
- Phrase questions concisely. Western academics often preface questions with long statements and then pose questions in a hypothetical manner. When translating across linguistic and cultural barriers, however, straightforward questions will solicit more useful answers!
- Body language can be an important adjunct to verbal communication. Although it may seem awkward at first, always look at (and address in the second person) the individual to whom you are directing your comments, not the interpreter. If you naturally use hand gestures when speaking, continue to do so since this may help to convey your meaning.
- Remember that interpreting is an extremely taxing job. Positive reinforcement is always welcome (as is constructive criticism, where necessary).

#### In Closing:

Your ten days in Vietnam are bound to leave you with indelible impressions that may take some time to sort out. You will doubtless be struck by a host of apparent contradictions, not the least of which will be the dramatic contrast between the lush tropical beauty of the land itself and the stark poverty in which the Vietnamese currently live. Yours is a privileged vantage point from which to experience Vietnam at this juncture in its history. Travel in good health, and, above all, with an open mind!

VIETNAM FACULTY DEVELOPMENT SEMINAR  
READING LIST

GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

- David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism (Univ. of California Press, 1971).
- David G. Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Univ. of California Press, 1981).
- Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 (Cornell Univ. Press, 1982).
- Greg Lockhart, Nation in Arms: the Origins of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (Allen & Unwin, 1989).
- Carlyle A. Thayer, War By Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam, 1954-60 (Allen & Unwin, 1989).
- William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954-75 (Westview, 1986).
- Nguyen Khac Vien, "Traditional Vietnam" Vietnamese Studies 21.
- Thomas Hodgkin. Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path (Macmillan, 1981).
- John K. Whitmore, An Introduction to Indochinese History, Culture, Language, and Life (Ann Arbor, 1979).
- Keith W. Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam (University of California-Berkeley, 1983).

CULTURE AND ETHNICITY

- Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley: Indochina Resource Center, 1974)
- Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley, 1979).
- Gerald Hickey, Sons of the Mountains (Yale, 1981).
- , Free in the Forest (Yale, 1982).

### CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

William S. Turley (ed.), Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective (Westview, 1980).

Carlyle A. Thayer and David G. Marr, ASEAN and Indochina: The Trend Towards Dialogue (New Zealand, 1988).

Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnam since 1975: Two Views from Australia (Brisbane, 1982).

Richard Stubbs, Vietnam: Facing the 1990's (Toronto, 1989).

William S. Turley (ed.), Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective (Westview, 1980),

William J. Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon (Ohio, 1985, revised edition).

### ARTS

Nguyen Khac Vien and Huu Ngoc, Vietnamese Literature (Hanoi, 1980).

### VIETNAM WAR AND AFTERMATH

George Kahin, Intervention (Anchor, 1977).

George Kahin and Anthony Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Longman, 1989).

Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983).

Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy (Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1986).

David W. P. Elliott (ed.), The Third Indochina Conflict (Westview, 1981).

### GENERAL REFERENCE

Barbara Cohen, The Vietnam Handbook (Harper & Row, 1990).

Full set of: Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi).

Vietnam Forum (Yale).

Lac-Viet Series (Yale).

## Point of View

By Allan Goodman

### Scholars Must Give More Serious Thought to How They Teach and Write About the War in Vietnam

**R**ECENTLY I addressed my daughter's 11th-grade history class on the Vietnam War. Like most juniors at that time of year, they were still slogging through World War II and had about a hundred pages of their textbooks to go before reaching the five pages covering the French and American wars in Indochina. Their teacher was afraid they would end the course without reading about Vietnam, and so she drafted me. Of course, high-school students today do talk about the Vietnam War. Some have visited the memorial on the Mall in Washington. Others have cried during "Born on the Fourth of July" and linked arms at Billy Joel concerts when he sang "Goodbye Saigon."

But they probably know less about the causes and consequences of the Vietnam War than about the Civil War, and they are far more familiar with the terms of the treaty that ended World War I than with the ill-fated "Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" that was signed the year they were born.

Ignorance of the Vietnam War, of course, is not limited to high-school students. College students are just as uninformed, and even scholars have barely begun to ask some of the most important questions. Indeed, despite the hundreds of books written about the Vietnam War and the millions of pages of classified government documents opened to the public over the last two decades, very little scholarship breaks new ground in the study of America's involvement in Indochina. Many history and foreign-policy professors ignore the war, and those who do address it are still going over the old debates and questions that exercised them during the conflict itself.

If we expect our young people to understand just how decisively Vietnam changed American society, and if we hope to avoid similar disasters in the future, we need to give more serious thought to how we write and teach about the war.

For example, we need courses that portray the war as a fundamental clash between cultures and ways of thinking about power and history, and which place it in a larger political and societal context. This would mean moving away from the current fashion of offering courses that are anecdotal accounts of what the fighting and decision making were like (at home and abroad), as well as the longer-standing approach of teaching about Vietnam as an episode in the cold war. What my daughter's generation needs to learn is how to avoid Vietnams in an era when the cold war has ended, but when nations may, in fact, feel freer to resort to warfare to settle internal and external differences because the risk of superpower confrontation has receded.

The scholarship on the war also needs a broader focus. It is time to stop writing so much about such topics as the motives, characters, and strategies of the ghosts who committed the United States to the war, why the resulting policy of escalation was or was not an aberration in American foreign policy, and how the growth in Congressional power over foreign affairs has immunized us against future Vietnam-type quagmires. As the recent U.S. involvement in the civil wars of Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador indicates, covert action and military intervention are far from being outmoded tools of foreign policy. These episodes also suggest that—as was the case in Vietnam—once the United States intervenes, it is remarkably difficult to negotiate a way out.

Consequently, I suggested to my daughter's class that when they got to college, they should look for a course with a reading list that invited them to examine Vietnam in the context of other historical events that raised the question of when to use force and when to use diplomacy. I suggested that there are still three historical problems worth debating:

- Why did we get involved?
- Why, even though we did not actually lose the war, did we almost certainly lose the peace?
- Did the whole episode really matter?

**A**S TO THE FIRST QUESTION, I noted that the jungles of Vietnam were one of the least likely places in which to expect Americans to fight once the Japanese were defeated in World War II. We wanted the boys home and hoped never again to be involved in land wars in Asia. And the strange politics and authoritarian leaders of Indochina seemed ill suited to an American effort to promote democracy abroad.

It really was our connection with the French, who were mired in defense of their colonial empire, that led to our involvement in the first Indochina war, which lasted from 1946 to the defeat of the garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. France was an ally to be supported in our cold-war struggle with the Soviet Union.

Most high-school and college textbooks make it appear that the United States had been engaged in fighting Communism in Vietnam virtually since the end of the World War II. But it was not until the period from 1958 to 1961 that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy decided to resist Communist-led wars of national liberation by means of counterinsurgency, and so launched what has come to be known as the Second Indochina War. It was during this period that the domino theory gained its widest acceptance: Our effort in Vietnam was to set an example that would deter Communist moves elsewhere (especially in the Middle East and Latin America), and to show developing countries that the United States could help them as they struggled with the political problems of underdevelopment.

The problem scholars and their students should now analyze is how we could have misled ourselves about the stakes, the intentions of our ally, the efficacy of our actions, and the rationale behind our policy.

The second historical problem I discussed with my daughter's class was why, even though neither we nor our ally lost the war in a military sense, we lost the peace. By every conventional military indicator, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces consistently improved in their ability to defeat the Communist forces in Vietnam. Such progress repeatedly caused Hanoi to change the estimate of how long it would have to fight for unification. In the mid-1960's, North Vietnamese generals thought victory would follow an urban political uprising (later called the Tet Offensive) sometime between 1968 and 1970. By 1972, these generals were telling their troops to prepare for another 10 to 20 years of warfare.

To make my point, I tried to get the students thinking about the war from the Tet Offensive of 1968 onward. This offensive marked a military turning point because it failed to achieve Communist political objectives, decimated Communist ranks, turned the South Vietnamese population decisively against their National Liberation Front, and disabused all but a few politicians of the idea that there could be a neutral, middle ground between the Communists and the South Vietnamese government. The point that most texts miss is that South Vietnamese forces very nearly succeeded in defeating the Communists then. Three issues must be examined in considering why this did not come to pass:

■ How much force is needed to win a guerrilla war, and is the American government prepared for conflicts of such magnitude? Many prominent military theorists have suggested that guerrillas win if they do not lose. With a very small force and careful choice of the times and places to attack, guerrillas can demoralize the citizenry by demonstrating that the incumbent government cannot provide security. Of the more than 100

guerrilla wars that have been fought since 1945, the incumbent government has lost more than three-quarters.

■ Why did none of our leaders foresee the growing power of Congress to constrain American foreign policy? Whatever the terms of the peace agreement signed in 1973, that development would have made it very difficult for the U.S. government to monitor North Vietnamese violations and reinvoke its ground and air forces in Vietnam to enforce the agreement. Even today, the inner circle around American Presidents tends to underestimate the power of Congress to limit the projection of American military power abroad.

■ What should we have expected from our Vietnamese ally? The rapid, dramatic, and pitiful collapse of the South Vietnamese army in 1975 was not inevitable. From Tet onward, the South Vietnamese knew that they were fighting for their lives and that, should the Communists win, a unified, socialist Vietnam would not be a kinder, gentler place. Why couldn't the South Vietnamese leaders bring themselves to root out the corruption and incompetence that led to the collapse? And what are the telltale signs of weakness that we should look for in governments we are considering supporting elsewhere?

**I** ENDED MY TALK to my daughter's class by asking the students to consider whether Vietnam matters any more.

Its costs and impact on the Vietnamese people were of monumental dimensions. The conflict—and the Communist victory in the end—left nothing and no one untouched. But the war also changed American society, government, and politics decisively. It divided a generation, drove the government deeper into debt, created a sharing of power in foreign affairs between the executive and legislative branches that may, in some respects, be unconstitutional, and spawned a credibility gap between the government and the people that persists today.

Perhaps the historical problem that students need to consider above all is how long the aftermath of the Vietnam War will continue to shape their lives and society. But will they get the chance to do this in college?

What most textbooks miss is that all wars—even those that are broadly supported and are fought well and victoriously for noble ends—permanently change the people and societies that engage in them. Often they determine the subsequent cultural and political divisions and alignments of an entire generation, not just of those who fought. This, in turn, leads to systemic changes in the political process of both winners and losers and profoundly affects not only who leads a country, but also the types of people who will seek to be leaders. And, inevitably, the costs of financing a war hit the underclasses hardest. After a war, most governments find themselves in debt, and politicians run for election based on pledges to cut spending. This reduces substantially—if it does not eliminate altogether—the chance for the poor to escape poverty and for the middle class to assure that their children will have a higher quality of life than they did.

Historians must ask, and help students consider, whether wars are worth the social polarization and economic problems they often produce.

If they do not ask these questions, what is there to prevent my daughter's generation from thinking that it can control and limit the effects of war better than my generation did?

*Allan Goodman is professor of international affairs and associate dean of the school of foreign service at Georgetown University. He has written several books about the negotiations to end the war in Vietnam.*

# The New York Times

Late Edition

New York: Today, hazy sunshine, afternoon clouds. High 95. Tonight, cloudy. Low 76. Tomorrow, afternoon thunderstorms. High 93. Yesterday, high 91, low 73. Details, page C15.

No. 48,301 Copyright © 1990 The New York Times NEW YORK, THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1990 50 cents beyond 75 miles from New York City, except on Long Island 40 CENTS

## Ethics Committee Urges Rejection of Durenberger

### Conduct Is Called 'Reprehensible'

By RICHARD L. BERKE

18 — The Senate recommended disciplinary action against a Senator. Shortly after the committee's vote was announced late today, a subdued Mr. Durenberger apologized, reading a brief statement at a news conference. "Of all the thousands of words that have been written or spoken during 23 months of investigation, news coverage and commentary, only three are appropriate."

Continued on Page B6, Column 4



Senator Dave Durenberger in Washington after ethics vote.

## Builders See Recession

### Home the Savings Crisis

By IVER PETERSON

any improvement unlikely for the near term — the rest of the economy will also be pulled under.

In fact, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, eased interest rates last week to offset the tightening in commercial loans.

"We're worse off today than we were in the early 80's when we had those incredibly high interest rates," said H. town, N.J. "Then the banks were help-

Continued on Page D3, Column 1

Greenspan Sticks to Policy

The Fed chairman suggested interest rates would not drop soon, despite Administration pressure. But another rate is up: Consumer prices rose half a percent in June. Pages D1 and D5.

## 80 SCHOOLS CHOSEN FOR NEW YORK TEST OF POWER SHARING

FERNANDEZ PLAN TO START

Parents and Teachers to Join Principals in Program — Some Resisting Effort

By JOSEPH BERGER

Eighty New York City schools have been chosen to begin Schools Chancellor Joseph A. Fernandez's trademark experiment in power sharing among teachers, parents and principals, but scores of other schools have signaled a stiffening resistance to the Chancellor by staying out of the process.

Starting in September, new governing teams of roughly 10 to 12 teachers, parents and administrators will take over a broad range of responsibilities at the 80 elementary, junior high and high schools. Their new authority could embrace budgets, hiring of new teachers and administrators, changes in curriculum and work schedules.

Mr. Fernandez came to New York after an acclaimed stewardship of the schools in the Miami area, where he introduced the governing concept, calling it "school-based management/shared decision making."

'Closest to the Children'

The theory, his aides have said, is that by giving "the people closest to the children" freedom from some government rules and from some union contract provisions, they can develop programs that best suit the children's needs.

Mr. Fernandez staked much of his reputation on his ability to persuade New York City's principals and teachers to join his power-sharing program. But many principals, led by their union, the Council of Supervisors and Administrators, have resisted surrendering authority to parent-teacher committees unless they retained a veto over all decisions.

Although the teachers union, the United Federation of Teachers, has strongly backed Mr. Fernandez's plan, many teachers have been reluctant to take on the extra hours of work on governing committees without increases in pay. And some parent-group leaders have been wary because the Chancellor's regulations require that a majority of a school governing committee's members be made up of teachers and other professionals.

At many of the city's 984 schools, the array of pitfalls proved fatal. Mr. Fer-

Continued on Page B4, Column 5

## U.S. SHIFTS CAMBODIA POLICY; ENDS RECOGNITION OF REBELS; AGREES TO TALKS WITH HANOI



Associated Press



The New York Times

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d announced yesterday in Paris that the United States was withdrawing recognition of the Cambodian guerrilla coalition and opening talks with Vietnam on the Cambodian conflict.

## SOVIETS BACK MOVE

New Stance Could Open Way to a Renewal of Ties With Vietnam

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

PARIS, July 18 — In a major policy reversal, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d announced today that the Bush Administration was withdrawing its diplomatic recognition of the Cambodian guerrilla coalition, which includes the Communist Khmer Rouge, and opening negotiations with Vietnam on settling the Cambodian conflict.

Mr. Baker, speaking to reporters after a two-hour meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, said the move was necessary because existing American policy appeared increasingly likely to promote a return to power of the Khmer Rouge, under whose rule in the 1970's more than a million Cambodians were killed or died of starvation.

Pressure From Rights Groups

The Administration had been under pressure from Congress and human rights groups to change its Cambodia policy, especially in light of a recent series of major military gains by the Khmer Rouge.

The policy that was abandoned today dates to the Carter Administration, which, seeking to improve relations with China and in deference to Southeast Asian nations wishing to contain Vietnam, stifled some of its human rights concerns and condoned Beijing's support of the Khmer Rouge. The policy continued under the Reagan Administration.

Mr. Shevardnadze, whose Government supports Vietnam, said after meeting with Mr. Baker that the American and Soviet approaches on Cambodia have "come much closer."

Seeking to Isolate Hanoi

The Administration also signaled that the talks with Vietnam could eventually lead to normal relations with Hanoi, although Mr. Baker said that such a step was not at hand. After the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the United States sought to isolate Vietnam diplomatically and economically and did not establish relations.

Since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, ousted the Khmer Rouge and installed a pro-Vietnamese Government, Washington came to support a three-faction Cambodian coalition trying to topple the Government in Phnom Penh, led by Prime Minister Hun Sen. The United States argued that Mr. Hun Sen was an illegitimate puppet of an "expansionist" Soviet-backed Vietnamese Government.

The rebel coalition consists of two

Continued on Page A6, Column 1

Continued on Page A10, Column 3

## A Divisive Issue of German Unity: How to Reconcile Abortion Laws

By MARLISE SIMONS

Special to The New York Times

EAST BERLIN — The question of how to deal with abortion has become one of the most divisive issues between East and West Germany as the two nations move toward full reunification.

East German women have started to mobilize to preserve abortion on demand, which has been their right for almost two decades. West German law is more restrictive, requiring the approval of two doctors before an abortion may legally be performed.

The issue has led to rousing debates in Parliament in East Berlin, and East German women's groups, picking up Western-style campaign techniques, have organized petition and letter-writing campaigns. The Health Ministry said it had received more than 100,000

signatures over two weeks in July demanding that East Germany preserve its full abortion rights.

Some writers also want to continue the distribution of contraceptives free of charge.

But the unification treaty, now under discussion, stipulates that West German law will apply to the acceding states of East Germany, except in cases where special rules or exemptions are made for a transition period.

Expert meetings to unify the abortion laws have bogged down in disparities, prompting a spokesman at the West German Justice Ministry to say that "the gap between the two positions is clearly unbridgeable."

After yet another round of inconclusive talks in early July, politicians in Bonn and East Berlin say the abortion question has proved so nettlesome that both sides now favor postponing a resolution until after unification.

"I think we will not include any changes in abortion law in the treaty," Christa Schmidt, East Germany's Minister of Health and Family, said in an interview just after she returned from a meeting with her counterpart in Bonn. Rather, she said, the two ministers were hoping for an interim solution, allowing the five East German

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## Gene Moscone in a Man

NGIF makes a man a sed, but scien-



## A Child's Nightmare in Italy Is Now the Nation's Shame

By CLYDE HABERMAN

Special to The New York Times

ROME, July 18 — Every now and then a relatively small incident causes a country to examine its soul, and the one newspaper wrote, "along the happy road of vacation there were scheduled stops for attending to the

# Behind U.S. Reversal: Gains by the Khmer Rouge

By CLIFFORD KRAUSS  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18 — Defense and intelligence officials say they are increasingly concerned that the Communist Khmer Rouge guerrillas are winning their war to oust the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian Government. The Bush Administration's announcement today that it is withdrawing recognition of the Cambodian rebel coalition and opening talks with Vietnam underlines that concern.

State Department, Defense Department and Congressional analysts said that despite recent Khmer Rouge advances they do not believe the Cambodian Government will fall this year.

They said that two non-Communist guerrilla groups loosely allied with the Khmer Rouge had failed to make similar advances. The two groups receive more than \$15 million in yearly overt and covert American assistance.

### A Rainy Season Offensive

"A primary concern of our policy is to keep the Khmer Rouge from taking power," said a senior State Department official. "Khmer Rouge military advances have caused concern."

"We want to do everything we can to

prevent a return of the Khmer Rouge to power," Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d told reporters in Paris. Human-rights monitors have docu-

mented that more than a million Cambodians were killed under Khmer Rouge rule in the 1970's during a radical restructuring of society that included the forced mass migration of urban people into the countryside.

Administration officials said that the Khmer Rouge rebels are following rural-based strategy similar to the one used in encircling Phnom Penh in 1975, when the Khmer Rouge came to power.

American officials said that in their current rainy-season offensive, the rebels are taking advantage of the Government's decreased mobility. The rebels are spreading their forces across the countryside — from northwestern Siem Reap province and Banteay Meanchey province to southern Kampong province — while they cut off major highways and communications lines to choke the cities.

In the face of this offensive on northern, southern and central villages within 40 miles of the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, Government forces are retreating and in some cases dropping their weapons, the officials said.

## Using a strategy that brought the rebels to power.

A Defense Department official said the Khmer Rouge strategy was directed at "undermining the people's confidence in the Government and the Government's confidence in itself." The official continued: "The Government forces are hard pressed and extended in contending with the Khmer Rouge offensive. Morale problems and corruption are clearly evident."

The Vietnamese-backed Government of Prime Minister Hun Sen is struggling to manage a series of problems. The Government cannot pay all of its civil servants and soldiers, a situation made all the more severe by rising inflation and a decline in Vietnamese and Soviet economic aid.

Regular Vietnamese Army forces, which once numbered up to 200,000, left the country last year. American officials report that a few thousand Vietnamese military advisers have returned to help beat back the offensive.

In briefings to other Government officials earlier this week, Central Intelligence Agency analysts estimated that the Khmer Rouge faction consists of 30,000 to 40,000 fighters, slightly larger than the size of the two non-Communist rebel groups combined.

They fight a Government army of from 60,000 to 100,000 men. The CIA estimated that the value of Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge approaches \$100 million a year, while the non-Communist groups receive much less from several countries, including Singapore, which sends them \$10 million a year in military hardware and other supplies.

The CIA estimates that the Khmer Rouge is backed in one form or another by 30 percent of the population, with larger proportions of support in areas they control, where they can exercise intimidation.

CIA analysts also said the non-Communist groups and Khmer Rouge share supply lines, raising questions of how the Bush Administration can continue to supply the non-Communist without inadvertently helping the Khmer Rouge. The deeper the American-supported groups operate inside Cambodia, the more dependent they are on the Khmer Rouge.

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## A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA

Continued From Page A1

non-Communist groups led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian leader, and a former Cambodian Prime Minister, Son Sann, both of which have received American aid. The most powerful military force in the coalition, however, was the third partner, the Khmer Rouge. Washington, in its eagerness to oust the Vietnamese-installed regime, was seen as indirectly supporting the Khmer Rouge's aim of returning to power.

Explaining the Administration's move today, long advocated by human rights organizations, Mr. Baker said Washington had realized one of its goals on Cambodia last year with a Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

But he added: "Another policy goal was to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. We've not been able to achieve that goal and, in fact, it would appear that the risks are greater as we move forward than that might occur. So we want to do everything we can to prevent a return of the Khmer Rouge to power. That has been one of our policy goals all along that we've not been able to achieve."

### U.S. to Continue Aid

Mr. Baker said that in keeping with this objective, the United States would now "open a dialogue with Vietnam about Cambodia." He said Washington would also "be prepared to enhance our humanitarian assistance to Cambodia" and to withdraw support for the rebel coalition's claim to Cambodia's United Nations seat, which it has long held. Washington is expected to support leaving the seat open pending elections in Cambodia.

The Secretary indicated that Washington would continue to provide aid to the two non-Communist guerrilla factions led by Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Son Sann, to keep them politically alive until internationally supervised elections can be held in Cambodia. Whether such a policy will be sustained by Congress, however, is uncertain.

Mr. Baker said he and Mr. Shevardnadze would have discussions of such regional problems when they meet in Irkutsk, in Siberia, on Aug. 1.

### U.S. Holds Talks With China

Mr. Baker also said that Washington has held "consultations" with China and Southeast Asian nations regarding the policy switch, but he declined to elaborate. Persuading China to withdraw its backing for the Khmer Rouge would be an essential ingredient in defusing the conflict.

He said the Administration's decision to "change policy does not constitute a decision to normalize relations with Vietnam. It is a decision simply to begin a dialogue with Vietnam about Cambodia."

Mr. Baker said whether the talks would lead to normalization of relations would depend in large part on Vietnam's responsiveness to American inquiries about prisoners of war and soldiers missing in action.

American officials said the talks with Vietnam would be held in New York, where Vietnam has a United Na-



Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, left, leaving a meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union yesterday in Paris. Mr. Baker made his policy announcement on Cambodia

shortly after the end of the session. Mr. Shevardnadze, whose Government supports Vietnam, said that the American and Soviet approaches on Cambodia have "come much closer."

tions mission; a date was not disclosed. The American delegation will be led by the Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, Richard H. Solomon.

Mr. Solomon has been in Paris representing the United States at a meeting with China, France, Britain and the Soviet Union designed to push an Australian plan to put Cambodia under United Nations administration until elections can be organized.

That conference adjourned with diplomats from the five countries citing progress toward agreement among themselves, but also voicing frustration with the lack of progress toward

## Washington now agrees to hold talks with Hanoi on a settlement.

agreement among the Cambodian factions.

The American policy reversal today appeared to be a way to put pressure on the Cambodian factions to reach a settlement under the plan being developed by the five nations, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Their next meeting on Cambodia is scheduled for late August in New York.

### Factors Behind U.S. Switch

The Administration's policy switch on Cambodia appears to have been motivated by two factors: The war on the ground, where the Khmer Rouge appear suddenly to be making major headway, and mounting Congressional

opposition.

The Khmer Rouge's senior diplomatic representative in Paris, Khieu Samphan, was quoted by French newspapers as saying that the rebels have recently taken up positions near Phnom Penh.

In Congress, a series of recent votes has made it clear to the Administration that its policy of supporting a coalition that could return the Khmer Rouge to power is rapidly losing support. The end of the cold war has made the Soviet-backed Hun Sen Government less distasteful to Washington, and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia last year has undercut the impression that Mr. Hun Sen was a puppet of Hanoi.

Mr. Baker acknowledged this change in perception of the Hun Sen Government when he said: "It certainly was a puppet government while Vietnam troops were in the country supporting it. Those Vietnam troops have now gone and that's one of our policy goals that we've been able to achieve."

While today's move came about in part from consultations with Congress, it is not the result of any negotiated bipartisan agreement, Mr. Baker said.

### Fears of a New 'Killing Field'

WASHINGTON, July 18 (Reuters) — The Bush Administration's decision to open talks with Vietnam is not enough to prevent the Khmer Rouge from again turning Cambodia into a "vast killing field," Senator George J. Mitchell, the majority leader, said today.

"I welcome Secretary Baker's announcement of changes in American policy toward Cambodia, although I do not believe they go far enough in clearly and effectively preventing future Khmer Rouge domination of Cambodia," Senator Mitchell said.

The Maine Democrat called for a comprehensive rethinking of American policy.

Representative Stephen J. Solari, Democrat of Brooklyn, chairman of the House Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee, said the policy shift was a recognition of changed circumstances in Southeast Asia.

"I consider it a welcome adjustment in our policy in Cambodia," Mr. Solari told reporters.

### Non-Communist Oppose Policy

BANGKOK, Thailand, July 18 (AP) — Non-Communist Cambodian guerrilla leaders said today that the American decision would force them closer to China and strengthen the Khmer Rouge.

Vietnam's Ambassador to the United Nations, Trinh Xuan Lang, hailed the decision as a "positive" step that could eventually lead to the normalization of relations with the United States.

"In the future, to survive, to go on fighting, we will have to accept more aid from China," said Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of Prince Sihanouk.

### No Reaction Reported in China

Special to The New York Times  
BEIJING, Thursday, July 19 — China's leading newspapers carried no reaction today to Mr. Baker's announcement on Cambodia.

In comments quoted by the New China News Agency, Xu Dunxin, the Assistant Foreign Minister, expressed satisfaction with the progress being made in the talks in Paris among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. His comments appeared to have been made before the Baker announcement.

## ASIA

na's foremost Indochina expert, Mr Xu Dunxin, is due in Hanoi on June 11th for four days of talks. His visit will be the most senior formal contact between the two countries since the Chinese army took an unsuccessful swing at Vietnam in 1979.

America would also like to see peace come to Cambodia. But the Chinese want to ensure that the Hun Sen government, installed by the Vietnamese army, does not stay in power in Cambodia. And the Americans want to ensure that the Hun Sen people agree to a free election. Peace in Cambodia will need a fourth try, maybe even a fifth.

### Indian economy

## Pepsi generation

FROM OUR INDIA CORRESPONDENT

THE manifesto that won last November's Indian election for Mr V.P. Singh's National Front was stuffed full of old-fashioned big-government promises. Cynics laid bets on how long it would take the minority government to come to terms with reality. Mr Singh has now set his colleagues firmly on the road to liberalisation.

Foreign investment is the key. The new government has opened the door to it. The

old practice was to declare certain parts of the economy open to investment, implying that the rest would remain closed. At the beginning of May the prime minister told the governors of the Asian Development Bank, meeting in Delhi, that India would welcome foreign investment in all but a few things, adding that the rules for investors would be more clearly stated, and approvals speeded up. True, India's brilliant bureaucrats are expert at diluting politicians' promises. But Mr Singh knows their little ways. He argues that India is growing up; it is time to dismantle protection and to bring tariffs down.

In his budget speech for 1990-91 the finance minister, Mr Madhu Dandawate, announced in mid-March that India's tariff jungle would be cleared and replaced by a three-rate structure, ranging from 40% to 125%. He also promised to simplify indirect tax rates and move towards a value-added tax. Would-be investors should soon be able to know just how much protection their products will enjoy in the home market, and the duty rebates they will get on exports.

The central planners are taking some knocks. India's eighth five-year plan was due to start in April. The latest draft presented to the cabinet did not even bother to set a target for GNP growth: the planners preferred to set a target of a 3% annual growth in employment, along with lots of schemes

for direct relief of poverty. The cabinet told the planners to have another think, insisting that GNP growth (a respectable 5.3% between 1985 and 1990) be reinstated.

The pragmatists are impressed that, last, the government is allowing an American multinational, Pepsi-Cola, to build a plant for fruit concentrates, fast food and soft drinks in the troubled state of Punjab. Keeping soft drinks makers out of India has been a fetish with Indian socialists ever since a previous government chucked out Coca-Cola in 1977. Mr Singh's government seemed to be delaying the PepsiCo project but has now realised that Punjabi farmers are solidly for it, relishing the know-how will bring to food exporters. Coca-Cola, not to be outdone, is trying to get back too.

### Taiwan

## Crime-cracker

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT IN TAIPEI

NOBODY believed the tidy official explanation when Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui named a military man, General Hau Pei-tsun, to be prime minister. The president suggested a regimental hand was needed to contain the island's growing problems of "social disorder"—crime, as westerners call it. In fact the president was trying to protect his right flank within the ruling party; but the excuse was less phoney than it sounds. Taiwan is suffering from a social-disorder wave.

Crime was the biggest issue in last December's elections. The rate of violent crime is still low by American or poor-country standards, but it has been rising fast. Official figures show violent crimes of all kinds up by more than 20% between 1988 and 1989. Last year the courts issued 68 death warrants. The annual average used to be nine.

Rival explanations are offered. Some say the ending of martial law three years ago let the gangland vermin crawl out from under the stones (hence General Hau's appointment, to send them scurrying back). Others point to the island's ethnic division. The 15% or so of Taiwanese descended from the Nationalists who fled from the mainland in 1947 control Taiwan's politics; but in business native Taiwanese have outshone the "mainlanders". Mainlanders who cannot make it in politics or the bureaucracy, runs this reasoning, turn to guns.

Drugs, which get the blame for most countries' crime waves, are not thought to be behind Taiwan's. Some people blame envy. Taiwan is one of the world's most egalitarian societies, but a land and stock-price boom in 1987-89 created a resented class of super-haves who began flaunting their furs and Mercedes.

The criminals' motives are certainly eco-

## Nervous Vietnam

FROM OUR SOUTH-EAST ASIA CORRESPONDENT

A BIG crackdown on dissent is going on in Vietnam. The Paris-based Vietnam Committee on Human Rights estimates that 6,000 people were arrested in Vietnam during May. That is in addition to 8,600 the committee says had been sent for "re-education" since last December. The security police say they have confiscated more than 500 different sorts of leaflets and other propaganda, many of them produced abroad. The leaflets call for privatisation, the return of confiscated land, opposition to military service and freedom for writers. Security forces say that during February and March they picked up 14 armed men trying to enter Vietnam from Laos.

The authorities have also picked up Mr Mike Morrow, an American who lives in Hongkong, where he publishes a magazine about the petroleum industry. He was recently arrested in the town of Da Nang and held for three weeks. His interrogators accused him of being a CIA agent in touch with Vietnamese plotting to overthrow the government. Four Vietnamese Mr Morrow spoke to are still being held. When he was a reporter in Saigon during the Vietnam war, Ameri-



can officials alleged that he sympathised with the North Vietnamese side.

The Communist government believes spies are everywhere. Radio Vietnam recently carried a report claiming that "CIA agents are trying in every way to cause instability, instigate dissatisfaction and stir up trouble." In their search for enemies, the Communists appear to be turning on old friends. Two prominent Roman Catholics under arrest, Mr Chan Tin and Mr Nguyen Ngoc Lan, have long supported the government, though both have criticised abuses of human rights. Other detainees include a former vice-president of the Communist-led Vietnam Labour Union and a former president of the Saigon Students Union.



# THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL.

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## What's News

**CHINA'S** repayment of commercial debts isn't expected to run into serious problems if Beijing maintains tight control over imports, a report by a Western consulate in Hong Kong said. But the ADB is unlikely to resume project lending to China soon because the bank's biggest donors, the U.S. and Japan, oppose such credits. (Stories on Pages 3 and 24)

Seiko's legal battle with an American chip-making pioneer illustrates the dangers of cross-cultural partnerships. (Story on Page 4)

Mitsubishi Motors became the first Japanese auto company to acquire a U.S. car-rental company. (Story on Page 5)

India's prime minister is going nose-to-nose against the country's leading corporate wheeler-dealer in an effort to clean up the murky ties between politics and business. (Story on Page 12)

Elders' planned restructuring of its U.K. brewing interests is under review by the British corporate watchdog. Meanwhile, Australian regulators are scrutinizing a purchase of Bell Group shares by publishing baron Robert Maxwell. (Stories on Pages 9 and 10)

UMNO plans to consolidate its assets to ease its debt crunch. The process would transform a modest-sized property company into one of the biggest investment-holding concerns in the region. (Story on Page 14)

Hong Kong's insider trading bill is sparking widespread debate over what constitutes an abuse and how severe punishment should be. (Story on Page 30)

Thai cabinet ministers delayed approval of a value-added tax system so they could win broader public support for the measure. (Story on Page 20)

Commentary: India is inching toward a new realism about the need to open up to foreign investment. Story on Page 16.

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## Hanoi's Quiet Embrace Of Capitalism Injects Some Life Into Economy

By BARRY WAIN

**HO CHI MINH CITY**—Chau Hon's troubles started in 1975, when communist forces stormed Saigon and toppled the U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government.

An ethnic-Chinese businessman, Mr. Hon persisted in running his private bakery as Hanoi sought to impose strict socialist policies on the reunited country. Arrested during a nationalization drive in 1978, he was sent to toil in the countryside for two years. Digging canals, the authorities figured, he would learn the value of labor and forget his bourgeois ways.

While Mr. Hon and his family endured what he calls "a dark time," most of his friends—traders, shopkeepers, manufacturers—fled Vietnam along with many others as refugees.

### Irreversible Policy?

Back in the city, Mr. Hon was recruited in 1981 by daring communist cadres who had become convinced that free enterprise was the only way to save the increasingly impoverished nation. They supplied the flour, and he made the bread to feed a hungry population—at a profit. Over the next few years, he narrowly escaped prison again, along with his backers, as the Vietnamese Communist Party went through a fierce internal struggle to decide which economic system would prevail.

Today, the outcome is beyond dispute. Mr. Hon, aged 54, owns six small factories that produce a variety of food products, he's importing a \$500,000 wafer-making machine from Austria and he has bought a \$200,000 home for his wife and 10 children. He also has opened a small department

Continued on Page 22

## Japan's Speculators Are Foundering as Stock Market Sinks

Demise of Overleveraged Players Fuels the Nikkei's Volatility; The Disappearance of Mr. Tai

By MASAYOSHI KANABAYASHI  
And MARCUS W. BRAUCHLI

**TOKYO**—Komei Tai is in a jam. He owes \$600 million. Creditors have seized his business. Gangsters are hunting him. And Tokyo's haywire stock market no longer can bail him out.

It is the stock market's gyrations, in fact, that put him in this jam. Mr. Tai is a professional stock speculator. A big winner in boom times, he may well be the most notorious victim of the Tokyo market's dramatic plunge this year. Strawn in with his wreckage are dozens of securities firms, financiers and a handful of companies in which he held stock. With share prices on the stock exchange languishing, Mr. Tai's prospects for recovery are bad. But few here show him sympathy: Police had to rescue Mr. Tai a month ago after a group of creditors turned hostile and tried to kidnap him.

### On the Lam

"We are in difficulty," admits Ryutaro Zaima, who was managing Mr. Tai's main enterprise—a \$12.50-an-hour "love hotel"—before it was stormed and shut down recently by angry lenders. Peering furtively over a cup of coffee at a cafe, he insists he doesn't know how to contact his boss, who has been on the lam for more than a month. Mr. Tai, through his lawyers, declined to be interviewed.

The downfall of Komei Tai and his company, Akebono Kikaku Co., which has been forced into bankruptcy, is a tale of the times in Japan. In the past decade, when Japan's market leapt to a succession of new highs, speculators like Mr. Tai became important players. Leveraged to the hilt with billions of dollars in borrowed money, speculators terrorized companies with threatened takeovers or noisy complaints. They usually demanded to be bought out at a profit—a practice known as greenmail—or simply dumped their stock back into the market when share prices rose, making a profit for themselves but often causing losses for other investors.

Speculators have been a fixture in Japan's stock market for decades, throwing their influence around in a most un-Japanese way. But as stock and land prices boomed, their influence has grown. Companies as big as automobile giants Nissan Motor Co. and Toyota Motor Corp. and camera-maker Konica Corp. have been their targets. The compa-

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## Japan News Section

Pages 4-8

# Vietnamese Economy Shows Signs of Life As Hanoi Quietly Embraces Capitalism

Continued from Page 1

store and is seeking approval to establish the country's first supermarket.

With many of his old business friends returning from abroad to invest in Vietnam, Mr. Hon believes Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Co Thach's repeated statement that the government's commitment to an open economic policy is irreversible.

Mr. Hon's experience parallels the fortunes of the country since the communist takeover 15 years ago last week. It is, for the most part, a tragic tale—one of missed opportunities and misguided leaders, of inappropriate policies and inept officials, set against a backdrop of seemingly endless conflict and suffering.

## Supreme Irony

Above all, however, it is a story of supreme irony. With their military victory, the communists were able to realize their dream of creating an independent Vietnam united under a socialist banner. But socialism didn't work. It is openly admitted now that the main result was to make the south almost as poor as the north. To rescue the economy, Hanoi had to embrace the U.S.-promoted capitalist system it once fought with religious fervor. Moreover, in search of management skills, the government has had to turn to technocrats of the defeated South Vietnamese regime and to entrepreneurs like Mr. Hon who flourished under it.

Vietnam has a long way to go before it overcomes its legacy of war and socialism, a deadly combination that has left it one of the world's poorest nations. It also must contend with the debilitating effects of an international economic embargo led by the U.S., which still doesn't recognize Hanoi. In a further twist to the saga, Vietnamese officials believe the Americans are missing an opportunity to consolidate peacefully in Vietnam the same capitalist system they tried for two decades to implant largely by force.

According to local and foreign economists, Vietnam's reforms in the past year have made it more market-oriented than any other communist country.

If Vietnam's conversion from communism to capitalism has escaped wide attention, it is partly because the nation remains a one-party state and the government is coy about terminology. Indeed, Hanoi doesn't acknowledge its reforms as capitalism, preferring *doi moi*, the local equivalent of Moscow's *perestroika*, which translates as "renovation." "Socialism" remains the official ideology and supposedly the long-term objective.

## Catastrophic Result

What passes for socialism today bears no resemblance to the traditional Soviet development model that was originally introduced in North Vietnam and imposed on the whole country in 1975. That committed Vietnam to rigid central planning and rapid industrialization, with collectivized agriculture and little room for private economic activity.

The result was catastrophic. As northern and southern Vietnamese alike resisted, the economy skidded and hundreds of thousands of desperate people took to the seas in refugee boats. By 1979-80, the situation had reached a stage described by the leadership as "truly perilous."

To avert the crisis, the government started experimenting with market forces. For instance, it adopted the contract system, which allowed farmers to sell in the free market produce in excess of a state-fixed quota. But the moves were largely tactical and the economy continued to stagnate.

The turning point came at the Communist Party's sixth congress in late 1986, when pragmatic leaders who came to power admitted that the party had been on

the wrong track for a decade or more, and pledged serious reform. The new policies aimed to reorient investment toward agriculture, light industry and exports, rely more on the marketplace and encourage private initiative.

What has happened since then amounts to a "silent revolution," in the words of a local economist.

To attract Western companies—and to participate in the international division of labor, as economic jargon has it—Vietnam has adopted one of the most liberal foreign-investment codes in the communist world. Among other things, the code allows foreigners to hold up to a 99% stake in joint ventures, provides for production-sharing arrangements in oil and gas finds, and permits 100% foreign-owned ventures in certain circumstances.

In the past three years, 140 projects representing a commitment of more than

to upgrade their quality, marketing and efficiency.

A few, such as Hanoi-based Vietnam Airlines, the country's sole domestic and international carrier for 15 years, face a double challenge. They are expected to show a profit even as they lose the protection that goes with holding a monopoly.

Vietnam Airlines, whose poor service in the past has been denounced by the government, perennially operates at a loss. The government simply covers the shortfall. That cozy arrangement ends this year, when the subsidies run out.

At the same time, Air Saigon, a newly formed joint venture, has been licensed as a rival in Ho Chi Minh City, the municipal area created since 1975 that includes Saigon, former capital of South Vietnam. Air Saigon will serve domestic routes and may fly internationally as well. Preparing for the competition, Vietnam Airlines is trim-

*Doi moi alone can't overcome the economy's multitude of ills, which include a pre-industrial structure, a shortage of qualified personnel, a stifling bureaucracy and a shortfall of capital.*

\$1 billion have been approved under the code. Most are small, and most are in the south. Just six contracts, all for offshore oil and natural-gas exploration, account for the bulk of overseas funds. Officials say the response is encouraging in view of the international embargo, but limited in terms of Vietnam's needs.

Internally, the government has decentralized decision making, granted autonomy to state enterprises and lifted most restrictions on private business. By and large, goods and services are traded at negotiated prices. No longer needed, the central-planning apparatus has all but disappeared.

In one of the most far-reaching thrusts, the government has almost eliminated once-pervasive subsidies. For example, public employees are now paid entirely in cash instead of getting coupons that enabled them to buy rice and other items at a fraction of free-market prices. Only housing, electricity and water remain subsidized.

## Strengthening Currency

The authorities also have introduced a single exchange rate that accurately reflects the purchasing power of the dong against the dollar, replacing a dozen or more official rates and undermining the black market in currency. At the same time, the authorities have created almost a free market in gold. In the past year, the previously unwanted, now floating dong has strengthened by 50%, while the local price of gold has tumbled by one-third as it aligned itself with international prices.

Although the government retains a large stake in the economy, state enterprises have been put on a commercial basis. "There is only one rule for them," says Nguyen Xuan Oanh, an American-trained former deputy premier and central-bank governor of South Vietnam who has been recalled to service as an economic adviser. "Be efficient, make a profit, survive."

That isn't easy these days, because factories not only are deprived of subsidies in the form of cheap credit and raw materials, but also forced to compete with private companies and face a flood of better-quality consumer goods being allowed into the country, mainly from neighboring China and Thailand.

To stay afloat, enterprises are issuing bonds, taking on private partners and shedding staff. Some are merging, recruiting skilled managers, or trying other ways

ming several thousand employees from its staff of about 6,500.

Newer state enterprises are trying to avoid mistakes at the outset. When the bureaucrats of one district in Ho Chi Minh City decided to open a garment factory to ease unemployment, they didn't try to run it themselves, as they might have in the past. Instead, they recruited Nguyen Thi Son, whose family had been in the garment business before 1975. Mrs. Son, 40, appointed general director, demanded—and got—approval to be boss in practice as well as title. "I hire and fire, fix salaries and make other decisions" without interference, she says.

After three years, her Legames State Co. is a budding conglomerate, with 3,500 workers in six units producing clothing, shoes, handbags and other leather goods for local and overseas markets at a healthy profit. Mrs. Son frequently visits her customers and contacts in France, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Hong Kong as well as Eastern Europe. One of her management techniques: She distributed no less than 40% of last year's profit to staff in the form of a bonus—no questions asked.

Not all of Vietnam's 5,000 state enterprises, which have reduced their total labor force to about 1.1 million from 1.5 million, are faring so well. Officials say many factories need temporary help to survive, usually in the form of low-interest loans for new equipment. Even so, up to 750 of them are teetering. A few have been dissolved, a complicated process in the absence of a bankruptcy law. Others are dead in the water, no longer functioning but still not formally wound up.

For its part, the liberated private sector has spread at a frenzied pace, especially in the downtown area of Ho Chi Minh City, which is still officially named Saigon. The population, 4.2 million by government count, 5.5 million by local estimate, seems to be in perpetual motion, clogging the streets with cars, motorbikes and bicycles. Every home appears to have a pavement workshop where family members make household items to be sold or bartered. More shops trade gold than before 1975.

Some of the old nightlife also has returned. Thousands of restaurants, bars, coffee shops, nightclubs, discos, billiard rooms and massage parlors advertise their presence with colored signs, flashing lights and blaring pop music.

In Hanoi, with less than half Ho Chi

Minh City's population and an infrastructure little changed since the Vietnamese communists threw out the French colonialists in 1954, the transformation is more orderly but no less striking.

The front room of almost every ground-floor dwelling has been converted into a tiny coffee shop or store. Many of the professional associations that historically were the core of the city's commerce have been revived.

In the countryside, where 80% of the 66 million population lives, farmers have responded to incentives that have halted and rolled back collectivization. Granted long-term leases that can be passed to succeeding generations, farmers now effectively own their land. And, as long as they pay government taxes, they can produce and sell where and what they like.

Agricultural cooperatives, in fact, have been abandoned altogether in some southern provinces. Where they still exist, their role is severely limited. Officials say the overall result is that individual families now get 40%-60% of their harvests compared with 20% previously.

For all that, however, Vietnam remains impoverished, heavily dependent on Soviet aid that will decrease in real terms in coming years, and with per capita national income below \$200.

*Doi moi alone can't overcome the economy's multitude of ills, which include a pre-industrial structure, a shortage of qualified personnel, inadequate institutions and a stifling bureaucracy. Most of all, the country lacks capital.*

Almost every attempt to attract large-scale funds runs into the U.S. embargo. Washington originally imposed the economic blockade against North Vietnam in 1964, then extended it to cover the whole country in 1975. Washington renewed the embargo, with the support of allies, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces last year—a controversy continues over whether some troops have remained in or re-entered Cambodia—hasn't induced the U.S. to ease up. American officials say there needs to be a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia before Washington will normalize relations with Hanoi.

Washington blocks aid to Vietnam through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. It also influences its allies, particularly Japan, to discourage private investment.

Vietnam's immediate problem is that it is in default to the International Monetary Fund and to other nations and Western banks. Until the IMF arrears are cleared and the other debts rescheduled, commercial banks won't extend fresh loans.

## Lower Inflation

Having followed an IMF austerity program for the past few years and achieved relative price stability—inflation fell to about 36% last year from about 470% in 1988—Vietnam was hopeful of an early settlement with the IMF. Officials say a plan was devised in which a French commercial bank agreed to provide a loan to cover the \$131.5 million in IMF arrears while a support group of member nations injected additional funds. The proposal was considered at an IMF executive board meeting in Washington last October.

According to central bank executives and other Vietnamese officials, the U.S. and Japan blocked the plan. In Washington, the IMF declined to comment on the meeting.

While the embargo stays, the officials say, Vietnam is unlikely to be able to dig itself out of poverty. "The U.S. embargo is the major obstacle to further economic recovery and the development of free enterprise in Vietnam," says Mr. Oanh, the government economic adviser, who worked for the IMF in Washington in the 1950s and '60s after obtaining a doctorate from Harvard.

"Lifting the embargo would not only help Vietnam," he says. "It would help the U.S. economy as well, and strengthen the free-market system world-wide."

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try visa from the U.S. State Department, to visit the United States. However, such funds are limited to the amount needed to pay expenses for travel between the United States and points outside of Vietnam, and travel and maintenance within the United States (payment of living expenses and the purchase of goods for personal use in the United States). Money for any other purpose may not be sent to Vietnam without special permission from the U.S. Treasury. Only currency may be sent under this authorization; gold, in any form, does not qualify as currency.

Usually funds are transferred through a bank which may request the person sending the money to fill out a form asking why he is sending the funds and how much money he has previously sent.

### **VIETNAMESE BANK ACCOUNTS AND OTHER ASSETS**

There is a total freeze on Vietnamese assets, both governmental and private, and on financial dealings with Vietnam; all property of Vietnam, of Vietnamese nationals, and of Specially Designated Nationals of Vietnam in the possession of U.S. persons is "blocked." Any property in which Vietnam has an interest which comes into the United States is blocked by operation of law. While Vietnam or the Vietnamese national continues to own the property, blocking imposes a complete prohibition against transfers or transactions of any kind. No payments, transfers, withdrawals, or other dealings may take place with regard to blocked property unless authorized by the Treasury Department. Blocked deposits of

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funds must be interest-bearing.

### **ESTATES AND INSURANCE POLICIES**


An estate becomes blocked whenever a Vietnamese resident is an heir or is the deceased; money from a life insurance policy is blocked whenever the deceased is a Vietnamese resident. It is now possible for the heir of a person who died in Vietnam, or the beneficiary of a life insurance policy of a person who died in Vietnam, to apply for a license from the U.S. Treasury Department to unblock the estate or the insurance proceeds. Persons administering or interested in blocked estates or life insurance proceeds should contact the Licensing Division of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/376-0424 to obtain further information concerning procedures for requesting a Treasury license.

**If you have information regarding possible violations of any of these regulations, please call the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/376-0400. Your call will be handled confidentially.**

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The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control also administers sanctions programs against South Africa, Panama, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Iran, and various Communist bloc countries. For additional information about those programs or about the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, please contact the:

**Office of Foreign Assets Control  
U.S. Department of the Treasury  
Washington, D.C. 20220  
202/376-0392**



**WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW  
ABOUT THE U.S. EMBARGO**

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The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, authorized under the Trading With the Enemy Act, established economic sanctions against North Korea in 1950. On May 5, 1964, they were amended to include North Vietnam under the sanctions and, on April 30, 1975, after the fall of Saigon, they were extended to cover South Vietnam. They were also extended to cover Cambodia on April 17, 1975. The Regulations are still in force today and affect all U.S. citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and organizations physically in the United States, and all branches and subsidiaries of U.S. organizations throughout the world. They are administered by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Penalties for violating the sanctions range up to ten years in prison and \$50,000 in fines.

This pamphlet is an overview of the Regulations for all individuals intending to travel to or otherwise deal with Vietnam.

## BUYING FROM VIETNAM

Goods or services of Vietnamese origin may not be imported into the United States either directly or through third countries. The only exceptions are informational materials, such as books and magazines, and non-commercial quantities of Vietnamese merchandise up to \$100 in value which may be brought into the United States for strictly personal use as accompanied baggage by an authorized traveler. Receipts should be kept to document any goods purchased in Vietnam and made available to U.S. Customs when entry is made into the United States.

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## SELLING TO VIETNAM

Except for informational materials, no U.S. products, technology or services may be exported to Vietnam, either directly or through third countries. This prohibition includes dealing in or assisting the sale of goods or commodities to or from Vietnam. Such "brokering" is considered to be the export of a service.

## SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS

The Regulations prohibit buying from or selling to Vietnamese nationals whether they are physically located in the country or doing business elsewhere on behalf of the Vietnamese government. Individuals or organizations who act on behalf of Vietnam anywhere in the world are considered by the U.S. Treasury Department to be "Specially Designated Nationals" of Vietnam. Their names are published in the Federal Register, an official publication of the U.S. Government. A listing of such Specially Designated Nationals may be obtained by calling the Office of Foreign Assets Control at 202/376-0400. The listing, however, is a partial one and any U.S. individual or organization engaging in transactions with foreign nationals must take reasonable care to make certain that such foreign nationals are not specially designated. Specially Designated Nationals of Vietnam operating in the United States are subject to criminal prosecution and U.S. individuals or organizations who violate the Regulations by transacting business with them are also subject to criminal prosecution.

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## SENDING GIFTS

Gift parcels may only be shipped or carried by an authorized traveler to an individual, or to a religious, charitable, or educational organization in Vietnam for the use of the recipient or of the recipient's immediate family, subject to the following limitations: the combined total domestic retail value of all the items in the parcel must not exceed \$400; not more than one parcel may be sent or given by the same person in the U.S. to the same recipient in Vietnam in any month; and only items normally sent as gifts, such as food, clothing, toilet articles, or medicine may be included in the gift parcel. No gold in any form qualifies as a gift. Organizations that consolidate and send multiple gift parcels in single shipments must obtain a validated license from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Each gift parcel must meet commodity, dollar-value, and frequency limitations. If a parcel being shipped or carried to Vietnam fails to meet these standards, it is subject to seizure by the U.S. Government.

## TRAVELING TO VIETNAM

Individuals are authorized to travel on their own to Vietnam without the need to obtain special permission from the U.S. Treasury Department. However, they may only spend money in Vietnam to purchase items related to travel, such as hotel accommodations, meals, and goods personally used by the traveler in Vietnam. In addition, informational materials and \$100 worth of merchandise in non-commercial quantities, for strictly personal use, may be brought into the United States as accompanied baggage. Because

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the sanctions program prohibits business dealings with Vietnam, purchases of goods or services unrelated to travel are prohibited.

### ● TRAVEL SERVICE PROVIDERS:

U.S. travel service providers are prohibited from arranging, promoting, or facilitating tours to Vietnam. The only transaction that a U.S. travel service provider is permitted to perform is the booking of passage for an individual traveler to Vietnam aboard a "non-blocked carrier." A non-blocked carrier is any carrier other than a Libyan, Cuban, Cambodian, North Korean, or Vietnamese carrier. No transportation services directly to Vietnam are available from or authorized for U.S. carriers. Travelers are cautioned against signing up for a U.S. sponsored or affiliated tour group destined for Vietnam.

### ● CREDIT CARDS PROHIBITED:

Credit and other charge cards may not be used in Vietnam--not even for living expenses or for the purchase of goods used by the traveler.

## SENDING MONEY TO VIETNAM

U.S. persons may send up to \$300 every three months to the household of a close relative in Vietnam and up to \$750, on a one time basis, to enable a close relative to emigrate from Vietnam. A close relative means a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, nephew, niece, or spouse, widow, or widower of any of those people. U.S. persons may also provide funds for a Vietnamese national, who has already obtained an en-

# Travel Advisory

United States Department of State  
Bureau of Consular Affairs  
Washington, D. C. 20520



(THIS REPLACES  
ADVISORY OF 5/16/88)

MAY 30, 1990

## VIETNAM - CAUTION

SUMMARY: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADVISES THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. NO THIRD COUNTRY REPRESENTS THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM. CONSEQUENTLY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO ACCORD NORMAL CONSULAR PROTECTIVE SERVICES TO U.S. CITIZENS IN VIETNAM AND DISCOURAGES TRAVEL TO VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

U.S. PASSPORTS ARE VALID FOR TRAVEL TO VIETNAM. HOWEVER, IT IS THE TRAVELER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO APPLY FOR THE REQUIRED VISA. VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS HAVE IN THE PAST DETAINED AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO HAD ENTERED VIETNAM ILLEGALLY WITHOUT VISAS. THOSE DETAINED WERE HELD INCOMMUNICADO FOR MONTHS AT A TIME WITHOUT ANY CONTACT WITH U.S. AUTHORITIES AND RELEASED ONLY AFTER PAYMENT OF A LARGE FINE.

U.S. CITIZENS WHO TRAVEL TO VIETNAM DESPITE THIS TRAVEL ADVISORY SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THEY MAY BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY VIETNAMESE SECURITY AGENCIES WHO MAY BE SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE AMERICANS. VISITORS SHOULD KEEP THEIR DOCUMENTATION FULLY IN ORDER AT ALL TIMES AND COMPLY WITH ALL RELEVANT VIETNAMESE LAWS AND REGULATIONS. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE GUIDELINES OR ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES DEEMED SUSPICIOUS BY VIETNAMESE SECURITY AUTHORITIES COULD LEAD TO THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF BOTH THE AMERICAN TRAVELER AND HIS/HER VIETNAMESE CONTACTS, RELATIVES, OR FRIENDS. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WOULD EITHER INFORM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR ALLOW U.S. REPRESENTATIVES ACCESS TO AMERICAN CITIZENS UNDER DETENTION.

DUAL CITIZENS: U.S. CITIZENS WHO WERE BORN IN VIETNAM OR WHO WERE AT ONE TIME CITIZENS OF VIETNAM, AND THE CHILDREN OF SUCH PERSONS, MAY BE DUAL NATIONALS AND MAY, THEREFORE, BE SUBJECT TO ALL VIETNAMESE LAWS THAT IMPOSE SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS UPON VIETNAMESE NATIONALS, SUCH AS MILITARY SERVICE, TAXES, ETC.

U.S. CITIZENS CONTEMPLATING TRAVEL TO VIETNAM SHOULD ONLY CARRY A U.S. PASSPORT WITH THE PROPER VISA AFFIXED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD U.S. CITIZENS ACCEPT TRAVEL DOCUMENTS THAT IDENTIFY THEM AS CITIZENS OF VIETNAM.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON DUAL NATIONALITY MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE OFFICE OF CITIZENS CONSULAR SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520.

U.S. TREASURY REGULATIONS--TRAVEL OF INDIVIDUAL U.S. CITIZENS: FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PERMIT U.S. CITIZENS TRAVELING TO VIETNAM TO ENGAGE ONLY IN CERTAIN TYPES OF FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES. NO WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION IS REQUIRED TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING TRANSACTIONS:

--PAYMENT OF ORDINARY TRAVEL EXPENSE, INCLUDING LIVING EXPENSES AND PURCHASE OF GOODS FOR PERSONAL CONSUMPTION WHILE IN VIETNAM.

--PURCHASE AND IMPORTATION INTO THE U.S. OF MERCHANDISE WITH A FOREIGN MARKET VALUE NOT TO EXCEED 100 DOLLARS PER PERSON. THIS MERCHANDISE MUST BE FOR PERSONAL USE, CAN BE BROUGHT INTO THE U.S. ONLY AS ACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE AND MAY NOT BE RESOLD. AN INDIVIDUAL MAY IMPORT THIS AMOUNT OF MERCHANDISE ONLY ONCE IN A SIX-MONTH PERIOD. SINGLE COPIES OF PUBLICATIONS DO NOT COUNT AGAINST THE 100 DOLLARS LIMIT.

U.S. CITIZENS MAY NOT USE CHARGE CARDS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEBIT CARDS, CREDIT CARDS OR OTHER CREDIT FACILITIES FOR EXPENSES WHILE IN VIETNAM.

TRAVEL OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND RESEARCHERS: PERSONS TRAVELING TO VIETNAM FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING NEWS, MAKING NEWS FILMS, ENGAGING IN PROFESSIONAL RESEARCH, OR FOR SIMILAR ACTIVITIES ARE AUTHORIZED TO ACQUIRE AND IMPORT INTO THE U.S. PUBLICATIONS, INCLUDING FILMS, PHONOGRAPH RECORDS, TAPES, PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC., DIRECTLY RELATED TO THEIR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES WITHOUT MONETARY LIMITS. THE ITEMS MUST BE FOR PROFESSIONAL USE AND NOT FOR RESALE.

FURTHER INFORMATION: UNDER DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY REGULATIONS, NO PERSON SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION MAY ARRANGE, PROMOTE, OR FACILITATE GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL TOURS OR TRAVEL TO VIETNAM. TRAVEL SERVICE PROVIDERS SHOULD CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. THIS ADVISORY PROVIDES ONLY GENERAL GUIDANCE REGARDING DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY REGULATIONS. INDIVIDUALS CONTEMPLATING TRAVEL TO VIETNAM ARE ENCOURAGED TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AT THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

LICENSING SECTION  
OFFICER OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220  
TELEPHONE: (202) 376-0236

EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFINITE.  
NO. 90-60

## HEALTH INFORMATION

08-14-1990

VIET NAM

### CHOLERA:

#### CONSIDER IMMUNIZATION.

- This disease is active (at the time of this printing) in this country.  
Even if immunization is not required for entry to this country, it may be required for other countries you will visit later.  
Check with CDC to determine if the disease is still active.
- Cholera vaccine is of limited usefulness and only about 50% effective.
- Avoiding contaminated food and water is the best way to prevent cholera.
- Cholera certificate is valid for 6 months after injection.
- Immunization NOT REQUIRED for entry.

### YELLOW FEVER:

- Vaccination certificate REQUIRED of travelers older than 1 year ARRIVING FROM AREAS INFECTED with this disease.
- Check your itinerary to be sure you will not be in a country with this disease BEFORE ARRIVING IN THIS COUNTRY.

### MALARIA AND OTHER COMMENTS:

- Malaria is present in this country. Prevention of mosquito bites will reduce the risk of developing malaria (see summary).  
These medications may be appropriate to help prevent infection:
- Use MEFLOQUINE prophylaxis for malaria prevention (CDC 3/90).
- Falciparum malaria represents 54% of malaria.  
There is a risk of vivax malaria exposure. PRIMAQUINE treatment may be appropriate for those with prolonged or heavy mosquito exposure.
- There is no risk of malaria in the Delta region in the North.
- PLAGUE is active in this country. Immunization is advised.
- Health workers in this country should consider HEPATITIS B vaccine.  
6 months may be required to establish full immunity.
- Refer to US Department of State Travel Advisory dated 30 MAY 1990 for important information on travel to this country.

# INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS

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## UNDERSTANDING VIETNAM'S HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Ministry of Education and Training, Hanoi

Ho Chi Minh City University

January 4-16, 1991

Application Deadline: October 15, 1990

Vietnam has played a pivotal role in 20th-century geopolitics, yet this role is most commonly discussed with exclusive reference to the other nations with which its history has intersected. At a time when Vietnam is increasingly open to the outside world, this seminar provides a rare opportunity to understand Vietnam on its own terms, from the multiple perspectives of its own people, culture and history.

The legacy of Vietnam's recent past—a century of colonial rule, three decades of war and a turbulent experiment with socialism—remains powerful, but an understanding of contemporary Vietnam also requires an examination of its rich ethnological, historical and cultural roots. Ongoing economic reforms and changes in the political climate are shaping Vietnam's destiny as a significant force within Southeast Asia once again.

This seminar will be hosted by Vietnam's Ministry of Education and Training (Department of International Cooperation) together with Ho Chi Minh City University. Daily seminar presentations will be made by faculty from Ho Chi Minh City University, Hanoi University and other academic institutions; these faculty will also be available to seminar participants during the Professional Interchange sessions.

Accompanying the group as seminar leader will be Dr. Keith W. Taylor, Professor of History in the Department of Asian Studies at Cornell University. A specialist in Vietnamese history and literature, Dr. Taylor is the author of The Birth of Vietnam.

### **COST: \$1400.**

Includes all accommodations, breakfast and lunch daily, tuition and seminar materials, admissions, field trips, receptions, roundtrip airfare between Bangkok and Vietnam, one-way airfare between Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, leadership costs and Council administration fee.

Accommodations: Double occupancy at modest local hotels or government guest houses. Single rooms may be available at extra cost.

Travel Arrangements: For information on low-cost international group flights for participants in this seminar, please contact the Council at the telephone number provided below.

Selection: All applicants will be notified of their status by November 1, 1990.

For Further Information: Please contact Professional Programs at the Council on International Educational Exchange, 205 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017, tel. (212) 661-1414, ext. 1110, or fax (212) 972-3231.

Note: Implementation of this seminar is subject to final approval of a license application pending with the U.S. Treasury Department.

### TENTATIVE PROGRAM SCHEDULE

<b>Friday, January 4</b>	Arrive Bangkok
<b>Saturday, January 5</b>	Bangkok Orientation and City Tour



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## TENTATIVE PROGRAM SCHEDULE (CONTINUED)

**Sunday, January 6**                      Arrive Ho Chi Minh City  
Orientation and City Tour

### SEMINAR AT HO CHI MINH CITY UNIVERSITY (Jan. 7-12)

**Monday, January 7**

Morning: "Overview of Vietnam: Geography, Archaeology and Pre-Colonial History"  
Afternoon: Visit to Hall of Reunification (former Palace of President Ngo Dinh Diem)  
Evening: Welcome Reception/Professional Interchange

**Tuesday, January 8**

Morning: "Ethnology of Vietnam: Ethno-linguistic Origins, Religion and Social Structure"  
Afternoon: Visit to Anthropological Museum  
Evening: Free

**Wednesday, January 9**

Morning: "Traditional Vietnamese Culture: Literature, Folklore, Music and the Performing Arts"  
Afternoon: Professional Interchange  
Evening: Free

**Thursday, January 10**

Morning: "Education in Vietnam"  
Afternoon: Visit to Children's Palace  
Evening: Free

**Friday, January 11**

Morning: "Vietnam's Colonial Era and Struggle for Independence: History and Aftermath"  
Afternoon: Visit to Cuchi (Viet Cong) Tunnels  
Evening: Free

**Saturday, January 12**

Morning: "Vietnam and the World: International Relations and Foreign Policy"  
Afternoon: Professional Interchange  
Evening: Free

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## TENTATIVE PROGRAM SCHEDULE (CONTINUED)

SEMINAR HOSTED BY MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING, HANOI (Jan. 13-15)

### Sunday, January 13

Morning: Arrive Hanoi

Afternoon: Visit to Co Loa (Ancient Citadel)

Evening: Free

### Monday, January 14

Morning: "Institutions in Vietnam: Politics and Polity"

Afternoon: Visit to Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, Museum and Parliament

Evening: Reception/Professional Interchange

### Tuesday, January 15

Morning: "Current Political and Economic Situation in Vietnam: National and Regional Perspectives"

Closing Ceremony (Ministry of Education and Training)

Afternoon: Visit to National Economic Development Institute

Evening: Free

**Wednesday, January 16**      Depart Hanoi for Bangkok  
Seminar Ends

# INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS

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## UNDERSTANDING VIETNAM'S HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Ministry of Education and Training, Hanoi

Ho Chi Minh City University

January 4-16, 1991

### UPDATED SCHEDULE

#### Friday, January 4

9:55 p.m. Arrive Bangkok, Thai International Airlines flight no. 761  
Bus transfer to SASA International House  
or individual arrangements (non-U.S. participants only)

#### Saturday, January 5

8:00 a.m. Breakfast orientation meeting  
SASA Internatioal House conference room

11:00 a.m. Depart SASA House for city tour

11:40 a.m. Lunch

1:00 p.m. Tour of Grand Palace/Emerald Buddha

2:00 p.m. Klong (Canal) tour on long-tail boats

5:00 p.m. Return to SASA House

Evening: Free

#### Sunday, January 6

Morning: Depart SASA House by bus for Thai International Airlines flight no. 680,  
departing 10:40 a.m.

12:15 p.m. Arrive Ho Chi Minh City

Afternoon: Orientation and City tour

Evening: Free

**Seminar at Ho Chi Minh City University**

**Director: Rector Nguyen Ngoc Giao**

#### Monday, January 7

Morning: "Overview of Vietnam: Geography, Archaeology and Pre-Colonial History"

Prof. Tran Van Giau

Afternoon: Visit to Hall of Reunification (former Palace of President Ngo Dinh Diem)

Evening: Welcome Reception/Professional Interchange

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## UPDATED SCHEDULE (page 2)

### Tuesday, January 8

- Morning: "Ethnology of Vietnam: Ethno-linguistic Origins, Religion and Social Structure"  
Prof. Mac Duong
- Afternoon: Visit to Historical Museum of Vietnam
- Evening: Free

### Wednesday, January 9

- Morning: "Traditional Vietnamese Culture: Literature, Folklore, Music and the Performing Arts"  
Prof. Nguyen Loc
- Afternoon: Professional Interchange

### Thursday, January 10

- Morning: Visit to Children's Palace
- Afternoon: "Education in Vietnam"  
Prof. Tran Thanh Dam
- Evening: Free

### Friday, January 11

- Morning: "Vietnam's Colonial Era and Struggle for Independence: History and Aftermath"  
Prof. Nguyen Phan Quang
- Afternoon: Visit to Cuchi (Viet Cong) Tunnels
- Evening: Free

### Saturday, January 12

- Morning: "Vietnam and the World: International Relations and Foreign Policy"  
Prof. Tran Bach Dang
- Afternoon: Professional Interchange
- Evening: Free

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## UPDATED SCHEDULE (page 3)

**Seminar at Hanoi University**  
Hosted by **Ministry of Education and Training**  
Directors: Rector **Nguyen An**, Vice Rector **Phan Truong Thi**, Hanoi University

### Sunday, January 13

Morning: Arrive Hanoi  
Visit to Co Loa (Ancient Citadel) en route to city

Afternoon  
& Evening: Free

### Monday, January 14

Morning: Visit to Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, Museum and National Assembly

Afternoon: "Institutions in Vietnam: Politics and Polity"

Evening: Reception/Professional Interchange

### Tuesday, January 15

Morning: "Current Political and Economic Situation in Vietnam: National and Regional Perspectives"  
Closing Ceremony (Ministry of Higher Education Official)

Afternoon: Visit to National Economic Development Exhibition

Evening: Free

### Wednesday, January 16

Morning: Free

Afternoon: Depart Hanoi for Thai International Airlines flight no. 683, departing 1:50 p.m. for Bangkok

3:30 p.m. Arrive Bangkok  
Transfer to Regina Palace Hotel  
or individual arrangements

**Seminar ends**

### Thursday, January 17

10:30 a.m. Depart for U.S. on Thai International Airline flight no. 762 for Seattle  
or individual arrangements

Delta  
1719

6:05 -  
8:40

Market 234



1:05 - 3:40

### FAX MESSAGE

In case of incomplete transmission, please respond to our telefax number or call telephone # 212-661-1414.

SB/Seattle

TO: Prof. Walter Capps

FAX # (805) 893-2059

FROM: Asian Operations / Ana CC:

FAX # (1) 212-972-3231

DATE: Dec. 1, 1990

NUMBER OF PAGES (THIS) PAGE INCLUDED: 1

4450

MESSAGE:

Plo. find below your itinerary for panel to Bangkok from Santa Barbara. Please call us by 4:00pm EST Dec 3 if you need to have anything changed.

Thank you.

\*A

					departure	Arrival
1.	10APPS/WMR					
1	AA5260B	03JAN	Q	SEASJC	HK1	655A 807A
2	AA1174B	03JAN	Q	SJCSEA	HK1	854A 1118A
3	TG 761G	03JAN	Q	SEADRK	OK1	
4	TG 680B	06JAN	S	BKKSGN	OK1	
5	ARNK					
6	TG 683D	16JAN	W	HANBKK	OK1	
7	TG 762G	17JAN	Q	BKKSEA	OK1	
8	AA1463B	17JAN	Q	SEASJC	HK1	1208P 219P
9	AA5246B	17JAN	Q	SJCSEA	HK1	317P 428P
10	ARNK					
11	AA 363B	17JAN	Q	SEASJC	HK1	316P 724P
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COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL

ITINERARY SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR : INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT  
SEMINAL VIETNAM

SAWASDEE.....WELCOME TO THAILAND

FRI 04 JAN 91  
21:55 HOURS.

SEATTLE/BANGKOK  
ARRIVE BANGKOK AIRPORT VIA TG 761  
MEET & TRANSFER TO SASA INTERNATIONAL HOUSE

SAT 05 JAN 91  
11:00 HOURS.  
11:40 HOURS.  
13:00 HOURS.  
14:00 HOURS.

BANGKOK  
TRANSFER FROM SASA INTERNATIONAL HOUSE  
LUNCH AT LOCAL RESTAURANT  
GRAND PALACE AND EMERALD BUDDHA TEMPLE TOUR  
KLONG TOUR ON LONG-TAIL BOATS  
ACCOMMODATION AT SASA INTERNATIONAL HOUSE

SUN 06 JAN 91  
07:30 HOURS.

BANGKOK/VIETNAM  
TRANSFER FROM HOTEL TO AIRPORT FOR DEPARTURE  
ON FLIGHT TG 680 LEAVING AT 10:40 HOURS.

MON 07-TUE 15 JAN 91

VIETNAM


WED 16 JAN 91  
15:30 HOURS.

VIETNAM/BANGKOK  
ARRIVE BANGKOK AIRPORT VIA TG 683  
MEET & TRANSFER TO REGINA PALACE HOTEL

THU 17 JAN 91  
07:30 HOURS.

BANGKOK/SEATTLE  
TRANSFER FROM HOTEL TO AIRPORT FOR DEPARTURE  
ON FLIGHT TG 762 LEAVING AT 10:30 HOURS.

\*\*\*\*\*  
WISHING YOU HAVE A PLEASANT HOLIDAY  
\*\*\*\*\*







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
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251-1111 AND 251-3121 INDRA HTL EXT.274 EAST WEST GROUP  
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9:30 - Jun 3, 1991 -

Thomas Merton talked about "waiting & forking around" when the plane lifted off the runway at SFO on his trip to Asia. He, of course, was on a pilgrimage to view the wonders of Asian religion. The vets went off to 'Nam with lots of uncertainty and apprehension. I feel more like the Vet than like Merton. My agenda, ~~which was~~ ~~little~~ whatever it was originally, has been completely swamped by the very vivid memories of our now just-concluding family celebration of the holidays. Such wonderful children were her girls - had a thoroughly terrific pastime. And what so energetic and mutually-suggestive together. I'm sorry, Brother Louis, but I'm not running for anything. He had I'll be counting the days to get back into all of it again.

	Thurs.	-
	Fri	-
	Sat	-
	Sun	-
	Mon	-
	Tue	-
	Wed	-

T/F Sat    Sun/Mon/Tue & Wed.  
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 Wed - Thurs / Fri - Sun  
 Thurs - Sat / Sun

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# SEMINAR AT HO CHI MINH CITY UNIVERSITY

( January , 07 - 12 / 01 / 1991 )

DATE	TIME	ACTIVITIES	PLACE
Monday, Jan - 07	8h00	REPORT : "A people's historical destinies"  by prof. TRAN VAN GIAU	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training 03-Cong Truong Quoc Te  KY HOA Hotel
	14h00	Visit to Palace of Reunification	
	19h00	Welcome Reception/Professional Interchange	
Tuesday, Jan - 08	8h00	REPORT : "Ethnology of Vietnam : Ethno-Linguistic Origins, Religion and Social structure "  by prof. MAC DUONG	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training
	14h00	Visit to Anthropological Museum	
Wednesday, Jan - 09	8h00	REPORT : " Traditional Vietnamese Culture : Literature, Folklore, Music and the performing Arts "  by prof. NGUYEN LOC prof. CHU XUAN DIEN	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training
	14h00	professional interchange	
Thursday, Jan - 10	8h00	Visit to Children's Palace	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training
	14h00	REPORT : "Education in Vietnam today orientations & problems".  by prof. TRAN THANH DAM	
Friday, Jan - 11	8h00	REPORT : " Vietnam in the modern times : Independence and Revival"  by prof. NGUYEN PHAN QUANG	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training
	13h30	Visit to Cuchi Tunnels	
Saturday, Jan - 12	8h00	REPORT : " Vietnam always wishes to be friend to all people ".  by Mr. TRAN BACH DANG	The Hall of the Ministry Bureau of Education and Training
	14h00	professional interchange	

University of hanoi - CIEE

Các báo cáo đề dân

# HỘI THẢO KHOA HỌC

Tìm hiểu viễn cảnh lịch sử Việt nam  
(Understanding Vietnam's Historical Perspectives)

Ngày 13 - 16 / 1 / 1991

Thành phố Hà nội

# INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM

Prof. Nguyen Nien

The system of administrative organs in Vietnam is organized in conformity with the 1980 constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the 1981 Laws on the organization of the Council of Ministers, the 1981 Laws on the organization of the People's Councils and Committees which were modified in 1989.

But the machinery is cumbersome and less effective. It is, therefore, necessary to carry out a great renovation in the organization of state organs. The imperative task is to rearrange ministries, state committees, general departments and streamline the ministries' administrative machinery. It is also urgent to reduce intermediate organs such as departments, sections and to quickly move to the way of direct working, to cut down deputy positions at all levels and organs and the machinery of People's local committees should be smaller and streamlined.

## I. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

The Council of Ministers is the government of SRV, the highest executive and administrative organ with the supreme power (Article 104, Constitution). The Council of Ministers is elected by National Assembly. National Assembly elects the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chairman in turn nominates presidents of state committee to be approved by National Assembly. The standing committee of the Council of Ministers consists of chairman, vice-chairman and general secretary. The chairman leads the Council of Ministers' work. Ministers and presidents of state Committees who are members of the Council bear collective responsibility of the Council and bear personal responsibility for the fields they are in charge of. The Council of Ministers is responsible before and reports its work to the National Assembly. When the National Assembly does not need. It is responsible before and reports its work to the state council. The Council of Ministers and Ministers are under supervision of the National Assembly and State Council. The Council of Ministers organized and

implements all state managements in every social life such as politics, economics culture, society, security, defence and foreign affairs. The Council of Ministers leads the work of ministries, state committees and People's local committees. The Council of Ministers' Authority :

- Submit law drafts to the National Assembly and state laws to the state council.
- Promulgate legal documents (below laws) such as resolutions, decrees, decisions, circulars and directives (about 500 legal documents a year).
- Lead all fields in national construction and national defence.
- Establish a system of ministries, state committees and local authorities; train personnel for all state organs.

The state machinery used to consist of more than to ministries, state committees, general departments and sections under direct management of the Council of Ministers. But according to the restructuring renovation, it now consists of only 48 organs and this number will be smaller in the future. In 1991, state personnel will be destaffed by 25%

## II. MINISTRIES' AND STATE COMMITTEES' ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

Ministry is the Council of Ministers' central state organ which is responsible for the unified management of a branch or a field in the whole country. There are ministries which manage only one scientific technical branch (such as Ministry of Heavy Industry, Ministry of Light Industry, Ministry of Aquatic Products...) but there are ministries which lead a general branch (for example, State Committee for Sciences, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Labour... ). Minister is the Council of Ministers' member who leads the ministry according to a one-head regime. Minister promulgates such documents as decisions, circular and directives. In work, minister has to solve three relations :

- The relation between minister and Council of Ministers and its chairman.
- The relation between ministries and
- The relation between ministry and People's committees at various levels.

Minister's state management is manifest in the following ways :

- Working out plans for the development of the branch.
- Compiling law drafts, state laws to submit to the National Assembly and People's council and committee.
- Promulgating decisions, circulars and directives in the management of the branch and
- Building up, organizing and training a contingent of personnel for the branch.

Structurally the ministry consists of general departments, sections, institutes, centres and institutions.

### III. LOCAL AUTHORITIES' ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS.

People's committee is the highest executive organ of the People's council, is the state administrative report its work to the People's council of the same level, is under the leadership of the People's committee at a higher level and under the unified leadership by the Council of Ministers. People's committee is elected and revoked the mandate of by People's council of the same level and only after being approved by the People's committee at a higher level (if it is People's provincial committee, it is approved by the Council of Ministers) does it officially begin to operate. People's committee has a chairman, vice-chairmen and executive members. People's committee promulgates decisions and directives.

Local authorities in Vietnam are divided into three levels (i) People's provincial committee under the central management, special zones (ii) People's committees at the level of districts, provincial towns and cities belonging to the province; and (iii) People's committee at the level of village and district towns.

People's committee operates according to the collective regime; each member of the People's committee bears collective responsibility before the People's council of the same level and a personal responsibility for the field branch he is in charge of. Chairman of the People's committee is the leader of the People's Committee's work, is responsible before the People's council at the same level and before the People's committee at a direct higher level.

There are provincial city boards, specialists' sections (each province has about 30-35 provincial city boards to help People's provincial committee in the state management in each locality). There are departments and sections (each district has from 15 to 20 departments and sections) to help People's district committee. Each village has about 5 special sections to help People's village committee.

In the cause of renovation, Vietnam is now undergoing a process of streamlining the administrative machinery and destaffing state personnel by 25%. It is necessary to intensively transform the leadership into a unified system from centre to locality (from the Council of Ministers to People's Village Committee) so as to do the management work more quickly and effectively. The relation between People's Committee and People's Council at the same level is being studied and modified.

In 1991, Vietnam will modify the 1980 constitution, 1981 laws on organization of the Council of Ministers and laws on organization of People's Councils and committees.



PRESENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATIOND IN VIETNAM.  
DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL PROSPECTS

---

I. Present socio-economic situation in Vietnam

1. The basic economic views set forth by 6<sup>th</sup> Congress of Vietnam Communist Party ( Dec., 1986 )

1.1. Establishing a new economic mechanism, shifting capital investments. In the past, capitals were concentrated in heavy industry, but at present, due attention is paid to agriculture and light industry. Satisfactory capitals are invested in agriculture and light industry to basically solve the problems of food, foodstuff and consumer goods for people .

1.2. Bringing into full play various economic sectors. Allowing private sections to operate and consider them equal with other economic sectors before laws,

1.3. Abolishing centralized, bureaucratic and state-subsided mechanism, building up a socialist self-accounting mechanism.

1.4. Speeding up scientific-technological advances, considering them as an important motive to develop production.

1.5. Expanding economic links with foreign countries on the principle of mutual interest and observation of Vietnam sovereignty.

2. Results achieved over the past four years : The implementation of new economic views has brought about initial considerable results :

2.1. Production forces develop : from an importer which had to import from 500.000 to 1.000.000 tons of food, in 1989 and 1990 Vietnam exported about 1.4 millions tons of food each year.

From a country without mineral oil, in 1990 Vietnam exploited 2.5 million tons of crude oil .

It could also produce necessary consumer goods for people.

2.2. Considerable results have been achieved in establishing a new economic management mechanism, socialist self-

accounting mechanism, abolishing dateaccounting mechanism, abolishing state-subsidized mechanism. The system of market price has been implemented throughout the country, the domestic price is for the first time closely linked with international price, self-control for production and business units is also expanded.

2.3. Expanding economic links with foreign countries. After three years' promulgation of laws on foreign investment, there are about 200 foreign-invested projects in Vietnam which have received permits. In Hanoi alone these about 21 projects which have received permits and are being carried out .

### 3. Difficulties Vietnam still faces :

3.1. Vietnam is still facing an economic blockade .

3.2. The Soviet Union and East European countries are facing difficulties in economy thus restricting considerably their cooperation with and assistance for Vietnam.

3.3. Vietnam lacks capitals for technical equipment for national economic branches.

3.4. Vietnam lacks markets to sell its products. Vietnamese goods with poor quality cannot compete in international markets.

## II. Domestic and regional prospects :

Although there are a lot of difficulties in economy, there is political stability in Vietnam, which is a favourable condition for renovation in order to get the country out of difficult situations.

### 1. Fundamental views to speed up renovation :

1.1. Develop economy and society according to the socialist way in order to make people rich, the country prosperous, advanced and modern .

1.2. Develop and plan a commodity economy with various sectors .

1.3. Establish an open economic system, make a maximum exploitation of all natural and human resources at the same time expand relations and cooperations with foreign countries.

1.4. Carry out industrialization and modernize the country in conformity with concrete conditions on the bases of the development of science, technology, training and education.

1.5. Consider socio-economic affectiveness as the most important criterion for development .

2. Prospects for domestic economic development .

2.1. Develop various economic sectors with a national economy playing a leading role, create conditions for private and family economies to develop .

2.2. Mobilize all capitals from people to develop production by setting up share-holding companies.

2.3. Improve economic management mechanism, abolish bureaucratic and state-subsidised mechanism . Carry out synchronically economic measures to achieve business self-accounting mechanism effectively.

2.4. Perfect all state's policies so as to attract more foreign companies to invest in Vietnam.

2.5. Encourage production of expert goods from domestic materials.

3.1. Prospects for regional cooperation .

3.1. Expand economic cooperations with Laos and Campuchea .

3.2. Expand economic cooperation with ASEAN countries.

3.3. Expand economic cooperations with China , Japan, Korea and Australia.

3.4. Establish new forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union and East European countries.

3.5. Expand economic cooperation with other regions such as West Europe, North America etc...

Prof. Le Van Vien, Ph.D in Economy-  
Dean, Faculty of Economics-University of  
Hanoi

Participants in Seminar from Hanoi University

Department of History :

Prof. Le Mau Han  
Prof. Dinh Kuan Lam  
Prof. Phan Huy Le  
Dr. Phung Hau Phu  
Dr. Pham Kenh  
Dr. Nguyen Van Thu  
Dr. Do Quang Hung  
Dr. Vu Minh Giang

Prof. Vu Duong Ninh  
Mr. Pham Hong Tung  
Prof. Nguyen Van Hong  
Prof. Phan Hau Dat  
Mr. Pham Quang Minh

Department of Literature :

Prof. Phan Cu De  
Prof. Ha Minh Duc  
Prof. Hoang Thi Chau  
Prof. Bui Phung  
Prof. Nguyen Lien  
Prof. Nguyen Kim Dinh  
Prof. Nguyen Tai Can

Department of Physic :

Dr. Prof. Nguyen An

Department of Geology- Geography :

Dr. Tran Yem  
Dr. Phan Truong Thi  
Mr. Phan Duy Nga

Department of Economic :

Dr. Nguyen Bich  
Dr. Le Van Viet  
Prof. Dr. Lê Văn Viên

Department of Foreign Languages :

Dr. Le The Que  
Mr. Vu Ngoc Tu  
Mrs. Bui Phuong Lan

Department of Phylogophy :

Dr. Nguyen An Lich  
Dr. Bui Thanh Quat

Department of Law :

Prof. Dr. Nguyen Nien

Department of Chemistry :

Dr. Tran Chuong Huyen

SEMINAR SCHEDULE  
AT UNIVERSITY OF HANOI (JANUARY 13-16)

Sunday, January 13.

Afternoon : Arrive Hanoi

Evening f Free

Monday, January 14.

Morning : 8.30 Depart for visit to Coloa

Afternoon : 13.00 Depart hotel

13.30 Opening Seminar by Prof. Dr. NGUYEN AN  
Rector of University of Hanoi and Prof. Dr.  
KEITH Taylor, Cornell University

14.00 Seminar on Topic : " Institutions in Vietnam"  
Politics and Polity".

Speaker : Prof. Dr. NGUYEN NIEN, Law Faculty,  
Dean.

17.00 Conclude seminar .

18.00 Depart for reception

Evening : 18.30 Reception / Professional Interchange  
At International Club .

Tuesday, January 15.

Morning : 8.00 Depart hotel

8.30 Seminar on Topic : " Current Political  
and economic Situation in Vietnam : National  
and Regional Perspectives ".

Speaker : Prof. Dr. LE VAN VIEN, Economic  
Faculty, Dean.

Afternoon : 11.30 Closing Ceremony Mr. Bui Thien Du

Mr. Jay Henderson

14.00 Visit to institute of World Economy  
( Social Committee )

Evening : Free

Wednesday, January 16.

Morning : 8.00 Visit to Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum

11.00 Depart Hanoi for Bangkok

Mr. Representative of Council on International  
Education Exchange,  
Mr. Bui Thien Du, Head of Department for Interational  
Relations, the Ministry of Education and Training.

Ladies and Gentleman,

On behalf of all the professors and students of Hanoi University, I would like to welcome all of you our honoured guests, coming here from America and Germany far way to organise the Spring 1991 seminar on "Understanding Vietnam's Historical Prospectives".

We have had the opportunity to have contacts with many Americans including scientists, educators, businessmen, journalists etc. Through these contacts we realize that the majority of Americans living in America do not understand the country and the people of Vietnam.

Most Americans who have been to Vietnam have warm feelings towards Vietnam. At the beginning, they do not understand Vietnam but once they have been here, have met and talked with Vietnamese, they understand us more, have warmer feelings towards us so when they return to America, they encourage more Americans to visit Vietnam. Your presence today is a fact that we are happy and proud of.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The war has ended but its heavy consequences still remain. Heavy loss and wounds are torturing both parts. But to be fair, we have to suffer more. Almost every family had to suffer from war consequences. My father was wounded from an American bullet and our house was destroyed by American bombs.

But as with the ends of other previous wars, the Vietnamese people always understand that we are a small nation and moreover we are rich in tolerance and forgiveness. Our people are always ready to forget hatred of the past and look forward to the future. We want to live in peace, in love and would like to be loved. Therefore, we have sincerely received Americans, as well as French, Japanese and other foreigners.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Why does such a nation that loves people, that is no less intelligent, that does not lack natural resources has to endure poverty ? ...

First of all, we have many short - comings that our press have mentioned and today we would like to hear objective analysis and new perspectives from you. But during this open discussion, we cannot help repeating one reason from America's side. That is the long lasting hostility of the American government and the ungentlemanly way of living of the American Administration as a super power. In our opinion, living in a gentlemanly way is as follows : Do not put pressure on the weak and then consider them to be inferior but, contrarily, create all opportunity available for them to act to see if they can build up a prestige for themselves.

American press usually considers itself to be the most free and democratic and therefore America is the most powerful country but American press also allows itself to act in such an ungentlemanly way. Why so ? This is a question that keeps on aching my mind for a long time.

If only America stopped its economic blockage against Vietnam, If only America did not hinder other countries to cooperate with Vietnam ! How would Vietnam be ? I firmly believe that Vietnam would not be as poor as today, and would develop fast. I believe that America would not be poorer because of a rich Vietnam but, on the contrary, it would be richer . America would not be weaker but more powerful because of a stronger Vietnam.

Why is this obvious truth not admitted ?

I hope that this seminar will give answer to all the questions - that the attendants have borne in mind. May the seminar be successful, may each of us be happier and have a more peaceful state of mind after this seminar.

Thank you for your good will.

# INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS

## EVALUATION FORM

VIETNAM

Seminar Site

In order to help us improve the format, design, and content of future seminars, please take a few minutes to respond to the following questions:

1. Was the pre-departure information with which you were provided adequate (i.e., information about seminar and location, reading materials, program schedule, etc.)? Please comment.

Information was accurate. Special Vietnam circumstances made some arrangements last minute. But no complaints. Staff in NY office were particularly accessible.

2. How would you rate the overall organization of the seminar?

Excellent      Good      Fair      Poor

Comments: Jay's contribution was superb — leading sound and sure direction and indispensable ~~expertise~~ and contagious spirit. Keith's role was never clearly defined and very much underexercised. Frank Triplett effectively became tour leader.

3. How would you rate the overall content of the seminar?

Excellent      Good      Fair      Poor

Comments: I learned a lot. It surpassed my expectations, and I came with high expectations. Much of the information disseminated was rather wooden. But knowledge was made accessible.

4. Did this seminar meet your expectations? Please explain.

Yes — I would have thought 7 or 10 days (instead of 2 weeks) might have sufficed.

5. Which session(s) did you find most valuable/interesting?

The two with the most senior scholars at Ho Chi Minh University. In fact I thought all of these sessions were excellent.



6. Which session(s) did you find least valuable/interesting?

1st one in Hanoi - when we had a difficult time penetrating Party dogmas.

7. Please comment on the faculty interchange component of the seminar. Were you able to meet counterparts with similar interests? Do you have any suggestions for improving the format?

This was fine. I was able to meet as many as I wanted - the most helpful factor here was having access to the HCMC translators

8. Please rate your accommodations: \_\_\_\_\_ (hotel name)

Excellent

Good

Fair

Poor

Comments:

Ho Chi Minh City

Hanoi.

Facilities have much to do with collective morale. There was a definite drop in Hanoi.

9. Would you recommend this seminar to a colleague?

yes, but I'd try to make him/her aware of special requirements. It would have been a picnic.

10. Other suggestions/comments (e.g., group leader, CIEE staff, etc.)

Frank Triplett - a natural experienced team leader - emerged as a tremendous resource. Perhaps he could be enlisted to lead such a group in the future.

Would you be willing to be interviewed for an article describing this seminar?  Yes  No

Name (optional):

Walter Cepps



Council on International Educational Exchange