Dialogue Discussion Paper

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THE VIETNAM WAR AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SENSIBILITY, II

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The inability of the Americans to impose their will on Vietnam had been answered in 1968, yet the leadership of this country had not been able to adjust to that failure. And so the war went on, tearing at this country; a sense of numbness seemed to replace an earlier anger. There was, Americans were finding, no light at the end of the tunnel, only greater darkness.

-- David Halberstam

Despite what seemed like the interminable bloodbath of Vietnam, and because of it, the great changes of the war's decade were ones of sensibility, awareness, and attitude, not of institutions.

-- Morris Dickstein

At the same time, the war was relying on inherited myth, it was generating new myth, and that myth is part of the fiber of our own lives.

-- Paul Fussell

This is intended as a starter paper. Its goal is to serve as background to the project we are launching on the religious implications of the Vietnam War, and to identify some of the project's areas of interest. Our motive in having a starter paper is to gain greater clarity about our own interests in this area so that the subject can be approached systematically and comprehensively in the weeks and months ahead.
Apart from its more intrinsic worth, the subject has a
symbolic significance that is worth noting at the outset.
Genetically speaking, the project was conceived through a
series of conversations, across the years, with Bullah and
Irving Laucks. Much of this discussion has focussed upon the
roles religious influences might assume in helping increase
the modern world's capacities for peace. Irving Laucks had
turned his attention toward developing peace strategies follow-
ing the atomic bomb attacks upon Nagasaki and Hiroshima in the
final days of World War II.

The record also shows, and Norman Cousins' address of
several weeks ago confirms, that the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions found a portion of its own raison
d'être in the same catastrophic events. There was an acute
awareness at the time that every aspect of human life had been
threatened and subjected to pervasive realignment by the power
that had been unleashed. Before the nuclear capability was de-
volved, warfare could be kept within some manageable bounds; its
catastrophies were always of finite proportions. But the nuclear
explosion changed the meaning of war, and through it, as
Robert Lifton has pointed out, it has altered perceptions of
life. Lifton noted in Boundaries (1970) and in Death in Life
Survivors of Hiroshima (1968) that the fundamental sets of
patterns by which human life is approached and mediated under-
went radical change. Heretofore, life had been the comprehensive
term in that fundamental polar relationship, and death had been
comprehended by life. Following Hiroshima, particularly for
those persons who experienced its ravages directly and immedi-
ately.
as the dominant regulative term, and death was comprehended in terms of life. Following Hiroshima, a reversal and interchange occurred within the dominant relationship: death became the commanding term, and life was conceived in terms of death, first, for those directly affected by the war, but gradually for an increasingly larger number of persons. With this came changes in the ways human beings understand both themselves and the world in which they live. Human beings had come to conceive life differently. And the ramifications were to be felt in a wide variety of aspects of our common life. Persons related to persons, and nations to nations, in a different way. Changes came in attitudes toward government, toward leadership, toward the role of the military, toward all forms and reservoirs of power, to authority itself. From this point forward, all instruments of power, in degrees never possible before, were approached with suspicion. Power, by definition, carried the threat of destruction, and destruction carried the capacity of extinction. Lifton employed this interpretation to explain why patterns of personality formation changed from a fixed to a fluid, protean style.

Sensitivities nurtured by such awarenesses called for an urgent and thorough reexamination of everything upon which sustainable human life depends. There was a reassessment of the function of our dominant political, social, and cultural institutions. Serious attention needed to be given to the dynamics of world order, particularly as these had been re-addressed by the cataclysmic event. The function and value of education had to be -- and was, in fact -- reassessed. Value
issues, many of which were assumed to have been settled long ago, were opened to fresh examination. There was deep recognition that the survival of the species required deliberate attention. Further, given the radical and primary character of the change that had occurred, no assurance could be given that the new strategies would prove successful. Indeed, strategy itself became a subject of critical attention. It was as if the forces that had been unleashed were too powerful to be tamed and were threatening to run their own courses, being challenged, as Thomas Merton said, only by "an alternative way of being." Along the way, there would be an accumulation of wondrous scientific advances, all of which would also make the prospect of all-out destruction more immediate and imminent. And it wasn't Hiroshima, simply; it was also the Jewish Holocaust. The two events became fused in Western consciousness. Regarding this coupling, Ron Rosenbaum writes (in "The Subterranean World of the Bomb," in Harper's, March, 1973):

When early strategists began to talk about the totality of nuclear war, they used phrases like "the death of consciousness" on the planet. Kissinger used the only slightly more modest phrase "an end to history." Without consciousness not only is there no history, there is no sorrow, no pain, no remorse. No one is missing or missed. There is nothing to feel bad about because nothing exists to feel. A death so total becomes almost communal. The Holocaust of the European Jews left behind millions to feel horror, bitterness, and loss. When people began applying the word "holocaust" to nuclear war they meant a holocaust with no survivors, or one in which, to use the well-known phrase, "the survivors would envy the dead." Even now when a much-disputed scientific report argues the probability for long-term post-Holocaust survival, at least in the southern hemisphere, one does
not, if one is an American, think of surviving a total nuclear war. One thinks of dying in a flash before there's time to feel the pain. Could that be the attraction, if that word may be used, of nuclear war? Is there some Keatsian element "half in love with easeful death" in our fantasies of the end? (pp. 88-89)

I have portrayed the situation this way, following Lifton's lead, to dramatize that from some such perspective as this (more detailed, specific, sophisticated, and circumstantially-ordered) the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions found a portion of its being. The early documents give evidence of the power of Hiroshima's influence. Clearly, following Hiroshima, the Center has had a fundamental stake in the fate of our civilization, and, indeed, in the future of corporate human life. It has been concerned that those elements upon which life, and our sense of life, depends not be destroyed, shunted, or left to neglect. "Hiroshima," it is clear, had worked its powers upon the founders' consciousnesses. And the Center itself was a product of the response to that awesome, tragic, and paradoxically catalytic event. The Center was born, at least in part, via "Hiroshima" inspired sensitivities.

This correspondence can be made the basis for a number of further interrelated preliminary observations. First, the portrayal I have sketched, with some necessary additional
details, describes the situation from which Irving Laucks' compulsions for world peace also came. Second, the project on Vietnam, as it is being conceived under the Center's auspices, is linked substantively to that originative interest in Hiroshima. Though the events have distinctive and varying forces, they both possess eloquent formative power, the one coming at the beginning of the Center's history, and, if it is not presumptuous, the other intermingled with the time of significant renewal. Thirdly, as I hope to demonstrate, the attitudes that were expressed in "Vietnam" have their own origins or stimuli in "Hiroshima." Both became much larger than events that could be isolated. "Vietnam" was not simply a war, and "Hiroshima" was not only a massively destructive nuclear explosion. Neither can be understood in narrow senses, for each also stands as an event in human consciousness, a challenge to fundamental human assumptions, and an occasion for an eventual redressing of those sets of connections through which human beings define themselves.

In a multiplicity of respects, "Hiroshima" created "Vietnam." The revised understanding of the implications of warfare affected the way the war was perceived, interpreted, portrayed, and fought. Because the stakes were conceived differently, the war itself was regulated by a new agenda. "Winning" and "losing" couldn't mean what they meant before. Neither could be determined on the basis of the acquisition of territory, the winning of battles, the killing of enemy soldiers, the bombing of enemy establishments, the
strongholds, etc. For the battles that were waged were
motivated by other kinds of interest, and were assessed
by new sorts of criteria. The battlefield itself was
the arena whereon other sorts of conflict were finding
dramatic expression. The issue wasn't physical combat
simply, nor could differences of opinion be restricted
to matters of military strategy. But Vietnam became
both the scene and the testing-ground for a more compre-
hensive adjustment of human priorities. Some of the
sensitivities nurtured in response to "Hiroshima" and
the Jewish Holocaust could not find enunciation and
challenge -- both at once -- until "Vietnam." By the
time of "Vietnam," "Hiroshima's" realignments had become
self-conscious, and had come to influence strategy. This
made it impossible to judge the outcome of the war in
traditional terms. The threat of destruction of infinite
proportions was the regulative polar term by which all
finite events were given a corresponding place.

Signs of this larger transposition appear in American
religious sensitivities. It is no longer necessary to demon-
strate that the past years have seen a phenomenal growth of
interest in "spiritual religion" in the west. Yoga, tran-
cendental meditation, trans-personal psychology, psychic
awareness, mind-expanding experience, the attraction of eas-
tern gurus, etc., are examples in point. But no less sig-
nificant is the development of a simpler, less conflicted,
attitude and response to life -- an orientation that is being nurtured in the west, in part, through the influence of Asian religious currents. All of this has become a fact of modern religious, social, cultural, and psychological life.

But the linkage between this religious transformation and "Vietnam" has not been examined thoroughly. The linkage is direct, profound, and multi-layered. "Vietnam" gave occasion to Asian religious sensitivities. The latter were one set of self-consistent religious and attitudinal options to which the west had been made susceptible by the gnawing, self-developing experience of "Hiroshima." Indeed, "Vietnam" brought eastern religious sensitivity to light in the west. It provided an opening that even the most sophisticated missionary strategy could not have duplicated. For when one dominant strain of western religion came, as it were, to the end of its tether, there was response, but response from a source previously understood to be utterly alien.

In making this suggestion, I am not invoking any simple-minded "influence theory." I do not mean that those westerners who went to Vietnam were exposed to Asia simply by being there, then returned, bringing their "treasures" back with them. Some of this happened, of course. But the linkage is more specific. For "Vietnam" was fought in the Occident as well as in the Orient. And the terms were as much mental, psychological, and spiritual as they were geographical and militarial. "Vietnam" stimulated Asian religious sensitivities in the west because it was an event that could not be adequately or satisfactorily
comprehended in the most prominent and/or standard western ideational terms.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the brilliant German Protestant theologian who met his death on the gallows in a Nazi prison in 1944, would have understood the connections. In words not wholly comprehensible from his Letters and Papers from Prison, he suggests that the occurrence of two full-scale world wars in Christian Europe in less than half a century is a judgment against the Christian religion of the severest kind. Bonhoeffer perceived that there was something intrinsic to the spirit of western religion which allowed and perhaps encouraged such conflict. He was pointing to something in its fiber, to a dissonant factor. It is not only Christian aspiration toward loving one's enemies, turning the other cheek, not responding in kind when one is despised, harmed, or wrongfully used, etc. Neither is this to minimize Christianity's emphasis upon love, peace, brotherhood, harmony, and gentleness -- qualities that are vividly exemplified in the lives of St. Francis of Assisi, Mother Teresa of Calcutta, and a host of other persons both well and lesser known.

But it is to recognize that the religions that have become entrenched in western culture are father religions primarily. And it is to add that father religions, characteristically, are, to use David Bakan's phrasing, religions of "agency." They encourage one to set things in motion, to
be an effective doer, to work for a particular cause or end or objective. Only with large reluctance will they accept things as they are. They work instead to make things better. They are instrumental. They channel and regulate power. They set out for goals that have not yet been achieved. And this kind of aggressive, anti-passive mood or disposition finds it fitting that there be an ultimate victory. It encourages the promotion of strategies through which good will redress, eliminate, or conquer evil. It believes it proper that right should vanquish wrong, that justice should be effected, even though considerable latitude is provided regarding the means by which victory shall be achieved. All of this belongs to a conviction that life does indeed exhibit a basic propriety, a fundamental harmony, a sense of balance and rightness that wills to be exercised, must be enunciated, and must eventually become visible. It believes in judgment against wrong, and it expects such judgment to be expressed, sometimes dramatically, in historical events. Even the great song and cry of the social revolution of the sixties, "We Shall Overcome," can be understood in these terms.

"Vietnam" was a severe challenge to these fundamental convictions, because it provided no clear way in which victory could be conceived or its terms enacted. "Right" and "wrong" could not be distinguished with clarity. The components of justice could not be easily identified. In religious terms, the event itself did not seem to exhibit a "theophanous"
character, as Paul Tillich would have said it: it was difficult to construe the day-by-day occurrences as visible signs of the working of an invisible divine will. For the war didn't mean what wars had meant before. Previous frameworks of interpretation didn't count. Earlier criteria didn't register. Former understanding didn't fit. What followed was profound mental anguish, deep interior turmoil, massive divisions within the country, political and military leadership unsure of itself, and pervasive readjustments within that ongoing sense-of-things Lifton refers to as the "underlying symbolic matrix."

The anguish and ambivalence is reflected in a host of chronicles and interpretations of the war that have appeared in recent weeks and months. For example, in his autobiographical A Rumor of War (1977), Philip Caputo recalls what it felt like to be inspired by John F. Kennedy's memorable inaugural injunction "ask not what your country can do for you -- ask what you can do for your country." Caputo writes:

This is what I wanted, to find in a commonplace world a chance to live heroically. Having known nothing but security, comfort, and peace, I hungered for danger, challenges, and violence.

I had no clear idea of how to fulfill this peculiar ambition until the day a Marine recruiting team set up a stand in the student union at Loyola University. They were on a talent hunt for officer material and displayed a poster of a trim lieutenant who had one of those athletic, slightly cruel-looking faces considered handsome in the military. He looked like a cross between an All-American halfback and a Nazi tank commander. Clear and resolute, his blue eyes seemed to stare at me in challenge. JOIN THE MARINES, read the
slogan above his white cap BE A LEADER OF MEN.¹

Caputo recalls:

I rummaged through the propaganda material, picking out one pamphlet whose cover listed every battle the Marines had fought, from Trenton to Inchon. Reading down that list, I had one of those rare flashes of insight: the heroic experience I sought was war; war, the ultimate adventure; war, the ordinary man's most convenient means of escaping from the ordinary. The country was at peace then, but the early sixties were years of almost constant tension and crisis; if a conflict did break out, the Marines would be certain to fight in it and I could be there with them. Actually there. Not watching it on a movie or TV screen, not reading about it in a book, but there, living out a fantasy. Already I saw myself charging up some distant beachhead, coming home a suntanned warrior with medals on my chest. The recruiters started giving me the usual sales pitch, but I hardly needed to be persuaded. I decided to enlist.²

At the end of the three-year enlistment period, after Caputo had been to "Vietnam" and in the midst of "Vietnam," he feels differently:

I came home from the war with the curious feeling that I had grown older than my father, who was then fifty-one. It was as if a lifetime of experience had been compressed into a year and a half. A man saw the heights and depths of human behavior in Vietnam, all manner of violence and horrors so grotesque that they evoked more fascination than disgust. Once I had seen pigs eating napalm-charred corpses -- a memorable sight, pigs eating roast people.³

² Ibid., p. 6.
³ Ibid., p. 4.
Caputo's aspirations had been altered.

I was left with none of the optimism and ambition a young American is supposed to have, only a desire to catch up on sixteen months of missed sleep and an old man's conviction that the future would hold no further surprises, good or bad.

I hoped there would be no more surprises. I had survived enough ambushes and doubted my capacity to endure many more physical and emotional shocks. I had all the symptoms of combat veteranitis: an inability to concentrate, a childlike fear of darkness, a tendency to tire easily, chronic nightmares, an intolerance of loud noises -- especially doors slamming and cars backfiring -- and alternating moods of depression and rage that came over me for no apparent reason. Recovery has been less than total.

Summing it up, Caputo writes:

Beyond adding a few more corpses to the weekly body count, none of the encounters achieved anything; none will ever appear in military histories or be studied by cadets at West Point. Still, they changed us and taught us, the men who fought in them; in those obscure skirmishes we learned the old lessons about fear, cowardice, courage, suffering, cruelty, and comradeship. Most of all, we learned about death at an age when it is common to think of oneself as immortal. Everyone loses that illusion eventually, but in civilian life it is lost in installments over the years. We lost it all at once and, in the span of months, passed from boyhood through manhood to a premature middle age. The knowledge of death, of the implacable limits placed on a man's existence, severed us from our youth as irrevocably as a surgeon's scissors had once severed us from the womb. And yet, few of us were past twenty-five. We left Vietnam peculiar creatures, with young shoulders that bore rather old heads.

1 Caputo, ibid., p. 4.
2 Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.
The disillusionment was thorough, and it was experienced not only among those who participated in the war directly, but by the people at home, those who watched the war, night after night, on television. Peter Tauber catches the sense of the general mood in his novel, *The Last Best Hope* (1977):

All over, a dreary mood had settled in. No lever could be found to move the world. The war had become, for many at home, the source of fruitless contention; for others, a new idiom of entertainment: in the evenings they could turn a dial a "watch the war." To some it existed solely because it was on every channel. If not palpable, it was nonetheless undeniable. People had begun to chant that "things were in the saddle," and to feel that their lives were at the mercy of forces, great or infinitesimal, beyond their control: overwhelming vectors, insuperable momentum, genetic and historical.¹

Vietnam was not the traditional war. There was to be no victory, no conquering of the forces of evil by the forces of good, no basis on which heroic aspirations could be sustained or even recognized.

But gradually there came a shift, an adjustment, perhaps, to the inevitable. In Morris Dickstein's words, it became apparent that there had been "an over-reaching." And with this gradual acknowledgment came a series of attempts to effect a disengagement, a relinquishing of involvement, a persistent and growing criticism of "clear-cut military victory" objectives, and profound individual and corporate soul-searching.

The mood was changing. The disposition was being altered. And the shift was enunciated in the music, particularly on the songs sung by Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, Joni Mitchell, Judy Collins, and, most especially by John... and Paul McCartney. Lennon's "I don't wanna be a soldier mama I don't wanna die/ I don't wanna be a sailor mama, I don't wanna fly/ well, I don't wanna be a failure mama, I don't wanna cry/ well, I don't wanna be a soldier mama, I don't wanna die/ oh no oh no oh no oh no" and his "Imagine" ("Imagine there's no countries/ it isn't hard to do/ nothing to kill or die for/ and no religion too/ imagine all the people/ living life in peace") said it well.

Imagine all the people living life in peace

What happened in the music was also portrayed in the poetry, through the writings of Allen Ginsburg, Gary Snyder, Kenneth Rexroth, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Gregory Corso, and a host of others. It was in evidence in the temper of the new publications. It could be felt in the churches too, particularly in shifts in liturgical style. It was implicit in the accelerated extinction of institutions that had been established on a prior set of conditions and assumptions. This was "Vietnam," a war that served as a challenge to a sense of rightful expectation. It was an event that had become an occasion for a thorough reassessment and eventual redressing of human sensitivities.

As the war progressed, it became apparent that what was occurring, as Peter Tauber phrased it, was "contrary to American faith."¹ Michael Herr reflects

¹ Tauber, op. cit., p. 27.
the confusion and ambivalence in his description of religious
life in Vietnam during the war:

Prayers in the Delta, prayers in the Highlands, 
prayers in the Marine bunkers of the "frontier"
facing the DMZ, and for every prayer there was 
a counter-prayer -- it was hard to see who had 
the edge. In Dalat the emperor's mother sprinkled 
rice in her hair so the birds could fly around her 
and feed while she said her morning prayers. In 
wood-paneled, air-conditioned chapels in Saigon, 
MACV padres would fire one up to sweet muscular 
Jesus, blessing ammo dumps and 105's and officers' 
clubs. The best-armed patrols in history went out 
after services to feed smoke to people whose priests 
could let themselves burn down to consecrated ash on 
street corners. Deep in the alleys you could hear 
small Buddhist chimes ringing for peace, hoa bien; 
small incense in the middle of the thickest Asian 
street funk; see groups of ARVN with their families 
waiting for transport huddled around a burning prayer 
strip. Sermonettes came over Armed Forces radio 
every couple of hours, once I heard a chaplain from 
the 9th Division starting up, "Oh Gavd, help us learn 
to live with Thee in a more dynamic way in these 
perilous times, that we may better serve Thee in 
the struggle against Thine enemies...." Holy war...
long nose jihads like a face-off between one god who 
would hold the coonskin to the wall while we nailed 
it up, and another whose detachment would see the 
blood run out of ten generations, if that was how 
long it took for the wheel to go around.1

Tauber adds this observation:

To many it was hard to believe. And so it was not 
believed. It was not so much a heroic refusal as 
it was romantic. For belief itself was the greatest 
agony. What was held as true was disappointing; 
what was hoped for seemed impossible. Cherished 
values trembled. Dear faiths brought the most pain-
ful and paradoxical returns: the best intentions in

the world murdered and maimed and ruined.

So the faithful, the hopeful, had few good choices then: acceptance, withdrawal, rejection, or revolt. They chose the romantic course.

To no use. \(^1\)

The experience of Vietnam was such that it fostered many of the same insights that are taught in Asian religious traditions, particularly in Buddhism. In suggesting this, we are drawing upon a consensus that eastern and western religious traditions can be distinguished from each other regarding the meaning of successes and failure, "winning and/or losing," and the like. Ivan Morris, in his brilliant book, The Nobility of Failure (1975), which is an analysis of the concept of heroism in Japanese thought, approaches the distinction in the following way:

The Judeo-Christian approach is based on the comforting idea that, so long as a man keeps faith, God will be on his side and he, or at least his cause, will eventually triumph. Thus a hero like Roland, though defeated in battle, is never abandoned by God and succeeds in contributing to the Christian victory over the Saracens.

This basically optimistic outlook has been especially conspicuous in the most western of all major Western countries, the United States of America, whose tradition has always tended to extrude any tragic sense of life and, often against cogent evidence to the contrary, to put its trust in the essential goodness of mankind, or at least that part of mankind which is fortunate enough to reside within its boundaries. "I know America," a recent President was fond of saying, "and the heart of America is good." The statement is not without a certain irony when one recalls the identity of its

\(^1\) Tauber, op. cit., p. 2.
author; yet the sentiment reflects an underlying assumption that has been widely and confidently accepted. Americans, of course, are no strangers to despair, yet it comes not from any philosophical awareness of man's existential limitations but from disappointment that follows excessive hope in the possibility of compassing worldly happiness.

By contrast, Morris describes an attitude to life that has been expressed in Japanese culture, and is typical of the Buddhist orientation:

At the opposite end of the spectrum are the Japanese, who since ancient times have tended to resign themselves to the idea that the world and the human condition are not essentially benign. For all the country's vigour and ebullience, there is a deep strain of natural pessimism, a sense that ultimately things are against us and that, however hard we may strive, we are involved in a losing game. Sooner or later each individual is doomed to fail; for, even if he may overcome the multifarious hurdles set by a harsh society, he will finally be defeated by the natural powers of age, illness, and death. Human life...is full of sad vicissitudes, fleeting, impermanent like the seasons. Helplessness and failure are built into human enterprises.

Morris explains that "this underlying pessimism" -- which also recognizes a wonderful beauty and poignancy in "the pathos of things" -- is supported by Mahayana Buddhist religion.

The linkages between this orientation and the lessons of Vietnam are subtle and indirect. Through the frustrations

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2 Ibid., p. 39.
of the experience came a strong need to make sense of things without recourse to the fundamentally optimistic, happiness- and success-dominated outlook of the west. James Dittes, Yale psychologist, refers to this as the search for the grammar of "positive disengagement." This, in turn, directed attention to sources of individual and corporate authority that counseled repression and extinction, rather than cultivation, of the acquisitive, aggressive, agential posture. For one of the lessons of the experience was that conflict derives from human acquisitive impulses, which conflict can never be resolved by the satisfaction of desire, for satisfactions simply stimulate additional desires. What is required, instead, is abolition, negation, repression, a quenching of appetite, and a deepened empathy with what Morris refers to as "the pathos of worldly misfortune."

The resolution of "Vietnam," even in military and political terms, required the development of an alternative strategy, a set of moves by which the dominant expectation would be held up to self-scrutiny and the natural propensity for winning, for victory, would be dissolved. Gradually, but in a visibly stumbling manner, the nation's leaders came to see this. But they couldn't find the language. The analogues they offered were inexact. They were seeking the language of disengagement, indeed, "positive disengagement" (or withdrawal that possessed positive connotations). But it was a difficult language, concept, and grammar to locate. Describing President
Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" -- a word and a program that comes as close to "disengagement" as political and cultural realities allow -- David Halberstam writes:

...it would be Vietnamization, we would pull back American troops, probably to 250,000 by 1970, and perhaps to as few as 75,000 by 1972. There would be fewer and fewer Americans on the ground. 

Halberstam offers his evaluation:

So he was dealing with war without really coming to terms with it; it was the compromise of a by now embattled President who knew he had to get American troops out but who still believed in their essential mission. So now he sought peace with honor, "What President Nixon means by peace," wrote Don Oberdorfer in the Washington Post, "is what other people mean by victory." 

"Victory" or "success" or "peace" involved envisioning the war in a radically non-traditional way.

"Hiroshima" was precursor, for it created the compulsion thoroughly to revise the implications of warfare. But "Hiroshima" was more than this, for it also brought the awareness of the imminence of the end to consciousness with remarkable force. And the response has been apocalyptic. Two of the potential outcomes are Armageddon or Eden.

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2 Ibid.
Morris Dickstein places the chain of developments in a larger sequential pattern. In his prize-winning analysis of contemporary American culture, Gates of Eden. American Culture in the Sixties (1977), Dickstein provides the following chronicle:

The fifties were a great period for home and family, for getting and spending, for cultivating one's garden. All that is reflected in its writing. But its spokesmen also called it an Age of Anxiety; behind its material growth hovers a quiet despair, whose symbols are the Bomb and the still-vivid death camps, and a fear of Armageddon.... But this anxiety is metaphysical and hermetic, closed in upon itself.

...The spirit of the sixties witnessed the transformation of utopian religion into the terms of secular humanism.... So the sixties translated the Edenic impulse once again into political terms...starting with the civil rights movement, which was propelled by the millennial spirit of Southern black religion religion...

The culture of the fifties was European in its irony and sophistication. It put its faith in what is called "the tragic sense of life," a fateful determinism that affirmed the obduracy of man's nature and his surroundings. But for the culture of the sixties the watchword was liberation: the shackles of tradition and circumstance were to be thrown off, society was to be molded to the shape of human possibility.

By the early seventies...time had once again revealed to us the illusion and even dangers of "paradise now," and had disclosed virtues we had slighted....

Then, with particular reference to Vietnam, Dickstein continues:

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I needn't apply such subtle reasoning to the collapse of our client state in Vietnam to show that it too belonged among the unfinished business of the sixties. In Vietnam we lost not only a war and a subcontinent; we also lost our pervasive confidence that American arms and American aims were linked somehow to justice and morality, not merely to the quest for power. America was defeated militarily but the "idea" of America, the cherished myth of America, received an even more shattering blow.¹

The chronicle Dickstein weaves carries compelling theological force. The awareness of the imminence of the end time (explicit in the "Hiroshima" aftermath) translated into both threat and opportunity, each simultaneously. The event transposes heaven and hell, as Ernst Bloch said, into "real possibilities." From the one side, there is a well-founded fear of cataclysmic annihilation of the human race; but the same conditions, from the same analysis, can also stimulate a "paradise now" campaign. Both readings, indeed, the composite reading, is in keeping with a Christian interpretation of the meaning of history. All of it can be incorporated within the dominant American religious framework. For all of it there are precedents and analogues. It is Armageddon or it is Eden. All of it makes sense in these terms; all of it, that is, until Vietnam. And the experience of Vietnam spells an interruption in the sequence, a break in the interpretive framework, a profound "category error," a severe challenge to the mythological sequence.

¹ Dickstein, _ibid._, p. 271.
Paul Fussell writes in his *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1975) that the military leadership didn't know how to proceed in World War I until writers had learned how to depict it. The same phenomenon is evident in the Vietnam situation. There has been no easy way to place it, or refer it, or locate it, or make sense of it until there is a way to portray it. It is significant that this creative work is just now occurring, and that the struggles it is equipping humankind to face are ones that continue to occur after the formal military hostilities have ceased. In more than one sense, the war is over, but Vietnam continues to live and have influence in human self-awareness. Tracy Kidder describes his feelings when coming home from the war:

I remember flying home from Vietnam on the so-called "freedom bird." It was a Flying Tiger Lines commercial jet. On board, some of the jubilant GI's pinched the stewardesses because they had round eyes. The boy in the seat beside me slept with a grin on his face. We flew so far, first to Japan and then to Travis Air Force Base, and life seemed to be proceeding so normally at home, that I thought the war had vanished. But last winter, when I traveled around to find some of the men who had gone as boys to Vietnam, the war did not seem to have ended after all. In fact, it seemed obvious that no war ends until all the people who have participated in it have died or lost their memories.1

This time the dominant literary work is being effected by the journalists, war correspondents, media people, and by the

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servicemen themselves. By a curious twist, and by multi-
layered cultural ironies, the language of response includes
a lexicon that has developed within Asian religious settings
and to a significant degree, in the west, within the monas-
tic tradition.

The implications with respect to religion are profound.
It would require another paper to explore the reli-
gious implications. What seems significant, in religious-cultural
terms, is that the west is facing west again, but this time
(and for the first time) from the east. This has led to pro-
found changes within the monasteries. And with a new fas-
cination with monastic life has come an intense interest in
rediscovering and reinterpreting the mystical literature of
the west. John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, Meister Eck-
hart, Henry Suso, Richard Rolle, Julian of Norwich, Jan von
Ruysbroeck, and especially the women, Hildegard of Bingen, Teresa of Avila,
Catherine of Sienna, Mechthild of Magdeburg, Simone Weil,
and a host of other mystical writers are coming into greater
prominence. Book series are being launched. New academic
courses in western mystical literature are being conceived
and offered on college and university campuses. The history
of religion in the west is being reconstructed. Monastic
communities are striving to renew ties and bonds with the
religious situation of the twelfth century; the proponents
of this effort regard much of the intervening history as
being demonstrably off course. With all of this has come
an increasing irritation with the dominance of the "problem-
solving" approach to human life. Visible in the wake is a
new mood, a more delicate nuancing, a kind of mediation
between person and world, an orientation in which the distinc-
tion between subject and object is softened, or transcended,
in favor of a "sensorium of communion," to paraphrase Edmund
Spenser, between self and nature.

Where will it lead? What are the ramifications? Can
such metamorphoses ever succeed in the west? Is the west
really capable of facing itself in this manner? Can it effect
the necessary adjustments without denying, destroying, or
violating that which makes it west? And can the new mood
ever assume sustained social, cultural, and institutional
force? It may be too early to tell.

But we can be sure that a portion of the current intrigue
received its impetus from the unsettling character of the
Vietnam experience. We can be certain, too, that the aftermath
includes profound dangers and threats to the vitality of our
common life as well as adventures. Some of the responses ex-
pressed already, even in the religious sphere, focus on dangers
and threats. Others exhibit an almost Petrarchian "what a
world I see dawning" enthusiasm, the promise of the recovery
and/or disclosure, in Dickstein's words, of "virtues we had
slighted." The logic of such promise has been expressed in
E. F. Schumacher's observation:

All through school and university I had been given
maps of life and knowledge on which there was hardly
a trace of many of the things that I most cared about
and that seemed to me to be of the greatest possible
importance to the conduct of my life. I remembered
that for many years my perplexity had been complete;
and no interpreter had come along to help me. It
remained complete until I ceased to suspect the
sanity of my perception and began, instead, to sus-
pect the soundness of my maps.

1 E. F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed (New York:
"We, for our part, will move more cautiously, suspending judgment until we have come to know the disposition better. Initial evidence shows that the transformations we are trying to identify have greater bearing upon the ongoing vitality of our common life than anyone has yet fathomed."