Journal of the Vietnam Veterans Institute



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This issue:

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

Dr. Peter C. Rollins is a Regents Professor of English and American/Film Studies at Oklahoma State University (Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078). He teaches classes in Vietnam as film/literature and has made two television programs about Vietnam and the media, both of which are available from SONY video. A vice chair of VVI, Dr. Rollins was a Marine infantry unit commander during the Vietnam war.

Preface

J.Eldon Yates and **Peter Rollins**
Editors, VVI Journal

This issue of *The Vietnam Veterans Institute Journal* addresses the rightful place on our nation's campuses of Vietnam veterans, Vietnam-related classes, and the memory of Vietnam. In doing so, we embellish a theme of importance to us since the founding of the Institute fifteen years ago when scholar-veterans of the Institute began speaking out on campuses around the country. Our workshops in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Washington, D.C. have all been aimed to enhance the perception of veterans and veterans issues--especially in the light of the many distortions of the Vietnam heritage. (We welcome invitations to your campus. Call or write to us for details on our speakers and workshops programs.)

We have found that there are scores of classes about Vietnam being taught, but--paradoxically--very few by veterans who experienced the war "up close and personal." Common sense would suggest that veterans would be sought out to teach such classes, but common sense is not always the guiding principle on campuses when the subject is Vietnam. Indeed, many of our academics can relate personal anecdotes about how former activists (now

professors and administrators) have carried over the anger of the 1960s into current-day discussions of teaching and tenure. In this issue, Joe Dunn (Converse College-SC) and Pam Steinle (U of Calif-Fullerton) assess some of the methodological and psychological challenges of teaching Vietnam today. What is the state of the field as a subject matter for research and teaching; furthermore, what is the mindset of our students? Why do they have such trouble bringing Vietnam into focus? On the issue of focus, David Berman (U of Pittsburgh) exposes the flaws of the most popular curriculum available to teachers, a pedagogical tool which, we are sad to report, perpetuates misperceptions. Berman's essay conveys the passion and protectiveness we of VVI feel for our legacy.

Common sense suggests that veterans would be sought out to teach classes on Vietnam, but common sense is not always the guiding principle.

What are the statistical facts about discrimination against Vietnam veterans? Our last issue explored that theme exhaustively with case studies and statistics. In the current offering, Ron Trewyn (Kansas State U) and James Stever (U of Cincinnati) draw from both personal experiences and a large pool of data to reveal some shocking insights: despite their affirmative action status in federal law since 1974, Vietnam veterans are a rare breed on campus. In his article about Berkeley in the 1960s, Abraham Miller adds futher insight into the anti-veteran animus of counterculturists, many of whom are now part of the Establishment on the same campuses where they once protested the war. Appearing at various places in the issue are poems by Phoebe Spinrad (Ohio State U), a Vietnam veteran whose work explores the tensions on campus--not only among members of the Vietnam generation of teachers, but between the veteran-teachers and the youth they attempt to touch with the fire of their war experience. Finally, the summer workshop described by Christopher Lovett (Ft. Hays State U) is a model for us all in its combination of academic rigor and empathy, fact and art.

Our last issue carried an original--and controversial--article by Phoebe Spinrad about PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and a critique of the existing methods for treating those who suffer from that debilitating condition. In an In-Depth Section for this issue, Dan Merlis and his colleagues describe an entirely new approach called EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing). We are delighted to be one of the first journals to carry articles about this innovative technique. Both editors are laymen, but we could not but be fascinated with the promise of EMDR. Clearly, the approach needs to be given an opportunity to prove itself to laymen and specialists alike.

Finally, continued research into Vietnam issues requires that there be archives, places where original source materials will be preserved for study. In

the final segment of this issue, James Reckner (Texas Tech U) and John Baky (LaSalle U) describe the collections at their schools. Reckner's Center at Texas Tech hosts an annual meeting and will soon have its own building and staff. There is an active acquisition program aimed at collecting the details of individual experiences in Vietnam--photographs, audio tapes, letters, video interviews are all welcomed. John Baky's archive in Philadelphia focuses exclusively on how Vietnam has been reflected and refracted by the human imagination--in song, poetry, fiction, and film. Both archival efforts are vital to those who seek both objective and subjective truths about the Vietnam experience.

This issue of *The Vietnam Veterans Institute Journal* should draw a base line for future studies of Vietnam in Academe. We hope to answer the following questions:

1. What is being taught about Vietnam and who is doing the teaching? Don't veterans have a special and valuable role to play?

2. How much does the campus anti-war legacy of the 1960s carry over into pedagogical and personnel decisions, today? Twenty years after the war, are veterans still stigmatized?

3. What do students know about Vietnam and why do they have such difficulty retaining what they are taught? Is the blockage as much emotional as it is intellectual?

4. What new hope exists for the treatment of veterans roadblocked by painful memories from enjoying their lives?

5. Where can we go to donate research materials or to study both the personal side of the war and the record the war has left in the arts?

Hopefully, this issue of the *VVI Journal* on Vietnam in Academe will set our readers on their own research and teaching paths.

Joe P. Dunn was a sergeant (E–5) and NCOIC of the Ground Sensor Program (electronic intelligence) of the 199th Infantry Brigade, 1969–1970; when the 199th was deactivated, he completed his tour with the 1st Air Cavalry.

The State of the Field: How Vietnam is Being Taught

Joe P. Dunn
Charles A. Dana Professor of History & Politics,
Converse College

I have taught a course on the Vietnam War since 1974. During this more than twenty years, I have written extensively on teaching the subject, followed closely the growth of courses, participated in many conferences and major forums on dealing with the war, and attempted to analyze the trends in dealing with the subject. The state of the field has changed dramatically over the years and continues to evolve. Although different numbers have been tossed around at various times, no one knows how many Vietnam courses exist in the United States. The Indochina Institute at George Mason University conducted partial surveys in 1985, 1986, and 1990–91, but all were far from complete. The 1986 survey, the most comprehensive, listed over 400 offerings which dealt with the war as a significant portion of a course. Still, this recorded only a small percentage of the actual courses. What is taught in these courses is another question. The **Report of the 1990–1991 Survey of Courses on the Vietnam War**, edited by Patrick Hagopian, (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 1993) compiled a data set from the 89 faculty responses that developed some information about what was taught in Vietnam courses; but the editor admitted the limitations of his survey.

It is clear that the Vietnam War is being taught, either as a major segment or as an entire course, in many hundreds of the over 2000 junior and senior colleges and universities in America. Many campuses have several Vietnam courses taught in different departments.

anyone dealing with the war, and everyone teaching a course on the evolution of the conflict should consider this superior paperback text , no matter what one's orientation or perspective. Vietnam–expert William S. Turley, **The Second Indochina War: Short Political and Military History, 1954–1975** (1986) and **China–specialist Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1975** (1991) are Asianist approaches which give thorough attention to the American war effort. Turley's book is excellent; Young's, a sad polemic. Two orientations exist within the Asianist approach. Many Asianists portray the communists as the true Vietnamese nationalists. The other perspective, best articulated in Bui Diem's **In the Jaws of History** (1987), emphasizes a strong non–communist Vietnamese nationalist movement which fought against the communist destroyers of Vietnamese destiny. Bui Diem, one of Vietnam's greatest statesmen, was South Vietnam's Ambassador to the United States during the Johnson administration, and he has remained a voice of reason, moderation, and great wisdom as a leader within the Vietnamese community in the United States ever since the end of the war.

Will the now-popular Vietnam courses give way to the next *au courant* issue? Particularly in political science departments, many former Vietnam courses are being linked with the latest event.

The second and larger category consists of courses which focus on the American side of the war. Taught normally by historians with specialties in recent United States, diplomatic, or military history or by political scientists with national security, foreign policy, or American politics specialties, these offerings vary greatly in content and orientation. Asianists complain, and quite justly, that many, if not most, American– centered courses give insufficient, if any, emphasis to understanding Vietnamese history, life, and culture. Thus students fail to truly comprehend the context of the war. I contend that Vietnam courses should be taught by individuals with adequate preparation, both in Vietnamese history, culture, and politics and in American politics, culture, and diplomatic and military history.[2]

The resources for approaching the war from the American perspective are legion. The number of fine texts today is encouraging. From my perspective the best two texts are George C. Herring's well–established diplomatic history classic, **America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975** (2nd ed., 1986) and Lt. General (Ret.) Phillip B. Davidson's **Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975** (1988), primarily a military history. Personally, I use David L. Anderson, ed., **Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945–1975** (1993), which in conjunction with William Duiker's **Sacred War** and a large number of other readings in my course, has worked beautifully. The brief, insightful essays on each of the President's handling of Vietnam written by experts such as George Herring, Gary Hess, Robert McMahon, Sandra Taylor, and others are

readable, manageable, and fit in well with the large amount of other readings I employ. However, a wide range of other fine texts exist depending upon the orientation or purpose and the role of a text in structure of the course.[3]

For the increasing number of national security focused courses, three collections of essays on military policy questions are invaluable either as texts or as supplementary readings: Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn, eds., **The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts** (1987), an excellent source which is unfortunately available only in an expensive hardback; William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., **Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies** (1993); and the forthcoming, James R. Reckner, ed., **On Winning and Losing: A Reexamination of the Summers Thesis and the Vietnam War** (1996).

The third category of Vietnam War courses is a broad catch–all which I will call the literature and/or popular culture approach. A large and ever–growing number of Vietnam courses fall into this area, and indeed it may become, if it is not already, the largest genre of Vietnam War studies. Vietnam certainly has spawned a vast amount of literature—first person accounts, novels, short stories, film, poetry, etc. Much of it is excellent. No one can question the invaluable insight of literature for understanding reality. The available body of Vietnamese literature gives us a window into the various dimensions of a proud and rich culture. The hundreds, maybe into the thousand category now, of American war memoirs and novels raise important questions about the war, its conduction, and an array of moral issues. It is a rich repository of material.

I endorse the teaching of Vietnam literature and film in English, American Studies, film studies, or other interdisciplinary departments and programs. This approach is a powerful vehicle for bringing the war to new generations who have no direct or historical conception about a war so long ago in the ancient 1960s.[4] However, I have no hesitancy in letting my prejudices show: I contend that the analytical tools of the historian and the political scientist are necessary elements for passing our understanding of this very important event in American and world history on to the next generation. I am concerned that too much of the teaching of Vietnam comes from courses which are entirely literature or film–based, and that too many individuals who teach these courses are not grounded in the proper analytical tools to deal with the important political and geo–strategic issues of the war. I fear that too much of Vietnam is presented through emotive approaches and the desired result is to evoke passion. In that sense, we haven't progressed beyond the 1960s.

The Popular Culture Wave

I have particular concern about the captivation of Vietnam War courses by the popular culture establishment. A host of largely younger academics, many associated with the Popular Culture Association, who teach Vietnam exclusively through film, novels, poetry, plays, personal testimony, etc., often through the interpretative lenses of feminism, deconstructionism, or film criticism, for the purported purpose of understanding the nature and soul of America, have become a significant

force.[5] Their approaches may have merits, but I argue that their objectives are less than adequate for a deeper understanding of what, in my less than humble opinion, are the more important questions which we should be addressing about Vietnam. I have listened to several in this camp wax eloquently about their courses on Vietnam when it is evident that they could barely find the country on a map, much less know anything about the geography, history, or politics so central to understanding the conflict. They rattled off cliches and stereotypes about American involvement with little interest or knowledge about the decision–making processes that led us into and through that conflict. It is my position that at heart Vietnam was a question of policy making, of the process and product of decisions and of the dynamics of international politics in the mid–20th century. I understand that others have the right to very different views, but in my perspective the war's internal impact and its cultural legacy are secondary to the primary lessons we should seek from studying this experience. The many insights to be gained through the study of literature, film, testimony, etc., are valuable, enlightening, and even inspiring. They may bring students to wanting to understand the larger political and international dimensions of the war. But ultimately, they are of secondary nature.

Taking my brief remarks in response to the 1990–91 survey out of context, Patrick Hagopian set up a false dichotomy by satirizing my position as the "serious teaching" school vs. H. Bruce Franklin's employment of literature and cultural sources. I have no problem being placed as far away from the views of Mr. Franklin as I can possibly get. We have in Hagopian's words, "divergent assumptions about the content and purposes of teaching the Vietnam War." But Hagopian mis–defined the issue. The salient point of my critique was that I believe that the teaching of Vietnam should be dominated by serious scholars with proper analytical tools to deal with the central issues of the history of the involvement, the policy process, and the lessons of the war. These tools and basic grounding are not exclusive to, but might be more likely found among, historians, political scientists, or other social scientists than from most of the popular culturists with whom I have come in contact. I do recognize some notable exceptions to this prejudice, including Peter Rollins as cardinal example. I openly admit my provinciality, but I continue to contend that my emphasis is of greater import than Franklin's pseudo-psychology or therapy sessions: "When [students are] invited to tell how they first became conscious of the war, portentous revelations emerge about troubled veterans, taboos on conversation, responses to popular Vietnam movies, after shocks in their own families' lives..."[6]

Franklin is not the only one in this genre. Susan Jeffords, Kali Tal, Jacqueline Lawson, and others present the entire Vietnam War through the lenses of misogyny, racism, and class. Even with the fall of communism, the die–hards of the left continue the litany of hegemony and exploitation. Some of the popular culture approach is harmless, if marginal to silly. Papers and sessions in the Vietnam interest section at the Popular Culture Association conference on Nam Porn, comic book depictions, B–grade movies and short–run television series, and obscure dime store novelists make mockery of a serious area of

inquiry. Most of this is incomprehensible except for those who travel in this make–believe world. Eliot Gruner's **Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam POW** (1993), a rambling, unfocused deconstructionist attempt to demonstrate the mythology of the POW experience (whatever that means), provides an example. In Gruner's words:

> I seek to break up what I see as a monologue, a dominant of the POW experience in American culture. I want to show the polyphony that lurks beneath the surface of popular culture. I juxtapose the representations and production to make their contradictions visible and to soften the hard objective truths that feed POW myth. I do this not so much to oppose the texts but to embrace the differences. I want to show that the array of representations I examine has rehistoricized the American POW experience in ways that channel us into certain roles and patterns of action.
> It may seem that I would like to exclude the POW experience from popular culture, or to privilege certain forms of representation over others. This is, however, exactly the kind of cannonization or silence that I would reject. Instead, I would have us look at a broader range of experiences and ideas in order to make visible the assumptions behind the representations themselves. The POW story seems to hide out in the self–confirming authority of autobiography or late–night paid TV programming. Such presentations, if taken by themselves, leave us with the deceptive, simplistic closure of narrative rather than the more complex implications of human experience. The challenge is to engage all the stories. Such an approach makes both the contradictions and the convergences of the POW story obvious. (3)

The wide range of objectives among those teaching Vietnam today is reminiscent of the mid and late 1960s grassroots Vietnam courses, mini–courses, and free universities which sprang up in reaction to American military engagement in the war. Most of those first– generation courses, like Bruce Franklin's today, had more emotional political agenda than substance. Many authorities have emphasized that it is well past time to move beyond polemics to a more mature, scholarly, and dispassionate assessment of the meaning of the Vietnam experience. While this is taking place in many circles, it is less evident, from my vantage point, among the popular culture genre.[7]

Eliot Gruner's **Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam POW**, is a rambling, unfocused deconstructionist attempt to demonstrate the mythology of the POW experience (whatever that means).

The Positive Role of Video

Despite my concern that video sources play an unduly heavy role in the way that Vietnam is being presented to this generation, especially by the popular culture group, who defend their approach by arguing that this is a television or visual generation, I do recognize the

value and the excellent quality of some of the visual resources available. And I understand that one cannot discuss the teaching of Vietnam without noting the impact of some of these resources. The Public Broadcasting System's thirteen–part, **Vietnam: A Television History**, (1983), undoubtedly was the single biggest spur to the teaching of the war in the classroom. Both the 1986 and 1990–91 surveys list 1984 as the year when the greatest number of the Vietnam courses in the respective studies began, with a large number beginning in each of the next several years. The 1986 survey indicated that many of these courses were built around the television history series.

Used with proper caveat, **Vietnam: A Television History** can be most instructive; but on both content/orientation and pedagogical grounds, I would argue that it should not be the basic element of the course.[8] Among the several other valuable video resources, I will mention only a few, most specifically Accuracy in Media, Inc. (AIM)'s two–part counter to the PBS series, **Television's Vietnam: The Real Story and The Impact of Media** (1984 and 1985)—which despite its value should carry a few caveats itself; and **Dear America: Letters Home From Vietnam** (1988), the single best video source which I have employed in the classroom. Commercial movies are very popular in Vietnam courses. When I use movies, I am less interested in the metaphorical or metaphysical than in trying to address my students perennial question: "Was that what it was really like?" Obviously any source whether visual or written can provide only a glimpse into a tiny portion of a war that had so many dimensions. That is an important point to make. Three movies that I have employed do address part of that question of what it was really like. **Platoon** is replete with false impressions and stereotypes but it does capture the surreal nature of combat. **Hamburger Hill** captures the camaraderie, the courage, and honor of soldiers in combat. **Good Morning Vietnam** catches some of the flavor of the rear–echelon experience.

Some Big Courses and Conferences

Two of the largest Vietnam courses in this country best illustrate the very different objectives of teaching Vietnam. Both courses are now passe, but in the late 1980s they employed similar means to achieve very different ends. Theodore R. Kennedy's "Vietnam Involvements Symposium," taught as a special topics offering under an anthropology label at the State University of New York—Stony Brook enrolled 800 students. Kennedy, a Korean War veteran, started the course as tribute to his brother who died from the deterioration of his lungs after returning from Vietnam (presumed to be from Agent Orange exposure). Kennedy spent several thousand dollars of his own money to bring in the array of speakers, academics and participants, which the course featured. Speakers included Harry Summers, James Webb, Robert Muller, Jan Scruggs, John Wheeler, William Westmoreland, David Horowitz, Reed Irvine, Douglas Pike, Peter Dunn, Nguyen Tien Hung, and a host of others including a large number of ordinary veterans. Kennedy strived for balance and wide perspective, but underlying his orientation was a tribute to the sacrifices and the honorable, even heroic, service of the veterans who suffered a controversial war which the nation never fully understood or appreci-

ated the costs at the time nor since. Personal financial and psychological costs caused Kennedy to drop the course after two years in 1986 and 1987.

While Kennedy's symposium was a local phenomenon, Walter Capps religion course at the University of California—Santa Barbara, which accepted over 900 enrolles and turned away hundreds, remains the highest profile Vietnam offering in the nation. It was featured on CBS's "Sixty Minutes," discussed in **The Chronicle of Higher Education**, and mentioned in every press article on teaching the war. The readings collection edited by Capps for, and to some degree from, the course—**The Vietnam Reader** (1991)—is an excellent source. Although both Kennedy and Capps employed the same method of inundating students with scores of different perspectives on the war, including many from Vietnam veterans, their politics and their purposes were very different. Capps described his concern as values: "The course offers an illustration of how values are transmitted within contexts of highly volatile social and political change." He continued that the fundamental questions addressed are "about the nature of virtue, the claims that vested national interests make upon justice, the properties of the good society, how far patriotism and the dictates of warfare are trustworthy guides for achieving ones telos as a human being."[9]

Some of the most significant recent conferences and symposia which have contributed to the state of the field of Vietnam study must be noted. Among these are **Vietnam and the West**, sponsored by the American Studies Centre at the University of Wales, Swansea (1988); the **Indochina Institute's National Conference on Teaching the Vietnam War** (April 1988) and National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute (1990); **Seminar on US–Vietnam/Indochina War at Columbia University** (November 1990); The Air Force Academy's Fourteenth Military History Symposium (1991); **The Vietnam War: Impact and Legacy at Georgia Tech** (February 1991); **Remembering Tet 1968**, at Salisbury State University (November 1992); **Vietnam: Paris + 20**, at Texas Tech University Center for Study of the Vietnam Conflict (April 1993); **Viet Nam 20 Years After: Voices of the War**, at Hampden–Sydney College (September 1993); **Vietnam: The Early Decisions, 1961–1964**, at the LBJ Library (October 1993); **America and Vietnam: From War to Peace, A Transdisciplinary Conference**, at Notre Dame (December 1993); the Vietnam Veterans Institute sponsored **The History and Legacy of Those Who Served in Vietnam**, at the University of Baltimore (November 1994); **On Winning and Losing: A Reexamination of the Summers Thesis and the Vietnam War, sponsored by the U.S. Army War College and the Vie**tnam Center at Texas Tech University (March 1995); and the forthcoming **After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam** (April 1996) at the Vietnam Center at Texas Tech. Several books are in print from the papers presented at these conferences, and other volumes will follow from the more recent gatherings.[10]

Some of these conferences were sponsored by groups or academic centers with particular interest in the teaching of the Vietnam War. The oldest is the Indochina Institute, at George Mason University. The William Joiner Center, at the University of Massachusetts—Boston, has been active in supporting the

teaching of Vietnam. The Vietnam Veterans Institute has become a major player in this field in recent years, publishing its own journal and hosting symposia around the country for general audiences and for college campus groups. The place to study the Vietnam War is now the Texas Tech University Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict. The Vietnam Center, housed in the new $14 million dollar International Cultural Center, is building a premier archives, starting with the papers of former Commander of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and the extensive Douglas Pike Collection transferred from the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California–Berkeley. Pike, the country's most eminent student of the Vietnamese communists, may soon accept an endowed chair at Texas Tech. The Center is negotiating to acquire copies of Vietnam's archives as well. The planned triennial conferences at the Vietnam Center are projected to be the periodic event on the study of the war.

Beyond these high–profile conferences, teaching sessions on Vietnam are commonplace at history, political science, international studies, Asian studies, and increasingly at literature, sociology, media, and other conferences. The World History Association and the Association for Third World Studies deserve special note. Often teaching sessions are more prevalent at regional than national conferences. For instance, the Southeast Conference of the Association of Asian Studies for many years had at least one session annually on teaching Vietnam, and two books have emerged from these sessions.[11]

A Brief Note on Recent Books

Although the volume has ebbed some, the quality of scholarship on the war is very strong. To my mind, the most essential questions today are how and why political and military decisions were made and what could have been done differently. The quest for the lessons of Vietnam remains central. Again to my mind, the most significant books in the last three or four years are Eric M. Bergerud, **The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province** (1991); Larry Cable, Unholy Grail: **The US and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965–68** (1991); Ronald H. Spector, **After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam** (1993); George C. Herring, **LBJ and Vietnam** (1994); Richard A. Hunt, **Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds** (1995); and Robert S. McNamara, **In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam** (1995).

Conclusions

So what is the state of the field of Vietnam in the classroom? Obviously, the subject is much alive, taught in various places in the curriculum, by a wide range of academics with varied backgrounds and reasons for dealing with the topic, who manifest many different approaches, pedagogies, and objectives. It is unclear, and probably too early, to judge whether Vietnam courses will be institutionalized as permanent components in history, political science, and international studies departments. The growth of Vietnam courses outside these areas, in literature, media, film, American studies, popular culture, and other programs is

significant; but again the issue of permanence is even more a question.

By every indication we have, student interest about the war remains very high, and little reason is evident for it to wane soon. The continuing questions we face on the global scene appear to keep the Vietnam experience exceptionally relevant, if in constantly changing ways. The resources for teaching Vietnam are abundant; a network of those involved in the subject is readily available manifested in numerous conferences and symposia; a lively debate continues over pedagogy, content, and objectives; and the quantity and quality of new scholarship abounds. Despite mine, or any other commentator's, concerns over particular directions or issues, abundant reasons exist for predicting a healthy future for the study of the Vietnam War.

Vietnam veterans should have an important say in the way that this war is interpreted to future generations; and as teachers, scholars, and resources, we should assert ourselves in this process. We have earned our voice; but more importantly, we owe it to future generations.

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[1] See Douglas Pike, "Teaching the Vietnam Experience as a Whole Course," *Teaching Political Science: Politics in Perspective* 12 (Summer 1985): 144-151; Ronald H. Spector, "What Did You Do in the War, Professor: Reflections on Teaching About Vietnam," *American Heritage* 38 (December 1986): 98-102; Frederick Z. Brown, "Myths and Misperception Abound in Our Courses on the War in Vietnam," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 34 (May 25, 1988): A 48; and Alan Goodman, "Scholars Must Give More Serious Thought to How They Teach and Write About the War in Vietnam," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 36 (July 25, 1990): A 36.

[2] See Joe P. Dunn, "Teaching Vietnam as History," *Teaching History: A Journal of Methods* 6 (Fall 1981): 50-59; and Joe P. Dunn, **Teaching the Vietnam War: Resources and Assessments** (Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University--Los Angeles, 1990), or any of my other writings on teaching the war.

[3] For teaching resources on a Vietnam War course, the three essential sources are Joe P. Dunn, **Teaching the Vietnam War: Resources and Assessments** (Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University--Los Angeles, 1990), now a bit dated; Marc Jason Gilbert, ed., **The Vietnam War: Teaching Approaches and Resources** (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991); and James S. Olson, ed., **The Vietnam War: Handbook** of the Literature and Research (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). My essay, "Texts and Auxiliary Resources," in Gilbert's volume, pp. 201-225, is a critical evaluation of all the texts and other teaching resources available at the time. Some good sources have appeared since that date.

[4] The best sources for introduction to the literature available for use in a Vietnam War course are found in several of the essays in both the Gilbert and the

Olson volumes cited above. The single best essay is Catherine Calloway, "American Literature and Film of the Vietnam War: Classroom Strategies and Critical Sources," in the Gilbert compilation. Also see Owen W. Gilman, Jr. and Lorrie Smith, eds. **American Rediscovered: Critical Essays on Literature and Film** of the Vietnam War (New York: Garland, 1990), which is slightly more current than three or four other similar collections; John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg, eds., **The Vietnam War and American Culture** (NY: Columbia University Press, 1991); Philip K. Jason's **The Vietnam War in Literature: An Annotated Bibliography of Criticism** (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 1992), which is extremely usefill, and it updates Timothy Lomperis's invaluable early work, **Reading the Wind: The Literature** of the Vietnam War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); and Andrew Martin, **Perceptions of War: Vietnam in American Culture** (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

[5] Dr. Peter C. Rollins, a Marine Vietnam veteran, was responsible for creating the Vietnam War Studies groups during his tenure as President of the Popular Culture Association (PCA) in the early 1980s. Under his leadership and later that of William Searle of Eastern Illinois University, this area grew to one of the largest interest areas of PCA. At its height in 1989, PCA had 23 full sessions with 89 papers on the Vietnam War. *Hustnam Generation,* a journal edited by Kali Tal, emerged from this group at PCA. However, in the last several years, the Vietnam War group has declined to a mere shadow of its former self. Most serious students of the war have separated themselves from the ideological clique who dominate the Vietnam War sessions.

[6] Quote and the attempted dichotomy are found in Hagopian, pp. 4849.

[7] For a survey of the various perspectives, see Joe P. Dunn, "What Should We **Teach About** the Vietnam War?: The Evolution of the Debate," in James S. Olson, ed., **The Vietnam War: Handbook of the Literature and Research** (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 483-494.

[8] For critique of the PBS series, see Stephen J. Morris, "'Vietnam,' a Dual-Vision History," *The Wall Street Journal* (December 20, 1983): 30; Reed Irvine, "The Flawed History of Vietnam," *AIMReport* (January 1984), 4 pp.; R.C. Raack, "Caveat Spectator, *Organization of American Historians Newsletter* 12 (February 1984): 25-28; and George C. Herring, *Journal of American Historic* 74 (December 1987): 1123- 1124. Stephen Vlastos, "Television Wars: Representations of the Vietnam War in Television Documentaries," *Radical History Review* 36 (1986): 115-132, critiques both the PBS series and the AIM response from a different perspective.

[9] Walter Capps, "On Teaching Today's Students about the Vietnam War," *Federation Review* 8 (May-June 1985): 10-13. Also see Capps, **The Unfinished War: Vietnam and the American Conscience** (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982).

[10] See Phil Melting and Jon Roper, eds., **America, France and Vietnam: Cultural History and Ideas of Conflict** (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Company, 1991), as dreadful a book as was the Swansea, Wales conference; Jane Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, **eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives** (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), a useful work from the Columbia University symposium; William Head and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., **Looking Back on the Vietnam War: A 1990s Perspective on the Decisions, Combat, and Legacies** (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), an exceptionally valuable volume from the Georgia Tech conference; and James R. Reckner, ed., **On Winning and Losing: AReexamination of the Summers Thesis and the Vietnam War** (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1996), a fascinating and useful compilation.

[11] The two books are Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn, eds., The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); and Marc Jason Gilbert, ed., The Vietnam War: **Teaching Approaches and Resources** (Westport, CT: GreenwoodPress, 1991).

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

Walking Point in Kansas: A Vietnam Veteran Teaching the Vietnam War to Teachers

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With the recent publication of Robert McNamara's memoir, **In Retrospect**, and the ensuing debate the book generated, it is apropos to explore how the Vietnam War is taught in American colleges and universities. Any examination of the war, must confront our national myths: "America is God's Country," "America has never lost a war," and America's "can-do" spirit can accomplish anything.[1] These myths and American political culture curtail our understanding of the war and Vietnam veterans. These myths must be overcome, if we ever hope to come to grips with the legacy of Vietnam.

As a not-so-young teaching assistant in the fall of 1985, I was returning examinations in a Western Civilization class when I noticed a female student wearing a baseball cap that read: "Mekong Delta 1968." As a veteran, I made an inquiry whether she had a relative who had served in Vietnam. She said no, she just went to a frat party, in which the fraternity turned their house into a Vietnamese village: students dressed as GIs, POWs, NVA, and VC. After regaining my composure, I realized that undergraduates were missing an important element in American history. I made an appointment with the Department Chair to see what could be done.

It is difficult to imagine that any college or university would not offer a course on the Vietnam War. This happens more times than not. Most undergraduates receive preliminary instruction about Vietnam in U.S. history survey classes, where instructors employ a wide range of approaches. This paper, while reviewing the level of instruction provided undergraduates on the war, will focus on a seminar that I conducted in the summer of 1994 in an effort to prepare secondary school teachers to communicate the Vietnam experience to their students.

Educators must realize that the Vietnam War remains a vital component of recent American history. It is not just another segment of the Sixties. Benjamin Schwarz, writing in **Atlantic Monthly**, notes that "the history we hold up as a light to nations is a sanctimonious tissue of myth and self-infatuation. We get the world wrong because we get ourselves wrong."[2]

In 1995, I made an inquiry on H-TEACH concerning course offerings about the war, respondents told me about a variety of classroom strategies. Many instructors follow a traditional methodology by covering the war in one fifty-minute lecture. Others attempt to buck the trend with a thematic approach. They spend a week on the conflict integrating domestic protests, the civil rights movement, and the war into one block of instruction. Some teachers incorporate video into their offerings.

Some innovative teaching about the Vietnam War occurs in a junior college. An associate professor at Broome Community College highlights the generational struggle associated with the war. She shows her classes magazine photos of "young people at war and demonstrating at home; I talk about my old demonstrating days and mention my frustration as a female of not being draftable — it made my protest less powerful; they like that."[3] Another respondent to my inquiry, who teaches at the University of Wisconsin-River Falls, follows a similar pattern by arguing "that the war had a major impact and thus is a logical point to begin to understand what has happen since." He, and many others, are concerned with the lack of knowledge that undergraduates bring to the classroom about the Vietnam War.[4] How do we account for the substandard preparation of under- graduates?

The reasons for the substandard preparation of high school students rests with their teachers. Surprisingly, Language Arts teachers provide high school students with the most detailed coverage of the conflict. High school English teachers use Tim O'Brien's **If I Die In A Combat Zone**, Bobbie Ann Mason's **In Country**, or Walter Myers' **Fallen Angels** in their literature classes. Perry Oldham, an Oklahoma City Language Arts teacher writing in **English Journal**, stresses that "teenagers need to be taught about the Vietnam War; and I believe those lessons, like other deepest human truths, are more likely to be found in poems, plays, novels, and personal narratives, than in history texts or TV documentaries."[5] Oldham's evaluation is disturbing, since a student's first exposure to the Vietnam War should have come in a history class. Secondary social science teachers need to revise their syllabi in order to provide the historical and social foundations necessary for students to understand the war.

Not all innovation occurs in large high schools or universities. In the middle of the Heartland (not far from my school) in Hoxie, Kansas, one concerned history teacher has made a difference. This dedicated educator decided to do an oral history on "The Wall." She instructed the students in the techniques of oral history: interviewing, photography, editing, and developing slide/tape presentations. She encouraged the students to enter the History Day contest, a nationally-sponsored history program for secondary students. The two female students working on this project placed first in their category during both the regional and state competition.

The first remedy for the academic amnesia is to have history departments periodically offer a course on the Vietnam War, but that is easier said than done. Anyone seeking to teach such a course will discover a minefield in his path, reflecting bureaucratic inertia, ideological disputes, and territorial jealousies that are intrinsic to contemporary academic culture. Chairs or department heads often do not enjoy seeking approval to add a new course to the college or university catalog. An effective remedy is to teach the Vietnam War as a "problems" course, which

allows both the chair and instructor to avoid many bureaucratic difficulties. The real victors are the students, who receive the instruction they need and want.

Who should teach a Vietnam War course? When undergraduates attended college in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, those who enrolled in a Second World War class had an instructor who either was a veteran or who had some familiarity with the military. Today, less than 1 percent of all professors teaching is a Vietnam era veteran, and the likelihood of having a Vietnam veteran teach a course on the war is slim.[6] Ronald Spector, in an article which appeared in **American Heritage** in 1986, assumes that about 3 percent of all the professors who teach a Vietnam War class actually served in Vietnam.[7]

It is not absolutely essential that the instructor be a Vietnam veteran, but as Spector believes, "there is something a little disconcerting about a spectacle of a hundred or more academics teaching a course about a recent historical event, experienced firsthand by hundreds of thousands of their contemporaries, fellow countrymen, and students, but not them."[8] Most veterans would agree and are concerned about balance and empathy. Vietnam veterans are disturbed that non-veterans often bring their oppositional biases into the classroom and consequently distort what happened in Vietnam. The first time I taught "Vietnam," one veteran actually sat through a semester of my class just to see "if I did it right." Another veteran asked me: "Are you just going to talk about the killing?"

The instructor must challenge undergraduates to analyze the conflict by allowing them to come to their own conclusions about the war. Some topics that contribute to highly charged class discussion involved the Kennedy legacy, My Lai, the media, Tet, the Phoenix Program, and the air war. In class, I take on many different personae. I become Lyndon Johnson, William Westmoreland, David Dellinger, "Lieutenant Dan" (Forrest Gump's platoon commander), Robert McNamara, Peter Arnett, and Richard Nixon. I select any position, and shift my stance according to the mood of the class. I want students to feel the passion the war generated among Americans in the 1960s and early 1970s. Any instructor who accepts the challenge of teaching a course must have the intensity to convey that fervor to undergraduates.

As Spector believes, "there is something a little disconcerting about a spectacle of a hundred or more academics teaching a course about a recent historical event, experienced firsthand by hundreds of thousands of their contemporaries, fellow countrymen, and students, but not them."

As a military historian, I have an obligation to demonstrate that wars do not occur in vacuums. I use music and videos to provide the color commentary during the war years. In order to bring the age alive, I use Barry Sadler's "The Ballad of the Green Beret," Barry McGuire's "Eve of Destruction," Nancy Sinatra's "These Boots are Made for Walkin'," Country Joe McDonald's "Fish Cheer" and "I-Feel-Like-I'm-Fix'in-To-Die-Rag," Jefferson Airplane's

"Volunteer," Creedence Clearwater Revival's "Fortunate Son", and Edwin Starr's "War" to highlight the diverse cultural manifestations of social conflict. I arrange for former student activists to speak to the class. I point out that the origins of the antiwar movement emerged from the civil rights struggle eventually as did modern feminism. All the cultural phenomena of the 1960s had an impact on the men and women who served in Southeast Asia.[9]

In terms of videos, **The War at Home** dramatizes the growing opposition to the war at the University of Wisconsin. **The Graduate**, starring Dustin Hoffman, is another excellent video delineating the differences within the sixties generation. (I am still wondering why Benjamin never received his draft notice!) Those videos demonstrate to contemporary students how the war polarized the sixties generation. **The Anderson Platoon** and **The World of Charlie Company** highlight the class and generational divisions of the conflict. Likewise, I use all of the Hollywood productions such as **Go Tell the Spartans, Deer Hunter**, **Apocalypse Now**, and **Platoon** during evening video screenings.[10]

Reviewing operations in Vietnam is another matter. Students have no collective memory of places like Khe Sanh, Dong Ha, A Shau Valley, Hamburger Hill, and the Ia Drang. Most students were not even born during the war years. Students do not know the differences between "the Pig" and the farm animal or a "fast mover" and a sexually active teenager. Consequently, the instructor should furnish students with a glossary of terms in which they can refer as they read texts, novels, and source literature. By focusing on the combat experience and providing an explanation of the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of a line unit, the instructor can dispel misconceptions about Vietnam veterans, since many students, both secondary and college, believe that all Vietnam vets served in combat units. I direct my students to Ronald Spector's examination of American forces sent to Southeast Asia, in which he reveals that the Pentagon created a "Vietnam-only Army" based upon draftees, "shake 'n' bake" NCOs, and OCS officers.[11] I remind my students that only 10 to 20 percent of the 2.5 million GIs who served "in country," between 1965 and 1972 actually saw combat or were under fire. Students are shocked that the "tooth to tail" ratio in Vietnam was 1:10, but it was the American way of war.

More conservative students wonder if the war was "winnable," since the U.S. lacked the commitment to activate the National Guard and the Reserves. Those students find answers from commentators such as Harry Summers, who claim that by failing to mobilize the "National Will," Lyndon Johnson contributed to the American defeat. Other students would agree with John Prados, who recently wrote: "Victory was an illusion....Victory is still an illusion."[12] Presenting undergraduates with contrasting arguments helps to mend the wounds that remain untreated.

More important, such emotions helps to explain the breach that exists among baby boomers who served and those who did not. Tobias Wolff recently describes that phenomenon in **Time**, where he relates an effort to talk about the Vietnam War with his peers: "If you protested the war, you couldn't help worrying about the bafflement and pain you were causing those in danger, and their families. How did you make peace with the fact that, however, unintentionally, you were encouraging a hard, often murderous enemy who was doing his best to kill boys you'd grown up with?" Wolff concludes that "we were all a little chastened to find out how many demons there were, and how much power they still had to complicate even our affections and trust." Christian Appy supports Wolff's observations, because he discovered similar views when he talked with veterans for his book, **Working-Class War**.[13]

Fiction and memoir literature are excellent tools for undergraduates to understand the combat experience. I found that James Webb's **Fields of Fire** and John Del Vecchio's **The 13th Valley** realistically depict small unit operations in Vietnam and dispel the romanticism of war. I selected these novels because they are still in print, and to a large extent, autobiographical. The same can be said for Tim O'Brien. I sometimes have my students compare his memoir, **If I Die In A Combat Zone**, to **The Things They Carried** in order to delineate fact from fiction. Charles Anderson's **The Grunts** and Matt Brennan's **Brennan's War** are excellent illustrations of memoir literature. I have used both titles at different times, and I have found that students are mesmerized by their graphic characterization of combat. By using fiction and memoirs, students manage to gain a first hand view of Vietnam then they would otherwise not receive by using traditional sources.[14]

Yet, as Peter Rollins notes, there are dangers and possibilities by using this approach. "The danger," according to Rollins, "lies in accepting the report of any one document as the total picture." Still Professor Rollins avers, "These infantry fictions are colorful evocations of Vietnam." [15] The professor should prepare students for war literature and documentaries by informing students of the time period in which the veteran writes and the methods producers employ to edit their films. When the author was "in-country" is crucial in understanding the author's message. Veterans who served in Vietnam in 1965-1966 saw a far different war from those writers who wrote about their experiences in 1968-1969. Educators, students, and the general public must be aware that in contemporary America the medium becomes the message, particularly concerning Vietnam documentaries such as **Vietnam: A Television History** and **Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War**, the most common documentaries used in American classrooms.[16]

Instruction about the Vietnam War for secondary school teachers deserves serious attention. For the past two years, I offered a summer seminar for teachers at Fort Hays State University entitled: **"We Held The Day In The Palm of Our Hand': Vietnam in History and Literature."** No one thought that the seminar would work. I took people's skepticism as a challenge and prepared a grant application to the Kansas Humanities Council (KHC). The KHC granted the application and encouraged me to invite antiwar protestors, Vietnamese, and Laotian emigres to serve as resources. They also limited attendance to fifteen teachers of the sixty-six who applied.

The seminar ran for five days in July 1994. During the morning sessions, the group discussed all aspects of the conflict from the diplomatic and strategic to American grunts, who fought and died in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam. In the afternoons, I organized panels of Vietnam veterans, Laotian and Vietnamese emigres, and antiwar protestors. The teachers were encouraged to ask questions and the subsequent discussions often kept me off schedule and continued into the dorms.

After a dinner break, the teachers returned to view both documentaries and Hollywood productions dealing with the war. The screenings included: **Go Tell the Spartans, Full Metal Jacket, The Anderson Platoon, The World of Charlie Company, The War at Home, My Lai Remembered,** and **Platoon**. The teachers were encouraged to compare the videos with the books and articles that they had read in preparation for the seminar. The video screenings were open to the public, and interested members of the community were encouraged to attend. Many Vietnam veterans in the Hays area took the opportunity to participate and one veteran drove 70 miles each night. (Afterwards, he decided to return to Vietnam and appeared on CNN in March 1995 while in Hue.)

The sessions were intense, especially when they addressed the topic of the media, the antiwar movement, and My Lai. The sessions encouraged the teachers to use critical reasoning skills to discover the complexities of the war. One teacher told the class that while reading **The Tunnels of Cu Chi**, he actually threw the book across the living room. Another teacher declared that she did not realize how under-strengthed American combat units were at the time. All of the participants managed to comprehend Vietnam's complexities and the burden placed on the shoulders of nineteen-year-old American GIs.

I spent time (as I do with undergraduates) examining the men and women who were sent to Vietnam. In the process, it is possible to dispel the misconceptions which surround Vietnam veterans. The teachers read and discussed the results of recent research which contends that Vietnam was not a "class war." Christian Appy's book and an article written by James Fallows, a senior editor with the **Atlantic Monthly,** argued that if the sons of the privileged elites were drafted, as were minorities and blue collar kids, the war would have ended much earlier. Some educators actually argued that current revisionism provides an "out" for those who did not serve for one reason or another. Many of the teachers agreed with James Fallows when he noted that the draft histories of most politicians "suggests that the inequities of service in Vietnam, perceived or real, still matter to many Americans..."[17] The educators concluded that the war will remain a wedge issue dividing the fortysomething generation — soon to be the fiftysomething generation — for years to come. Any instructor seeking to be objective about the war has to address the explosive issue of service. During the seminar a teacher told the gathering that "going to Vietnam was easy," while protesting the war, on the other hand, required commitment. In order to highlight the "options," and the class nature of the war, I attempted to show what alternatives were available to a young draft eligible male: fleeing to Canada and rejecting your family; refusing induction and accepting a lengthy prison sentence; seeking a slot in the National Guard or Reserves; volunteering for the draft by enlisting; or accepting induction and taking your chances. Teachers who examine the young men and women sent to Vietnam can refute the illusion that the GIs were victims, "losers," "outcasts," "social misfits," or sociopaths like **Rambo**.

Most traditional historians teach the war by solely emphasizing decision makers and ignoring the combat experience. As a result they fail, as many veterans believe that Robert McNamara did, to contemplate the repercussions of those judgments. **In Retrospect**, the former Secretary of Defense belatedly refutes that assumption, but non-Vietnam veteran academics often imagine the 58,000 men and women on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the 300,000 wounded, and the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese killed as statistics. Tobias Wolff gets it right when he notes, "We did not die by the hundreds in pitched battles. We died a man at a time, at a pace almost casual."[18] The task before the instructor is to convey that message and to dispel the illusions presented by Hollywood and television. It is a daunting task and not one for the faint of heart.

The crowning achievement of the seminar came when Matt Brennan, the author of **Brennan's War**, attended and spoke about his experiences in Vietnam with a "Blue Platoon" (Recon) with the 1st Cavalry Divison. Matt was scheduled for an hour presentation, which turned into three hours. Normally a shy and reserved person, Matt was so moved by the reaction of the teachers that he agreed to return. I strongly urge others who contemplate offering a similar program to use Vietnam veterans in the workshop as much as possible. Their experiences and insights are invaluable and contribute immeasurably to closure

and the healing process for both veterans and non-veterans alike.

The participant evaluations revealed the success of the program. One young woman wrote: "I began questioning things I was otherwise ignorant about. Several times I got out of class, went for a long walk in an isolated area and cried. Those emotional outbursts were good for me — a healthy, healing process that I should have taken care of years ago." An experienced teacher, who opposed the war while in college, concluded that "this needs to be continued and would be a service to the nation if allowed to go national." Another educator claimed: "The value of this experience is incalculable."[19]

Instead of being the dregs of society, Vietnam veterans were the best the nation had to offer.

The grant has been refunded and "We Held The Day In The Palm of Our Hand II: Vietnam In History and Literature" was held on July 17 through July 21, 1995 and ninety-three teachers applied for the fifteen available spots. I followed the same format as I did during the first seminar. I wrote to numerous authors when planning this year's course including Robert S. McNamara, Tim O'Brien, Stephen Coonts, David Halberstam, Nelson De Mille, Oliver Stone, and David Hackworth. I invited all of them to attend and participate in the healing process by educating our teachers about the war. Nelson De Mille declined because of a prior commitments; but he, a veteran of the 1st Cav and author of **Word of Honor**, did donate fifteen copies of his book for this summer's participants.

I strongly urge other veterans in the profession to sponsor similar programs by utilizing their state humanities councils, local veterans and authors, particularly in states like New York, Massachusetts, California, and Oklahoma. Only by a concerted effort can teachers be prepared to teach about the Vietnam War and, in the process, dispel the negative images of Vietnam veterans. Instead of being the dregs of society, Vietnam veterans were the best the nation had to offer. They did their duty as had their fathers and forefathers before them. What happened later was a tragedy, when the veterans returned home from Southeast Asia, a tragedy related to our national myths, ingrained in our cultural heritage, and magnified in pathetic contrast with the American victory in World War II.

Recently, Tom Engelhardt has analyzed the problem and concludes that Americans after Vietnam "had experienced a profound loss that could no longer be captured in the idea of 'losing' a country. Instead they had evidently lost something of value in Vietnam."[20] Americans had lost their myths of national innocence and American exceptionalism in the jungles and rice paddies of Indochina. The myth is as old as the Republic itself and may have its origins with the execution of Nathan Hale and the development of an American national character.[21] Vietnam forced Americans to reexamine their national mythology and they did not like what they discovered. Only by instructing our teachers and students about the war can closure occur. Then the long and arduous process of healing the wound that has separated a generation for over two decades can begin and the ghost of Vietnam finally can be laid to rest.

Notes

[1] Loren Baritz, **Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way Did** (New York: Morrow, 1985) 19-54.

[2] Benjamin Schwarz, "The Diversity Myth: America's Leading Export," **Atlantic Monthly** May 1995: 58.

[3] H-TEACH Memo, April 27, 1995.

[4] H-TEACH Memo, April 27, 1995.

[5] Perry Oldham, "Some Further Thoughts on Teaching Vietnam Literature," **English Journal** 8 (Dec. 1993): 65.

[6] According to the Affirmative Action Office at the University of Iowa as of March 31, 1995, there are only 4 Vietnam veterans and 2 Disabled Veterans in the College of Liberal Arts out of a total work force of 1,168. That amounts to .531 percent. For the complete work force at Iowa, the percent is 1.4 in all categories of employment. The Affirmative Action Officer confessed to a "problem" in finding Vietnam veterans. See also R. W. Trewyn. "Discrimination Against Veterans by the Federal Agency Charged with Protecting Veterans' Rights." 1 (1994): 22-36.

[7] Ronald H. Spector, "'What Did You Do in the War Professor?': Reflections On Teaching About Vietnam," **American Heritage** 1 (Dec. 1996): 100.

[8] Spector 101.

[9] Peter C. Rollins, "Television's Vietnam: The Visual Language of Television News," **Journal of American Culture**, 4 (1981): 114-135; George Lipsitz, "Who'll Stop The Rain?: Youth Culture, Rock 'n' Roll, and Social Crisis" **The Sixties: From Memory to History**, ed. David Farber (Chapel Hill: NCU Press, 1994) 206-234; David E. James, "The Vietnam War and American Music," **The Vietnam War and American Culture**, eds. John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) 226-254; Louis A. Peake, **The United States in the Vietnam War 1954-1975: A Selected Annotated Bibliography** (New York: Garland, 1986) 281-290. I developed a more up-to-date filmography than found in most Vietnam War bibliographies.

[10] This is the filmography that I supply to all teachers in the summer seminar. I include in the filmography any film or video that deals with the war, Vietnam veterans, or has a Vietnam War theme.

Film	Year	Director
Air America	1990	Roger Spottiswoode
The Anderson Platoon	1966	Documentary
An Officer and A Gentlemen	1982	Taylor Hackford
Apocalypse Now	1979	Francis Ford Coppola
Bat 21	1988	Peter Markle

Born on the Fourth of July	1989	Oliver Stone
The Boys of Company C	1978	Sidney J. Furie
Braddock: Missing In Action III	1988	Aaron Norris
Casualties of War	1989	Brian De Palma
Catch-22	1970	Mike Nichols
Coming Home	1978	Hal Ashby
Courage Under Fire	1986	CBS
Dateline: Saigon	1986	CBS
Dear America	1988	George S. Brown
The Deer Hunter	1978	Michael Cimino
84 Charlie Mopic	1989	Patrick Duncan
Flight of the Intruder	1991	John Milius
Friendly Fire	1985	David Greene
Full Metal Jacket	1987	Stanley Kubrick
Gardens of Stone	1987	Francis Ford Coppola
Good Morning Vietanm	1988	Barry Levinson
Go Tell The Spartans	1978	Ted Post
The Graduate	1967	Mike Nichols
The Green Berets	1968	John Wayne
Hamburger Hill	1987	John Irwin
The Hanoi Hilton	1987	Lionel Chetwynd
Hearts and Minds	1970	Documentary
In Country	1989	Norman Jewison
Johnny Got His Gun	1971	Dalton Trumbo
The Killing Fields	1984	Roland Joffe
The Lords of Discipline	1983	Franc Roddam
Missing In Action	1984	Joseph Zito
Missing In Action II: The Begining	1985	Lance Hool
My Lai Remembered	1988	Documentary
Platoon	1986	Oliver Stone
Private Benjamin	1980	Howard Zieff
The Quiet American	1957	Joseph Mankiewicz
Rambo	1982	George Cosmatos
Rambo: First Blood	1985	George Cosmatos
Suspect	1987	Peter Yates
Taxi Driver	1976	Martin Scorcese
Television's Vietnam	1985	Peter Rollins
Tet	1988	CBS
The Ugly American	1962	George Englund
Uncommon Valor	1983	Ted Kotcheff
Vietnam: A Television History	1983	Documentary
Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day Day War	1980	Michael MacLear
The War At Home	1988	Documentary
The World of Charlie Company	1970	CBS

[11] Ronald H. Spector, "The Vietnam War and the Army's Self-Image" **Second Indochina War Symposium: Papers and Commentary**, ed. John Schlight (Washington: Center For Military History, 1984) 175: See also Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1985);

Andrew F. Krepinevich, **The Army and Vietnam** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986); Norman L. Russell (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993);

Alfred S. Bradford, **Some Even Volunteered: The First Wolfhounds Pacify Vietnam** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); James R. Ebert, **A Life In A Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam, 1965-1972** (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993); David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman, *About Face* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); and D. Michael Shafer, "The Vietnam Combat Experience: The Human Legacy," **The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagination**, ed. D. Michael Shafer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994) 80-103.

[12] Harry G. Summers, **On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War** (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982) 11-29; John Prados, **The Hidden History of the Vietnam War** (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995) 297.

[13] Tobias Wolff, "After The Crusade," *Time* 24 April 1995: 48; Christian G. Appy, **Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam** (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1993) 301-306.

[14] James Webb, **Fields of Fire** (New York: Pocket Books, 1978); John Del Vecchio, **The 13th Valley** (New York: Bantam, 1982); Tim O'Brien, **If I Die In A Combat Zone** (New York: Dell, 1969); Tim O'Brien, **The Things They Carried** (New York: Penguin, 1990); Matthew Brennan, **Brennan's War** (New York: Pocket Books, 1985); Charles Anderson, **The Grunts** (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1976).

[15] Rollins 316.

[16] See Peter Rollins, "Television's Vietnam: The Visual Language of Television News," **Journal of American Culture**, 4 (1981): 114-135; Peter Braestrup, **Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington** (New Haven: Yale, 1978); Don Kowett, **A Matter of Honor** (New York: Macmillan, 1984); Bob Brewin and Sidney Shaw, **Vietnam on Trial: Westmoreland vs CBS** (New York: Atheneum, 1987); Renata Adler, **Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland v. CBS et al.; Sharon v. Time** (New York: Knopf, 1986).

[17] James Fallows, "Low-Class Conclusions," **Atlantic Monthly** April 1993: 39; See also, D. Michael Shafer, "The Vietnam-Era Draft: Who Went, Who Didn't, and Why It Matters," **The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagination**, ed. D. Michael Shafer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990) 57-79; Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, **Change and Circumstance: The Draft, The War, and The Vietnam Geneation** (New York: Knopf, 1978); G. David Curry, **Sunshine Patriots: Punishment and the Vietnam Offender** (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985).

[18] Tobias Wolff, **In Pharaoh's Army: Memories of the Lost War** (New York: Knopf, 1994) 7; Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDemark, **In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam** (New York: Times Books, 1995) 191.

[19] Participant evaluations of "We Held The Day In the Palm of Our Hand': Vietnam In History and Literature." KHC Grant 94004SS. July 18-22, 1994, Fort Hays State University, Hays, KS 67601.

[20] Tom Engelhart, **The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation** (New York: BasicBooks, 1995) 259.

[21] See David M Potter and Thomas G. Manning, **Nationalism And Sectionalism In America 1775-1877: Selected Problems in Historical Interpretation** (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963) 1-31; See also, Lloyd Gardner, "America's War in Vietnam: The End of Exceptionalism?," **The Legacy: The Vietnam War in the American Imagination**, ed. D. Michael Shafer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990) 9-29.

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The Twisted Perspective of a Vietnam Curriculum

Dr. David M. Berman

"Curriculum Alert"—Watch what your children or neighbor's children are being "taught" regarding VN/SE Asia. There is presently a packaged study guide, put out by the National Council for the Social Studies, which is available to high school teachers throughout the country, and which is an abysmally warped version of VN. We should have no problem with discussing VN, or anything else, "warts and all," BUT, this "study guide" is historically invalid and erroneous. It simply is not accurate, comprehensive and worthwhile history, yet is portrayed as being just that. VN and SE Asia was and is far too important for any convoluted drivel, from any school of thought. Keep on alert for this, and do not be bashful about requesting equal time (Co Van My/Counterparts, 2).



A Reordering of Reality

In a moving commentary on the readjustment problems of American combat veterans, entitled "The Lessons of Vietnam," Steve Bentley wrote about his personal experience in Vietnam and his attempt to interpret that experience within the harsh glare of Vietnam combat casualties:

> It's important for anyone wanting to understand the Vietnam experience to realize that it was more than just a year in Vietnam. It was more than the lack of parades and the openly hostile or seemingly apathetic homefront. It went beyond the fact that the average age of the soldiers was 19. It was more than the perception of losing and that, for a very long time, the Vietnam vet was the disgraced scapegoat of the political right as well as the left. It was more even than the horror of guerrilla war. The experience of Vietnam was all of the things that took place in Vietnam and in the U.S. before and after Vietnam, and, for many of us, it was ultimately a reordering of reality. (14)

Bentley's commentary evolves into a personal journey that emerges

from the mythology of the American historical experience to confront the reality of the combat experience in Vietnam. He suggests that the realities of the combat he experienced are in sharp opposition to the manner in which we portray that experience in American popular culture. In this regard, Bentley writes about the realities of wartime:

> The bottom line in war is that people die. In my experience, they often died screaming, begging, and crying. It was brutal, terrifying, and senseless. At those moments, all the words, the ideology, and the politics mean nothing. Those abstract concepts don't even begin to measure against the stark and horrific finality of death before its time. (29)

As we are submerged in the sea of books, articles, films, and curricula that now appear on the contemporary scene professing to capture our experience in Vietnam, we might ask ourselves whether any of it begins to address "the bottom line" in the Vietnam war.

In this context, we confront here the well-publicized Vietnam Curriculum Project, entitled **The Lessons of the Vietnam War**, edited by Jerold M. Starr. In stark contrast to the humanity of combat veterans such as Steve Bentley, we witness Starr's academic psycho-babble as he attempts to justify the curriculum project. The project tries to "'humanize' the events and consequences of the war in ways that go beyond conventional narrative accounts," Starr writes, only then to reveal that the curricular objectives are couched in those pretentious "abstract concepts" of the academic arena (10). Witness the following statement:

> Although we consider the "grunt-level" perspective important, our learning objectives are much broader. We seek in this curriculum to teach students how to think critically about conflict resolution alternatives in international relations, reason ethically about difficult moral choices, and improve their understanding of people from other social backgrounds and cultures. (10)

Those grunts who once walked the "boonies" would no doubt appreciate the condescending reference to their perspective in favor of much broader learning objectives. I will argue in this analysis that the Vietnam Curriculum Project is, in the words of Steve Bentley, "a reordering of reality" designed to promote the academic agenda of the project editor at the expense of the "grunt-level perspective" of Americans and Vietnamese alike. As such, the project is academic propaganda promoted by an editor who appears to know nothing of these realities but who has nevertheless attempted to ordain what we teach our youth about the Vietnam

The Vietnam Curriculum Project is, in the words of Steve Bentley, 'a reordering of reality' designed to promote the academic agenda of the project editor at the expense of the 'grunt-level perspective' of Americans and Vietnamese alike.

War. Furthermore, Starr's failure to comprehend the wartime experience is compounded by his failure to understand the organization of contemporary social studies curriculum at the secondary school level. My analysis will focus upon the curricular objectives of the project, viewed primarily through the teacher's manual that organizes the curriculum, and the implementation of those objectives, viewed through the individual curricular units that comprise the curriculum. Starr's condescending reference to "the grunt-level perspective" in favor of "much broader" learning objectives is replicated throughout this curriculum, and our students thus gain, in the words of Co Van My/ Counterparts, "an abysmally warped version of VN" which undermines what are alleged to be "the lessons of the Vietnam War" (2).

Curricular Objectives

The Lessons of the Vietnam War was originally published in 1988 as "A Modular Textbook" for secondary and college level students by Starr's Center for Social Studies Education. The "modular textbook" consists of twelve curriculum units that cover a variety of topics related to American involvement in Vietnam. A "Teacher's Manual," entitled "Strategies and Resources for Teaching the Vietnam War," analogous to teacher's manuals that accompany social studies textbooks, is included with the curriculum units. In another version, also dated 1988, The Teacher's Manual had become Unit 13 of the curriculum. A revised version of the project advertised as a paperback student edition appeared in 1994 and a revised teacher's manual in 1993. This analysis, however, will focus primarily upon the original editions of the curriculum that appeared with explicit curricular objectives along with an extensive rationale of the underlying conceptual framework. (For a discussion of the revised edition, see endnotes).

As stated in the Teacher's Manual that organizes the project, the curricular objectives reiterate the fact that, in Starr's words, "our learning objectives are much broader" than "the grunt-level perspective." For the curriculum project entitled **Lessons of the Vietnam War**, we witness the stated objectives as follows:

> 1.Review the many aspects of the Vietnam War through a diversity of materials;
> 2.Teach students how to think critically about conflict and its resolution in international relations;
> 3.Teach students how to reason ethically about difficult moral choices; and
> 4. Help students better to understand people from social backgrounds and cultures different from their own. (2)

Of the four curricular objectives stated, only one of the four even mentions the Vietnam War. Indeed, the other three objectives emphasize critical thinking, ethical reasoning, and understanding peoples and cultures. The explicit message imparted by the curricular objectives is that teaching Vietnam is not the primary focus here; instead, the Vietnam War (note that we "review [my emphasis] the many aspects of the Vietnam War") has become the medium rather than the message and therefore the means to a more pedagogical end.

The following section of the manual is entitled "Critical Thinking

Explained"; here the work of Barry Beyer is advanced as a theoretical framework for teaching the Vietnam War. After listing "the basic operations" of the critical thinking approach, references to Kevin O'Reilly and his MARKER system to analyze historical cases, and an explanation of types of reasoning, a reference to Vietnam lies embedded in this section. "We chose to provide a plurality of views by featuring the personal statements of many different participants in the event [I thought this was a war, myself], not just political officials and their academic critics, but also American GIs, Vietnamese soldiers and peasants, and ordinary Americans for or against the war" (3). These statements are in the form of interviews, poetry, diaries, and songs, situated within the larger discussion of teaching critical thinking skills. Indeed, this is the only reference to the Vietnam War in the entire section and thus reiterates the belief that the Vietnam War has become the methodological means by which to implement those "much broader" curricular objectives.

In a section entitled "Videos and Guests," Starr notes that "we have invited Vietnam veterans and peace activists as guests to share the more intimate details of their very different experiences of the war as well as people with special knowledge of certain issues like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and its treatment or the facts surrounding the issue of soldiers M.I.A. and P.O.W." (4). Vietnam veterans have become an afterthought here, with an acknowledgement to those of us with PTSD, our fellow MIAs and POWs, thrown in with videos, films, and documentaries. The categorization of Vietnam veterans and peace activists together here might strike some as rather insolent; considering those who would protest the war, regardless of their honesty and convictions, within the same frame of reference as soldiers who fought and died in that war, strikes me, at least, as the insolence of someone who knows nothing about the combat experience. The intent becomes more pronounced in a "Speakers" section whereby seven "National Veterans' Organizations" are listed and ten "National Peace Organizations." At the state level, the speakers' list contains one reference for New Jersey (Vietnam Veterans United to Prevent WWIII), two for New York (to include the prevent WWIII group), and four references for Missouri to include the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and Richard ("Radio Rich") Dalton, a KSHE radio disc jockey.

Included in the Teacher's Manual, rather than accompanying the individual units, is a section entitled "Projects and Classroom Activities." Here each of the twelve curriculum units is organized according to suggested research projects and classroom activities; some contain an introduction for the teacher while the majority do not. Rather than curricular unit objectives organizing the unit topic, suggested research projects for the topic are presented first. Classroom activities are usually listed next to include what teachers, but not the project, refer to as lesson plans for specific class activities. For Unit 1 on Vietnamese history and culture, what passes for two lesson plans is offered that include activity objectives. For Unit 3 on the legality of the war, one lesson plan is included. For Unit 4 on who fought the war, one lesson plan directed towards one classroom activity, entitled "Examining Racism," is included. There are no unit objectives in either the Teacher's Manual or in the

individual curriculum units by which to organize these units. The only learning objectives offered are those that organize selected daily activities and the majority of these objectives are not stated in behavioral terms. To cite the objectives from one classroom activity entitled "Role-Playing a Forum on the Nature of War" for Unit 2:

Upon completion, the students should:

> 1. Understand how central this historical question was to justifying the positions of groups for and against the war;
>
> 2. Understand the interests and reasons central to the arguments of groups for and against the war;
>
> 3.Get a sense of the emotional intensity of this debate. (11)

The failure here to write instructional objectives in behavioral terms for the activity suggests the inadequacy of those very objectives. This failure reinforces the impression that the Teacher's Manual is a haphazard and inadequate attempt to transform the curriculum that Starr field-tested in his classes at West Virginia into the instructional process at the secondary school level. The explicit nature of the curricular objectives, whereby only one of the four actually refers to Vietnam, the lack of individual curriculum unit objectives, and the inadequate objectives for daily activities or lesson plans, together reveal an inferior curriculum project (see sndnotes). Instead, the project is more analogous to a social studies textbook (note that the curriculum is also referred to as "a modular textbook") whereby the text, complete with discussion questions, is accompanied by a teacher's manual with suggested research projects and classroom activities. To profess that twelve topical narratives which organize the history and politics of the Vietnam War, with no curricular organization at the unit level, and with accompanying teacher's manual, is curriculum, is misleading at best. This project is *not* curriculum but a pseudo-academic attempt to organize the teaching of Vietnam within the framework of "abstract concepts" that have nothing to do with the realities of the Vietnam War.

FIGURE 1

Unit 1: Introduction to Vietnam: Land, History and Culture
Unit 2: America at War in Vietnam: Decisions and Consequences
Unit 3: Was the Vietnam War Legal?
Unit 4: Who Fought for the U.S.
Unit 5: How the U.S. Fought the War
Unit 6: When War Becomes a Crime: The Case of My Lai
Unit 7: Taking Sides: The War at Home
Unit 8: How the War Was Reported
Unit 9: The Vietnam War in American Literature
Unit 10: The Wounds of War and the Process of Healing
Unit 11: Boat People and Vietnamese Refugees in the United States
Unit 12: The Vietnam War: Lessons from Yesterday for Today

Curriculum Units

The modular textbook/curriculum project (take your pick) as originally developed contained twelve individual curriculum units (see Figure 1).

A critical glance at the organization of the units suggests that the curriculum project is minimally concerned with the Vietnam War from the perspective of those who experienced the war. In this regard, the heart of the curriculum project should be units 4, 5, and 10 which focus upon the immediacy of the wartime experience. However, the majority of the other units represent subsidiary topics that instead have become Starr's curricular equivalent of the "grunt level" experience.

The curricular organization of the project suggests an emphasis upon the political framework within which the war took place as well as some of Starr's spin-off issues of the war era. Thus we have at the outset Unit 2 concerning the politics of the war and Unit 3 concerning the legalities of the war. Unit 7 concerns the ramifications of the war on the home front; Unit 8 concerns how the news media reported the war; Unit 9 concerns the literature of the war; and Unit 11 concerns the boat people. These topics are hardly unimportant, but when such secondary topics dominate the curriculum project, then teaching the Vietnam War becomes distorted to promote alternative curricular objectives.

A closer look at several units is called for here. Unit 5, for example, entitled "How the U.S. Fought the War," represents all the failures of the curriculum project in microcosm, an attempt by the editor to integrate different perspectives on the war within the curricular objectives of an abstract conceptual framework. We note here that the first curricular objective as stated in the Teacher's Manual, to "review the many aspects of the Vietnam War" is indeed what Unit 5 represents, an overview of how the United States fought the war. In this regard, the unit fails to honestly confront the realities of the combat zone. Since the other three curricular objectives ignore Vietnam entirely, teaching "how the U.S. fought the war" is couched within the curricular objective—"teach students how to think critically about conflict [not war] and its resolution in international relations." This unit reflects the implementation of the curricular objectives of the project, whereby we teach students how to think critically about conflict and resolving that conflict in political and diplomatic terms—which of course has absolutely no meaning to soldiers engaged in ground combat who must implement political objectives viewed through the body count as a measure of the war's progress.

"We fought the Vietnam war in cold blood," suggests Harry G. Summers:

> This cold-blooded approach to war was not unintentional. It was an outgrowth of the limited war theories that reduced war to an academic model. As we go back and read the writings of the political scientists and systems analysts on limited war, they are noteworthy for their lack of passion. The horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of the battlefield are remarkably absent. (62)

Summer's words epitomize the implementation of the curricular objectives of the project whereby teaching the Vietnam War is reduced to "an academic model." Nowhere is this distinction seen in more blatant form than in the very

unit which should confront "the horror, the bloodshed and the destruction of the battlefield." Instead, "the wounds of war" finally emerge in Unit 10, placed after the unit on American literature and before the unit on boat people, as if there was no connection between the combat zone and the casualties, almost as an afterthought.

Unit 5 reflects an editor's attempt to blend the work of one of the contributors, Joe Dunn (a combat veteran), with the writings of Starr himself, the second contributor, and fit this amalgamation within the framework of the curricular objectives. The result is a unit that becomes little more than a superficial history (my emphasis here) of American involvement in Vietnam. This history is organized in chronological progression (see Figure 2).

The fundamental idea of the curriculum unit is to organize knowledge for instructional purposes at the classroom level. Unit 5, however, is organized as a chronological history of American involvement in Vietnam—slightly more than one page in the Teacher's Manual supplements the unit. Four research projects and one classroom activity covering three class periods are suggested. In this regard, Unit 5 represents a superficial organization of content in historical and political terms and a minimal attempt at the organization of curriculum. Bona fide curriculum units should be organized by clearly stated curricular objectives, daily instructional objectives written in behavioral terms, and well-organized classroom activities to organize content. Given the absence of such objectives and the methodology by which to implement the objectives, Unit 5 fails to organize knowledge for instructional purposes at the classroom level and reflects the weaknesses on the project at the unit level.

Curriculum Perspectives

The quality of the individual curriculum units vary by topic and by

FIGURE 2

The Advisory Role: 1955-1960 (approximately 1/2 page)
The Counterinsurgency Program: 1961-1964 (1 page with picture)
The U.S. Enters Into Combat: 1965-1967
(7 pages with 1 full-page cartoon, 1 full page poem, 1 picture, 1 diagram, and 1 enlarged quotation)
The Air War: 1965-1967
(4 pages with 1 full page picture, 1 3/4 page poem, and 1 smaller picture)
Pacification: 1967 (1&1/4 page)
The War Turns Bad: 1968
(approximately 3 pages with 1 large cartoon, 1 smaller picture, 1 full page quotation entitled "The U.S. Destroys Hue to Save It," and 1 1/2 page quotation)
U.S. Disengagement: 1972-1973
(approximately 2&1/2 pages with 1 full page with 2 pictures and 1 1/2 page cartoon).

author. Zack Earp, the Chair of the Education Subcommittee of Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), has told me that some of the units are well-received by teachers in the schools while others are not, perhaps because of what he cites as the perceived bias of individual units (Personal Communication). "In its present edition," the VVA withheld endorsement of the Vietnam Curriculum Project, referred to as "the CSSR/ESR [Educators for Social Responsibility] Lessons of the Vietnam War Course Curriculum" (32). The resolution appeared as follows: Neither the project nor revisions of the project have been brought up again for VVA consideration. A more pointed yet similar criticism by CO VAN MY/COUNTERPARTS, the organization of those who served in counterpart (advisory) roles in Southeast Asia, are presented in their Winter 1988 Sitrep (see headquote and Figure 3).

The general trend criticizing the project is reinforced by Douglas Pike in **Indochina Chronology** in a section entitled "Indochina Teaching Aids" (see Figure 4).

The criticisms are noteworthy primarily because they represent those very perspectives ignored by Starr in his justification of the project whereby the "grunt-level perspective" becomes of secondary importance to "much broader" learning objectives. Thus Counterparts suggests here in explicit terms — "keep on alert for this and do not be bashful about requesting equal time" (2). While expressed in somewhat differing tones, the criticisms share similar themes in suggesting just how "badly flawed" this curriculum appears. In particular, the curriculum is viewed as "ideologically skewed" by Pike, as promoting "partially inaccurate and ideologically biased materials" by the VVA, and as being "an abysmally warped version of VN" by Counterparts. Such concerns about ideological bias are also seen, in my view, in the attempt to configure the teaching of the Vietnam War to the curricular objectives of the academic model advanced by Starr.

Curriculum Units Revisited

Unit 12, entitled "The Vietnam War: Lessons from Yesterday for Today," the concluding unit of the curriculum, is so superficial that it begs description, appearing thrown together in haste simply to terminate the project. The unit comprises 24 pages to include one reference page, one page of graphic credits, one full-page cartoon, six one-

FIGURE 3

WHEREAS, it is not in the best interest of this organization to endorse and promote partially inaccurate and fundamentally biased materials thereby reflecting on the credibility and impartiality of the organization; therefore, be it

RESOLVED that endorsement and promotion of the CSSR/ESR LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR be withheld until materials can be rewritten to include input from VVA Chapters and others with expertise regarding the Vietnam experience; and be it finally

RESOLVED that endorsement and promotion cooperation be reconsidered by the Board of Directors after review by the 1990 State Chairs Conference (1989:32,36).

FIGURE 4

The recent past has seen the appearance of new curricula and other classroom aids. Unfortunately none of them is what could be termed fully adequate and some are not even acceptable.

Most ambitious is The Lessons of the Vietnam War (Jerold Starr, ed.), a 12-unit "modular textbook" curriculum. It consists of a teacher's manual and 12 unit guides. A well intentioned but badly flawed curriculum because:

1) Its basic concept is off center as indicated by "the lessons" in the title; teachers should teach the war as history or political science or whatever and leave the "lessons" to the geopoliticians.

2) It is extremely ethnocentric — actually not about the Vietnam War but about the U.S. in the Vietnam War.

3) It is ideologically skewed, making it unbalanced — overemphasizing the relatively trivial in terms of historical meaning (such as My Lai) while ignoring the truly significant (the profound change Vietnam had on the nature of modern warfare) (1988:32).

half page cartoons, three poems that comprise two and three-quarter pages, three pages of quotes and one-half page of "Discussion Questions." The title page is page 1 of the unit while the table of contents is page 1. At a maximum, there are nine and one-half pages of text between the thirteen and three-quarter pages of cartoons, poems, quotations, and credits. The text of the unit is organized into eight sections entitled as follows, with the amount of text noted here in parentheses:

The Importance of Vietnam
(2 paragraphs)
The Radical View of the War
(4 paragraphs)
The Liberal View of the War
(6 paragraphs)
The Conservative View of the War
(7 paragraphs)
Ideological Abuses of History
(1&1/4 pages)
Vietnam and Central America
(1 page of text)
Learning from History
(3&1/2 pages)
Conclusion
(2 paragraphs)

The organization of the unit and the shallowness of the text call into question the contributions of another writer here, George C. Herring, who is listed as one of the two authors. (Kevin Simons of Sayre School in Lexington, Kentucky, is listed as the other).

The Teacher's Manual includes just over one page on Unit 12 and mentions seven research projects and one classroom activity. The manual also contains three handouts for the unit, the first two of which accompany the classroom activity: (1) "The Vietnam War: Two Perspectives;" and (2) "What is Faulty Reasoning." Handout (3) entitled "Crisis in Quechuria," is a role play involving the emergence of leftist guerrillas in a fictional Latin American country. As with the other curriculum

units, there are no curricular objectives for Unit 12 that organize either the text or the instructional process. The only objectives here are those for the one classroom activity and appear as follows:

> 1.Respond to a set of basic questions about the Vietnam war from radical, liberal and conservative perspectives;
> 2.Evaluate the other groups' responses and identify appeals to emotion, logical fallacies, unprovable givens, and misuses of historical analogies;
> 3.Write personal answers to each of the basic questions about the war, avoiding the use of faulty reasoning as identified in the activity. (31)

Viewed in its entirety, the implicit objectives for the unit, as with the other eleven units, must therefore be viewed within the larger framework of the curricular objectives stated in the Teacher's Manual. The objectives cited for the one classroom activity included suggest this is indeed the case.

The weakness of the curriculum project is further reflected in the very unit that professes to offer the reader something of the "lessons of the Vietnam War." Thus we are treated to three pages of quotations to include three quotes from CIA representatives, one from an NSC representative, and one from a news correspondent. There are two poems from soldiers and twelve sentences encompassing four paragraphs and perhaps one-quarter page devoted to their experience located in the eighth and concluding section entitled "Learning from History." The focus on "ideological abuses" and "radical," "liberal," and "conservative" views of the war suggests that the lessons of the Vietnam War are viewed here primarily in political and ideological terms relative to American historical involvement in the affairs of other countries. The counterpoint offered here to **The Lessons of the Vietnam War** is perhaps best expressed by Steve Bentley in "The Lessons of Vietnam" he learned under fire which suggest that viewing those lessons in such blatant ideological terms is "ultimately a reordering of reality."

Contributors

A list of "Major Contributors" is included in the Teacher's Manual. Of the twelve writers listed, two--Joe Dunn and Christopher Wilkens--are identified as Vietnam veterans. One writer, William Duiker, served with the State Department in South Vietnam. The poetry advisor, W.D. Ehrhart, is a combat veteran as is Steven Clarke, the Coordinator of Curriculum Development and Field Testing. Of the five Curriculum Developers listed, none is identified by service in Vietnam. The most unfortunate feature of the listing, however, is the failure of the editor to mention those contributors whose names he conveniently omitted. It is informative, to say the least, in describing the background of the curriculum project, Starr fails to discuss those unpleasant but significant events that shaped the project's development.

As one of the contributors to the project as it was originally conceived, I was witness to the removal of the project's editor, Don Luce, by Starr, and the ultimate defection, or disregard, of at least eight of the original contributors to the fifteen-unit project as it was initially designed. The concerns of these original contributors were based upon Starr's

failure to adequately explain the editor's removal and would translate into the manner in which Starr, as the new editor, would then edit their works. The important question here is not my personal dissatisfaction, but the degree to which these concerns shaped the development of the Vietnam curriculum and whether the curriculum has been constructed in the best interests of the students, a concern which I personally expressed to Starr by letter. The failings of Unit 5 and the shallowness of Unit 12, for example, serve as concrete representations of these concerns.

While other contributors can speak for themselves, such concerns were hardly unique to me or even to contributors whose names Starr has listed, and raise serious questions concerning the project's quality and veracity. Thus Sue Berg, for example, a high school teacher at Oak Park/River Forest High School in suburban Chicago, who wrote and field-tested the original My Lai curriculum unit, and under whose name it was originally published, is given no credit for her contribution because she refused to sign the release form because of her concerns for the integrity of the curriculum. The unit nevertheless appears in altered form as Unit 6 in the present version. To cite one letter, dated May 25, 1987, to "the Writers of the Vietnam Curriculum Project":

> Sue is concerned that Jerry continues to indicate that he is using her units despite the fact that she has informed Jerry that her units are not to be used. She has had serious concerns about the project over the past 2 years and has decided not to sign the release forms. She does not want her units to be part of the curriculum under the present circumstances which, she feels, threaten the integrity of the curriculum [and] depart from the original group intent. (1)

The concrete manifestation of these concerns is seen here in the quality of the individual units of the curriculum project--the point is that the unit as originally written by Sue Berg, is curriculum, while Unit 6 of the present project, written by Starr and Christopher W. Wilkens, is not. Indeed, this project, as an assemblage of individual units, is not curriculum and to represent it as such is misleading. And should anyone wish to see the curriculum unit written by Sue Berg entitled **My Lai: moral legal and psychological questions**, originally published as "a unit from the Viet Nam Curriculum Project," I have a copy.

Finally, in regard to the project editor, Starr's biographical sketch indicates that he is a Professor of Sociology at West Virginia University and Director of the Center for Social Studies Education in Pittsburgh (CSSE). (To be precise here, so as not to confuse the CSSE with the University of Pittsburgh, the Center is not an academic center but a corporation to publish the curriculum operated out of Starr's house in the Pittsburgh suburb of Mount Lebanon). The sketch notes that Starr "received his Ph.D. from Brandeis University and served on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania from 1969 to 1976." Where was Jerry during Vietnam? one might ask here, given no mention of his pre-1969 status. In a "Response to Berman," Starr answered my criticism of his editing a special journal issue on teaching Vietnam in the following personal terms—"Apparently our efforts look puny from the lofty heights of Berman's ivory tower, but

back in the U.S.A., George Bush was able to score points with the electorate on such`non-issues' as compulsory school prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance"(8). I would offer here, in personal terms, that while I was operating in Montagnard villages in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, Starr was enjoying life in "the lofty heights of [the] ivory tower" at private universities "back in the U.S.A." It thus seems clear why Starr has never emphasized his background during the Vietnam War as he has his other exploits. Neither has Starr emphasized his educational experience in the public school arena; his biography suggests (by omission) that he has no employment record as a public school teacher. Starr has developed and promoted a curriculum about "the Vietnam War," of which he has no professional military or academic experience, directed towards teaching "the lessons" to be gained from that war, to a population with whom he has had no professional teaching experience. This lack of credentials relative to Vietnam and schools is manifested in an inferior curriculum project and "an abysmally warped version" of Vietnam.

The Enemy to the Rear

In drawing the contrast between soldiers in the trenches and people on the homefront during World War I, Paul Fussell observes that "even if those at home had wanted to know the realities of the war, they couldn't have without experiencing them: its conditions were too novel, its industrialized ghastliness too unprecedented. The war would have been simply unbelieveable" (87). Yet it is precisely "those at home" who interpret the wars fought by their countrymen for future generations of students through the traditional academic channels of curriculum and textbook.

The opposition between soldiers who fight wars and civilians who interpret wars is an appropriate dichotomy here. Fussell writes that "the opposition between the troops and the enemy to the rear is like an odd resumption of the collision between Arnold's Educated and his Philistines, or between the Vulgarians and Aesthetes of the Nineties. Only here the role of the Sensitive is assumed by those who have been brutalized on the line while those who have remained unscarred are the Brutes" (89-90). Several wars later, "those who have remained unscarred" behind the lines remain "the Brutes" who glamorize the war in Hollywood movies or teach the "lessons of the Vietnam War" through the abstract concepts of a social studies curriculum project with condescending reference to those who have been brutalized at their expense.

In an unpublished essay on Vietnam war films, Alan Farrell, a professor of French and a Vietnam veteran, writes:

> I did learn the one secret known by all combat men, and I will tell it to you now, though you will not believe it: Men are more important than ideas. That is probably just the opposite of what you believe. You probably believe that wars are fought for ideas. Wars are started for ideas; they are fought for men ... The ideal may well be what gets you into a fight, but it is the last thing that keeps you fighting. In war men believe in men. When I see this simply and unalloyed truth—and the dignity it accords any man—surface as the guiding theme of a film, then I call that film a true war film and a film of true war. That's what you

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In drawing the contrast between soldiers in the trenches and people on the homefront during World War I, Paul Fussell observes that "even if those at home had wanted to know the realities of the war, they couldn't have without experiencing them: its conditions were too novel, its industrialized ghastliness too unprecedented. The war would have been simply unbelieveable" (87). Yet it is precisely "those at home" who interpret the wars fought by their countrymen for future generations of students through the traditional academic channels of curriculum and textbook.

The opposition between soldiers who fight wars and civilians who interpret wars is an appropriate dichotomy here. Fussell writes that "the opposition between the troops and the enemy to the rear is like an odd resumption of the collision between Arnold's Educated and his Philistines, or between the Vulgarians and Aesthetes of the Nineties. Only here the role of the Sensitive is assumed by those who have been brutalized on the line while those who have remained unscarred are the Brutes" (89-90). Several wars later, "those who have remained unscarred" behind the lines remain "the Brutes" who glamorize the war in Hollywood movies or teach the "lessons of the Vietnam War" through the abstract concepts of a social studies curriculum project with condescending reference to those who have been brutalized at their expense.

In an unpublished essay on Vietnam war films, Alan Farrell, a professor of French and a Vietnam veteran, writes:

> I did learn the one secret known by all combat men, and I will tell it to you now, though you will not believe it: Men are more important than ideas. That is probably just the opposite of what you believe. You probably believe that wars are fought for ideas. Wars are started for ideas; they are fought for men ... The ideal may well be what gets you into a fight, but it is the last thing that keeps you fighting. In war men believe in men. When I see this simply and unalloyed truth—and the dignity it accords any man—surface as the guiding theme of a film, then I call that film a true war film and a film of true war. That's what you

> look for ... Anything else is propaganda, and—for me—dishonesty. (3-4)

What we teach about the Vietnam War is dishonest if it fails to portray the truth and dignity accorded men under fire. The Vietnam Curriculum Project trivializes these truths. Indeed, such teaching is propaganda precisely because it suggests that there is anything, or anyone, more important than the men and women who fought and suffered this war, Americans and Vietnamese alike--ideology, politics, critical thinking, ethical reasoning, abstract concepts, or conflict resolution alternatives. What we have here, in Steve Bentley's terms, is "ultimately a reordering of reality" whereby the project editor makes condescending reference to "the grunt level perspective" in favor of "much broader learning objectives." In terms of this analysis, the **Lessons of the Vietnam War** is propaganda precisely because it fails to address the simple and unalloyed lessons that thousands of unnamed and unknown soldiers learned under fire, and that Jerold M. Starr, then at Brandeis and Penn, did not.

Notes

The revised Teacher's Manual, dated 1993, now refers to "Projects and Activities for Teaching the Vietnam War" in lieu of the original reference to "Strategies and Resources." The discussion of "Curriculum Objectives" has been eliminated, and there are no explicitly stated curricular objectives for the project. The subsection on "Critical Thinking Explained" that followed the discussion of curricular objectives has also been removed as have sections on the "Field-testing Program" and "Documentary Films/Filmstrips and Videocassettes." There are no "Acknowledgements" which cite the CSSE Board of Directors, the CSSE Advisory Board, the Funders, and Special Friends, and there is no "Speakers'" section listing Veterans' and Peace Organizations.

The revised manual now refers to the "Chapter/Unit," i.e., "Chapter/Unit 3: Was the Vietnam War Legal?" Eleven of these "chapter/units" have remained the same. One, Unit 9, "The Vietnam War in American Literature," has been eliminated in favor of a new Chapter/Unit 9, "Women's Perspectives on the Vietnam War." There are still no individual unit objectives and the only instructional objectives are those for selected daily activities. For Chapter/Unit 1 on Vietnamese history and culture, what passes for two lesson plans remains. For the classroom activity on "Role-Playing a Forum on the Nature of War" for Chapter/Unit 2, the objectives remain the same. For Chapter/Unit 3 on the legality of the war, there are two lesson plans rather than one. For Chapter/Unit 4, who fought the war, the one lesson on racism is removed in favor of two new lessons. For Chapter/Unit 5, how the U.S. fought the war, the four suggested research projects and the one activity remain the same, while one new activity has been added. For Chapter/Unit 12, the lessons of the war, four of the seven research projects remain. One new lesson has been added.

Advertised as a paperback student edition, the revised version of the curriculum, dated 1994, makes no reference to the project as a "modular textbook," yet the "Units" of the original version and the "Chapter/Units" of the Teacher's Manual are referred to here simply as "Chapters." The three-page introduction by Starr reiterates the project rationale referring to it as both a

curriculum and as a textbook. The reference to one author has been removed, one author has been added, Lady Borton, and one curriculum developer, Mary E. Haas, now appears as an author. References to the other four curriculum developers, and the reference to Steven Clarke as Coordinator of Curriculum Development and Field Testing, have been removed . W.D. Ehrhart is still the Poetry Advisor.

Chapter 5, "How the U.S. Fought the War," appears virtually unchanged in terms of both organization and content. The table of contents for the chapter has been removed as have references to the Curriculum Developers and Reviewers. The bulk of Chapter 12, "The Vietnam War: Lessons from Yesterday for Today," also appears virtually unchanged in terms of organization and content. The advertisement on the back of the paperback edition suggests that it "includes extensive coverage of the Persian Gulf War," yet the revised version simply substitutes a section on "Vietnam and The Persian Gulf" for the "Vietnam and Central America" section in the original version. "Often-cited comparisons between Vietnam and Nicaragua and El Salvador provide a good example of the limitations of reasoning by historical analogy" begins the section in the earlier version (12). "Comparisons between Vietnam and the recent Persian Gulf War provide a good example of the limitations of reasoning by historical analogy," begins the section in the revised version (330). With the same quotations and cartoons, the chapter concludes with the same "Learning From History" section and the same subsections organized in the same fashion. There are several minor changes in text. Ten of the eleven discussion questions that close the chapter remain. Question 7 has been changed as follows:

> What are the major similarities and differences between Central America and Vietnam? Might these differences lead to different results? Explain. (21)

> What were the major similarities and differences between the Persian gulf and Vietnam? Did these differences lead to different results? Explain. (340)

Some five years after his condescending reference to the soldier's experience, Starr has now incorporated this reference into the revised curriculum in virtually the same terms. Although the curricular objectives have been removed from the revised editions, Starr reiterates these objectives in the revised "Introduction":

> While we consider the "grunt-level" perspective important, our learning objectives are much broader. We seek in this curriculum to teach students how to think critically about conflict resolution in international relations, reason ethically about difficult moral choices and better understand people from other social backgrounds and cultures. The Vietnam War is a powerful vehicle for teaching those analytical skills youth need to become informed citizens (v)

Instructional objectives serve to integrate the content of the lesson, the evaluation procedures, and the student learning outcomes. Instructional objectives focus the teacher's daily lesson plan and should therefore be written in behavioral terms to operationalize the instructional process.

Written with precision and clarity in behavioral terms, students then know the expected learning outcomes and can explicitly demonstrate they have mastered the content. One standard social studies textbook explains instructional objectives as follows:

> A useful rule to remember in developing social studies instructional objectives is that they should be written in terms that identify student behaviors. This will keep you from writing objectives in vague, difficult-to-assess terms. Terms such as to know, to understand, to be aware of, and to appreciate have different meanings for different people. Thus, they are nonoperational - that is, they connote no specific behavior on the part of the student. On the other hand, terms such as to list, to classify, to predict, and to compare give specific clues as to what is expected of a learner (Ellis, et. al., 103).

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On the Construction of Cultural Knowledge: The Next Generation Asks 'Why Vietnam?'

Pamela Hunt Steinle

In the spring of 1988, **American Heritage** featured an article by Oklahoma junior high school teacher and Vietnam veteran Bill McCloud titled "What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?" In 1985, McCloud had asked over 700 junior high students what they knew about the war in Vietnam, and what questions they were most interested in having answered. McCloud then wrote letters to "decision makers" and "leading voices" of the Vietnam era, asking what they thought were "the most important things for today's junior high students to understand about the Vietnam war?" The **American Heritage** article summarized the responses of the students, and then presented extended statements from 52 of the "spokespersons," including Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush, POW and recent Vice-Presidential candidate James Stockdale; military and administration advisors Laird, McNamara, Rusk, Salinger, and Westmoreland; critics Fitzgerald, Hayden, Kesey, Paxton, and Seeger as well as several war correspondents.[1]

Perhaps because the question asked about "understanding," the answers of these leaders, with few exceptions, were structured as moral lessons about America's role in the world and offered revised criteria for American military assistance in the future. These answers evaded the questions raised in McCloud's junior high survey which indicated that his students wanted knowledge of more basic "things." Student responses disclosed that the majority knew five things about the war in Vietnam: that "many Americans were killed;" "it took place in Vietnam;" "the United States lost;" that "American POW's are still being held;" and that "it took place in the 1960s and 1970s." The top five questions they wanted answered were:

(1) "What was the cause?"

(2) "When was the war?"

(3) "How many Americans were killed?"

(4) "What countries fought in the war?"

(5)"Who won?"

Seven years later, the seventh and eighth graders of 1985 are the peers of the freshman and sophomore college students that fill my 230-seat general education course on "the American character." In the fall of 1991, I began teaching a section on the Vietnam war at the close of the course. Student comments in conversation, on exams, and on course evaluations repeatedly indicated that, prior to the course, they knew or believed they knew "basically nothing" about America's war in Vietnam — and that they wanted to know and valued the Vietnam section highly. In the fall of 1992, I decided to survey my students in the opening of the semester, asking them to write a brief, anonymous (and unexpected) essay about "what they know about the war in Vietnam" and "what they would like to know," identifying only their age, gender, and "any relation to a cultural participant in the era of the Vietnam war." One hundred and seventy one responses later, their answers inspired this exploratory essay.

What They "Know" About Vietnam

I found that their essays closely duplicated the reactions of their Oklahoma peers before they entered high school, much less college. They "know," for example, that many Americans died, but they're not sure if that means hundreds or millions. They know that the war took place in Vietnam but they describe the "Allied and Axis division," the "bombing of Hiroshima," and involvement in "North and South Korea." Some state that 'we lost," others "think we might have lost," and many are unsure of who won or who "the enemy" was ("Who are the Viet Kong [sic]?"). They know it was "a long war," and, although they are not sure when it began, they know it ended in the early 1970's. They "know," and here I quote from their essays, that:

> "Many innocent people were killed and Americans killed their own people because they were hallucinating and going crazy a lot. We lost many Americans and most are not proud of that war."
>
> "What I know is that it shouldn't have happened."
>
> "There isn't very much I know ... except that many people were against it, there were many protests, and many vets were traumatized for life, many are still missing in action, I think."
>
> "Many lost their lives and others their sanity .... Not all vets are insane, many, like my father, are perfectly well-adjusted people in society."

These statements incorporate the strongest areas of student "knowledge" about the war — in frequency of expression, accuracy of information, and confidence of statement. Student knowledge was highest regarding the war's controversial status: out of 73 students commenting on this aspect of the war, 44 students knew that it was protested, an additional 20 noted that the war was "unpopular," and 19 specifically pointed out its divisive impact on the nation. As one student put it, "the only issue to passionately split people's views today anywhere near the Vietnam era is possibly the war of abortion."

The second most commonly stated fact was one that may seem obvious when the topic at hand is war, however, 56 students chose to emphasize that "many people died" as a consequence of America's involvement in Vietnam. This fact was closely followed by "knowledge" of the ill-treatment of vets upon their return home and of the "suffering" of vets—then and now. However, many of the fifty-four students who wrote about veterans phrased their knowledge in question form, highlighting the difference between knowing and understanding. One can hear in their words the influence (and mistrust) of media depictions of Vietnam veterans as well as more personal observations. A student whose uncle served in Vietnam questioned, "Since it seems to affect people so much, I would like to know what actually happened to those people sent to Vietnam to fight," while others asked:

> "Why did the vets catch so much crap when they returned home?"
>
> "If the protesters didn't like the war, then why did they treat the soldiers like the enemy instead of the politicians?"
>
> "Why haven't the people who served been helped? Why do we see them on the street with homeless signs and 'will work for food' signs?"

The nature of the fighting in Vietnam was another area of common knowledge. Of 42 students who wrote about American combat experience, 26 described "jungle-fighting" and "guerilla warfare," 12 made broad references to the war's "atrocities," and 4 pointed out that American military forces were "poorly prepared for that kind of war." As to the war's outcome, only 24 students chose to acknowledge that "we lost." Signaling the dissonance of this "fact" against paradigmatic assumptions of the righteous, mighty, and victorious nature of American military engagements, considerable strain was evident in the evasive language they used in place of words such as "loss" or "failed":

> "The war ended without accomplishing a victory."
>
> "The war itself proved futile, its objective not being met."
>
> "It was not a successful war."
>
> "The Vietnam war was not considered a win."

What They Do Not Know

Finally, my students were only too aware of what they did not know. Twenty-nine students admitted that their knowledge of the war in Vietnam was "pretty slim" or that they knew "nothing really." Of note, this was the only area of student response in which gender was a factor: twenty-six of the twenty-nine were female, in a class with slightly more than a third male enrollment. Yet when these particular responses were analyzed in the context of the complete essays of all students, I found that men and women were equally informed or misinformed. This suggests that the absence of direct admissions of "not knowing" among male students may reflect a greater difficulty of admission in the face of cultural assumptions about war as an arena of masculine expertise. Gender aside, these students opened their essays (or their list of questions) with equal and apparent discomfort. "It's

kind of embarrassing to say but I know very little about the whole Vietnam ordeal," one student wrote, while others stated more simply:

> "I know amazingly little about the Vietnam war." (male)
>
> "I honestly do not know a whole lot about Vietnam."
>
> "I am pretty much a blank state regarding the Vietnam war."

The Construction of Cultural Knowledge

Why has the war in Vietnam remained as "inscrutable" for the youth of 1992 as the Vietnamese themselves appeared to Americans in the ethnocentric perspective of the war years? The number one question that my students asked restated the number one question among McCloud's junior high students: "Why were we in Vietnam?" Except for the use of the past tense, this is the question that the American public asked repeatedly during the war years: the question that was painted in block letters across the protest banners of anti-war activists, that successive Presidential administrations tried to answer as did journalists and critics throughout the war, and that has not received a culturally agreed answer as yet. Dismissed by former national security adviser Walt Rostow as "that goddam silly question,"[2] it is my thesis that the cultural construction of popular historical knowledge of the war in Vietnam, among the American public, cannot begin without participant discourse — however complex —that responds to this question.

Popular historical knowledge, which is to say knowledge of an historical period as shared and commonly understood by participants of a given culture, reflects familiarity with both formal and popular accounts of a particular historical moment. The construction of formal accounts, "history books," is a cultural process as much as an intellectual task. As cultural participants themselves, scholars reflect the beliefs, values, and tensions of their own social-historical context as they address their evidence and construct their texts. Consequently, while the resulting accounts may be as objectively factual as possible, authorial determinations of what is included (and what is left out), what is highlighted, and the organization as well as the intonation of narratives are more subjective processes. Although many scholars recognize that such subjectivity exists in the construction of formal historical accounts, the naive reader, unfamiliar with the subject at hand, usually does not. Published historical accounts ("non-fiction") and especially textbooks have been shown to be received by the American public with more respect and regard than critical thinking — a reading sensibility rooted in the schoolroom presentation of historical texts as "weighty volumes" speaking in "measured cadences" and containing "the truth of things."[3]

As to the war's outcome, only twenty-four students chose to acknowledge that 'we lost.'

The subjectivity of "history" as it is presented in popular accounts, however, is more commonly recognized and, hence, the naive reader more

disposed to question and challenge their validity and inclusiveness. In fact, the muddying, blurring, and alteration of historical evidence for aesthetic reasons or entertainment value, is legitimized in popular accounts (i.e., commerical literature, film, and television) by audience acknowledgement of "artistic license," an understanding that these works do not intend the objectivity of formal texts. In fact, although popular accounts may emphasize the depiction of a specific historical period, the past is often used as a context for exploration of cultural themes, tensions, and conflicts pertinent to the contemporary moment of the text's construction. These accounts, then, convey a different sort of historical "truth."

While the "received truths" of a culture reflect familiarity with both sets of historical accounts, reliance on one form of information more so than others is largely a function of literacy, education, and accessibility. The reading of textbooks occurs primarily in the process of formal education, reading fiction at least requires literacy, bookstores and libraries are less handy than the television, and going to a movie is more sociable but also more costly. However, formal and popular accounts are not the only, nor suggestively even the most important, source of popular historical knowledge. These accounts are first considered and understood in the context of broader cultural participation, and the individual's grasp and interpretation of them is framed by institutional processes. The history textbook is selected and assigned to students by an instructor, based on educational requirements and his/her training; the decision to view a film or television special, or read a novel, is influenced by critical acclaim and advertisement. Behind it all, the interests of the producer/publisher of these accounts determines their existence — an interest most often based on their estimation of public interest qua marketability.

Indeed, if we look at the actual process of constructing cultural knowledge, at how a historical subject comes to be "learned and shared," such attempts to define and claim "public interest" reveal the most crucial factor of all: the people themselves. What is talked about — and what is not — in the course of daily life is a primary source of participant interest as well as information. Informal discussions with family, friends, and peers, classroom discussions "led" by the instructor, allusions in sermons and political rhetoric all define the initial framework of historical knowledge that is required for cultural currency.

What is talked about--and what is not--in the course of daily life is a primary source of participant interest as well as information.

That this is so is not so much disputed by those who study the transmission of cultural knowledge as it is disregarded in the tendancy to focus on formal and popular texts. Recent recognition of the role of the reader in the interpretation of texts has led to the development of theory and methods for the study of audience knowledge and response.[4] However, social discourse can also create a tacit construction of what might be called "negative knowledge:" a sort of cultural black hole for issues that are taboo. Discussions that come to a

sudden end via closed declarative statements, swift changes in topic, or outright silence, serve to censor interest as well as information, and to refuse recognition of the offensive issue. Often a tacit and verbally-based construction, negative knowledge may elude discovery in text-based studies of explicit audience knowledge. Interestingly, it may explain the stated responses of readers/viewers who "can't remember" or "didn't think anything about" an individual text: they "don't know" because they aren't supposed to know.

Unknowable Truths or Incomplete Narratives?

Cultural knowledge of America's war in Vietnam is a case in point, existing in this sort of informational "no man's land." Where veteran status in America previously connoted patriotism and courage, veterans of the war in Vietnam carry the stigma of "our mistake," "our failure," or both depending on one's perspective — a stigma identified even as it is refused in the occasional bumper-sticker proclamation, "VIETNAM VETERAN AND PROUD OF IT." In the rhetoric of the Bush administration, the war in Vietnam was a malignancy in the cultural memory: a source of knowledge that threatened to spread like a diseased growth (which Richard Nixon had earlier termed the"Vietnam syndrome"[5]) that was to be excised with surgical precision in Operation Desert Storm and to receive follow-up treatment in Operation Restore Hope.

The phrase "collective amnesia" has been used to explain as well as to capture the exhausted public silence of the American people from 1973 until 1982 when the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was unveiled in Washington, D.C. The absence of memory suggested by this metaphor was, at least on one level, contradicted by the increasing spiral of production of popular accounts (most notably in commercial fiction) that began in 1966 and is sustained today. Popular accounts of the war began to appear as early as 1963 in commercial and elite forms of fiction, prose, plays, diaries, and song lyrics, and have since expanded into the realms of film and television. Similarly, formal historical texts saw publication as early as 1963, if in smaller numbers, and continue to amass at the present moment with some discourse among them.[6]

Assuming exposure and familiarity with at least a few of these accounts, the lack of historical knowledge about the war in Vietnam among college students in the 1990's—students whose parents are of the "Vietnam generation"—is particularly striking. A war that was not fought on American soil, yet engaged the American public in the divisive sentiment and contest that came to be euphemistically referred to as "the war at home." A war that is contemporary, ending (for America) some twenty years ago, and yet is an appropriate subject for historical study and narrative as it began over forty years ago. And still the predominant question, as asked by my students, remains: why were we in Vietnam?

Variant explanations of our involvement in Vietnam certainly exist in the formal accounts, however a complex grasp of these texts requires the reading of at least a few of them. If it is unlikely that a naive reader will be able to select the range of texts representative of the discourse on this subject, it is a further stretch to imagine the normative student independently undertaking such a set of readings. Meanwhile, the texts that my

students were introduced to (in high school and in university survey courses) too often relied on simplistic reductions of historical explanation ("to stop the spread of communism"),[7] limited discussion to a boxed-off inset, or erred in their presumption of a contextual knowledge that the post-Vietnam era generation does not have.

For example, even if the American public during the war years was familiar with the domino theory and to some degree believed it was correct, it did not necessarily explain our presence in Vietnam nor guarantee support for U.S. involvement. Administrative explications of the domino theory and the need to fight the spread of communism were vague and unconvincing—or increasingly suspect—to many participants in the Vietnam era. If some of the protest against the war in Vietnam reflected the more broadly anti-war stance of pacifism or the more specific resistance to the draft, much of it had to do with the absence of clear and explicit grounds for support of the Vietnam war in particular. And latter-day explanations of the contexts for America's involvement in the war, necessary for Americans coming of age in the 1990's, require acknowledgements which Americans of the "Vietnam generation" may not be willing or able to make. When the "dominos" didn't fall (to continue the example) behind Saigon, a focal line of justification became a costly mistaken theory, compounding the sense of loss connected with the war.

Not surprisingly, then, my students expressed considerable suspicion that they "have not been told the whole truth" of America's involvement in Vietnam. Fifty-nine students thought that the Vietnam war had "something to do with the spread of communism,"[8] but twenty-four pointed out that this did not explain "why our young boys had to go fight their war," or "what the reason for U.S. involvement was." While eighteen students "knew" that Vietnam "was a war we shouldn't have been in," twenty-one students questioned "what the real reason was," and, more directly, "what was the hidden agenda?" Aware that they lack knowledge of "the specifics," the students did not lack interest in the subject: their questions were numerous and thoughtful in themselves, and many used adjectives suggesting sincere inquiry. Many students ended their anonymous essays by repeating the questions they were interested in and "hoped would be answered." One student implied some familiarity with the domino theory (and its insufficiency) when she asked in closing, "We didn't want to spread communism but why did we really care so much about Vietnam," while another student stated more directly, "I would like to know the basics of why, who, what, and when."

As noted earlier, many students knew of that the war was protested but fifteen explicitly wanted to know "what the protests were about." Indeed, they were particularly curious about the relationship between the war, protest, and "government by the people;" between American ideals and cultural practice in the Vietnam era. "I would like to know how our country, America, being that we are suppose to be a country that cares so much for our people, could send them to a war that was so wrong in many Americans views," asked one student, while another asked "Why, in a democracy, did the American people (at that time) not stop the war?" In a follow-up to "that damn silly question," yet another student asked,"Why weren't the soldiers, and

even our citizens, able to spell out exactly why we were fighting there?"

Related questions about the length of the war were raised by twenty-seven students and again reflected their beliefs about the lack of public support. However, these questions were most often framed in terms of the recent "short-term win" in the Persian Gulf. Reflecting the dissonance in their statements about the war's end, only three students (out of 171) wanted to know "why we lost," but fifteen students wanted to know why we didn't fight — and implicitly win — like we did in past and more contemporary wars. "Should have gone in to win, not just hang out," said one student, "I would like to know why the U.S. wasn't able to just wipe them out?" Perhaps reflecting the ideological success of President Bush's surgery in the Gulf, another student asked, "Why didn't we just bomb the hell out of them, like Desert Storm?" Yet another student's response suggested a generational strain as he noted with apparent disdain that "Dad dodged the draft by going to Azusa Pacific Theological Training," and then continued on to ask, "Why didn't we just nuke'em, like Japan?"

If the teachings of educators can be as discouraging as they are instructive, the silence of family members is an even more powerful source of negative knowledge.

Silences and Omissions

It is not within the scope of this paper to argue why the answers to these questions are especially painful for Americans of the "Vietnam generation" as well as older Americans, or why complex explanations of economic or political aspects of the war are nearly as difficult. Suffice it to say at this point that admissions of error, poor judgement and bad faith — required in complex and contextualized answers — may be reason enough for the lack of a shared explanation. Yet the responsibility to educate future generations remains a central cultural task, and it is one in which it seems we are currently failing. "I really don't know very much at all but I hope to learn something from this class," wrote one student in the opening of her essay, "None of my other history classes have gone over it in detail. Therefore, I am somewhat oblivious to the facts of the war."

Actually, less than 10% of my students mentioned any formal education about the war in Vietnam — and those who did wrote of the insufficiency of their academic introduction to the war. While some students wrote about the silence of teachers who "just skimmed the subject very briefly" or "never got to discussion of the readings, just gave us a quiz," others were expansive. "I don't know much about it at all," stated one young woman, "Everything I learned about it in high school was of no importance to the real issue. I was never properly taught about it." "I would like to get into the specifics about exactly why America went to war in Vietnam," asked a male student, "I have learned some general reasons for U.S. involvement, but there is a link missing to me, a piece of the puzzle."

These statements identify the transmission of incomplete information which is in itself a form of negative knowledge. Students sense that "there is more to the story" than what they have been taught, and a few suspect that the incompleteness is intentional. "It appears that our country has not told us all the truth, almost like it never happened," wrote one student, while another stated that "the Vietnam war era seems to be kept like a secret." And if the teachings of educators can be as discouraging as they are instructive, the silence of family members is apparently an even more powerful source of negative knowledge.

Fifty-seven of my students have fathers or uncles who are Vietnam veterans and three have parents who were anti-war activists, giving these students access to first-hand information. Yet their essays demonstrated either equivalent or less "knowledge" than their "un-related" peers, and their statements suggest why they have not learned about Vietnam. The daughter of a veteran who "was one of the first infantries to arrive in Vietnam and fought on the front lines," wrote, "I really do not know alot about the Vietnam war," and then asked pointedly, "I would like to know why it is like a taboo subject to talk about." Several other students commented about familial silence —fathers and uncles who "rarely discuss" or "have never spoken a word about it." "My father was drafted and sent to Vietnam," explained one student, "my uncle was also in the Vietnam war. They both came back — messed up. I'm not sure what the war was about. But I do know that I don't think it was handled properly."

The children of veterans were not only more aware of their lack of knowledge but they also tended to feel worse about it, as if not knowing reflected a personal failing on their part. As one young woman guiltily explained, "I believe my uncle was involved with the war. Its never talked about...I don't clearly remember ever being taught about it. It was like I should have already known about it." " I know that I should know more about what happened in the war, however I know very little (if anything)," wrote another student, adding in apparent explanation of her sense of expectation that "my dad (46) served in the Vietnam war." In other responses, incomplete explanations translated into incorrect or limited knowledge. One student bluntly stated "My Dad was a part of it," and then recounted what little information his father had told him, beginning with "The Vietnam war was a long fought war in the Viet Congo [sic]. American soldiers . . . would be blown up by these rigged

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The construction of social knowledge must begin with the explanation of how and why a historical moment came about ('What was the cause?' and 'Why were we in Vietnam?') -- whether we are proud of the explanations or not.

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villagers. So the American soldiers started having to kill everyone."

Children of the anti-war activists didn't fare much better but for different reasons. Two of the three expressed that their familial knowledge of the war was so explicitly negative that they were "turned off" to further study. Out of twenty-one students who responded negatively to my "what would you like to know" prompt, one of them identified himself as the "son of a war-protester" and then wrote "Nothing, because what is there to know that we had to suffer for a bunch of crooks in the White House and it is boring. I'd rather talk about WWII." Yet the children of anti-war activists were not the only ones who were tired of negative information. "My father was on the front line of the war. . . . We shouldn't have been there because it wasn't ours to fight," was the comment of one student who went on to explain that she had "heard enough stories from my father to cause prejudism against Vietnamese for the rest of my life — and I don't want to know anymore."

Faced with silence, avoidance, and negative or limited discussion among family and teachers regarding Vietnam, my students turned to the increasing spate of popular accounts filling movie screens and bookstores across America like so many peepshows, offering a tantalizing look into the cultural closet without explaining the relation of its contents to public life. Films and television were the most frequently mentioned sources of familiarity with the war in Vietnam, but my students did not consider them to be particularly trustworthy sources of information because of their recognized subjectivity. "I don't really know any specifics about the Vietnam war," wrote one veteran's son, "I used to watch 'China Beach' all the time and I kind of got some of the feelings about that time." Noting that he was "not sure on facts," another student demonstrated not only distrust of popular accounts but their contextual dislocation as he explained,"Don't know much. American troops sent to Vietnam for what reason I'm not sure. Seen movies such as **Platoon**, etc." "I've seen lots of movies which may or may not be accurate accounts of the way Vietnam really was for American soldiers but they painted a very bleak picture," wrote one student, while another student was more to the point: "I know a lot of what I've seen in films portraying the Vietnam War — mostly negative. What I've seen was not anything to be proud of."

Coming To Terms:
Toward Cultural Reconciliation

Not anything to be proud of. If the war in Vietnam cannot be "considered a win," does it necessarily follow that there is only room for shame? As many G.I.s returning from Vietnam were not only denied celebratory public receptions and "welcome home" rituals but were instead greeted with public scorn, why did this denial foster silence and subterranean anger instead of giving rise to immediate and outspoken demands for due recognition? If we cannot valorize our involvement in Vietnam along the lines of previous wars, does this mean we can only focus on the pain, suffering, and atrocities of combat, the craziness of the war and (by implication) of the warriors? Does the popular mythology foster discourse or does it actually encourage silence among vets whose experiences ("in country" or after their return to "the world") don't fit the images of **The Green Berets**, **Apocalypse Now**, or **Born on the Fourth of July**? What happens to the fact that the

nature of American military experience in Vietnam was diverse, dependent upon one's location in greatly disparate frames of time and geography, branch of service, rank and responsibility. Similarly, what happens to the sentiments of fully ninety-percent of Vietnam veterans responding to a 1980 Harris poll who agreed with the statement "Looking back, I am glad I served my country," and the fifty-four percent who agreed that "I enjoyed my time in the service."[9] Are they able to make those same statements in public? And what other aspects of our involvement in Vietnam are being evaded as we direct our attention to accounts, fiction and non-fiction alike, which focus on the G.I. and the angst of the veteran—accounts which rarely offer any explanation of where Vietnam is or what the war was about, much less why Americans were there. Whether or not there is much to be proud of, the history of America's war in Vietnam holds much for us to learn.

Extrapolating a theory of the cultural construction of historical knowledge from this data, I believe that popular historical knowledge about the war in Vietnam demonstrates that both formal and popular historical accounts are rendered impotent when their *raison d'etre* is lacking or is not apparent in the accounts themselves. Taking up an essentially taboo or negative subject, these accounts will not be retained or find a place in the existing construction of cultural knowledge, nor can they suggest a new framework. The construction of cultural knowledge must begin with the explanation of how and why a historical moment came about ("What was the cause?" and "Why were we in Vietnam?")—whether we are proud of the explanations or not. Moral lessons and injunctions to "learn from the mistakes of the past" come across as excess verbiage, devoid of meaning, when the intentionality and motivation of past behavior and belief is unknown. Lacking explanation, the purpose of the retention of this knowledge, the reason for its incorporation into the "received truths" of the culture, is unclear and hence may be discarded as useless or, in the terminology of the 1960s, without relevance. In the case of American culture and the war in Vietnam, the possibility of constructing popular historical knowledge is effectively denied as the "negative knowledge" of the discomfort and silence of family and teachers tells the present generation that "not knowing" is preferable to the pain of understanding.

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[1] Bill McCloud, "What Should We Tell Our Children About Vietnam?" in *American Heritage*, May/June 1988, pp. 55-77.

[2] As quoted in Marilyn Young's recent study, *The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p.ix. This statement appears at the opening of Peter Davis' controversial 1974 documentary film, *Hearts and Minds*. Rostow successfully sued for removal of this statement from the film as the remark was recorded while the film crew was setting up and not within the context of Rostow's actual interview with Davis. Inexplicably, rental copies of the film still carry Rostow's "off-the-cuff" remark, serving the film's exposé theme about the putative callousness of American leaders.

[3] See Frances Fitzgerald's critical study of the processes of publication and revision of American history textbooks, *America Revised* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). Fitzgerald made her own contribution to the construction of cultural knowledge of America's involvement in Vietnam in her provocative (if subjective) analysis of the war, *Fire in the Lake* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

[4] Stanley Fish's *Is There A Text In This Class?* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980) is the seminal theoretical work in this field, while Janice Radway's *Reading the Romance:Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature* (Chapel Hill: No. Carolina UP, 1984) and Jane Tompkin's *Sensational Designs:The Cultural Work of American Fiction* (New York: Oxford UP, 1985) turn theory into practice as they define and investigate audience interpretations of the text in their studies of popular literature.

[5] George C. Herring credits Nixon with the coining of this term, signifying that "American failure in Vietnam and the backlash from it ... (were) primarily responsible for the malaise that... allegedly reduced the United States to a state of impotence in a menacing world." See "The Vietnam Syndrome and American Foreign Policy," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 57 Autumn 1981, p.594. Nixon's *No More Vietnams* (New York: Arbor House, 1985) offers an expanded explanation of his perspective on America's involvement in Vietnam and its significance as well as its legacy for contemporary American foreign and military policy.

[6] I found Phillip Beidler's *American Literature and the Experience of Vietnam* (Athens: Georgia UP, 1982) and Michael Anderegg's anthology *Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television* (Phildelphia: Temple UP, 1991) to be most helpful in documenting the early popular accounts. Marilyn Young's *The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990* was useful in identifying the early formal accounts.

[7] Among the students who did acknowledge prior formal study of the war in Vietnam (less than 10% of those surveyed), this phrase was repeated without expansion as the explanation for American involvement. This may reflect course lecture and student study techniques in preparation for reductive examinations (i.e., multiple choice examinations constructed for ready evaluation via electronic scanning devices) as much or more so than the limits of textual explanations.

[8] Although the total of 59 students here is higher than the number of respondents noted earlier as the second and third most commonly stated "facts," the general vagueness and doubtfulness/questioning that characterized the students' comments on the role of communism I took as evidence of their insecurity about their lack of knowledge rather than evidence of actual knowledge.

[9] Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., *Myths and Realities: A Study of Attitudes Toward Vietnam Era Veterans* (Washington: Veterans Administration, 1980). I am indebted to Peter C. Rollins' review essay, "Vietnam and American Culture," (*Journal of American Culture*, 1991, 14.4: 77-84) which brought this study to my attention.

NO
by Phoebe S. Spinrad

The faces of the refugees
Have haunted me all these years.
Helplessness. Guilt.
I failed them. We failed them.
Should have done more.

No.
The helplessness wasn't my choice;
I did what I could.

No. We,
the names on the Wall,
the wounded, the missing,
the waiting ones on the fringes,
the nurses, the medics, the PJs, the trash-haulers,
even the paper pushers,
the ones who came home to be spat on,
the ones who came home to be called murderers . . .
we tried,
gave everything we were allowed to.

No. You,
the clever ones,
the homefront heroes, the marchers,
the moralists, the safe ones,
and the returned ones who sold us out
for public approval, for a handful of headlines . . .
you,
who tied our hands when we were there,
who spat on us when we came home,
who write the books now,
still spitting,
you,
you failed them.

No.
Not my guilt.
Not ours.
Yours.

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The War, the Counter-Culture and Campus Politics: Reflections on Berkeley in the 60's.

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In the documentary *Berkeley in the Sixties*, one of the respondents, reflecting upon her involvement some twenty years earlier in the Free Speech Movement, recalled that when the students won their fight with the university, she thought the student movement was over. At the time, she was at a large rally celebrating the victorious conclusion of months of demonstrations. The festivities were winding down. People were beginning to trail off when she heard a voice from the speaker's platform: "Don't forget, people, there's still the war."

Her immediate reaction was: war? what war? At the nation's most prestigious, public university, in the winter of 1964-65, it was possible for the war to be something so remote from one's consciousness that even the politically active had to be reminded.

Benefitting from student deferments, which provided a shelter from the draft that could be carried into a prolonged graduate-student career, Vietnam was and could easily have remained someone else's war. It didn't. Berkeley's Free Speech Movement quickly became the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). The student movement had found its ultimate cause, one that would spread from Berkeley's Sather Gate to campuses across the

country. The war would provide the quintessential catalyst for radical campus politics not seen before or since.

For campus politicos, the war provided something the Civil Rights Movement had not, a movement from which they could not be rejected. Many of the leaders of Berkeley's Free Speech Movement had obtained their baptismal papers in the Civil Rights Movement. But after the summer of 1964, Black Power reared its formidable head and white students, initiated into the rites of social protest, found they were no longer welcome. The Free Speech Movement was a ready-made surrogate for those who needed a cause, and when it came to an end, there was the war.

Student activists needed a political movement, but the *original* members of the bay area's counter-culture were not the least interested. They did not seek to change the social order but to change themselves. The social order was out there and of concern only if one made it such— an effort they found both counter-productive and unattractive.

The conflict of generations, so vividly etched in our memories of the 1960's, is perceived as a single political expression that achieved its greatest height in the anti-war movement. The conflict was more complex than that, as was the counter-culture which embraced it. Although the war was the primary campus political issue, the war neither caused the massive generational conflict of the 60's nor did it give birth to the counter-culture. These expressions were already part of a Cult of Youth before there was a meaningful consciousness of the war. The war simply threw gasoline on flames of youthful passion.

The Counter-Culture

Intellectuals have the capacity to reconstruct life's struggles through their own abstract philosophical prism. In their vision the counter-culture was a journey into Freud, Marx, Marcuse, and the passions of the life of the mind. One of the best of these reconstructions was Theodore Roszak's, **The Making of a Counter-Culture**. Yet, the philosophical issues Roszak described were as foreign to most denizens of the counter-culture as was a discourse on free trade. The average member of the counter-culture no more could understand Marx than he could identify Kerouac.

To be against something is to be for something else. To be anything is to make a political statement. If 'hippies' had a statement, it was both tacit and apolitical.

It was one thing to see the counter-culture from the ethereal heights of Berkeley's faculty ghetto. It was quite another to see it in the human degradation on Berkeley's Telegraph Avenue or the Haight-Ashbury District after 1966. In both these places what began as an alternative life-style in pursuit of the Nirvana of "love" quickly stumbled into hedonistic decadence. Haight-Ashbury became a magnet for America's rebellious youth, lured not by the promise of a new culture but by the accessibility of sex and drugs.

Kerouac, Ginsberg, Burrows and other members of the Beat Generation,

may have been the symbols of the early days of youthful alienation. Ken Kesey so wondrously described by Tom Wolfe in **The Electric Kool Aid Acid Test** may have been the court jester of the new society. The "Merry Pranksters" may have been the first generation to cross (by bus of course) into the promised land of the Haight's new culture. But none of these was able to withstand the torrent of hedonistic youth from afar and weekend hippies from nearby affluent suburbs who descended on the streets in search of excess. "Better Living Through Chemistry" was then the slogan of the DuPont Company and an apt description of what youth was looking for in the streets of love central. Chemistry and sex distilled in unequal parts and both practiced publicly in California's Golden Gate Park, at ceremonies known as "Be-Ins" and "Love-Ins," were the counter-culture's primary expression.

I recall ambling through some of these gatherings where I found the marijuana smoke was thick enough to cut with a knife and spread on sour-dough. Nubile couples copulated publicly, simultaneously smashing the last refuge of adolescent innocence and bourgeois convention. San Francisco's finest, mounted on horseback, looked on with restraint and bemusement. Had they entered the drug-basked gathering, easily numbering many thousands, the police would have set off a riot. And which one of the hundreds of naked couples could one accuse of and prove to have engaged in public fornication?

It has been called the anti-American generation. But it wasn't. To be against something is to be for something else. To be anything is to make a political statement. If hippies had a statement to make it was both tacit and apolitical. They had dropped out and tuned out of society. They cared no more about politics than about a career. The war was out there somewhere. It was not their concern.

They were not going to sign up for the draft or report for induction. But that was not a statement of protest, because they didn't make political statements. They simply didn't take personal responsibility for compliance with what others expected of them.

If society generally was concerned about a generation that scorned the gray-flannel suit and the work ethic, the campus politicos were even more concerned. While the students may have acquired the garb and even the argot of the hippies—one through the tasteful use of daddy's plastic money and the other through the studied and measured cadence of the inarticulate—these students were not hippies. Student activists thrived on the politics of confrontation. Hippies flourished on chemistry and sex. Politics was reputed to ruin both. Hippies wanted to go to a "love in." Students wanted to go to a demonstration.

It was the bane of the student politicos that the manpower and womanpower so ripe for exploitation as pawns in the front lines of the politics of confrontation were *initially* beyond mobilization. Hedonism triumphed over commitment. The experience of the moment triumphed over the slow process of political change.

When hedonism reached its zenith in 1966 in the Haight-Ashbury, the Haight started to become indistinguish-able from the Tenderloin, San Francisco's vice district. The counter-culture built originally on a new orienta-tion toward materialism succumbed to drugs, alcohol, and the degradation wrought from aimlessness and poverty.

The radical sociologist Tod Gitlin would later note that social movements can embody the worst attributes of the society they oppose (**The Sixties** 406-7). Gitlin characterized the violence and hedonism of the rock concert at Altamont (which was supposed to be the Westcoast's Woodstock), but he could have easily been speaking of the Haight after the summer of 1966.

With the death of the Haight, some of the surviving remnant of the leaders of the counter-culture moved into the South Campus area of Berkeley. Here it once again confronted an aimless, often pathological, adolescent community.

A Conflict Within A Generation

The opposition to the war launched by VDC (the Vietnam Day Committee) from the campus focused on the Oakland induction center. The student radicals attempted to achieve a symbolic victory by closing it down. Scenes outside the induction center were not of a conflict of generations but a conflict within a generation: Clean-cut young men going to war and disheveled young men trying to stop them confronted each other with hostility.

Young men going to war could not comprehend how Berkeley students, who had access to the best the country could offer, would not support the nation in a time of struggle. Berkeley students saw the historic irony of the less privileged and less aware going to war to defend a system that exploited their patriotism. Spit, clenched fists, and profanities were the stock-in-trade of dialogue across the barricades in Oakland. In these scuffles, heads were more likely to be broken than minds were likely to change.

The demonstrations continued, but the Oakland Police controlled the terrain and the demonstrators' frustrations were vented by destroying property and vehicles belonging to Oakland's working classes. As in all such demonstrations, the action itself with its attendant violence and carnival atmosphere was as meaningful to some demonstrators as the anti-war movement was to others. When the violence escalated, more serious and politically astute protesters dropped out and the transients on the street dropped in.

The attitude of those who dropped in was expressed to me some two years later when I was conducting interviews on the street. A young ragamuffin of a teenager approached me asking when the next demonstration was going to happen. He added regretfully that he had been in Berkeley for nearly two weeks and had not yet participated in public protest.

These adolescent transients brought the same attitudes to Berkeley's anti-war movement that earlier trampled the counter-culture in the Haight. To reconstruct them as an anti-American generation would be to anoint them with an intellectual competence that they simply did not possess and had no interest in acquiring. The typical member of the counter culture was a teenager who stumbled through the undemanding curriculum of an American high school while high (or low) on drugs. But this group should not of course be confused with the campus culture that was vibrant with political activity and buttressed with ideology. There anti-Americanism flourished among students as it does again three decades later among 1960's students who became today's faculty.

The Manchurian Philosophy

These were the people who were nurtured on the neo-Marxism of the 1960's. To them, America, not the Soviet

Union, was the imperialistic oppressor. They believed that the National Liberation Front did indeed exist as a broad-based liberation movement, untainted by the puppet strings of North Vietnam. They believed that the Viet Cong was something other than the tool of the Northern commanders. As American blood spilled in the rice paddies of Vietnam, students were the ones who carried North Vietnamese flags and chanted "Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh; Ho Chi Minh is going to win."

After 1975, they never showed the intellectual courage to apologize for spreading the myth of a National Liberation Front that existed only as a Viet Cong disinformation campaign.

These students believed that capitalism was a dying economic system needing a dose of imperialism to sustain it in its last stages, and that communism was the wave of the future.

They never felt the need to explain why the post-war Vietnam looks very different from the pluralistic, democratic, and independent Vietnam they peddled. And they never felt the need to explain why their opposition to the war was frequently indistinguishable from their opposition to the young men who fought it.

Their heroes were Marx, Marcuse, and the fiery Angela Davis, Marcuse's best-known student. They viewed Mao as a great democratic leader and Hubert Humphrey as a fascist. To them, Nixon was a war criminal and Ho Chi Minh a great patriot. My Lai was reality; the Hanoi Hilton propaganda. In their mythical world, Tet was a great military victory for the Viet Cong. They conveniently forgot that after the smoke from Tet cleared little was left of the Viet Cong. They relished in attacking the Phoenix Program as a collection of war crimes, conveniently failing to note that Phoenix was modeled after the Viet Cong's own programs and even the Communists now acknowledge that it destroyed a good part of their covert leadership in the South.

These students believed what too many of their teachers told them: that capitalism was a dying economic system needing a dose of imperialism to sustain it in its last stages, and that communism was the wave of the future. The war was not about containing the one ideology on the face of the earth committed to a ruthless and expansionist foreign policy but about keeping capitalism out of the dustbin of history through force of arms. Communism was to be judged by its relative accomplishments. Capitalism by its failures. It was a comparison which America could not win and the communists could not lose.

Certainly there were good reasons to be against the war. The Central Intelligence Agency had advised Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy that Vietnam would be the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Eisenhower, an experienced professional soldier, understood the wisdom of this advice. Kennedy, stung by the Bay of

Pigs and seething over Khrushev's gambit in the Cuban Missile Crisis decided to draw the line in Vietnam. Both the political and military decisions were open to question.

The CIA continued to question and to be at odds with the military. The Order of Battle Controversy between the CIA and the Pentagon is now a matter of public record. The CIA's reading was that General William Westmoreland was far too optimistic about being able to reach the strategic cross-over point—the point where NVA and Viet Cong casualties would exceed the pool of replacements.

Perhaps the strongest reason to be against the war was that the rules of engagement were being determined by political rather than military considerations. Young men were sent 10,000 miles from home to fight a war that the politicians knew could neither be won nor even fought to a decisive conclusion. If war is too important to be left to the military, it is far and away too important to be left to the politicians and bureaucrats.

But the anti-American generation was not against the war for any of these reasons. Its anti-war posture wreaked of a neo-Leninist interpretation of imperialism and a glorification of communist insurgency as a mechanism of liberation. This belief system required turning a blind eye to the killing fields in Cambodia and the Vietnamese boat people

Conclusions

No insurrectionary movement can exist without its cannon fodder. And Berkeley's VDC was no exception. As the anti-war demonstrations became more violent, they increasingly drew individuals who neither thought about the war nor about politics but about the violence of the moment. As the original aspirations of the Haight succumbed to the vices of sex and drugs, the demonstrations against the military increasingly fell victim to the denizens of the South Campus who were more interested in overturning cars and destroying property than in ending the war. Such violent indulgence were not without their contagious effects on others.

The leaders of the demonstrations, of course, were as political as they had always been, but many who shared their concern about the war could no longer indulge the consequences of arbitrary violence. For others, the sight of demonstrations led by society's privileged youth that resulted in the destruction of the property of Oakland's working class was too much hypocrisy to stomach.

As Herring notes, whatever claim might be made that such demonstrations hastened the end of the war needs to be tempered by public opinion poll after public opinion poll that showed that such demonstrations had an impact quite opposite of what their organizers intended (173).

America's growing impatience with a seemingly interminable conflict, the growing list of casualties and the inability of the South Vietnamese to produce a legitimate government brought pressure on America to disengage itself from Vietnam. The throngs of young people demonstrating in the streets may have attracted the camera's lens but they failed to capture public opinion. In the end they were not the embodiment of the hopes of a new generation but the victims of the same weaknesses that destroyed the original aspirations of the counter-culture.

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Academe: Not so Hallowed Halls for Veterans

R.W. Trewyn and James A. Stever

"Why do you want to be a murderer?"

The teenage, Army ROTC cadet was jolted and confused by the question. He did not understand why his English professor would say such a thing, nor did he understand her abusive tone or expression of contempt. It was the first time he'd worn his uniform to class, and that had apparently triggered a reaction ... a hidden hatred his professor could not control. Appallingly, this unprovoked assault occurred in front of the young man's classmates, making it even more incomprehensible and upsetting.

This incident actually happened at a large Midwestern university in 1991. Most sectors of American society were honoring those who wore the uniform that year. This was the year of Desert Storm. In contrast, a youthful ROTC cadet was verbally abused wearing military uniform. But, why? Is this typical?

Both of the authors of this article found this incident consistent with their experience. Upon returning to campus after Vietnam, one author watched the main building on his campus burn. Students, attempting to protest the Vietnam War, torched the building. Upon graduation, one author was pointedly told by his major professor to delete any reference to military service from his vita. This major professor understood that people who list military service on their vita do not gain employment in academia.

The ROTC cadet did not know that campus hostility toward the veteran began before he was born. Why did it begin? Why does it continue? Regretfully, a credible answer is difficult to come by. However, it is clear that long after the Vietnam War ended the tension between the military and the campus culture continues.

Representative Gerald Solomon recently sponsored an amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill forbidding colleges and universities receiving Department of Defense funding from interfering with military recruiters on campus. Almost immediately, the higher education lobby devised ways to circumvent this amendment.

Beyond the Solomon amendment, there is other evidence that many in American higher education dislike the military and military veterans. But, why? What explanations are there for the

campus war? Historically, how and when did tensions between the higher education community and the military escalate? These are questions this article attempts to address.

The Citizen-Soldier Tradition

Tension between the military and the remainder of American society was virtually nonexistent in the nineteenth century. Veterans experienced an easy transition between the military and their civilian occupation. To be a soldier was to be a good citizen. This meshing of citizenship to service to country as a soldier has been labeled the "citizen-soldier tradition."

There are a wealth of indicators as to how the military functioned in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an integral part of society. One illustration is that the founding fathers accepted military service as an inevitable element of civic virtue. Thomas Jefferson proposed to "make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education" (Huntington 197). This champion of the simple agrarian life regarded mystery of the military arts and skills as a normal part of being a responsible member of a democratic society. Jefferson disagreed with Alexander Hamilton over the necessity for a professional military that made a career from the study of military science. His solution was to hold the farmer, banker, and businessman responsible for maintaining their military skills. National defense was the responsibility of the common man.

The citizen-soldier tradition was born in the Revolutionary War. The effectiveness of common man turned soldier against the aristocratic officers and mercenaries of King George became a part of American folklore and culture. Andrew Jackson revived this ideal during his presidency—arguing that West Point must be closed because it was a needless expense and encouraged a counterproductive, aristocratic approach to national defense. And the common man tradition flourished throughout the Civil War as well. Both North and South relied heavily on conscription and volunteers. This was a war of commoners, a war where many chose their own weapons over those supplied by their units.

The decline of the citizen-soldier approach to national security can be attributed to a variety of factors: the increasing technical and scientific complexity of warfare, the emergence of professionalism, and politics. Dennis Hart Mahan, an instructor at West Point, began to win converts in the 1870s with his arguments that military matters must be treated as a scientific specialty. Citing national interest, he argued that untrained citizens, recruited hastily into the military, could no longer be counted on to protect the national interest. Mahan and his supporters were riding the wave of professionalism that was sweeping the country.

The state militia was the visible symbol of the citizen-soldier ideal, and Mahan's professional approach challenged its utility. The Republican Party during the 1870s threw its support behind Mahan's new kind of military. The Democratic Party, looking for an issue that would bring it back from the obscurity they suffered in the aftermath of the Civil War, opposed a professionalized military. More specifically, the Democrats opposed any expansion of the military. Instead, this party substituted a professionalized the civil service for a professionalized military—arguing that America's future would be best secured by pouring

resources into the development of the civil service. They further reasoned that an expanded civil service encouraged peace; whereas a large standing army was dangerous to liberalism and democracy.

This nineteenth century political conflict over the military might have remained a tempest in a teapot had it not been for subsequent developments during the Progressive era. In this era, the nation's colleges and universities were growing, and this growth profoundly affected the military.

The Progressive Era

During the waning decades of the nineteenth century, the American middle class discovered that education was an alternative route by which to succeed. A professional education offered young men and women who did not own property another means by which to make money. And it is not surprising that the lure of professionalism transformed the American campus, particularly in the Progressive era from 1890 to 1920. Training professionals for civilian occupations became a central mission of colleges and universities. Not unexpectedly, Jefferson's ideal of a military curriculum fully integrated into collegiate education was not achieved in the Progressive era.

The Progressive movement was primarily a movement of intellectuals dedicated to the use of science to solve social problems. Progressives believed that universities should be used to train people in science so they could address urban problems and inefficient government. Science applied to military purposes was not a central concern for most reformers. Hence, military professionalism and campus professionalism began to diverge during the Progressive era. Professional military officers were taught primarily in dedicated military institutions.

The separation of the military from American society became so complete that it alarmed many in the military sector. The Secretary of War in 1920 argued, for example, that the military must be brought into closer contact with the experience of the general population (Huntington 283). In response, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, established by the National Defense Act of 1920, was an effort to involve a broad base of higher education institutions in the training of officers. In short, the goal was to put the military back on campus, in touch with a broader segment of civilian society.

However, many progressive reformers were opposed to using the resources of American higher education to create a professionalized military. Charles Beard a leading Progressive and historian of the period, was one of the most strident opponents, arguing that the resources of the university and the country should be diverted away from the military to peaceful pursuits. Beard used historical scholarship to argue that military intervention abroad and a preoccupation with national security diverted the country from making domestic advances (Breisach 191-194).

Beard's hostility towards the military was eventually his undoing when he continued to advocate an isolationist foreign policy in the face of Hitler's conquests of Belgium and France. Not only Beard but other Progressive intellectuals who treated military service as a marginal activity were discredited as the country prepared for World War II.

The campus itself was swept up in war mobilization. Association with the

military became fashionable again among intellectuals. At the University of Chicago, for example, it was not uncommon for three Pullman cars to leave for Washington, DC, on Sunday night, full of professors and other professionals who served in the wartime administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Nonetheless, World War II was but a lull in the developing campus conflict over the military. The antipathy and hostility of many intellectuals toward the military would be reborn with heretofore unseen fury in the 1960s.

The Campus Wars: The 1960s and Beyond

In the post-World War II era, American campuses expanded, and this expansion created a pluralistic, complex environment. On the typical college campus, Department of Defense (DoD) dollars contributed to the expansion. Using the GI Bill, thousands of veterans utilized the higher education system to retrain for civilian occupations.

The 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) further enlarged the DoD presence on campus over the next decade. Student support funds from NDEA and the GI Bill in combination with billions of dollars of defense funds earmarked for university-based research should have predicated loyalty to military values from students, professors, and educational administrators inhabiting the post-war campus. Yet, the opposite occurred. And the answer to this anomaly can be summed up in one word: Vietnam.

Perhaps the most durable impact of the Vietnam War was its effect on the people who attended the university during that period. In the early 1960s, record numbers of undergraduates flocked to the college campus — lured by generous DoD scholarships. Professors, researchers, and technicians swelled higher education payrolls, supported in many cases by DoD research grants.

The S-2 draft deferment provided a substantial percentage of these people with an incentive to linger on in university graduate programs just as the Vietnam War was expanding in the mid-1 1960s (Bowen 1992). In essence, avoiding Vietnam was the motive harbored by many who attended college in the '60S. When the S-2 deferment for graduate studies ended in 1968, those who faced military service had an additional incentive for joining the antiwar, campus-based protests that were gaining momentum.

The campus riots of the late 1960s/ early 1970s are a matter of record. These riots, though, were a visible indicator of the tensions between the campus and the military. The roots for this tension had grown decades before. The campus-based causes spouted by a radical minority of the population were amplified by the mass media of the day, and, contributed to the end of the Vietnam War. However, the question lingers: What happened to the college campus in the aftermath of the war? Unfortunately, as the rhetoric subsided, the anti-military culture of the campus did not recede. There are a variety of ways to illustrate this point, but the most telling is to consider who institutions of higher education employed after the Vietnam War.

As the war ended, the United States Congress gave colleges and universities, along with thousands of other federal contractors, a reason to hire Vietnam veterans. The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 (Title 38, United States Code,

Section 4212) required all federal contractors—those contracting in amounts over $10,000—to use affirmative action in the employment and advancement of those who had served in the military between 5 August 1964 and 7 May 1975. Those with military service during these dates were defined as "Vietnam-era veterans." Anticipating discrimination against the Vietnam-era veteran, the Congress also imposed penalties on those who did not comply.

The Readjustment Act provides an excellent opportunity to examine whether American universities threw off the influence of the radicals of the '60S and '70s and welcomed the Vietnam veteran back to campus. Virtually all colleges and universities are federal contractors and subject to this law. As a benchmark, Vietnam-era veterans make up approximately 6% of the civilian labor force nationally (Trewyn 1994), so that is the employment level one might reasonably expect to find at these institutions by chance; i.e., without any positive efforts of affirmative action or negative effects of discrimination.

Affirmative Inaction

The 28April1995 issue of **The Chronicle of Higher Education** cataloged "key elements" in the development of affirmative action in higher education. The first three elements specifically affecting employment were: 1971, "Harvard University adopts an affirmative action program for the hiring of women and members of minority groups," 1972, "Williams College formally adopts a policy of affirmative action in faculty recruitment and hiring," and 1973, "the American Association of University Professors endorses the use of affirmative action in faculty hiring."

Not listed among the milestone events in the **Chronicle**: 1974, the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act was signed into law. With what went on the preceding three years, the timing for veterans should have been ideal. Following Harvard's lead, universities around the nation were gearing up for affirmative action in recruitment and hiring at all levels of employment. Vietnam-era veterans and disabled veterans should have been swept along on the new tide. So, why, as shall be documented below, were they swept aside? Why did it take until 1994 before Harvard University decided to comply with federal requirements of the 1974 veterans' act?[1] Why did it take so long to begin the process of granting veterans their legally mandated civil rights—twenty years late?

The answers to these questions may never be known with certainty, but as any veteran of the Vietnam era can attest, the college campus of that period was not a friendly place for veterans or the military. Few antiwar fanatics could separate their abhorrence of the war from their loathing of those who served; their unbridled hostility permeated the "hallowed halls" of the Ivory Tower. Veterans were not welcome there.

Nevertheless, did those in academe willfully violate federal law? Did they knowingly contravene the 1974 act that protected veterans from discrimination and afforded them affirmative action rights in initial employment and advancement? In retrospect, it's hard to believe otherwise.

Administrators of American higher education have consistently endorsed affirmative action from its inception in 1965 with Executive Order 11246. Opponents of the Vietnam War who came to regard the campus as a safe

haven from an oppressive American society have been particularly zealous about affirmative action. In a utopian-like mind-set, they view affirmative action as a technique or method by which to convert the university into a model institution for the rest of American society. With this technique, radical academicians proposed to transform the university into a "city on the hill" that represents all of American society, not simply the privileged few.

Closer scrutiny of the "city on the hill" envisioned by the radicals reveals that it is a university free of veterans. Harboring the belief that an oppressive military establishment caused the Vietnam War, the university they sought was to be a military-free zone of peace where all formerly oppressed peoples of the country could associate and build a new peaceful society — one that is free of conflict, hatred, and competition.[2]

Radical academicians, with the assistance of university administrators, began to construct this model university in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Hence, it is hardly surprising that campus administrators simply ignored the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 when it called upon colleges and universities as federal contractors to give Vietnam-era Veterans full affirmative action privileges in employment. Radical intellectuals supported affirmative action for other classes they regarded as oppressed, but not for veterans whom they regarded as dysfunctional elements in their new model society.

Veteran Cleansing

Data collected by the Center for the Study of Veterans in Society suggests that the post-Vietnam climate for veterans on most college campuses

Figure 1. Vietnam-era Veterans Hired: The Ohio State University

- Vietnam-era veterans equaled 6.4% of Ohio's labor force in 1991
- New hires in 1990 & 1991:
  - 1 of 889 = 0.1%
  - 5 of 2,097 = 0.2%
- Data for 1992:
  - 19 of 754 hires = 2.5%
  - But, *51 terminations**
- Re: VETS-100 Reports & *Ohio House & Senate Committee Report



hasn't changed much in twenty years. Overt discrimination may have given way to covert discrimination, but the outcome is much the same—veterans need not apply!

In 1988, many institutions of higher education discovered for the first time that they were employing Vietnam-era veterans; 1988 was the first year that federal contractors were required to file an annual report (the VETS-100) quantifying the number of Vietnam-era veterans and disabled veterans they employed as well as the number hired during the previous year. An interesting pattern emerged once the alarm was sounded that there were "unrepentant" veterans within the halls of the academy... veterans who were willing, unashamedly, to identify themselves as such (Vickers 1991). In many cases, the VETS-100 numbers for the first year or so were fairly respectable, but at a number of institutions, they dropped like a rock thereafter.

At Ohio State University, 4.5% of the new hires at all levels of employment in 1987 were Vietnam-era veterans (Figure 1). By 1990, the value had fallen to 0.1%, and it was only 0.2% in 1991 when university officials testified before the Ohio Senate that they were providing affirmative action in the employment of Vietnam-era veterans (Doulan and Snell, 1991). Throughout that period, Vietnam-era veterans comprised more than 6% of the civilian labor force in Ohio.

The lack of attention to the employment numbers at Ohio State may well have continued, except that the federal government intervened. A less-than-timely investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1991 found that, in fact, Ohio State was not providing affirmative action to veterans and, moreover, that an atmosphere of "harassment, intimidation and coercion" existed for veterans on campus (Doulan 1992). The supposed corrective action that ensued was noted by university officials to include an increase in new hires of Vietnam-era veterans in 1992 to 2.5% (19 of 754).[3] However, an official questionnaire submitted by OSU to a Select Committee of the Ohio House and Senate indicated that "veteran terminations" in 1992 included: "51 Vietnam-era veterans" and "135 other military veterans;"[4] the number for Vietnam-era veteran terminations exceeding the preceding four-year aggregate of new hires.

A similar phenomenon appears to have been in vogue at other institutions as well. The federal VETS-100 reports filed by Cleveland State University indicate that 11 faculty members were Vietnam-era veterans in 1988 (Figure 2). Three of the new faculty hires in subsequent years were also era veterans which should have brought the total to 14, but remarkably, the number of Vietnam-era veteran faculty decreased each year. By 1993, the number had dropped to zero. The total number of non-faculty Vietnam-era veterans remaining at Cleveland State was reported to be 9 in 1993, 0.6% of the total employees.[5]

The New School for Social Research in New York City is another noteworthy institution with regard to veterans' employment. The New School reported that it employed a total of 48 Vietnam-era veterans in 1988 (Figure 3). That number plummeted to zero by 1991; only 2 era veterans were employed in 1992. The latter number represents 0.1% of the total employees at the New School.[6]

With the pattern that emerges, covert discrimination may be too

Figure 2. Vietnam-era Veteran Faculty: Cleveland State University



{Re: VETS-100 Reports; New Hires 1989-93 = 3}

Figure 3. Vietnam-era Veteran Employees: New School for Social Research

{Re: VETS-100 Reports; New Hires 1989-92 = 6}

Figure 4. Vietnam-era Veteran Employees: University of Akron



generous a description for the practices employed.

Truth: A Casualty of War

When challenged on the issue of discrimination against veterans, universities provide an array of innovative responses. For example, the University of Akron was criticized in the press in 1992 for employing a low number of Vietnam-era veterans —2.0% (Snell 1992). An examination of Akron's VETS-100 reports illustrates a fascinating solution to the problem (Figure 4). In 1992, a total of 33 Vietnam-era veterans were employed at the university. Three (3) additional era veterans were hired in 1993. Then, the total number employed jumped from 33 to 102. Now that's affirmative action!

As depicted in Figure 5, geography doesn't seem to play a role in such aberrations or in the demographics of university employment of veterans. Montgomery College, a few miles from Washington, D.C., in Maryland, employs what might be considered a reasonable number of Vietnam-era veterans, 5.5%, especially when compared to the not-too-distant University of Pennsylvania (0.9%) and nearby American University (0.7%). The latter institution, in Washington, D.C., is worthy of additional scrutiny as well, since the Washington Post reported recently that 2.5% of American's employees were Vietnam-era veterans (Mathews 1995). That's curious because their federal VETS-100 report filed for 1993 (for the period 2/15/93 to 2/14/94) points to the much lower number cited above, 0.7%.

According to American's VETS-100 report, a total of 27 full-time and part-time employees were Vietnam-era veterans in 1993. A survey filed by the university to comply with the Civil Rights and Higher Education Acts (the IPEDS report) indicated a "grand total (for) all employees," full-time and part-

time, of 3,968 for 1993. Twenty-seven (27) Vietnam-era veterans amount to less than 0.7% of the total; a far cry from the 2.5% quoted to the Washington Post reporter a year later. To reach 2.5% from 0.7%, over sixty (60) additional Vietnam-era veterans would have to have been added in one year. Somehow, that seems an unlikely occurrence based on the fact that the largest number of new hires in any of the preceding 4 years was three (3) according to the institution's VETS-100 reports.

As also shown in Figure 5, appalling employment statistics are not limited to the East Coast schools either; San Diego State University ranks among the worst. The 1994 VETS-100 data for San Diego State documents two (2) new Vietnam-era veteran hires for the year (the only ones hired since 1990), with a total of three (3) employed. Sixteen (16) Vietnam-era veterans had been employed by the institution four years earlier. With three veterans on the employment roster for 1994 and a total employee count of 5,675 as of October 1994 according to San Diego State's IPEDS report, a paltry 0.05% is obtained for the percentage of Vietnam-era veterans, hardly a value indicative of affirmative action.

In fact, with Vietnam-era veterans constituting 6% of the civilian labor force nationally, what term other than "discrimination" could one use to describe most of the outcomes summarized above? There appear to be few other descriptors appropriate for results 10-fold—even 100-fold— lower than those expected by random chance.

Rights versus Wrongs

One might question how discrimination against veterans could still exist, decades after the war in Southeast Asia. Interestingly, the answer may have been provided by a professor of English at Harvard in an article about "political

Figure 5. University Employment Data: Vietnam-era Veterans



correctness" (Brustein 1994). He noted that "the radical students who once occupied university buildings over the Vietnam War... are now officially occupying university offices as professors, administrators, deans, and even presidents." Maybe these individuals don't like being reminded of their evasive behavior in days gone by.

Most military veterans can look back with pride on their own conduct, having served their country honorably when called, just as America's citizen soldiers have done in other wars. Perhaps having "unrepentant" veterans around is problematic for the convoluted radical psyche; the stark contrast between bravery and cowardice might be noticed by students, younger colleagues, and alumni. Or, perhaps, when confronted with the situation, these human rights' hypocrites still despise veterans as much now as they did during the divisive years of the Vietnam era.

Paying the Price for Patriotism

Unfortunately, the long-term costs of military service during the Vietnam era—to veterans, their families, and the nation—have been high. A 1990 research publication by Joshua Angrist, then at Harvard, documented that, "long after their service in Vietnam was ended, the earnings of white veterans were approximately 15 percent less than the earnings of comparable non-veterans." Fifteen percent! Each and every year, these veterans can look forward to taking home 15% less than those who didn't serve the nation during the Vietnam War, to providing 15% less for their families. Their career earnings will be hundreds of thousands of dollars less. Their retirement benefits will be less.

These costs are not trivial; nor should they persist.

As stated by Myra MacPherson in her 1984 book entitled **Long Time Passing**: "Above all, Vietnam was a war that asked everything of a few and nothing of most in America." Regretfully, little has changed over the years; everything is still being asked of the few. However, the anti-military culture of the Academy makes the price of service to country needlessly high. The young ROTC cadet who confronted his English professor experienced a double bind. On one hand, the rigors of military training posed a formidable set of challenges. On the other hand, this cadet began to realize that joining the military could cause a professor to lower a course a grade. Low grades create other problems: e.g., canceled fellowships, a less distinguished military career, or a lower paying civilian career.

In the current technological economy, career military personnel, reservists, and the national guard find themselves increasingly dependent on the campus—for reeducation, for job advancement, for training. This tension between the campus and the military must be addressed; and constructive integration established. In spite of the pretensions of some on campus, colleges and universities do not live in a world where the military can be ignored or jettisoned. Military personnel serve all the people, including those on the campus. For this service, they immediately require, at minimum, equitable, evenhanded treatment. Longer range reforms of the campus should be based on the premise that military citizenship is one of the highest forms of citizenship. This should be not only enshrined as doctrine at the university, but translated into a campus-based ethical norm. Without these reforms, the costs of military service are not only needlessly high, but the national security is jeopardized.

Notes

1. When asked to provide copies of veterans' employment data (the VETS-100 reports) required by federal regulations (41 CFR 61-250) to document contractor performance in meeting the requirements of the 1974 law, the Office of the General Counsel, Harvard University, responded, 30 June 1994, that Harvard had just begun collecting the information.

2. For any who believe that the "city on the hill"concept is absent from the affirmative action agenda of the 1990s, one should review President Clinton's speech on affirmative action, 19 July 1995. Serving as the spokesperson for higher education, he stated that, "if (young people's) colleges look like the world they're going to live and work in, and they learn from all different kinds of people things that they can't learn in books, our systems of higher education are stronger' (The **Chronicle of Higher Education**, pp. A28-A29, 28 July 1995). Nowhere in his speech did the President comment on the congressionally mandated affirmative action rights for veterans.

3. University testimony, 14 June 1993, to Select Committee #51 of the Ohio Senate and House of Representatives. Also, The Ohio State University VETS-100 report for 1992.

4. Ohio Colleges and Universities Veterans Affairs General Questionnaire, submitted by Vice President Linda Tom, The Ohio State University, 26 July 1993, to Representative Mark A. Malone, Chairman, Ohio House and Senate Select Committee #51. The complete response to the question of terminations was: "Between February 1, 1992 and January 31, 1993 (our VETS-100 reporting period) total veteran terminations were: 51 Vietnam-era veterans, 0 disabled veterans, and 135 other military veterans."

5. Ohio Colleges and Universities Veterans Affairs General Questionnaire, submitted by Vice President Njeri Nuru, Cleveland State University, 13 July 1993, to Representative Mark A. Malone, Chairman, Ohio House and Senate Select Committee #51. Total employees, veteran and non-veteran, were reported to be 1553.

6. Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System survey (Form lPEDS-S), filed 13 January, 1994.

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A New Strategy for Treating Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: An In-Depth Section on Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR)



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Introduction: Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing: A Promising, Albeit Controversial, Methodology

What we in the psychotherapy business need to pay attention to are the ways in which we can harm the individuals who seek help from us. This is especially true regarding how we treat Vietnam veterans. Some therapists working with Vietnam veterans describe their clients in ways which are demeaning and which presume severe character pathology. Other therapists maintain considerable distance from their clients and prefer to administer strong medicines and to lecture about how to correct their thinking and behaviors. Some scientists are very busy with magnetic resonance imaging equipment, studying possible brain shrinkage in this group of people. It is unclear how these research expeditions will be useful to people who are bothered by painful memories.

Several years ago, a very bright psychology intern, Francine Shapiro discovered that, when an individual concentrated on an uncomfortable memory of a past event while moving the eyes laterally a number of times, the individual would experience a change in the nature of the memory. Often the discomfort associated with the memory would fade. Following this discovery, Shapiro worked with some Vietnam veterans who re-

ported intrusive painful memories of war. She designed a fairly simple study which included Vietnam veterans and others who had experienced trauma and found that, for many of her clients, the use of the eye movement technique (now referred to as EMDR) was helpful in putting selected memories to rest. This psychologist was different in some ways from many psychotherapists one might meet: first, she relied on her client to decide what memories would be most important to focus on; second, Shapiro presumed that the capacity to heal was inherent in all people and that the role of the therapist was to help activate that capacity and then to get out of the way; third, Shapiro had a notion that some persons who had been many times hospitalized, medicated, and educated and who were feeling worse than when they started getting all of this "treatment," might respond to a different approach to getting better.

It is not too hard to predict how the mental health industry might respond to someone as out of step as Francine Shapiro. She did not make many close friends in the pharmaceutical industry. There is no big money available for research studies from them. A handful of previously unknown psychiatrists and psychologists became famous in the public media for their staunch criticism of her treatment method. Some people accused her of making money off her discovery A few politically powerful psychotherapy trainers complained that her approach was not as good as theirs and that clinicians should not learn EMDR until 'exhaustive research studies' had been completed. They encouraged therapists to study their treatment methods during the several years it would take for EMDR research to be conducted without noting that "exhaustive research" had not been conducted on their methods.

In some mental health circles, it is not uncommon to find practitioners talking about their EMDR experiences under their breath.

Some therapists who have experienced EMDR for themselves have commented that this treatment method could have an adverse effect on psychotherapists' profits.

These therapists state that it is not the client who is chronic but rather that it is the psychotherapy which is chronic. People will get better with EMDR they say, will choose to discontinue long-term psychotherapy, and might even choose to wean themselves from the strong medicines they have been put on over the years.

In some mental health circles, it is not uncommon to find practitioners talking about their EMDR experiences under their breath. They have learned that mental health managers and bureaucrats are anxious about EMDR because it seems different and because the managers have heard from someone that there is controversy over the method. In these circles, clinicians become reticent about sharing their work

experiences with their colleagues, supervisors, or managers. Other clinicians will pursue training in EMDR but will elect not to use it out of fear of professional reprisal. Psychotherapists in the private sector are experiencing fewer constraints. They are also more likely to share their experiences with others without as much risk of ridicule or official reprimand.

The articles that follow are important to publish and I applaud the editors, Dr. Peter C. Rollins and Mr. J. Eldon Yates for their willingness to do so. Perhaps there will be readers who, once acquainted with EMDR, will be prepared to join in the battles that surround its use. One well-known Vietnam veteran psychologist has emphasized that it is unethical to withhold this treatment from Vietnam veterans. It is close to impossible to have an EMDR study published in a major mental health journal at this time. I applaud, also, the authors for their courage in conducting research, reporting on clinical experience, and for subjecting themselves to the intense scrutiny sure to result from this publication of findings and vignettes.

Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing as an Exposure Intervention in Combat-Related PTSD: Four Case Studies

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In the current view, major diagnostic features of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) include (1) reexperiencing of the traumatic event, such as, combat (e.g., in dreams or flashbacks) and intense distress on exposure to related material; (2) attempts to avoid thoughts or memories associated with the trauma and/or emotional detachment; and (3) increased arousal and anxiety, involving such problems as sleep disorders, hypervigilance, and/or outbursts of anger (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

In recent years, some psychological treatments for these features of combat-related PTSD have included "exposure" methods, that is, the repeated rehearsal of relevant memories in a safe, therapeutic setting. The purpose of exposure is to allow anxiety reactions to diminish through a process called "flooding" or to permit the "desensitization" of emotional reactions. In the use of flooding for the anxiety associated with PTSD, a combat PTSD patient repeatedly rehearses warrelated memories while the therapist encourages the experiencing and reexperiencing of intense anxiety and other emotions until gradually the symptoms subside. Clinical evidence with regard to flooding treatment is generally positive (e.g., Keane & Kaloupek, 1982; Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, & Zimering, 1989; Boudewyns & Hyer, 1990), but some therapists have raised concerns regarding the need for engendering severe emotionality (especially, fear and even panic) in the clinical session, and suggested that some veterans may actually show an increase in anxiety under some flooding conditions (Pitman, 1991).

By contrast with flooding, in "desensitization" exposure treatment, efforts are made to keep emotional reactions at a low level and to allow for

learning ("counterconditioning") of reactions that are incompatible with anxiety. In recent years, one type of desensitization method to be applied with veterans with PTSD, termed "eye movement desensitization and reprocessing" (EMDR), was introduced by Shapiro (1989). The technique essentially involves having the patient identify a memory and assess its level of distress with a 10-point scale. Current memory-related thoughts are also identified, including positive ones that a patient would like to believe. Next, while focusing on the memory and related thoughts and sensations, the patient engages in rapid back-and-forth movements of the eyes by following the therapist's hand from left to right for short periods of time. Between the eye movements, the therapist asks the patient to recall thoughts, images, feelings, or sensations he may have just experienced. Later, during "reprocessing," the patient is asked to concentrate on more positive beliefs regarding the memory, such as, "It is past me now, I can handle it." Then he is asked to engage in additional eye movements in an effort to "install" the positive beliefs (cognitions).

The EMDR procedure differs in some fundamental ways from flooding. For one, EMDR does not require the intense reexperiencing of emotionality during traumatic memories. Rather, in our experience, the relatively brief periods of eye movement appear to help attenuate emotional reactions, while the periods between eye movements offer a "safe" opportunity that may allow some emotions to subside before proceeding to another memory (or the same memory) and set of eye movements. Some therapists also have suggested that the eye movements themselves act as a kind of "distractor," helping to minimize the likelihood of full-blown anxiety reactions. Another feature of EMDR that differs from flooding is that, during "reprocessing," deliberate efforts are made to allow the patient to discover alternative and more positive ways to view past experiences.

Unfortunately, studies on the effectiveness of EMDR in applications to veterans with PTSD have yielded varying results. The first published study of EMDR with veterans among the subjects was by Shapiro (1989), in which she reported that some patients suffering from traumatic memories of the Vietnam War were significantly improved by the procedure. More recently, Boudewyns, Stwertka, Hyer, Albrecht, and Sperr (1993) reported that patient self-reports reflected positive change for treated subjects, but no corresponding changes were reflected in measures of physiological responses. Lipke and Botkin (1992) also reported both positive and negative results for several combat PTSD cases, but suggested that their patients may have been more serious cases than those of Shapiro. In yet another recent study, possibly flawed by short and incomplete treatment (two sessions) conducted by relatively inexperienced therapists, Jenson (1994) failed to find evidence of improvement using EMDR with Vietnam combat veterans.

In view of the possible benefits of EMDR for the treatment of PTSD in combat veterans but the limited number of supportive studies, we have begun studies of EMDR at the Honolulu VA Medical Center Stress Disorders Laboratory with several distinct features: First, strict application of the EMDR procedures recommended by F. Shapiro was assured through personal training of several experienced therapists.[1] Second,

on the assumption that combat PTSD is a serious and chronic disorder that is likely to be resistant to short-term interventions, a twelve-session treatment regimen was followed in nearly all cases in order to help patients more thoroughly resolve their PTSD symptoms. Third, a number of standardized and powerful forms of clinical assessment were used, in view of concerns that many studies in this area have not employed adequate measures of therapeutic outcomes (Herbert & Mueser, 1992). On the basis of the earlier studies, we began this research with a very cautious attitude regarding the usefulness of EMDR in the treatment of chronic PTSD. In this paper, we describe our EMDR methods and initial results obtained with four veterans suffering from moderate to severe PTSD, cases that have led us to a less skeptical position and a determination to complete larger controlled studies.

Method

Subjects

Four Vietnam veterans with combat experience, ranged in age from 42 to 55. Three patients were Caucasian and one was Asian-American; two of the patients were unemployed, and three were divored or separated, as is characteristic of our population of combat veterans in Hawaii (Carlson, Chemtob, Hedlund, Denny, & Rusnak, 1994). Informed consent to participate was obtained following an explanation of all procedures.

Materials

Across several one-to two-hour sessions, a number of standardized questionnaires were administered, including the Mississippi scale for Combat-Related PTSD (MISS), a general indicator of symptoms of PTSD; the Impact of Events Scale (IES), which assesses the traumatic aspects of combat; the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS), an oral interview that goes into detail regarding many symptoms of PTSD; the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), that measures degree of depressive emotionality; the Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventories (STAI), that assess levels of current and chronic anxiety, respectively. In addition, an 11-point scale (0 to 10) was devised by the authors for a self-rating of overall severity of current "PTSD symptoms." In addition, each patient completed a Stressful Scene Construction Questionnaire (SSCQ) in which he described memories of specific incidents that he considered to be particularly traumatic (cf. Pitman, Orr, Forgue, de Song, & Claiborn, 1987). From these accounts, two personal scenes were summarized and each was audio taped in a 30 - 45 second segment by a therapist for script presentation at pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up.

Throughout the study, many of the patients' physiological responses were also measured. These methods and resulting data will not be discussed in this report because they were not found to show effects of the EMDR procedures and are not essential for the present discussion.

Procedure

Subsequent to the pretreatment sessions, two baseline sessions (20 min each) and a 20 min period in which the taped scripts were presented allowed us to obtain physiological measures (see above), allowed the patients to become adjusted to the treatment room, and assured that traumatic material that was

earlier recalled would be available for the subsequent EMDR sessions. There were two sessions per week during baseline and treatment with a minimum of one day between sessions.

The EMDR treatment was begun in the third session. The first and the second authors, who are clinical psychologists, were the therapists and each was accompanied at all times during therapy by the third author, a psychiatric nurse. Beginning with the memories described in the SSCQ's, EMDR sessions were each approximately 60 - 75 minutes in length and consisted of periods during which each patient was asked to rate (1) the degree of emotional distress characterizing a memory using an 11-point "subjective units of distress" (SUDS) rating (Wolpe, 1990), with 0 and 10 equivalent to minimum and maximum distress, respectively; and (2) the believability of a positive statement regarding his memory from a " 1 " (not at all believable) to "7" (completely true)—the Validity of Cognition (VoC) Scale. Next, a patient began periods during which he would track the therapist's finger in back and forth motions (typically, about 24 in number) producing eye movements while the subject focused on related memories, negative cognitions, and sensations. Periods of eye movements were each followed by a statement by the therapist to "close your eyes and clear your mind" (or some equivalent expression). Then the patient was queried regarding thoughts, images, or feelings that may have surfaced during the eye movements. Other material mentioned by the patient may also have become topics dealt with during subsequent eye movements, as appropriate to the standard course of an EMDR session as recommended by Shapiro. During and concluding each treatment session, patients were asked to rate (via the SUDS measure) the traumatic scenes that had been the topic of exposure during the session and also provide a rating for the believability of positive cognitions regarding the memories (the VoC scale). The questionnaires were readministered after 12 treatment sessions (posttreatment), and again after three months (follow-up).

Results and Discussion

A summary of the main results on the standardized questionnaires is shown in Table 1. As seen in the table, although there were considerable individual differences at pre-treatment, the patients as a group showed elevations on other comprehensive indicators of PTSD: the MISS (a score of 107 and above is characteristic of PTSD, Keane, Malloy, & Fairbank, 1984), the IES, the CAPS, and self-ratings of PTSD symptoms. In addition, measures of anxiety were elevated, as were the depression scores on the BECK.

Turning to the individual veterans, they are discussed in the following sections in approximate order of severity of the individual case. Fictitious first names are used to protect individual identity.

Veteran #1: Sam

Sam was a 43 year old, unmarried, unemployed Asian-American. He had recently begun a new relationship with a woman and, with her help, he was-making an effort to reduce his use of marijuana—this was our only patient who admitted to substance abuse at the time of treatment. Sam maintained that the change in drug use was contributing to difficulties in his sleep and to overall emotional distress. He also reported

TABLE 1

Total Scores on Assessment Instruments at Pre-treatment, Post-treatment, and Follow-up

		INSTRUMENT										
PATIENT		MISS	IES-I	IES-A	CAPS-Re-exp. Freq./Int.	CAPS-Avoid Freq./Int.	CAPS-Arousal Freq./Int.	CAPS-Overall Freq./Int.	PTSD Symp.	Beck	STAI-S	STAI-T
Sam	**Pre**	95	14	20	7/4	23/19	2/3	32/26	3	20	37	50
	Post	94	3	1					0	4	27	41
	F/up	89	3	1	1/0	1/1	2/4	4/5	1	5	34	39
George	**Pre**	107	33	25	7/6	14/11	11/13	32/30	7	18	53	51
	Post	67	6	1					0	1	22	25
	F/up	71	7	8	0/0	1/3	3/5	4/8	0	9	34	46
Fred	**Pre**	111	23	26	8/12	19/15	21/19	48/46	8	26	54	66
	Post	45	1	0					0	0	20	26
	F/up	60	1	1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0	0	34	39
Gary	**Pre**	116	33	23	12/12	18/13	18/19	48/44	6	15	37	40
	Post	107	35	13					7	12	37	42
	F/up	105	23	14	8/12	8/7	14/12	30/31	6	16	43	41

problems in keeping jobs, frequent and distressing reexperiencing of combat events, avoidance of combat-related material, and social difficulties. He was diagnosed with moderate PTSD based on the composite of measures and interviews at intake (although his MISS score was below the standard cutoff for PTSD, that is, 107; see Table 1, preceding page).

Sam's therapy began aimed at two traumatic memories described in his SSCQ's. The first dealt with being identified as Viet Cong by a sentry and having a gun shoved into his chest followed by the sound of the weapon being readied for fire—his SUDS rating was initially at 7, the VoC rating ("It was an honest mistake") at 1.5. The second incident revolved around having been called a number of racially demeaning names by fellow soldiers in a communications center—the SUDS rating began at 9, the VoC rating ("I can let it go") at 3. Several other non-combat memories that were less distressing emerged during therapy and were also the target for EMDR training.

In the fifth session of EMDR treatment, the SUDS ratings of the two targeted memories were at 0.5 and 1.5 (minimally distressing), respectively; VoC ratings were at 5.5, and 6.5 (somewhat believable), respectively. Sam maintained at this point that he felt he had dealt with all of his most painful memories and that now he often did not think about Vietnam at all—he could "let go" of things. Sam also reported that "racially" he could more readily accept the way his fellows in combat had treated him: "That is how they were brought up," he stated. In this case, while our initial plans were to provide twelve sessions of therapy, treatment was discontinued after five sessions—it was agreed by the research staff and the patient that it was not likely to be therapeutically productive to continue.

As seen in Table 1, various of Sam's measures of symptomatology—the ES, Beck, and personal rating of PTSD symptoms—were considerably lower both at post-treatment and three months later. However, his MISS and anxiety (STAI) scores, showed lithe change. Importantly, his PTSD interview (CAPS) scores were substantially lower at follow-up, reflecting improvement on important and comprehensive clinical indicators of treatment effect.

Veteran #2: Fred

Fred is a retired Air Force Colonel, 53 years of age, whose combat or similar duty included several tours in Vietnam, Laos and one in Afghanistan. Fred had a history of leadership and various decorations for bravery. He had been captured briefly both in the Vietnam campaign and in Afghanistan, enduring a severe beating in the latter case. Fred was a recovered alcoholic undergoing his third divorce at the time of treatment. This patient was diagnosed with PTSD and reported symptoms that included reexperiencing of combat events, nightmares and severe sleep difficulties, patterns of avoidance of thoughts of his wartime experiences, feelings of detachment, and some anger problems, among other serious difficulties.

Fred began EMDR therapy centered on two memories described in his SSCQ's—the first was a memory of the shooting down of a fellow officer during an air combat mission. On this incident, he provided a SUDS rating at 10 to start, and a VoC rating ("it was not my responsibility") at 1. On the second incident, a near death experience in Afghanistan, the SUDS rating was

initially at 10, the VoC rating ("It's over now") at 3. Several other recollections from childhood and Vietnam were also subjected to treatment as they surfaced during EMDR therapy.

In the twelfth and last session of treatment, the SUDS ratings of the two targeted SSCQ memories were at 2 and 3 (mildly distressing), respectively; VoC ratings were both at 6 (quite believable). This was a particularly moving session in which the patient spontaneously proposed combining images during his eye movement training of white objects relevant to each of the target memories and the image of a white Buddha The patient reported that Buddha accepted the objects associated with his trauma and left him with the statement, "Go in peace." The session ended with the patient in tears of joy.

Very large decreases in many of Fred's questionnaire scores from pre- to post-treatment and three-month follow-up are shown in Table 1. Substantial changes can be seen in his IES, his Beck, STAI, and self-rating score, with some scores declining to 0 levels, a phenomenon not previously observed in this laboratory. At follow-up, the patient's interview (CAPS) scores were also dramatically lower relative to pretreatment. As with some other patients treated with EMDR, some increases in anxiety (STAI) scores were found, although not to pre-treatment levels.

Veteran #3: George

George is a retired colonel, 55 years of age, with a history of child abuse and adult alcoholism prior to his joining Alcoholics Anonymous. At the time of treatment, he had been sober for the past seven years. George had recently begun a new academic career that he described as stressful (due to the workload) but also a source of pleasure to him.

George had married before his Vietnam tour but went through a difficult period of affairs and drinking upon his return and was divorced (by then having three children). His second marriage was long-lasting (17 years) but had recently ended prior to treatment. The EMDR therapy was focused on one memory described in his SSCQ's in which he had been struck by a boot and leg during a bombardment. He rated the memory at 7 on the SUDS and his positive VoC ("I have put it to rest") at 1. By the end of the first session, he rated the memory as a 1 on She SUDS (minimally distressing) and a 6 on the VoC (quite believable). He stated that he did not believe Chat he was so relieved so rapidly of a memory of 20 years, but returned to She next session convinced that in fact it was no longer was an issue for him. His second memory involved feelings of resentment and anger regarding a young enemy soldier who was treated in an American hospital in Vietnam occupying space that an American would ordinarily have. His SUDS rating of 7 was reduced to 0 (no distress) and his VoC ("It's over") changed from a 1 to a 7 (completely true) by the end of treatment. Other memories of childhood abuse were dealt with using EMDR.

As seen in Table 1, at post-treatment, this patient showed very significant reductions in his IES, Beck, and self-rating PTSD symptoms scores (to 0 or 1), and his MISS (from 111 to 45). At follow-up, George' s standardized clinical interview (CAPS) scores were at 0, and most of his questionnaire scores also still at very low or 0 levels. Two scores, the MISS and anxiety scale (STAI) showed some increases at this time, however.

Veteran #4: Gary

Gary is a 55-year-old Army veteran who had served one tour of combat in Viet Nam. He had a job he described as "satisfying," as an electronics technician in underwater communications--the duties allowed him to work alone most of the time. He was twice divorced, with two children, and he was in a sometimes "difficult" relationship at the time of therapy. Gary said he consumed alcohol daily but moderately and our interactions with him appeared to confirm his report since he was always sober at the time of therapy.

In some respects, Gary was the most serious PTSD case of these four veterans. He complained of extreme sleep difficulties, anger issues, and other problems including highly disturbing intrusive thoughts and dreams regarding combat experiences, substantial avoidance of combat related feelings and activities, and hypervigilance. He was quite emotional and reportedly very unhappy. He also had a history of depression, childhood polio and abuse, and adult hypertension.

The EMDR therapy began with a memory outlined in his SSCQ—his friend had been shot in the head by a sniper while Gary was standing nearby, he seemed to be carrying some degree of guilt because, since he was taller, he felt the bullet should have hit him. Gary rated the memory on a SUDS at an 8 and the VoC ("I can put this to rest") at 2. After several sessions of treatment, Gary's SUDS rating showed some improvement down to 3, but the rating of his positive belief showed very little (3). A second memory revolved around a night spent hiding in a garbage dump in his efforts to surprise a sniper. He vividly remembered crawling rats and the smell of the garbage. Although he successfully shot the sniper, he rated the memory at 10 on the SUDS and the VoC ("It's over; I'm safe") at 2. By the end of treatment, Gary's SUDS mtings was at 3, but as with the first memory, his VoC was little changed, also at 3. Many childhood memories of his polio, abuse, and others, surfaced during treatment and were also treated with EMDR, but with little effect.

Although this patient was very cooperative in therapy and kept his appointments regularly, in contrast with the other cases described here, he appeared to experience great difficulty working through his memories. He successfully avoided emotional reactions through discussions of nonrelevant material and remained highly avoidant of combat-related memories. He became more depressed at several points and felt that re-exposure to his memories was making him worse. He stated at one point that the therapist seemed more concerned with the research than with his difficulties. Alternative treatments were offered during treatment but Gary was determined to complete the EMDR sessions. At the end of the protocol, he was also offered a medical evaluation for his depression and another referral for further therapy. He declined but remained outwardly friendly and returned for his three-month follow-up at the scheduled time. Later, he self-referred to the laboratory for biofeedback therapy, but discontinued after four sessions with lithe sign of improvement.

Assessment at the end of treatment validated our other impressions that Gary's progress had been modest at best. With the exception of a small decrease in his MISS scale and ES avoidance scores, there were no notable decreases (and some slight increases) in scores on the remaining questionnaires for this patient.

Notes

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EMDR in the Context of Current Treatments of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Steven M. Silver, Ph.D.

Over the years, Vietnam War veterans, as well as other veterans suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, have been told that reactions did not exist; in a strange reversal of doctrine, they are told now that, because of their experiences, they are permanently crippled for PTSD (supposedly) cannot be successfully treated.

The reality is far different. Post-traumatic stress disorder has been around long enough for research into treatment to be conducted. We are now aware of a growing number of methods for treating PTSD which have shown success; undoubtedly, over time, we will find more. (Why clinicians may still maintain PTSD cannot be treated is an interesting question which I have some ideas about but will put off addressing to another day.)

A review of the professional literature over the past years shows, first, relatively few true research projects into the treatment of PTSD have been conducted. Using very large criteria, I found references to over 240 articles related to trauma and nonmedication treatment for adults. I then sought to discover how many actually described treatment with some kind of outcome measures. This reduced the field to 38. Apparently, if an article summarizing a survey on the incidence of PTSD among Dutch hostage survivors discussed implications for treatment, and every such article does, a broad query about treatment will retrieve that reference.

Treatments included, but were not limited to, NLP, Flooding, Psychoanalysis, EMDR, Crisis Intervention, Debriefing, Psychodynamic, Biofeedback and Relaxation Training, Systematic Desensitization, and Hypnosis. Of these, 27 were case histories or descriptions of the delivery of the treatment being described. The remaining 12 utilized some sort of control or comparative treatment group. This is important because if the treatment being studied is not compared with anything, we really have no idea what might have been responsible for positive results. The simple factor of

time, for example, might have been responsible for the changes.

Three of the studies were on debriefing, an approach used for emergency service workers such as fire fighters following a traumatic incident, which is not relevant to our focus here.

There were two studies on flooding, one each on systematic desensitization and stress inoculation therapy, with the remaining five on a technique called Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing, or EMDR.

Thus far the research supports EMDR as an effective treatment for PTSD. It is not a magic wand and not all people respond to it. Some, in fact, prefer not to use it, once they learn how it works. On the other hand, there is no evidence that EMDR produces any long-term negative effects.

To be effective, if we can use the results of the research as well as reports from vets, the clinician should be properly trained in EMDR. As with any other methodology, it is not enough simply to read about this advanced technique and expect to be able to use it effectively. Close examination shows that EMDR is not hypnosis, so the veteran is not under anyone else's control. In hypnosis, for example, the client enters a trance state marked by eyes being fixed; the client is guided into a relaxed state prior to the start of treatment. In this condition, the client, open to suggestion, loses his sense of time while in trance, and so on. In EMDR, the veteran is typically not relaxed when treatment begins because he is asked to think about a traumatic memory; his eyes are moving throughout the treatment. Suggestion, post-hypnotic suggestion, does not work. Finally, the veteran does not lose his sense of time. Veterans who have had both hypnosis and EMDR report a significant difference between the two experiences.

We are now aware of a growing number of methods for treating PTSD which have shown success; undoubtedly, over time, we will find more.

There are also two other studies on EMDR which have been written up and submitted for publication consideration.

A couple of points should be made here. First, since PTSD was defined in 1980, we have had on average less than one research paper published each year. So the field is still young and more will be done in future years. Second, there have been more research studies on EMDR than on any other treatment for PTSD. This is a little surprising, since EMDR was introduced relatively recently—in 1989.

The reason for all the research on EMDR is because it has shown dramatic results much greater than that for any other treatment for PTSD. This success has generated a great deal of controversy among mental health professionals and the demand for substantiation has been great.

EMDR can be quite powerful in its ability to assist someone in bringing up buried feelings; often it can help with recall far more rapidly than other techniques. Therefore, it is not used as a "self-help" technique by therapists who understand its power. In the professional literature, there is one report of an individual who, impressed with the results he was getting from EMDR in treatment, decided to use it on himself at home. He triggered a thirty-minute panic attack, which he was unable to stop until it had run its course!

EMDR is conducted by, first, developing a good history of the veteran, including trauma experiences. In cooperation with the veteran, a traumatic memory is selected for work. As part of the briefing, the veteran has the EMDR process explained that he understands what will be taking place is really making use of the veteran's own abilities. The therapist serves as a guide; the real work is done by the veteran.

The traumatic memory is focused on by the veteran while the therapist guides his or her eyes back and forth. Apparently, this taps into abilities exiting within the brain having to do with information processing and learning and may be what people naturally use to resolve stress. Recent research into Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep, a stage of sleep during which dreams are initiated, shows a strong link between REM and learning.

The therapist stops the eye movements from time to time and finds out from the veteran what, if anything, has changed. Sometimes the picture changes, sometimes it doesn't. Feelings may or may not change. It is possible other memories may arise. There is no "supposed to" in EMDR; the veteran's own brain supplies direction and the power is with the veteran. Every individual is different and no two responses are the same. Based on the responses, the clinician will ask the veteran to focus on some part of the report and continue the eye movements.

Speed of the treatment varies greatly from memory to memory. Sometimes a single session will result in the resolution of an experience; sometimes it will take many sessions. It is impossible to predict in advance. EMDR appears to help not only desensitize the remembered experiences (that is, reduce any negative feelings associated with the memories), but help the veteran resolve issues coming out of the experience. For example, many veterans are left with thoughts about themselves following exposure to combat, thoughts which hold them back in their lives—such as "I'm no good," and so on. While many other people have usually told the veteran such thinking is unfair and not true, and many times the veteran concedes the truth of the supportive remarks, nonetheless the veteran has found it very difficult to get rid of, to resolve, the thinking.

What EMDR does is help the veteran settle these issues in his or her own terms. For example, someone who has been judging himself as guilty may, in the course of EMDR treatment, come to understand that he did all he could do and that there is no need to persist in self-blame. On the other hand, a veteran might resolve the issue by concluding that he did make a mistake. He can take healing perspective that he can learn from the error and keep such things from happening in the future. The point is that each resolution is unique to each veteran; there is no cookie cutter" in EMDR.

Most importantly, there is no imposition of a "correct" way of

thinking. The veteran works out his own resolutions and understandings, often in ways which neither the therapist nor the client could have anticipated.

Human beings are complex; most of us know that our memories and thinking can often be quite interconnected. We see this in EMDR. For example, sometimes memories tie together in unexpected ways. We might start, for example, with a memory of a combat experience. It is possible that additional detail about the experience might come up. Sometimes other memories come up which are related in some way to the original targeted combat memory. This simply shows how complex our minds can be in that different experiences, even from different times in the person's life, can be interconnected.

This linkage should not be a problem in doing EMDR. Any connected memories, say a childhood accident memory connecting with a combat memory of an ambush, are simply treated with the EMDR as well. This cleans them out and, if they have been feeding into the original target memory, helps reduce the power of the original target. As those connecting memories are dealt with, the therapist will guide the veteran back to the original target and continue working on it.

At our inpatient PTSD Program, we have been using EMDR for about four years. We gathered information from veterans who went through our program as to what kind of an effect the program had in eight different problem areas: Anger, Anxiety, Depression, Relationship Problems, Isolation, Flashbacks, Intrusive Memories, and Nightmares. We were happy to see that when entry and exit self-evaluations in each of those eight areas showed significant improvement.

We were also able to look at the effects of adding EMDR, relaxation training, and biofeedback to the program experience of the veterans. Veterans getting the program and biofeedback did not do better than veterans getting the program alone in the eight problem areas. On average, relaxation training resulted in improved averages in all eight problem areas, though some of those areas the improvement may have just been due to chance and were not very great.

EMDR, when added to the program, increased the positive improvement two to seven times in the eight problems areas. It did better that the other two treatments in every area except Depression, where relaxation training did better. In the area of the PTSD symptoms of Intrusive Recollections, Flashbacks, and Nightmares, EMDR resulted in improvement twice that of relaxation training, and even better than either the program alone or the program with biofeedback.

EMDR is not magic. It will not supply what a veteran does not have. For example, if the client has been isolating and has never developed normal social skills, clearing out his traumatic memories will not suddenly supply those skills. EMDR will not cause a veteran to forget; he will not forget his friends from the war. But what does seem to happen is that the veteran finds a way to resolve the problems relating to the memories—which may make, for example, honoring those friends much easier.

As things stand now, with the knowledge and research we have now, it appears that EMDR is an extremely promising technique, quite likely the best we have for the treatment of PTSD

among combat veterans. When used by a trained clinician with a motivated veteran, it is producing, in far less time, positive results superior to any other treatment available. It is a method well worthy of further study and use.

READING THE WAR LITERATURE
by Phoebe S. Spinrad

I don't recognize the people in these books:
the killers and rapists,
the misogynistic predators,
the numbed ones with death behind their eyes--
they weren't like that,
they weren't like that at all.

Stunned, maybe, and scared,
wrenched by the deaths and near-deaths,
or off on the sidelines, waiting,
helpless, for Saigon to fall,
and the equipment left rotting in the jungle
and the missing men rotting in their cells.

Casualties of war, some broke; most didn't;
tried not to think about the dead and missing
or the other war we'd come from
and would someday go home to:
the taunts, the saliva, the eggs on the uniform,
the campuses blazing,
the rocks flying,
the contorted faces screaming "killer killer"--

and we weren't like that,
we weren't like that at all.

Overcoming Survival Guilt with the Help of EMDR

A vignette in honor of Sgt. Clarence Russell and SP/5 Winford Nass, who saved my life during the night of February 23, 1969.

By Griffin L. Perry

I was in Vietnam from June of 1968 through most of 1969. I was an RTO (Radio/Telephone Operator) with the 25th Infantry in and around Dau Tieng. During the end, of my tour I flew as a door gunner with the 1st Air Cav. The night of February 23-24, 1969, our positions in Dau Tieng were overrun by the Viet Cong and two of my friends were killed.

I exhibited all of the classic symptoms associated with "survivor guilt" to include the nightmares, anxiety on my anniversary date, and a fixation about punctuality. These problems stemmed from finding the bodies of my friends and comrades on that night; indeed, that scene has remained with me.

In 1982, I attended an Outreach Center where I participated in group and individual therapy. I paid my first visit to "The Wall' with that group in November of 1984. For the first time I was made aware that I was not alone; others were experiencing the same difficulties that I was and it was okay to address those issues which I had thought were long in my past. In short, the group therapy brought out the problems, but it took a new therapy, EMDR, to resolve them. I returned to "The Wall" in November of 1993 to finally make peace with my departed friends.

The most valid memory was of my reaching the rear end of a destroyed 3/4 ton truck which had been hit in the tailgate by an RPG, killing the six or more occupants. The image presented was of the entry puncture in that thick, metal tailgate. I was the first individual to the truck and remember going through the vehicle in an attempt to find one person alive; none was. The recurrence of that scene would play out for the next twenty-five years until it was instantly and successfully addressed in EMDR sessions with Dr. Edith Taber. Her most difficult task was not the EMDR therapy but was getting me to be willing to attempt the EMDR therapy at all. That process took her a period of approximately five years and is a tribute to her professionalism, unwillingness to give up, and her direct caring for the veterans she treats. Dr. Taber took the brunt of my anger with the system, my refusal to cooperate, and the frustration of a dysfunctional marriage. She went far beyond the requirements of her vocation.

The EMDR session which first addressed the visualization of the truck brought me immediately back in touch with that night. The sights, the sounds, the sensations of that incident were all there. I could smell the blood and visualize my hands and arms covered with the blood of my comrades. We played the scene over again about five or six times; I lost all track of time. Each

repetition brought out the fears, the anger, and the pain. I had been late in getting back to the assembly area and to this very day exhibit anxiety upon being late for virtually any event. Had I been on time, I would have been in the back of that truck with my dead friends and would not be writing of the experience.

The playback of that night diffused the emotions surrounding it. The playback also brought out other issues which were directly related, including my real fear at being separated from my unit and the loss of my direct superior as we rejoined our unit. There was also the loss of the guy who had shown me the ropes when I arrived in Vietnam; he was killed in the back of the truck after he had rescued us from our position (which had been cut off from our unit during the night attack). More important were the combat actions I later experienced in reaction to get even for those losses. These included my experiences of being shot down as a door gunner months later and actions taken as an radio man in the field. It was all visually vivid and the EMDR allowed me to release these feelings.

With the cessation of the EMDR, I could talk freely about things I had suppressed in a way that was not self-destructive. I have been able to accept the things that I did; I have been assured and do believe that I accomplished everything I could do to simply protect myself and my comrades on the field of battle and the EMDR has moderated, if not completely removed, my "survivor guilt." My life has not seen a reduction in adversity, but I deal with it differently.

The experiences of February 23-24, 1969, and the subsequent events that came out of that night will be within me forever, but the emotional charge associated with it and an intrusion of these thoughts into my life has been moderated to the point that I can at last talk about them. I can share them with those I have come to trust and deal with them from my own personal point of view, rather than react blindly to them as in the past. My thanks to Dr. Edith Tabor for helping me to see this light through EMDR.

GRADUATE SHAKESPEARE SEMINAR

By Phoebe S. Spinrad

A student objects to Othello's militarism,
the hegemony of the Venetian Senate,
the defense of Cyprus against the Turk.
The rest of the play vanishes for her:
the human frailties, human nobility,
one love turned selfish, another selfless,
public and private lives jumbled together,
all in a time of war, a land at risk.
Only the war remains for her, an evil,
regardless of its cause. Classist. Bad.

Fresh-faced young student, safe in academe,
what of the Cypriot townspeople, cheering
the drowning of the Turkish fleet, the tyrant?
What of the soldiers in the Venetian army--
led by a Moor, undercut by a Venetian,
the second in command a Florentine,
a young lieutenant unable to hold his liquor,
polite to the ladies, even the local whore?
Hegemony? A world of monsters? Or,
as I remember it, a world of people,
thoughtless and cruel sometimes, but only people,
trying to do their duty and survive.

Sweet-faced young student, what if you saw a friend,
one of these other students at the table,
hung from a tree, inside a sack, writhing,
seeming alive, until you cut him down,
opened the sack, and found the rats inside,
the man dead, the rats very much alive?
What if you reached the hut on which you'd returned fire,
found all the weapons gone, spent shells on the floor,
and, also on the floor, two mangled children?
What if they called you babykiller when you got home?

Dear students, how can I describe the horrors?
I never saw them myself; I only heard them
from friends, from strangers passing through, the people
you've never talked to, never want to know,
human like you, not monsters. Human. Like you.
And the enemy real, like these Turks attacking Cyprus.

You don't see it. You've been taught not to see it.
Brightly you look around the seminar table
and brightly speak the slogan I remember:
"What if they gave a war and no one came?"
Oh, dear young child who never knew the horrors,
the enemy, the aggressor, always shows up.

Dr. James R. Reckner is a retired naval officer who served two tours of duty as a senior advisor with riverine forces of the Vietnamese Navy. In 1989, he founded the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict and has served as that center's director since then.

The Vietnam Project at Texas Tech University

James R. Reckner
Director, Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict

Archive of the Vietnam Conflict

Some time ago I walked the perimeter of the Union Army lines at Gettysburg. As I walked, I was struck by the multitude of monuments, the great bulk of which had been erected in the 1880s and 1890s: the Civil War's "memorial period." The incubation period for nostalgia, it seems, is about thirty years or so.

We are now in the Vietnam War memorial period. The same span of time-thirty years-has passed since substantial American involvement in Vietnam began. And quite like the veterans of the Civil War, we have engaged in erecting monuments to those

we left behind. The stark black granite wall in Washington, D.C., has become the focal point for veterans' remembrance of their sacrifice in Vietnam. That is entirely appropriate. War memorials serve an important function for the community, but principally they serve the war generation.

The last of the Civil War soldiers, both Blue and Gray, have long since sounded the last post, yet their monuments remain. However, the significance of these monuments, once so brilliantly clear to every observer because of the vivid memories they evoked, have lost their immediacy. The continuing thirst for new understanding, new interpretations of the significance of that struggle, can be slaked only through preservation of such things as participants' diaries, letters, etc. Had a small portion of the money spent on monuments at Gettysburg been dedicated to preserving the records, letters, memories and impressions of the participants at the pivotal battle, the monument thus created would be alive today, a priceless source for each succeeding generation as it seeks to understand the Civil War experience.

Each succeeding generation will also seek to interpret the Vietnam

experience, like the Civil War, in light of that generation's experience. Young people will strive to understand our nation's involvement in Vietnam and the related strife at home that tore at the fabric of American society.

Also, like the Civil War monuments at Gettysburg, the Vietnam Wall, while conveying some insight into the spirit of the time, will not fulfill future generations' desire to understand the American experience in that far off land. For that, our grandchildren, great-grandchildren and later generations will be compelled to rely upon the records we preserve for them.

The archive at Texas Tech is intended as a Vietnam memorial for future generations

Texas Tech University has established the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict specifically to preserve such materials, and while for veterans of the war the Vietnam Wall in Washington and similar monuments in various states and communities provide an important element of recognition and memory, the archive at Texas Tech is intended as a Vietnam memorial for future generations: a living memorial preserving the key for future generations' understanding of what we did, our triumphs, our trials, our failures, and even the way the war affected us in the ensuing years.

Today the discovery of a fresh, detailed Civil War diary or set of letters providing new insights into life during that traumatic period would be a tremendous historical discovery. The preservation of letters, diaries, tapes, photos and films of the men and women who served in Vietnam will ensure that these materials are available for researchers today and a century from now, for Texas Tech University has made a "longer than lifetime" commitment to this preserve these resources.

It is important to preserve the experiences of the regular soldier, sailor, airman, nurse and Marine. Letters home to parents and loved ones from Khe Sanh or Pleiku, Can Tho or Long Binh, from air bases in Thailand or riverboats in the Mekong Delta, or anywhere else in the theater are valuable historical records. Individual experiences —the social aspect— are just as important as government documents that illuminate the larger aspects of the war.

The day will most certainly come when the last Vietnam veteran will have passed away, when the last old soldier has answered his final muster and the final old sailor of that war has gone to his last sea detail. The day will also come when the last of us who were touched in any way by the fire of Vietnam have passed beyond the vale, gone forever. Our living memorial, the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech, will offer insights and impressions long after the day when the Vietnam Wall, that emotional, evocative, powerful monument to the men and women who died in Vietnam, will, like the monuments at Gettysburg, lose its immediacy.

The centerpiece of the Texas Tech archive is the Douglas Pike Collection, which was donated by Professor Pike in the Fall of 1994. Pike began his Vietnam career in the early sixties as a

foreign service officer in Saigon whose interest was the Viet Cong and newly formed National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The collection began as his personal research collection for his scholarly studies of the Viet Cong which are still considered to be the definitive works on the subject. Pike expanded and broadened the collection over the years until it contained, in its present state, over a million documents covering all aspects of the war in Vietnam. These documents include everything from newspaper clippings to U.S. government documents, to Rand Corporation studies, military studies, and captured North Vietnamese and Viet Cong documents. The collection is perhaps unrivaled as a research resource in that, perhaps nowhere else is so extensive a collection of material on so many aspects of the conflict brought together in one place. As a result, it is an ideal starting place for the researcher interested in studying any aspect of the war in Vietnam.

The Archive's holdings are not limited to the resources of the Pike Collection. The Archive's microfilm collection contains microfilms of the National Security files of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations; the records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; the monthly reports of the Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam, and SEAL Team unit histories just to name a few. It also contains some 140 smaller collections of letters, photographs and personal reminiscences of veterans from all over West Texas documenting the perspective of the combatant on the line in Vietnam. More recently, the Archive has acquired the reports of the Air Force's CHECO units which evaluated Air Force doctrine during the war, video tapes of the Senate's POW/MIA hearings, and a collection of interviews done by the Air Force Academy of Academy graduates who were prisoners of war during the conflict.

The Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech is not simply about housing documents related to the history of the conflict. It also functions to help the researcher interested in studying the war. Thus the Archive staff has several ongoing projects which include the cataloguing and indexing of collections already acquired by the archive, the preservation and restoration of archive materials, and the acquisition of new collections. The most important function, however, is to aid the researcher, scholarly or not, access the materials collected and answer questions about the resources available. To date the archive staff has helped researchers of all kinds from all over the United States and, more recently, all over the world. That help is as close as a phone call, letter, e-mail or fax to the archive.

On the subject of acquisitions, people who contact the archive frequently ask what kind of material the archive is interested in collecting. Simply put, just about any documentary resource related to the American experience in Vietnam. However, we would like to develop further is our holdings related to the experience of the ordinary soldier/sailor/airman/nurse in the field. Many veterans are often surprised to find that anyone would be interested in their old letters or orders or photographs that have been collecting dust in the attic. The truth of the matter is that these records provide the only eyewitness insight into the experience of the individuals who actually fought the war. It is a perspective that cannot be captured by the documentary films or detailed by government documents or

experienced through all of the analytical commentary available. The bottom line is that it can only be preserved by those who actually "lived" it. If that record is lost, future generations will have lost the opportunity to examine those "first hand" accounts of the war.

Obviously, no archive can house everything, but the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University is willing to consider all possibilities. Those who are interested in donating material are encouraged to contact the archive. If it is not possible to donate the material outright, the archive also has the ability to photocopy documents and reproduce visual images and return originals to their owners. In either case, the archive would certainly appreciate the opportunity to consider all the resources available.

The best way to view the archive is as a collective memory. The function of the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University is to see that the memory of the conflict is available to future generations. In order to do that, the archive requests the assistance of all who served and now have materials in need of preservation.

Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict

Within Texas Tech University, the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict complements the work of the Archive. While the Archive strives to preserve the historical record, the Center works to encourage continued study of that record. So vital is the work of encouraging younger generations to study all aspects of the American Vietnam experience, that a number of notable officials of the Vietnam era have lent their support to the effort.

Chairing Texas Tech's Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict's National Council is Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., who commanded U.S. naval forces in Vietnam and served as chief of naval operations from 1970 to 1974. Also on the national council are General William C. Westmoreland; William P. Bundy, former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs; William E. Colby, former CIA Director; Bui Diem, former South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States; and Vietnam scholar Douglas Pike.

Locally, the Center and its activities have been guided by an advisory board comprised principally of Vietnam veterans. Ranging in rank from lieutenant general to private, the board members have worked for six years to ensure the success of every aspect of the Center. In the process, their efforts have ensured that the Center and its programs have not become "purely academic." The Lubbock community and the nation as a whole have a great and continuing emotional stake in Vietnam; enlistment of the support of the local Vietnam veteran community has greatly strengthened the Vietnam project at Texas Tech University and also has established a new bond between university and community which will only strengthen as the Vietnam project matures.

In 1993, the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict embarked on a program of triennial Vietnam symposia with a meeting entitled **Vietnam: Paris + 20**. On 31 March - 1 April 1995, with the Army War College, the Center cohosted a Vietnam Roundtable entitled, "On Winning and Losing: The Summers Thesis and the Vietnam War." The papers of that roundtable are currently being edited for publication by Texas Tech University Press as the first in a planned series of such publications.

Our second triennial symposium, **After the Cold War: Reassessing**

Vietnam, is scheduled to be held in Lubbock, Texas, 18 - 20 April 1996. Among the already committed speakers are Admiral Zumwalt, William E. Colby, Walt Rostow, Bui Diem, George Herring, William Duiker, and a wide range of American scholars researching the war. Professor Ilya Gaiduk of the Russian Academy of Sciences will present a paper on Soviet aid to North Vietnam during the war, and Admiral Zumwalt has invited General Vo Nguyen Giap to attend and to participate in a panel discussion with the admiral and a senior U.S. Army officer. The Vietnam Working Group of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission of MIA/POW Affairs will also report the findings of their search for U.S. Vietnam-era POWs in Russia. The Commission's American Co-Chairman, U.S. Representative Pete Peterson (D-FL), himself a POW for seven years in the Hanoi Hilton, will present the commission's report.

Infrastructure

The Center and Archive were established at a fortunate time, for in recent years two long-standing building projects have finally reached fruition. Although originally planned principally to house Texas Tech University's extensive Southwest Collection when funding for the new $8.8 million archive building became available, plans were redrawn to include discreet spaces within the building for the Vietnam Archive. The new Southwest Collection/ Special Collections building, when it is completed in July 1996, will provide temperature- and humidity-controlled storage spaces for all archival materials, and state-of-the-art conservation facilities to ensure preservation of original documents. Vietnam researchers, beginning in the autumn of 1996, will thus be able to conduct research in the most modern of facilities, including a bright and spacious reading room.

For many years, individuals in the local community have pressed for construction of an International Cultural Center. Funding for that building was approved last year, and ground was broken in August of 1994. Scheduled for completion in February 1996, the International Cultural Center will house all of the university's international programs, and thus will provide office spaces for the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict, and also modern meeting facilities for Vietnam symposia. The new building will accommodate as many as seven conference sessions simultaneously, and will also be equipped to cater conference luncheons within the building.

With these new facilities, and with the continuing support of the government of the State of Texas as well as a broad range of Vietnam veterans and other citizens of the Lubbock community and beyond, the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict and the Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University have embarked upon an active program of preservation and study of the Vietnam Conflict.

"After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam"
18-20 April 1996
Symposium Agenda (As of 10 August)

Wednesday, 17 April 1996

Afternoon Conferees arrive at Conference Hotel

2000 Welcoming Remarks: "A Post-Cold War Reassessment of the Vietnam War."
Speaker to be announced. (At Holiday Inn, Lubbock Plaza)

2100 (Approx) Reception at Conference Hotel. (Cash bar + snacks)

Thursday, 18 April 1996
(Symposium Sessions at International Cultural Center)

0815 Welcoming Remarks:
Texas Tech University President Dr. Robert W. Lawless

0830 Opening Address: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.

0900 *Session 1: Views from the Other Side*
"China and the Defense of North Vietnam, 1964-1969"
Dr. Xiaoming Zhang, Texas Tech University
"The Soviet Union and North Vietnam"
Prof. Ilya Gaiduk, Academy of Sciences, Moscow
"North Vietnam's Relationship with the Soviet Union and China"
Dr. William J. Duiker, Penn State University

1045 *Session 2: Reassessing the Threat*
"China, Russia, and American Vietnam Diplomacy"
Dr. George Herring, University of Kentucky
"Chinese and Russian Support for North Vietnam: A South Vietnamese View"
Hon. Bui Diem,
former South Vietnamese Ambassador to U.S.
"The View from Langley: CIA Analysis of the Vietnam War"
Dr. John Prados, Independent Scholar and Author

1230 Lunch. Luncheon Speaker: To be announced

1400 *Session 3:*
After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam, Roundtable Discussion
Hon. William E. Colby, Hon. Walt Rostow, Hon. Bui Diem

1545 *Session 4: Panel on Laos*
"Broken Promises: The U.S. and the Hmong in Laos."
Dr. Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Southern Connecticut University
"Air America in Laos."
Dr. William M. Leary, University of Georgia
"How Laos Became Involved in the Cold War, 1954-1962."
Dr. Arthur J. Dommen, Independent Scholar

2000 *Conference Banquet*
(At McInturff Center, University Medical Center)

2100 *Keynote Address:* Speaker to be announced

Friday, 19 April 1996

(Sessions at International Cultural Center)

(The agenda for 19-20 April will be determined by the responses to our call for papers.)

0830 *Session 5A: "Domestic Legacies of the Vietnam War"*
Chair and Commentator: H.W. Brands, Texas A&M University
"Ronald Reagan and the End of the Cold War,"
Charles E. Neu, Brown University
"J. William Fulbright and the Transformation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."
Randall B. Woods, University of Arkansas

0830 *Session 5B: "The Veterans' Continuing War: Stereotypes and Reality"*
"The Importance of Story: Individual and Cultural Effects of Skewing the Realities of American Involvement in Southeast Asia for Social, Political and/or Financial Ends."
John Del Vecchio, Independent Scholar and Author.
"The Helping Professions and the Building of the Veteran Stereotype."
Dr. Phoebe Spinrad, Ohio State University
"PTSD Treatment and the VA: A Cure, a Recovery or a Contradiction?"
Richard R. Burns, Independent Scholar, Columnist, and Counsellor

1015 *Session 6A: Anthropological/Behavioral Aspects of the War*
Session being organized by Dr. Felix Moos, University of Kansas

1015 *Session 6B: Teaching the Vietnam War*
"The State of the Field: How the Vietnam War Is Being Taught,"
Joe P. Dunn, Converse College
"Teaching Vietnam with Film: History Is Important,
But So Is Film Language,"
Peter C. Rollins, Oklahoma State University
Steve Potts, Hibbing Community College, TBA

1145 *Lunch.*
Luncheon Speaker: Professor Douglas Pike,
"Recent Developments in Vietnam"

1315 *Session 7A: Air Force Reassessments*
"Air Force Doctrine and Vietnam,"
Colonel Dennis M. Drew, Dean,
School of Advanced Air Power Studies
"Vietnam and Desert Storm: Learning the Right Lessons from
Vietnam for the Post-Cold War Era,"
Col. Joseph P. Martino, USAF (Ret)
"The Impact of Victory on the Post-Vietnam War Air Force,"
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Army War College

1500 *Session 8A: Vietnam Film and Fiction*
Session being organized by Walter Jones, University of Utah
"American Fiction about the Vietnam War: How the Creative
Process Reflects and Interprets Vietnam
War Experiences,"
Walter Jones, University of Utah

1715 - 1900 *Civic Reception*

Saturday, 20 April

(Sessions at International Cultural Center)

0830 *Session 9: Armed Forces Reassessments*
Army
LTC Conrad Crane, USMA, West Point
Navy
Dr. Edward Marolda, Navy Historical Center
Marine Corps
Dr. Jack Shulimson, Marine Corps Historical Center

1030 *Session 10: Panel Discussion*
Admiral Zumwalt, General Giap [invited],
+ Senior U.S. Army Officer

1200	*Lunch* Luncheon Speaker: Dr. Lewis Sorley, "A Better War: The Neglected Later Years of American Involvement in Vietnam"
1400	*Session 11: The Antiwar Movement* Panel being organized by Dr. Charlotte Dunham, Texas Tech University
1545	*End of Formal Agenda*
1600	*(Approx.) Optional tour of Lubbock and Texas Tech University, followed by West Texas barbecue dinner at the Ranching Heritage Center, Texas Tech University*

Papers Proposed But Not Yet Assigned to a Panel

Dr. Herbert Y. Schandler, Chairman, Department of Strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, paper on LBJ and Vietnam.

Dr. Sandra C. Taylor, University of Utah,
"From a Different Dimension: The Vietnam Conflict as a Gender War."

Benjamin Dubberly, Texas Tech University, "America's First Atrocity."

LCOL James Willbanks,
"The Impact of the Vietnam Experience on Current Strategic Defense Policy."

R. Blake Dunnavent, Texas Tech University,"Muddy Waters: The U.S. Navy's Search for a Riverine Warfare Doctrine during the Vietnam Conflict."

Garnett "Bill" Bell & George J. Veith, "POWs and Politics: How Much Hanoi Really Knows."

For information about the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University, The 1996 Vietnam Symposium, and to be put on the Vietnam Center's mailing list contact:	*The Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University is interested in all inquiries from researchers and potential donors. The archive can be reached at:*
James R. Reckner, Director Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX 79409-1013	By mail addressed to: The Archive of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University Texas Tech University Library Lubbock, Texas 79409-0002
Phone: (806) 742-3742 Fax: (806) 742-1060 E-mail: jjrec@ttacs.ttu.edu	Phone: (806) 742-3758 Fax: (806) 742-0737 E-mail: livna@ttacs.ttu.edu

John S. Baky, M.S., M.A., is Director of Libraries and Curator of the Imaginative Representations of the Vietnam War Collection at La Salle University in Philadelphia. Having reached the rank of Captain after 36 months, Baky had served in the United States as a Military Police Officer and, upon completion of Jungle Operations School (Canal Zone) and Physical Security School (Ft. Gordon, GA), was assigned to the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal) and later as a platoon leader attached to the 11th Light Infantry Brigade at LZ Bronco (Duc Pho.).

Invitation to Use a Vietnam War Resource

by John Baky

A collection of material entitled "Imaginative Representations of the Vietnam War" is preserved in the Department of Special Collections at La Salle University, in the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The fundamental aspiration of the Collection operates under a dual intention:

1. To discover how a discrete body of creative literature becomes mythopoeic. That is, how a complex event may be interpreted through creative means;

2. To discover how creative treatments of an event use aesthetic values to reveal both the fact and



emotional essence of traumatic cultural phenomena.

The primary resources for studying the above two processes are gathered in a collection presently consisting of about 9,000 books of fiction and poetry together with 600 non-print items. Additionally, more than 600 films and videos are available. These films include narrative, commercial (Hollywood), pornography, and art films, as well as documentary films, curricular production, taped seminars, and extensive TV-generated material.

The collection is limited intentionally to imaginative literature and the visual arts. The Collection is focused on fictive writing in the form of novels, short stories, poetry, drama, filmscripts, extensive examples of graphic art, painting, video, TV production, and sound recordings.

Contained in this Collection, and additional to the published written material itself, are unpublished manuscripts, corrected manuscripts, shooting scripts, galley proofs, page proofs (corrected and uncorrected), holograph copies, limited editions, variant editions, rungs of comic books, and cartoon art. The remainder of the Collection consists of carefully catalogued items of ephem

era such as poetry broadsides, dealers' catalogs of Vietnam War fiction, published strategy games, published software, vanity publications, and curriculum guides for teaching the war through its literature across many educational levels and curricula.

The Collection is intentionally strong in material produced after 1980, though virtually every earlier title that appears in the 3rd edition of John Newman's **Vietnam War Literature** also exists in the La Salle Collection. In view of that comparison, it is a fundamental goal of the Collection to make available literature that demonstrates the evolution of the perceptions of the war experienced after the event had actually ended. The Collection is particularly committed to illuminating the process by which fictional narrative becomes mythopoeic. In using this Collection, it is possible to both question and document the sources of developing myths about the war experience. For example, one may examine and measure the impact of the original event by seeing how the experience is presented to the public through imaginative renderings. Using hundreds of examples, one can compare systematically how the post-1975 presentations and perceptions of war differ qualitatively from pre-1975 material. The more than 600 films and videos are of seminal utility in this connection. A growing sector of the Collection is composed of imaginative representations of Vietnamese refugees during and after the American conflict. As well, there is material representing the growing influence of the Vietnamese emigre community as it establishes itself in American culture. This would include typical hybrid mythic constructions such as the "Vietnamese Mafia," rags-to-riches narratives similar in spirit and naivete to the Horaio Algeresque tales of early 20th-century America, young adult fiction, and thinly veiled (mostly) right-wing political diatribes posing as fiction.

More globally, serious scholarly inquiry can be conducted concerning the elusive distinction between fictional narrative and autobiographical perception. The interrogation of this Coleridge-like chimera that mocks and distorts the reflexive distinctions between narrative memory and interpretive imagination fuels the enduing intellectual vigor of the Collection.

In direct support of the written and cinematic dimensions of the Collection are actively developed collections of graphic arts (posters, prints, collage, ephemera, etc.) featuring such material as ten original silkscreen propaganda posters presented to Denise Levertov during the poet's trip to Hanoi in 1972. Additionally, artifacts of a musical/sound recording nature include tapes of Hanoi Hannah, recordings of Armed Forces Radio broadcasts from Saigon and Danang, tapes of attacks in progress recorded during the onslaught of Tet. Underground tapes of GI music broadcasts in-country, and sound tracks of most films released about the war.

Comments so far made by the scores of visiting scholars who have examined the Collection indicate that the Collection is unique in its depth, peerless in its breadth, and that it is the largest subject collection of its kind in the world. Inquiries may be made to the address below, or by e-mail.

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Senators Robert C. Byrd, John McCain, Larry Pressler, Bob Smith; Speaker Newt Gingrich
Congressman Jim Bunning; and Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham
Honorary Co-Chairmen
M'Liss Solove Houston, Laura Marie Green, LTC Kathy La Sauce
Chairpersons
cordially invite you to the

Sixth Annual

PATRIOTS BALL

A Celebration of Service to Country!

Black-Tie, Military, or Highland Dress preferred
November 10, 1995; 6 pm - midnight
Capital Hilton Hotel, 16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, DC
(202) 393-1000
Patriots Ball room rates - $125 single or double
Rates are available - November 8,9, & 10

Starring

THE DRIFTERS

Reception and Open Bar, Capital Terrace - 6:00-7:15 pm
Dinner and Dancing, Presidential Ballroom - 7:15-8:30 pm
Program 8:30 - 9:10 pm
Show and Dancing - 9:10 pm-midnight

Distinguished Service Awards
Recipients
Wayne Newton & Robert Spanogle
Remarks
Wayne Newton

Keynote Speaker
Robert W. Spanogle
National Adjutant
The American Legion

Award for Life Service to Veterans
A 3/4 life-size oil portrait by Vietnam Veteran artist, Tom Nielsen, will be unveiled
of ***Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.)***
Remarks by Admiral Zumwalt

For more information on corporate sponsorship or attendance,
write the Vietnam Veterans Institute, The John Deere Building, P.O. Box 386,
Timonium, Maryland 21094
Vietnam Veterans Institute - (410) 494-9381/(202) 861-8812

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THE MCNAMARA BOOK AND LEGACY: RETROFIT FOR "IN RETROSPECT"

A one-day conference at the Army and Navy Club, Washington DC
(November 9th, 1995 at One Farragut Square - 901 17th St, NW)

Contact: Peter C. Rollins (918) 243-7637 or FAX (405) 744-6326 or RollinsPC@aol.com

IN RETROSPECT (Times Books, 1995) is Robert S. McNamara's apology for prosecuting the Vietnam war and a confession of error—which he attributes to both himself and to our political/military establishments. The book generated considerable controversy that must have surprised even the author. Indeed, letters-to-the-editor, cartoons, opinion pieces, and editorials erupted with heated discussions of issues of "guilt" and "retrospection" raised by the book during the "twentieth anniversary" of our defeat in Vietnam. (Only a small fraction were favorable to the author.)



(Times Books, 1995)

The Vietnam Veterans Institute (VVI) believes that our heritage needs constant analysis and evaluation. The VVI Journal has examined such issues as Discrimination against Veterans and the Neil Sheehan book, *A Bright Shining Lie*. We have read *In Retrospect* and we have found the book deficient—even in its declared areas of "clarification." This day-long conference will be taped and major media will be invited; an anthology will be created from the papers and comments. With these video and print records, we will produce a comprehensive retrospective of Robert McNamara's activity in, and account for, the Vietnam War—thereby providing a retrofit for *In Retrospect*.

Breakfast, lunch, and afternoon refreshments are included in the registration of $50.00. All must register.

This conference is partially underwritten by the American Legion, but is still seeking financial support from veterans groups and foundations.

I. Morning Sessions

7:30 - 9:30 *Registration and Breakfast*

8:00 *Welcome to the VVI Conference*
J. Eldon Yates, Chairman, Vietnam Veterans Institute
Dr. Peter C. Rollins, Curriculum Chairman, VVI
Dr. Adrian Cronauer, Vice Chairman, VVI

8:20 - 9:20 *The McNamara Book As Analysis*
Chair: Dr. Adrian Cronauer, VVI

Dr. Joe Dunn (Converse College),
"*In Retrospect*'s Context: McNamara, Military Strategy, and the Literature"

Comments: Dr. Joe Guilmartin (Ohio St. Univ.)

9:35 - 11:15 *The Military Perspective: Could We Have Won?*
Chair: Dr. James Reckner, Texas Tech Vietnam Ctr.

Hon. William Colby, "What the McNamara Book Doesn't Cover"
Dr. Stephen Young, "Westmoreland's Plan/McNamara's Ignorance"

Comments: General William C. Westmoreland, Admiral E. Zumwalt,
B. Gen. John Singlaub, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp,
Charles Krohn

11:20 - 12:20 *In Retrospect, Who Needs to Retrofit?*
Chair: Ron Trewyn, VVI (Kansas St. Univ.)

Senator Robert Dole, "Veterans Should be Proud..." (Invited)
Dr. John Wheeler, "McNamara the Man: Contributing to 'The Wall?'"
Tom Pauken, "Neither Americans nor Veterans Should Apologize"

Comments: J. Eldon Yates, VVI; William M. Detweiler,
Past Commander, American Legion;
Representatives from Veterans Organizations

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II. Luncheon Session

12:30 - 1:50 *Luncheon*
Chair: Dr. Peter Rollins, VVI (Oklahoma St. Univ.)

Tom Lyons, "We Kept The Faith..."
The Bolaños Bros. (Rick, Louis, Ben, William)
"Our Current Lawsuit v. Robert S. McNamara"

III. Afternoon Sessions

2:00 - 3:00 *The RVN View: Our Fight for Freedom Was Shortchanged!*
Chair: Dr. Nguyen Manh Hung (George Mason Univ.)

Honorable Bui Diem, Ambassador to US, 1966-72
Honorable Stephen Lyne (Boston Univ.)
Prof. Nguyen Ngoc Bich (George Mason Univ.)

Comments: George MacArthur; Douglas Pike

3:15 - 4:15 *McNamara as Political Analyst and Military Planner*
Chair: Dr. Bill Weston (Univ. of Baltimore)

Sedgwick Tourison, "The SOG Groups; A McNamara Deception?
Dr. Mac Owens, "Still Missing the Point About Vietnam"

Comments: Marc Leepson, Vietnam Veterans of America;
Douglas Pike

4:45 - 6:00 *The Future: The McNamara Debate and Legacy*
Chair: Dr. James Stever (Univ. of Cincinnati)

Dr. DeVallon Bolles, "A New World Order and a New Politics"
Dr. Stephen Cimbala, "McNamara and the American Way of War"
Dr. Ed Haley, "McNamara: America's Innocent Abroad?"

Comments: Dr. Frederick Brown (Johns Hopkins Univ.)

6:30ff *Reception: The Discussions Continue*

The Vietnam Veterans Institute

Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, its veterans have struggled to come to grips with their experience, and society in turn has struggled to come to terms with them and with its involvement in the war. These struggles have been compounded by an enormous amount of misunderstanding about the war, those who fought it, and the reaction to it.

Organization *- Founded in 1981, the Vietnam Veterans Institute is an incorporated, tax exempt, not-for-profit organization governed by the active Board of Directors and Trustees. It is an independent Education, Research, and Public Policy Institution.*

Mission *- To develop and foster legislative, public policy, and educational initiatives that positively address issues germaine to Vietnam veterans, veterans per se, and the standing American military. As a "think tank," the Institute serves as a scholarly resource to academe, the United States Congress, and the public at large.*

Goals *- To foster economic parity for American veterans with their non-veteran peers, to address issues of national security as it pertains to American military personnel, and to assure a positive and accurate historical record of the Vietnam War and sacrifices of Vietnam and all American veterans.*

Educational Programs *- VVI develops symposia in conjunction with universities and other institutions, utilizing VVI Directors and Trustees as faculty and keynote speakers.*

Publication *- Journal of the Vietnam Veterans Institute (American Veterans Journal)*

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Congressman Jim Bunning, Speaker Newt Gingrich

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c/o Dr. Peter C. Rollins, Dept. of English, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078; (918) 243-7637