This dissertation has been   65-9663
microfilmed exactly as received

CAPPS, II, Walter Holden, 1934–
  FREEDOM AND METHOD: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE
  THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

Yale University, Ph. D., 1965
Religion

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

FREEDOM and METHOD

An Essay in Comparative Theological Analysis

by

Walter Holden Capps, II

1965

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Précis

Freedom and Method is an analytical approach to the problem
of theological "unity and diversity". Noting that this problem
cannot be clarified by a simple comparison and contrast of se-
lected doctrinal statements, but that systematisation is its lo-
cus and source, this study seeks a methodological basis for dis-
cerning the formal and contentual elements implicit in theologi-
cal argumentation. Its direction is twofold: 1) it develops a
method of reflexive analysis by which the regulative character-
istics of given patterns of formal coherence might be disclosed;
2) it employs that method in undertaking an exercise in compara-
tive analysis of three representative essays on human freedom,
i.e. Irenaeus' Adversus Haereses, Thomas' "De Voluntario et In-
voluntario", and Luther's Tractatus de Libertate Christiani.

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is utilized as the
precedent for this application of critical reflexivity to dog-
matic history. Its fittingness derives from a cultivation of a
distinction between its author's analysis of a priori-synthetic
knowledge and its implicit Weltanschauung. This methodological
use of the Critique refers theological reflection to Kant's dis-
cussion of the function of "logical principles" and "interests
of reason" in formal systematisation. By means also of other
formal studies, Freedom and Method develops this use for com-
parative purposes, and nurtures a sensitivity to the structural
peculiarities of variant theological patterns.

Because its articulation disposes reflection toward one or
another formal pattern, and by virtue of its perennial theologi-
cal interest, the concept of human freedom qualifies as the fo-
cal point of this comparative analysis of respective systematic
"principles" and "interests". Irenaeus uses a comprehensive
principle to associate freedom with the fulness-directed motion
of the normative process by which God determines the course of
the world. Thomas, seeking the distinctiveness of the human
creature, understands freedom as the spontaneity of that organ-
ism which is characterized by the facultas voluntatis et ratio-
nis within a network of interaction. Luther, distinguishing
two loci of power and authority, and assessing their proper and
illegitimate claims upon and services toward each other, refers
freedom to the unrestrained rule of "the one thing needful".

The three chartable systematic formulations of freedom pos-
sess distinctive influences upon the selection and the topics
which are brought within range of concern. Exhibiting variant
"principles" and "interests", the three patterns nevertheless
reflect a fundamental structural unity. Each system is bipolar,
and each identifies its principle of orientation with the locus
of divine determination of the world. Each fashions that funda-
mental bipolarity, though from divergent starting points, accor-
ding to the asymmetrical relation which is conceived between God
and the world.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

> Neither theologians nor speculative philosophers
> can afford to overlook the religious questions
> which sometimes arise in the course of specula-
> tive inquiry and the speculative questions which
> sometimes arise in the course of religious in-
> quiry, or to mistake one for the other.[1]

By parallel consent, Christian theological reflection and the problem of "unity and diversity" belong together. Their long affiliation has been fostered by their mutual dependence upon the relation of the One to the Many. Theological reflection utilizes that relation for its conception of God and the world. "Unity and diversity" is implicit in the alternative systems of coherence which a Christian understanding of that relation requires. This is a study which seeks a basis for assessing the appearance, integrity, and shape of a selected three of those differentiable systems within the concordance upon which each depends. This is an essay on freedom.

Christian theological reflection, in both historic and contemporary assemblage, is characterized by its variety of vistas, alternative points of departure, and an apparent perennial procession of rival systems. Such systematic diversity does not appear to be a mere temporary accretion,

---

[1] William A. Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," in The Relevance of Whitehead, ed. Ivor Leclerc (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 89.

but must be regarded as an evident and perhaps fundamental and permanent feature of theology. But, theological variety is recognizable only by virtue of the presence of some form of unity. To paraphrase the Platonic argument that sheer change is unknowable: were there nothing but diversity, there would be nothing at all, and "diversity" would be non-existent; and, were there nothing but uniformity, then there would be nothing at all, and uniformity would be unintelligible. The question is not diversity as such, nor unity as such, but rather the possibility and basis of a rapport between the two.[1]

Despite the great moment being attached to the question in the current era, the interest in the location of "unity and diversity" within the theological tradition is not a new one. In the New Testament itself this interest can be discerned in the series of warnings against "dissensions" and "dangerous innovations".[2] In somewhat later guise it was expressed as a claim concerning the authenticity of a particular tradition as opposed to those which possessed not the same degree of 'successio' with

---

[1] Bernard Lambert, Le Probleme Oecumenique (Paris: Editions du Centuries, 1962), Vol. I, p. 69.

[2] See I Corinthians 1.10; I Timothy 6.20; Philippians 2.2 ff; Romans 12.18; and Jude 3. D. B. Reynders, in his "Paradosis. Le progres de l'idee de tradition jusqu'a saint Irenee," in Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, Vol. V (1933), pp. 155-191, also discusses the way in which "tradition" is understood in Acts 16.4; I Corinthians 11.2; II Thessalonians 2.15, and 3.16; and II Peter 2.21. Galatians 1.9-12; I Thessalonians 4.1; and Colossians 2.6-8 are also relevant.

the beginning,[1] or as an attempt to establish as normative what had been believed in all places, at all times, and by everyone. In each of these early instances, the problem of "unity and diversity" is closely associated with the problem of authority: the ability to demonstrate continuity is almost without exception (but with refinement) identical to an argument for validity and justification.[2]

But the problem of "unity and diversity" is being approached in a new way in the contemporary era. Indeed, it is being recognized that while the problem will always retain a close association with the problem of authority it is nevertheless an issue whose persistence does not depend upon other auspices. Though

---

[1] On the question of the interest in doctrinal unity and diversity in the apostolic fathers see: Oscar Cullmann, Die Tradition (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1954); P. D. Van den Eynde, Les Normes de la Doctrine Chretienne selon la Litterature Patristique des Trois Premiers Siecles (Paris, 1933); J. Rauft, Der Ursprung des Katholischen Traditionsprinzips (Wurzburg: K. Triltsch, 1931); R. C. P. Hanson, Tradition in the Early Church (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962); J. N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, "Tradition im Theologischen Sinne," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1959), pp. 65-86; Einar Molland, "Le development de l'idee de succession apostolique," in Revue D'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses. Vol. XXXIV (1954), pp. 1-29; W. den Boer, "Hermeneutic Problems in Early Christian Literature," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. I, No. 3 (1947), pp. 150-167. Of special significance in this regard is the article by D. B. Reynders ("Paradosis," Ibid.) wherein an analysis is made of the statements on "tradition" in Justin, I Clement, Irenaeus, Tatian, and Hippolytus, as well as the absence of statements in Pseudo Barnabas, Ignatius, Hermas, The Didache, and II Clement. See also discussion on this point in our following chapter on Irenaeus, Part II, chapter I.

[2] This point will be illustrated in a subsequent chapter on Irenaeus wherein the use to which he puts the argument for continuity against his Gnostic-oriented rivals is discussed.

concern for the problem is often prompted by other interests, the problem itself is not derivative. Theological conflict is showing itself as an issue in its own right. Differences of opinion are being recognized and even given status by growing numbers of the religious and theological communities. And the impetus is being fostered by a growing acknowledgment that the doctrinal differences which divide schools, communions, and individuals cannot always be dealt with, or uncovered, by a simple comparison and contrast of representative alternative affirmations.[1] The discovery of 'successio', for example, can neither be understood nor achieved apart from an awareness of the procedures by which continuity is meaningful. The recognition of "unity and diversity" presupposes an examination which is itself unifying or discriminating. And gradually the eagerness to re-evaluate this issue is being linked with explorations for definite programs of specifiable procedures of comparative analysis.[2]

---

[1] In philosophical inquiry this recognition is being explored in the analyses undertaken since 1937 by the International Institute of Philosophy (now in cooperation with U.N.E.S.C.O.). The purpose of the analyses, in large, is to assess the fundamental concepts of actual ideological conflict. Reports of work completed are contained in the journal Revue Internationale de Philosophie.

[2] Approaches to, or discussions of, such programs as applied primarily to theological materials include the following: Peter Fransen, "Three Ways of Dogmatic Thought," in The Heythrop Journal. Vol. IV, No. 1 (1963), pp. 3-24; Jean Danielou, "Unite et pluralite de la pensee chretienne," in Etudes. Vol. 312 (January, 1962), pp. 3-16; Edmund Schlink, "Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als oekumenisches Problem," in Kerygma und Dogma. Vol. III (1957), pp. 251-306; Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection," in International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. II (May, 1962), pp. 191-218; Gerhard Ebeling,

A significant methodological step toward qualifying the theological problem of "unity and diversity" for this kind of analytical approach was taken by Adolph Harnack and the members of his school. Harnack suggested that the original Christian story is different in kind from its subsequent adaptation to conceptual and systematic form. By means of this distinction an opportunity was created to endeavor to abstract the primitive sacred story from any product of that story's systematic translation.[1] Harnack further argued---and it is a further

---

"The Significance of Doctrinal Differences for the Division of the Church," in Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), pp. 162-190; C. Moeller and G. Philips, Grace et Oecumenisme (Paris: Chevetogne, 1957); G. Philips, "Deux tendances dans la theologie contemporaine," in Nouvelle Revue Theologique. Vol. LXXXV, No. 3 (1963), pp. 225-238; A. Malet, "Hermeneutique et philosophie," in Eglise et Theologie. No. 73 (September, 1961), pp. 2-22; Harald Eklund, "Die Denkformen der Theologie," in Studia Theologica. Vol. X (1955-57), pp. 67-76; Robert S. Paul, "Teaching Church History in an Ecumenical Perspective," in The Ecumenical Review. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 35-42; H. E. W. Turner, The Pattern of Christian Truth (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1954); Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958); N. A. Nissiotis, "Principles of an Ecumenically-Oriented Theology," in Criterion. Vol. II, No. 2 (1963), pp. 3-8; Maurice Blondel, "The Unity of the Christian Spirit," in Cross Currents. Vol. I, No. 3 (1951), pp. 1-12; Catholicity: A Study in the Conflict of Christian Traditions in the West, ed. E. S. Abbott, et al (London: Dacre Press, 1957).

[1] This basic distinction allows Harnack to attribute the disappearance of that which was essential to the primitive message of the Messiah and his Kingdom to the theological effort to adapt the kerygma to the forms of Greek language and thought. For Harnack, the Kingdom which Jesus and the apostles proclaimed is nothing but the treasure which the soul possesses in the eternal and merciful God, a spiritual gift not translatable into normative literature and only inadequately grasped by dogmatic construction. Such construction was fostered by the Christians' struggle with the Gnostics, and has as its purpose the establishment of criteria by which the Church might exclude

6.

argument[1]----that not only is the story abstractable from its conceptual translation, but that the translation as translation is illegitimate. The conceptualisation of the story is its dehabilitation, when dehabilitation is equivalent with change.

---

those who refused obedience. See Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York: Dover, 1961); and What is Christianity? trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York: Harper, 1957).

A variant on the Harnackian interpretation is presented by Martin Werner in his The Formation of Christian Doctrine (London: A. and C. Black, 1957). Werner traces the "process of hellenization" to an early collapse of the eschatological perspective which had previously characterized the Christian community. What followed was a transformation to the more apparent course of human history. Through this process of secularisation, primitive Christianity became mergent Catholicism by procedures which Werner believes to be strictly indefensible. By the same process, the historical Jesus became a mere product of doctrinal fantasy.

For a history of "the hellenization movement" see Jaroslav Pelikan's "The Eschatology of Tertullian," in Church History. Vol. XXII (1952), pp. 108-122. See also S. G. F. Brandon, "The De-eschatologizing of Christian Doctrine," in The Hibbert Journal. Vol. LIV (1955-56), pp. 392-396; Johannes Hessen, Griechische oder Biblische Theologie? Das Problem der Hellenisierung des Christentums in neuer Beleuchtung (Leipzig: Koehler und Amelang, 1956); Jean Danielou, Message Evangelique et Culture Hellenistique aux IIe et IIIe Siecles (Paris: Desclee, 1961); G. M. G. Reardon discusses Werner in "Martin Werner and the Problem of Historical Christianity," in The Hibbert Journal. Vol. LVIII (1959-60), pp. 42-52.

[1] Obviously one can regard the story and its systematisation as the unity-diversity variables without sharing Harnack's interpretation or scheme. One might contend that the translation of the initial body of revelation implies neither loss nor discontinuity with the beginning. In sharp contrast to the positions of Harnack and Werner, John Henry Newman, for example, holds there to be a fundamental continuity between the primitive Christian witness and its subsequent systematic expression, seeing both as comprising a unitary norm. Against any attempt to have "religion without dogma" Newman advances what he calls a "theory of doctrinal development" which finds the passage of time to be a necessary ingredient in the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas. (See discussion on this point by Owen Chadwick,

Clearly, Harnack's first intent was not to apply the technique of abstraction to the relevant materials for purposes of clarifying the problem of theological "unity and diversity". In a strict sense, even his quest for Christianity's core element is not identical with the search for the basis of theological unity. And, yet, the ingredients were present by which the project could be extended for that use. The original sacred story could readily be regarded as the locus of "unity", and "diversity" could become coincidental with the transposition

---

From Bossuet to Newman. London: Cambridge University Press, 1957, p. 152.) The nature of Christian truth is such that it cannot be comprehended all at once by its recipients, but requires time and deep thought for its full elucidation.

For Newman the translation and the original are virtually identifiable. But they are such since they are united by a comprehensive normative process. The original treasure (or sacred story) becomes the process' point of orientation; history and doctrine appear as its forms of development. Diversity then is coincidental with any form of extension from the beginning which lacks conformity or congruity with the normative process. In addition to securing a place for the regulative guidance of the Catholic Church, this scheme of continuity also demands an articulation of canons, or "notes", as the characteristic marks by which genuine doctrinal development can be discerned. (See Newman's Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. New York: Doubleday, 1960, part II, chapter 5, pp. 175-208.)

Karl Rahner (in Theological Investigations, Vol. I, trans. Cornelius Ernst. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961) refers the necessity of doctrinal development to the incompleteness of human language. Even though a revealed truth remains true and always binding, a truth concerning divine reality is nevertheless necessarily expressed in partial finite statements. In doctrinal development "no change takes place in the divine reality, nor do the true propositions concerning the reality become false, but there is a certain change in the perspective in which...the reality through the proposition is seen." (p. 75)

See also Jean Guitton, La Philosophie de Newman (Paris: Boivin, 1933); Alfred Loisy, The Gospel and the Church, trans. Christopher Home (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1909); F. Marin-Sola, La Evolution Homogenie du Dogme Catholique (Fribourg: Imprimerie et Librarie de l'Oeuvre de Saint-Paul, 1924).

of that story into another mode of discourse. But the primary
significance of that extension does not issue from the parti-
cular schematism which might be constructed, but rather from
a) the association of theological "unity and diversity" with
the process of systematisation, and b) a recognition that the
hellenizing process is such that its formal and contentual
elements can be distinguished by means of abstraction. It
is through the avenue of that distinction that an analysis of
the process of hellenization (i.e. the application of Greek
language forms to primitive religious affirmations) can con-
tribute to a clarification of the problem of theological "unity
and diversity".

Harnack's schematism itself is of limited value when ap-
plied directly to the problem of "unity and diversity". Its
stress on the freeing of the core element from conceptual adap-
tation prevents it from giving full status to the interdepen-
dence of formalisation and sacred story. Hence, the procedure
which Harnack prefigures is overly simple when hellenization is
not regarded as dehabilitative of "the essential core", and when
unity does not insist upon being preconceptual. It would appear
that the recognition of a fundamental difference between conten-
tual and formal and between sacred story and conceptual adapta-
tion is not sufficient basis upon which to identify these two
distinctions with each other, or, indeed, with the unity-diversity
variables. The problem is created by virtue of the fact that

sacred story does not stand solely in relation to systematisa-
tion as such, but rather to a variety of consistent but con-
flicting systems. A clarification of the problem requires not
only the abstraction of the kerygmatic affirmations from subse-
quent systematisation, but also the technique by which the
various systems (with which those affirmations have been as-
sociated) might be distinguished from each other. To be sure,
the problem of "unity and diversity" and the distinction be-
tween the contentual and the formal belong together. But their
association is not necessarily by the identification of their
respective determinative poles.

In a certain sense, the advancement beyond Harnack must
regard the process of hellenization not only as the source but
also as the locus of the problem of theological unity and di-
versity. In that context the reciprocal influences of the for-
mal and the contentual, as well as of affirmation and scheme,
are manifestly more complex than Harnack's simple identifica-
tions would allow them to be. The systematic pattern functions,
for example, as the structure by which affirmations are joined
and made to cohere. In specific ways the systematic patterns
contain the limits and circumscribe the possibilities for the
kinds of affirmations which can be given formal status. But,
beyond that, the system contributes content of its own. It
also creates additional affirmations as are structurally ap-
propriate or necessary to the achievement of systematic closure.
This creative or formative function, however, is not restricted

10.

to the system and to the exigencies of systematic order. The affirmations also retain various degrees of ability to shape the system into which they are incorporated. The candidacy of certain systems, for example, is nullified by the conceptual demands of specific affirmations. Other patterns do not readily allow the formal expression of some of the affirmations which Christian faith seeks to be made. And, under other circumstances, the presence of the affirmation might almost be coincidental with the articulation of some portion of that structural framework with which it comes associated.

When systematisation is regarded as the context to which "unity and diversity" refers (rather than simply being coincidental with diversity), then the approach to the problem must be fitted not to "de-hellenize" the kerygma, but, instead, to undertake a critical exercise in comparative theological reflexivity. It must be reflexive, for it requires an analytical technique by which the rudiments of already-expressed theological orientations might be discerned and disclosed. It is the cultivation of a peculiar consciousness, a critical sensitivity, an effort at rethinking. The exercise must also be critical and not constructive, for it seeks access to the constituents of given patterns of theological reflection. It must be comparative, for it must understand the variety of theological systems to be associated with the source from which the problem derives.

The approach which this treatise advocates and seeks to

11.

illustrate is the treatment of the problem of "unity and diver-
sity" through the development of a kind of morphology of theolo-
gical systematisation. The intention of this structural art can
be neither composition nor explanation, but analysis and critique.
Its patron is not constructive theology in any of its forms---it
cannot be used for such positive purposes except by carefully
measured transitions---but critical philosophy. Its precedent
is the entrance of critical reflexivity into dogmatic history.
Thus, some of its guidelines have been established and developed
through the patterns of analysis which have been applied to for-
malisation of thought. Its particular responsibility is the
adaptation and cultivation of those patterns toward a deliberate
sensitivity to systematic reflection's theological examples.

The following analysis, an exercise in critical theological
reflexivity, seeks access to the constituents of formal order in
three systematic presentations. The access which is sought is
calculated to disclose a basis of comparison and contrast with
respect to three types of formal order which have appeared in
the Christian theological tradition. It is not the purpose of
this essay to reduce the entire theological tradition to a com-
prehensive typological scheme which both links and demonstrates
the necessity of its divergent but component parts. It is the
intention of the project, however, to illustrate the fact that
a variety of formal patterns have been utilized in the Christian
tradition, and that this variety is implicit in the doctrinal
disputes which appear in both historic and contemporary survey.

12.

We shall approach this topic by specifying a means by which the
formative characteristics of divergent treatments of one and the
same theological issue can become accessible. We shall utilize
that issue to illustrate the way in which chartable methodologi-
cal variations are implicit in the starting points and manner
according to which formal patterns function.

The exercise itself is divided into two major sections. The
first of these is directed toward an examination of the charac-
teristics of formal systematisation. The second utilizes the dis-
covered characteristics of systematisation to locate the formal
patterns of selected representative theological perspectives. The
first section seeks to formulate a method by which such a compara-
tive formal analysis might be undertaken; the second tests that
method's usefulness as applied to specific essays of classic theo-
logical importance. The first part of the treatise is given to a
reassessment of the theological significance of the analysis in
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The second portion ap-
plies that significance to three representative treatments of
human freedom in Christian theological literature: 1) Irenaeus'
Adversus Haereses; 2) Martin Luther's Tractatus de Libertate
Christiani; and 3) Thomas Aquinas' discussion of "De Voluntario
et Involuntario" in his Summa Theologica. The Critique of Pure
Reason has been chosen as our starting point primarily because
of the precedent it establishes with respect to investigations
of the constituents of formal coherence in thought. Irenaeus,

13.

Luther, and Thomas have been selected by virtue of their ability to represent positions to which major chronological, historical, ecclesiastical, and theological divisions in Christendom can conceivably refer.

But, if the _Critique of Pure Reason_ is calculated for formal analysis, it does not itself establish the basis upon which an exercise in comparative formal analysis might be conducted. Nor does it assure that its basis of analysis is sensitive in every respect to the conceptual structures which are characteristic of our chosen theological examples. In order to utilize the _Critique_ for this task without distorting its original intent, we must preface our comparative exercise with the appropriate transitions. The initial undertaking (in Part I, chapter I) is the tracing of the way in which critical philosophy is applied to religion and to religious discourse within the _Critique_. Chapters II and III of Part I recall some standard interpretations of the theological significance of the _Critique_, and also cite and sort some major criticisms which philosophical assessments of the permanent importance of Kant's work have raised. The purpose of this sampling of responses is not only to refer our study to the tradition of ongoing discussion and scholarship which the _Critique_ has provoked, but also to clearly distinguish the strictly methodological use to which it will be put in this examination. For example, in contrast to the varieties of post-Kantian theological orientations which attempt to free religion from any required dependence upon the area of experience which the _Critique_ seeks

14.

to illumine, the methodological use treats this analysis primarily as a critical account of formal reasoning. It builds upon a distinction between a) the response to the question concerning the possibility of a priori-synthetic knowledge, and b) Kant's own account of the nature of reality. It argues that the legacy to be received from the critical philosopher (at least for these purposes) is not his _Weltanschauung_ (tempered as it is by Newtonian physics, Aristotelian logic, and Euclidean geometry), but rather the reflexivity which he exhibits concerning the way in which conceptual and categorial patterns are made to cohere. And, in contrast to the line of philosophical comment which also makes and develops that same distinction, but on the basis of a more accurate reading of the nature of reality, this thesis' supportive reference is the formal character of theological reflection. Systematisation, under the methodological auspices of a comparative theological exercise, is not dependent upon empirical data in quite the same demonstrable way as systematisation must be within an account of the possibility of knowledge. Thus, chapter III of Part I reexamines Kant's discussion of "the natural dialectic of reason", and refers its question concerning the constitution of systematic theological structures to the _Critique_'s account of the way in which connection of parts are manifested in conformity with a single principle. The intention throughout the entire first section of the dissertation is the cultivation of an access through which variations between unitary structures can be discerned and, if possible, negotiated.

15.

The concept of "freedom" is chosen as the focal point of
the structural analyses which comprise Part II of the study.
Freedom qualifies for this role since it is a concept which
appears to lead reflection into one or another characteristic
formal pattern. As such it assumes the function of a kind of
"formal concept" since its articulation, dependent upon a
specification of the relation of order to indeterminateness,
provokes a pattern of reflective systematic coherence. At the
same time, freedom is also a topic of fundamental and central
religious interest throughout the history of Christian life and
thought: the dominant interest in freedom may, indeed, be a
religious one. Thus, freedom's formal utility can be drawn
upon for comparative purposes when that concept is made the
focus of representative theological essays which seek to pro-
vide summary statements concerning the Christian faith.

The analysis which develops in the following pages is
necessarily precise and a very delicate one. As a formal
concept, freedom must nevertheless not be formally superimposed
upon the respective theological essays. Nor, on the other
hand, can freedom be regarded as a motif of such exclusive
religious interest that it is foreign to formal analysis. The
account of freedom in Part I must, therefore, be restricted
to an examination of that concept's function with respect to
systematisation. The account of freedom in Part II must allow
the theologians to express the significance of that concept as

16.

in their own language. But the search for bases of correspon-
dence and difference between the theological accounts is res-
ponsible for the application of Part I to Part II. The theolo-
gical literature is unable to provide critical and comparative
tools by which its variant versions can be measured. Formal
analysis can, indeed, specify such available techniques, even
though the literature is not the product of such analyses.

As the following project will further clarify in appro-
priate stages and in greater detail, formal systematisation
(even the unity given religious affirmations) reflects the con-
vergence of what Kant calls logical principles (starting points)
and interests of reason (methods by which coherence is achieved).
Theological variety, in chosen systematic instances, seems ac-
cessible when the analyst charts the function of characteristic
starting points (be it to synthesize, specify, discriminate,
etc.) and the interests under which unitary order is sought.
Irenaeus, for example, attempts coherence by means of comprehen-
sion and synthesis. Luther, on the other hand, seeks the parti-
cular in order to rid the indubitable of obscurity. Thomas be-
gins by inquiring as to the place of the peculiar and its opera-
tion within the totality. A careful reading of each approach
discloses a variation in principle and method which is indica-
tive of all-encompassing differences in orientation and per-
spective. In each a variant basis of systematic order is im-
plicit not only in the articulation of the concept of freedom:
it also possesses a distinctive influence upon whatever is

brought within range of concern. And, yet, with diverse star-
ting points and methods, the alternative systematic patterns
of Irenaeus, Luther, and Thomas nevertheless also manifest a
fundamental unity. Each is bipolar in structure, and each
fashions that bipolarity according to the asymmetrical rela-
tion which is conceived between God and the world. By virtue
of their respective intentions to capture a like asymmetrical
relation within systematisation, though by means of divergent
starting points and methods, these three patterns manifest
both unity and diversity in accessible and chartable forms.
As by a kind of gracious bestowal, the requirements of free-
dom demand that each of the three characteristic starting
points be included. And the dynamism of asymmetry, which
both creates and depends upon ordered variety, provides the
technique by which the three perspectives can be simultane-
ously retained.

PART ONE

Critical Reflexivity and Theological Systematisation

> No philosopher understands his predecessors
> until he has re-thought their thought in his
> own contemporary terms; and it is character-
> istic of the very greatest philosophers, like
> Kant and Aristotle, that they, more than any
> other, repay this effort of re-thinking.[1]

> The argument of our Critique, taken as a whole,
> must have sufficiently convinced the reader
> that although metaphysics cannot be the foun-
> dation of religion, it must always continue to
> be the bulwark of it...[2]

The foregoing introduction gives indication of the
possibility of clarification of the problem of theologi-
cal "unity and diversity" through an examination of the
procedures by which religious affirmations are formalized.
To refer this issue from the beginning to Immanuel Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason and the discussion which it has pro-
voked is to take not only a precautionary measure. Nor does
it exhibit simply an unwillingness to dishonor an established
precedent which views all contemporary theological problems
and efforts as being in some sense dependent upon the en-
trance of the critical philosopher into dogmatic history.

---

[1] P. F. Strawson, Individuals (New York: Anchor Books,
1963), p. xv.

[2] Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman
Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1961), A 849, p. 664.

20.

The reference of this treatise to Kant is indeed more precise. Its particular concern is the critical reflexivity which the philosopher exercised with respect to the influence of formal elements upon conceptual order. Its initial focus is Kant's assertion that reflection requires extra-mental factors which are indispensable to both knowledge and analysis. Its intended correlation of 'critique' and theology can be expressed as follows: if theology (as it has been practiced) can be understood as a reflective activity through which religious affirmations are given formal status,[1] then an analysis of the theological form of reflection would appear to be a parallel undertaking with that which Kant has already provided. In language appropriate to the Kantian analysis, the response given to the question concerning the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge might be construed as a paradigm according to which the formal pattern(s) of theology may also be approached. Even the Harnackian abstraction of "core element" from the ingredients of the system, or cosmology, or Weltanschauung with which those elements are associated implies some such critical procedure. But a specification of those procedures, as based upon the Kantian model, must await a review of the Critique's original purposes, and an evaluation

---

[1] This definition of theology, which seems especially appropriate to a comparative analysis of this kind, is taken from Henry Dumery, Critique et Religion (Paris: Sedes, 1957). Dumery conceives theology to be the exercise in adopting epistemology in order to give faith a rational structure. See Part I, chapters II and III following.

of its author's interpretation of its relevance for understanding the place and nature of religious discourse.

Thus we shall proceed by retracing the argument of the Critique which seems to culminate in Kant's ascribing the formalizing of religious affirmations to the requirements of moral teleology. Secondly, we shall contend that the restriction of the Kantian analysis to a particular categorial system (of which there are other examples) seems to qualify the particular theological implications which he was able to draw from it. Finally, we shall explore in more detail a less frequently treated argument from Kant's "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" which seems to illumine the kind of procedures implicit in theological formalisation. A recognition of the particularity of the categorial system to which Kant's critique is addressed should aid our project in three ways: 1) it should temper the prominence of moral teleology as the focus of the Critique's "religious implications"; 2) it should attribute more emphasis to the Critique's ability to serve as paradigm for the constituents of reflective order; and 3) it should provide the occasion by which critical analysis might be extended for comparative purposes to apply to other categorial systems. To condition the appropriate range of relevance of the Critique of Pure Reason in this way is to direct its implications toward an analysis of theological reflection rather than to a prescription of a place for religion within a perspective on the world.

This direction seems in line with the conditions Kant es-
tablished at the beginning of his work. The purpose of the
Critique of Pure Reason is the exposition and analysis of the
knowable as such: its limits, configuration, and the possi-
bility of its extension.[1] Two fundamental prescriptions are
disclosed: a) that the method utilized be analytical and dis-
criminatory; and b) that the range of its examination be
equivalent to that which can be known. The convergence of
these two insures that the description of the knowable will
issue from a correlation of means and bases of discrimina-
tion. And the prescriptive procedure of the Critique also
implies the possibility of a distinction between 1) that
which can be known, and 2) that which can be.

Kant asserts that knowledge is dependent upon the dis-
tinction between matter and form. The shape of his argument
is created by imposing that distinction upon situation after
situation. Among human faculties, for example, there is sen-
sible intuition and understanding; in human knowledge there
are a posteriori and a priori modes of apprehension: the for-
mer stands to the latter as matter to form. Indeed, the "re-
volution" which this approach implies can be told in terms of
the way in which the relation of matter and form is conceived.[2]

------

[1] Subheading three in Kant's "Introduction" reads, for
example, as follows: "Philosophy stands in need of a science
which shall determine the possibility, the principles, and
the extent of all a priori knowledge." B6, p. 45.

[2] See Critique, A 266-268, pp. 280,1.

Whereas formerly matter was given to the universal and form to the specific difference, the process now should be the reverse: matter becomes the determinable, and form the determination of matter.

This distinction becomes necessary because of the conflict between the empiricist and rationalist schools. It was to this dilemma that Kant had submitted his reconciling theses: all knowledge begins with experience, though, by this, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.[1] There is a knowledge independent of all experience and a knowledge which is possible only through experience; but this distinction is made possible only through analysis. In the cognitive experience, empirical knowledge is to pure knowledge as matter is to form, or, as the determinable is to its determination. There is sensibility (i.e. that by which objects are given) and there is understanding (i.e. that by which objects are thought).[2] As from sensibility intuitions arise, so from understanding concepts arise. The determination (form) of sensibility (matter) are the aesthetic forms (space and time). The determination (form) of understanding (matter) are the logical forms (the categories). Knowledge becomes possible through the determination of the sensuous manifold by a synthetic-mental act.

---

[1] *Critique*, B1, p. 41.

[2] *Ibid.*, A19, p. 65.

24.

In asking the question concerning the possibility of
a priori-synthetic knowledge Kant is proposing to demonstrate
that the synthesis upon which the possibility of knowledge
depends can indeed be described: what is never separated in
any act of knowing can, however, be abstracted for and by
the science of knowing. Upon the basis of the possibility
of this abstraction the Critique of Pure Reason itself de-
pends. Since knowing is judging, and judging is 'putting
together'---the objects of the mind agreeing with the mind---
the mind is capable of both synthesis (combination) and analy-
sis (decomposition). Synthesis produces knowledge; analysis
is the task of the Critique. From this perspective Kant pro-
poses to provide an enumeration of the determinants of know-
ledge, i.e. the a priori conditions under which matter be-
comes knowable. The discovery of those conditions is iden-
tical with a demonstration of the foundation of all theoretic
sciences, and, quite eminently, metaphysics.

The argument in its early stages resembles, therefore,
a process of sorting, distinguishing, locating types and
frames of reference, and assigning the discovered conceptual
ingredients to their appropriate spheres of influence. Kant's
chief concern in this regard has been the possibility---indeed
the descriptive possibility!---of knowledge. That realization
requires not only a discrimination between sensible, mental,
and extra-mental cognitive factors. It also demands a dis-
tinction among appropriate questions.

The question concerning the possibility of knowledge, for example, is not the same question as that concerning the "nature of reality". By limiting the scope of his examination to that which can be known (as distinct from that which can be) Kant has given clear indication that an inquiry into the way in which knowledge is possible cannot be expected to also provide an exhaustive account of the sorts of things there are. And yet this basic distinction cannot be extended as if to imply total separation: discrimination itself, as a valid epistemological tool, is to be applied within the totality of operations which demands that individual units and elements function correlatively within the organism itself. Not only does the question concerning the possibility of knowledge become bound up with the question concerning the kinds of things there are; also, a treatment of the "descriptive possibility" of knowledge implies some sort of circumscription of the nature of things. At least it becomes appropriate to distinguish between that which can be and also can be known and that which simply can be. The primary concern for an exposition of knowledge also becomes a basis, as it were, for the study of the limits and the possibility of the extension of knowledge.[1]

---

[1] See for example the way in which Kant relates this transition to the distinction between that which is true and that which we desire to know: "But although these rules of understanding are not only true a priori, but are indeed the source of all truth (that is, of the agreement of our knowledge with objects), inasmuch as they contain in themselves

Thus it is the question of the possibility of the extension of knowledge which introduces the normative methodological distinction between phenomena and noumena. This is not to supersede the familiar distinction between matter and form; rather it is to provide its amplification. When the focus of attention concerned the possibility of knowledge, the issue could be clarified by specifying the way in which the determinant functions with respect to the determinable. When the focal point becomes the problem of the extension of that knowledge to that which is implied in the possibility of knowledge but for which nevertheless no sensible intuition is available, then what is already determinable serves as the determinant by which the indeterminant can be distinguished. The relation between matter and form is evident in each case. With respect to the possibility of knowledge, form becomes associated with order. With respect to the extension and scope of knowledge, form is related to circumscription. In the former instance (as illustrated most vividly in the a priori-synthetic judgment) the determinable is the sensuous manifold whose determination is the imposition of pure knowledge. In the latter case, wherein the determination has the

---

the ground of the possibility of experience viewed as the sum of all knowledge wherein objects can be given to us, we are not satisfied with the exposition merely of that which is true, but likewise demand that account be taken of that which we desire to know. If, therefore, from this critical inquiry we learn nothing more than that, in the merely empirical employment of understanding, we should in any case have practiced without any such subtle enquiry, it would seem as if the advantage derived from it by no means repays the labour expended." A 237, p. 258.

character of a "boundary ascription", <u>noumena</u> becomes the
determination of <u>phenomena</u> but precisely by being its
limitation.

It is precisely at this point that confusions are born.
What Kant has presented is a series of fundamental distinc-
tions which serve as related 'frames of reference' (or areas
of orientation) to which the relevant data under discussion
is referred. What thereupon becomes necessary---if the pro-
ject is to be anything more than the assigning of significant
component parts to appropriate frames or areas---is the im-
plementation of conditions under which a careful balance can
be maintained between the respective frames of reference.
That delicate structural balance, threatened by the very
analytical and abstractive nature of the Kantian inquiry,
depends upon the joint operation of discrimination and cir-
cumscription as these are interpreted by the relation of
matter and form. Though distinct and individual, the dis-
criminated parts must also function with such reciprocal
efficiency that their combined activity might represent an
interacting organism. One must retain an uncompromised
distinction between component parts together with the co-
herence of the whole. The mutual dependence of parts to
part, domain to domain, must be both intricate and com-
plex: in the totality of the organism, respective frames
of reference are indeed reciprocal; yet, short of that
totality, reciprocity becomes both illusory and illegiti-
mate.

28.

It is this complexity which Kant seeks to trace in the chapter "Phenomena and Noumena".[1] It was not enough, he states, that the possibility of knowledge be assessed (i.e. that the way be specified by which determinants function with respect to the determinable). Now the conclusion concerning that possibility introduces another issue: the determination of the limits of the employment of <u>understanding</u>. It was asserted earlier that "all concepts and with them all principles...relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience."[2] But that assertion concerning the way in which potential knowledge (the knowable) becomes actual knowledge (the known) serves also to inquire as to the range of potential knowledge.

> If the understanding in its empirical employ-
> ment cannot distinguish whether certain questions
> lie within its horizon or not, it can never be
> assured of its claims or of its possessions,
> but must be prepared for many a humiliating
> disillusionment, whenever, as must unavoidably
> and constantly happen, it oversteps the limits
> of its own domain, and loses itself in opinions
> that are baseless and misleading.[3]

In other words, it was not enough that the relationship between the determinant and the determinable with respect to objects of possible experience be specified: account has still not been taken of that which is not an object of the

---

[1] <u>Critique</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 257-275.

[2] <u>Ibid</u>., A 239, p. 259.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., A 238, p. 259.

senses, and, thus, in that regard, is indeterminant. Or, to assert that understanding can never admit of any but an empirical (as distinct from a transcendental) employment is also to note that the circumscription of the range of the understanding is not equivalent to a circumscription of all the domains there may be. Thus, while understanding serves as the determinant by which intuitions become characterizable, so too must the understanding be determined since it, unlike the forms of intuition, potentially owns the capacity of extension beyond the limits of sensibility.[1]

The question is raised in the following way: does the understanding possess a transcendental function in addition to its demonstrated empirical employment? The answer is supplied in terms of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Noumena (i.e. that for which a sensible intuition is lacking) can be of two sorts: a) in the negative sense, a noumenon is "a thing insofar as it is not an object of sensible intuition"; and b) in the positive though problematic sense, a noumenon is "an object of a non-sensible intuition".[2] The issue in the former instance is referred to the character of the object, i.e. that it is non-sensible; the issue in the latter case is referred to the character of the mode of apprehension, i.e. that it is non-sensible.

---

[1] "We have an understanding which problematically extends further, but we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility can be given..." A 255, p. 272.

[2] Only B contains the distinction between positive and

When the question arises as to the function of the understanding with respect to that which is not determined by sensibility, the answer must be an explication of noumena in the negative sense: the concept of a noumenon is a limiting concept, with no positive affirming ability beyond the field of sensibility.[1]

> What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves....But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an unknown something.[2]

One of the chief purposes of the _Critique_ _of_ _Pure_ _Reason_ was to illustrate the way in which knowledge has the tendency to leave appearances to extend itself beyond the limits of experience.[3] Kant's reaction to that disposition comes in the form of two assertions: 1) that

---

negative senses. See B 307, p. 268 ff. The first edition (A 249, pp. 265,6) describes the relation between phenomena and noumena as follows: "Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories are called phenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which nevertheless can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible...such things would be entitled noumena (intelligibilia."

[1] The function of a "limiting concept" is "to curb the pretensions of sensibility". B 311, p. 272.

[2] B 312, p. 273.

[3] "But what is still more extraordinary than all the

31.

understanding can never admit of a transcendental employ-
ment;[1] and 2) that the synthetic order which understanding
imposes implies a kind of problematic predication beyond
the field of experience.[2] Understanding, in this regard,
is not only determinative of empirical sensibility; it is
also determinable by reason. Indeed, while understanding
is the mode of determining an object for the manifold of
a possible intuition, reason is understanding's determinant,
or, the mode of determining the thinking of objects in
general without regard to specification. Reason prescribes
to the understanding

> its direction toward a certain unity of
> which it has itself no concept, and in such
> manner as to unite all the acts of the un-
> derstanding...into an absolute whole.[3]

preceding is this, that certain modes of knowledge leave the
field of all possible experiences and have the appearance of
extending the scope of our judgments beyond all limits of ex-
perience, and this by means of concepts to which no correspon-
ding object can ever be given in experience." A 2,3, p. 45.

[1] A 238, p. 259.

[2] Kant describes this area of problematic prediction as
follows: "It is precisely by means of the latter modes of know-
ledge, in a realm beyond the world of the senses, where ex-
perience can yield neither guidance nor correction, that our
reason carries on those enquiries which owing to their impor-
tance we consider to be far more excellent, and in their pur-
pose far more lofty, than all that the understanding can learn
in the field of appearances." A 3, pp. 45,6.

[3] A 326, p. 318. "Reason concerns itself exclusively
with absolute totality in the employment of the concepts of
the understanding, and endeavors to carry the synthetic unity,
which is thought in the category, up to the completely uncon-
ditioned. We may call this unity of appearances the unity of
reason, and that expressed by the category the unity of under-
standing."

32.

The distinction between understanding and reason is made by referring to the former as "the faculty of rules" and by calling the latter "the faculty of principles".[1] It is in this distinction that Kant utilizes the term <u>principle</u> which will be given further development in the chapter on "The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason".[2] For now, "knowledge from principles is, therefore, that knowledge alone in which I apprehend the particular in the universal through concepts."[3] Necessary for this apprehension are the concepts of reason, i.e. the transcendental ideas. It is the function of the transcendental idea to determine the manner of understanding's employment in dealing with experience in its totality.[4] Again, the relation of matter and form is operative; this time, however, it is not the relation of the determinant to the determinable which is stressed, but that between determinant and indeterminant:

> The transcendental concept of reason is none
> other than the concept of the totality of con-
> ditions for any given conditioned. Now since
> it is the unconditioned alone which makes pos-
> sible the totality of conditions, and, con-
> versely, the totality of conditions is always
> itself unconditioned, a pure concept of reason
> can in general be explained by the concept of
> the unconditioned, conceived as containing a
> ground of the synthesis of the conditioned.[5]

---

[1] A 299, p. 301.

[2] See A 647 ff., p. 535.

[3] A 300, p. 301.

[4] A 321, p. 315.

[5] A 322, p. 316.

Reason, therefore, as distinct from understanding, does admit of a kind of transcendental employment. Its concepts, the transcendental ideas, concern themselves with "the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions".[1] And such transcendental ideas (i.e. the soul, the world, and God) comprise the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions in general as disclosed by those elements necessary to the subject-object noetic relationship.

> All transcendental ideas can therefore be arranged in three classes, the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance, the third the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general.[2]

Striving, therefore, for "the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions"[3] pure reason furnishes the transcendental idea of the soul (psychologia rationalis), the world (cosmologia rationalis), and God (theologia transzendentalis).[4]

Regulating the entire discussion is Kant's working axiom that "everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers must be appropriate to, and consistent with, their right employment."[5] As applied to the relation of matter and form,

---

[1] A 334, p. 323.

[2] Ibid.

[3] A 336, p. 324.

[4] A 335, p. 323.

[5] A 643, p. 532.

this axiom demands that a distinction be made between the
regulative and constitutive functions of the transcendental
ideas just as it had previously required a distinction be-
tween the empirical and transcendental employments of the
concepts of the understanding. The function of reason is
the ordering of understanding, as the function of understan-
ding is the ordering of sensibility. Understanding can re-
present no object in concepts except under the conditions of
sensibility; reason ascribes a certain completeness to know-
ledge by unifying the concepts of understanding. And yet,
because both concepts and ideas contain something also of
that which is indeterminate, neither is able to transcend
the conditions of sensibility. Though the determinant (even
the transcendental ideas) can be abstracted, it is not there-
by hypostasized.

Transcendental ideas never allow a constitutive employ-
ment (as though supplying concepts of certain objects) but
only a regulative usage. Reason does not create concepts
or objects, but simply orders and unifies them.[1] Hence,

---

[1] The following can be considered as a summary passage:
"If we consider in its whole range the knowledge obtained for
us by the understanding, we find that what is peculiarly des-
tructive of reason in its attitude to this body of knowledge,
is that it prescribes and seeks to achieve its systematisa-
tion, that is, to exhibit the connections of its parts in con-
formity with a single principle. This unity of reason always
presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of
knowledge---a whole which is prior to the determinate know-
ledge of the parts and which contains the conditions that deter-
mine a priori for every part its position and relation to the
other parts." A 645, p. 534.

reason cannot be employed in any speculative manner. The idea of God, for example, is appropriately regulative with respect to the systematic ordering of the world; but any attempted constitutive employment is self-defeating since it would imply the extension of knowledge "into a realm where no experience is possible".[1] The indeterminate can become determinant, but is not thereby determined.

Thus in his chapter "Critique of all Theology" Kant directs his discussion toward an assessment of the classical proofs for the existence of God. The result is a shift in emphasis. The interest in the possibility of predicating attributes to the divine is transferred from theoretical speculation to moral judgment. Since God is an idea for which no corresponding intuition can be supplied---since transcendental questions admit only transcendental answers--- the reality of God is assured only on the basis of practical utility. Since all constitutive speculative endeavors have been foreclosed,

> the only theology of reason which is possible
> is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks
> guidance from them. All synthetic principles
> of reason allow only of an immanent employment;
> and in order to have knowledge of a supreme be-
> ing we should have to put them to a transcen-
> dent use, for which our understanding is in no
> way fitted.[2]

---

[1] A 639, p. 530.

[2] A 636, p. 528.

The Kantian reflexivity with respect to the formalisation of religious affirmations would seem therefore to contain some of the following ingredients. Amid whatever ambivalence might surround the question concerning the relation of the reality of God to the possibility of knowledge, a fundamental thesis is never violated in the <u>Critique</u>: synthetic propositions are not established by conceding the divine reality. The existence and certainty of knowledge does not depend upon the reality and/or goodness of God. For Kant the conditions of knowledge are complete with the formal and empirical factors constitutive of the synthetic judgment. The idea of God regulates inquiry, but neither produces it nor insures its outcome. Nor, on the basis of that inquiry can that idea be utilized to constitute an object. This cognitive limitation---i.e. that all concepts relate to empirical intuitions or to the data of possible experience---also establishes the occasion for utilizing God in the valuational sense. The deepest penetration into the realm of the unknowable, indeterminate, and supersansible, therefore, is via the fulfillment of duty. Not only is knowledge limited by a series of applications of the matter-form relation, but the limitation can be regarded as evidence that man is ever on his way to a goal determined by his own freedom. The totality of nature provides religion with a rightful place and prescribed function. But, simultaneously, the character of that totality is such that the formalisation of religious affirmations is to be regarded as a matter of moral purposefulness.

37.

And yet these are conclusions which do not seem to take the conditions of their own starting points quite seriously enough. The author of the <u>Critique of Pure Reason</u>, until this point in his argument, has been careful to restrict his analysis to the knowable, or, to that which can be known as distinct from that which can be. No further specifications have occurred by which the tracing of the possibility of knowledge can be transposed so as to provide a kind of index into the nature of things. The response to the question concerning the possibility of knowledge is not necessarily equivalent to an account of the order among the sorts of things there are. The prescription that the <u>Critique</u> apply to the knowable is the condition on which the achievement of this reflective analysis depends. That prescription alone would require that careful steps be taken if the critique is to be used also for constructive purposes. In short, Kant has made it clear that ideas such as "God", "world", and "self" behave differently in reflection than do categories or concepts for which experience is available. He has also made it clear that the determinant and the determinable operate reciprocally in the process of knowing. He has also established that such ideas of particular religious interest are often introduced when the reciprocal operation of determinant and determinable requires coherence, order, and unification. He has further contended that the necessity of such ideas in the knowing process is not sufficient basis upon which to establish their constitutive

38.

reality or presence. Constitutive reality is different from regulative employment, just as "world" is not equivalent to the sum total of empirical data which the determinants of knowledge dispose. But he has not sufficiently explained why the analysis in the _Critique_ should be pointed toward finding religion's place within an organon by virtue of its association with morality. Rather, it would appear that Kant has also laid the foundation for a project which he himself did not develop, i.e. that ideas such as "God", "self", and "world" be analyzed with respect to their behavior in theological reflection. The development of the way in which such regulative ideas are utilized for systematic purposes would constitute a fresh way of allowing the _Critique_ to distinguish the sorts of ingredients which are implicit in theology's summary presentations. But we shall place the development of that project in theological orientation within the ongoing discussion Kant's work created within the religious and philosophical communities.

It is testimony to its comprehensiveness that Kant's work in critical philosophy should serve as a watershed also for western religious thought. That the relevance in this regard should be seen so clearly and exactly is an indication also of the nature and function of theology. As Karl Barth has described it:

> From now on theology would no longer be able to formulate its tenets, no matter on what foundation it might base them, without having acquired a clear conception of the method of reason which it also uses in the construction of its tenets. And theology which had not at least faced this question and presented its credentials was backward, from now on, superseded in its relation to the age, no matter how valuable or worthless it might be...[1]

Significantly, however, the theology which attempted to reformulate its tenets in the light of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason seems characteristically to have selected alternatives from among what were regarded as its "negative" conclusions. The thesis that knowledge is dependent upon empirical experience (as Kant was well aware) served as a critique of all forms of natural theology. With that

---

[1] Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens (London: S.C.M. Press, 1959), p. 157. On this subject see also George W. Knox, "The Influence of Kant on Theology," in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method. Vol. II (1905), p. 45 ff.

alternative no longer readily available, theological attention seems to have been focused on the following possibility: a) that the Kantian inquiry into the conditions of knowledge could be regarded as valid in principle; and b) that the theological implications were neither exhausted nor rightly disposed within the critical philosophy itself. Accordingly, religion (and, hence, theology) came to be distinguished from the area of experience which the Kantian critique illumined. Not until later was due consideration given to the alternative which this treatise seeks to develop, i.e. that the results of the Kantian inquiry into knowledge's conditions be regarded as tentative, and that any theological implications be dependent upon a thorough reappraisal of the transcendental deduction. This reappraisal provides the occasion for a methodological use of the Critique for purposes of theological reflexivity. But we shall introduce that methodological use by contrasting it with a select survey of types of reaction to Kant's negative conclusions.

A somewhat natural form of theological response seems implicit in the directives which the Kantian analysis had itself provided.[1] Kant had given fuller treatment to these directives,

---

[1] A good example of the way in which critical exposition becomes merged with a constructive project is Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper, 1960). The work itself depends upon subjects dealt with in the Critique of Pure Reason, e.g. the distinction between phenomena and noumena, the discussion of the proofs for the existence of God, the notions concerning freedom and immortality, etc. At the same time, the work is itself not a critical work but seeks to put religion forcefully before the members of the populace.

and had given verbal testimony that the conclusions of the *Critique* would allow the patterns of development of *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *Critique of Judgment*, and others of his works. Repeatedly he had suggested that religious affirmations be regarded as postulates required by the rationality of moral law. A theology intent upon discovering a 'reason' for its existence could, by this Kantian precedent, refer itself to morality. There the appropriate task could include a detailed development of the variety of dependencies which the intimate relation between religion and practical reason entails.

Other dominant modifications are possible without greatly disturbing the initial Kantian outline. While natural theology would find the conclusions of the *Critique* to severely limit (and perhaps eradicate) the possibility of knowledge of God, others could use those same conclusions as an argument for the distinctiveness of knowledge of God. The impotency of human knowledge *coram deo* can be seized upon as testimony to the character of the divine majesty. Kant himself had distinguished between phenomena and noumena. Upon that precedent, theology was free to devote its energies toward developing that distinction, especially with respect to its affect upon divine predication and worship.[1]

---

[1] This is not to suggest that the Kantian definition of noumena (as distinguished from phenomena) and Rudolf Otto's concept of the *sensus numinus* are equivalents. However, the Kantian distinction can be utilized for the kind of development which Otto receives through the work also of Schleiermacher. See Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1923); and

Theology can also find itself responding to the conclusions of the _Critique_ by means of prescribing modifications in the form of necessary additions. Such additions can be supplied without altering the initial starting points if the Kantian organon is not regarded as exhausted by the domains of pure, practical, and aesthetic reason. The theologians of Lund, for example, have referred the experience of religion to its own peculiar a priori and categorial scheme.[1]

Rudolf Otto, _Religious Essays_, trans. Brian Lunn (London: Oxford University Press, 1931). Of special interest in the latter selection are the essays "How Schleiermacher Rediscovered the Sensus Numinus," pp. 68-77, and "The 'Wholly Other' in Religious History and Theology," pp. 78-94. Though Otto's book on _The Idea of the Holy_ is described as "an inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the divine and its relation to the ration," one must note that the non-rational in this case represents a specific religious a priori, a distinct area of experience with its own categories and elements. The occasion for this was present in a reinterpretation of Kant (See _The Idea of the Holy_, op. cit., pp. 129-133), though Otto's reinterpretation is so extensive as to be not only a further development but also the creation of an additional distinct schematisation. See John M. Moore, "The A Priori in Rudolf Otto's Theory of Religious Experience," in _The Review of Religion_, (November, 1937), pp. 12-24.

[1] In a chapter in his book _Religiöst Apriori_ (Lund: Gleerupska, 1921) entitled "Den transcendentala deduktionens ide hos Kant", (pp. 206-215), Anders Nygren calls attention to the distinction Kant makes between deduction and illustration. The instance in point is Kant's statement (_Critique of Pure Reason_, op. cit., A 94, p. 126) concerning concepts as conditions of experience: "Concepts which yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for this very reason necessary. But the unfolding of the experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction; it is only their illustration." In a more general sense, it is not inaccurate to interpret the entire project of Anders Nygren as an extension of the Kantian distinction between deduction and illustration. What Nygren seeks is a Kantian prerogative for the

The peculiar religious a priori denotes a form of human
experience which Nygren regards as additional and comple-
mentary to the other forms. And yet the religious a priori
is unique in being that upon which the validity of the other

---

parallel schematism upon which religious experience depends.

Nygren classifies the post-Kantian alternatives avail-
able to theology in his "Dogmatikens Vetenskapliga Grund-
laggung," in Lunds Universitets Årsskrift. Vol. XVII, No.
8 (1921), p. 163 ff., and criticizes Kant for his exclusi-
vism. Kant's account of causality, Nygren contends, is
unable to provide access to other forms of human experience.
As an alternative Nygren argues that the theoretical, aes-
thetic, and ethical forms of experience are distinct, though
their validity is supplied by religion and its unique cate-
gory of the eternal. The eternal is necessary to the good,
the true, and the beautiful, and in fact is presupposed by
them. But the category of the eternal is also that for which
none of these other forms of experience can account on their
own terms. By so extending the range of the a priori forms
of human experience, Nygren has retained a modified Kantian
perspective together with much of its language.

In addition to the works already cited, Nygren discusses
Kant in Motivforschung als Philosophisches und Geschicht-
liches Problem. Adolf Phalen in Memorian (1937), and in
"Det Religionsfilosofiska Grundproblemet," in Bibelfor-
skaren. Vol. XXXVI (1919), pp. 290-313. E. Tegen discusses
Nygren's position in "Ar en Transscendental Deduktion av
Religionen Möjlig?" in Bibelforskaren. Vol. XXXIV (1922),
p. 300 ff. See also the excellent discussion of this is-
sue (together with lengthy translations from Swedish into
German) as provided by Hjalmar Lindroth, "Anders Nygren und
der Kritizismus," in Studia Theologica. Vol. X (1955-57),
pp. 89-188. /Lindroth indicates some of the ways in which
Nygren may be indebted to H. Larsson's Kants Deduktion av
Kategorierna (Lund: 1914)./ See also Rudolph Arendt,
"Religiöst Apriori hos Anders Nygren," in Svensk Teologisk
Kvartalskrift. Vol. XXXIII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 89-108; Gustaf
Wingren, "Teologiens Metodfråga," in Svensk Teologisk
Kvartalskrift. Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (1956), pp. 36-41; Wingren,
"Nomos och Agape hos Biskop Nygren," in Svensk Teologisk
Kvartalskrift. Vol. XXXII, No. 2(1956), pp. 122-132; Axel
Gyllenkrok, Systematisk Teologi och Vetenskaplig Metod
(Uppsala, 1959).

Articles on Nygren in English include the following:
Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict, trans. Eric H. Wahl-
strom (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958); Nels Ferre

forms of experience depend. The religious category of the eternal is presupposed by the other forms of experience and their respective categorial systems. The religious a priori, that is, possesses an independent value such that the task of theology cannot be derivative from any of the other forms of experience. The a priori is established, and theology is released from both the necessity or possibility to depend upon other modes of experience or discourse for its existence. Instead it finds its task to be the description of the content which historic religions have rendered with respect to the religious categorical question.[1]

Though this alternative seeks to retain and build upon a Kantian basis (with the necessary modifications as required by religion's independence) its full development only illustrates its sharp divergence from that initial starting point. The modifications ultimately become alterations. Kant had attributed to appropriate religious statements or doctrines a certain regulative function with respect to the unity of human knowledge. Because knowledge (and science, and religion) now refers to distinct cultural forms, Nygren can ascribe a regulative function only to that _motif_ which is fundamental to the historical response given the question of

---

Swedish Contributions to Modern Theology (New York: Harper, 1959); B. Erling, Nature and History (Lund: 1960); J. W. Heikkinen, "The Basic Principles of Anders Nygren's Theological Thought," in The Lutheran Quarterly. Vol. I, No. 2 (1949), pp. 123-134.

[1] The second phase of Nygren's task is undertaken under

45.

categorical preoccupation. Since that response can neither
establish the religious a priori nor be deduced from it,
it can only be located as evident in the faith of the re-
presentative religious communities. Theology then has
neither a demonstrative nor normative character, but is
given to an "elucidation of the nature of the Christian
relationship between God and man and with that idea of God
which is characteristic of Christian faith."[1] Theology's
task is a descriptive one:

> It does not seek to demonstrate "the truth"
> of faith, nor to provoke rational grounds
> for faith, nor to furnish proofs of the
> reality of God...Theology must focus its at-
> tention upon what is and what is not charac-
> teristically Christian.[2]

Implicit in the Lundensian approach is an assumption
that the Kantian inquiry into the conditions of knowledge
is one, ex hypothesi, to which the uniqueness of religious
experience is not accessible. That same assumption can be

---

the name of motivforskning (motif-research). See Anders Ny-
gren, Filosofi och Motivforskning (Stockholm: 1940), and the
discussion in Gustaf Wingren, Theology in Conflict, op. cit.,
pp. 3-22. The theologian's descriptive task is to elucidate
the motif which the historic religion supplies with respect
to the fundamental question of categorical nature. In the
instance concerning which Nygren is most interested, agape
is the motif without which Christianity would not be what it
is. See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Wat-
son (London: SPCK, 1957), pp. 46-48.

[1] Gustaf Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church, trans.
Eric H. Wahlstrom and G. Everett Arden (Philadelphia: Muhlen-
berg Press, 1948), p. 4.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

formulated in other ways and can be utilized to frame other kinds of response to the Kantian inquiry. One can regard religion not as an a priori form of experience fundamentally different from the forms to which the Critique might provide access; instead one can refer the uniqueness of religion to its pre-conceptual basis. Under such an interpretation the distinctiveness of religion would be based upon its logical priority rather than upon qualitative differences, or differences in kind.

Ernst Cassirer, for example, has called attention to the close association between religion and "the mythical consciousness".[1] This allows a retention of the validity of the Kantian analysis, in principle, with respect to the types of judgments which logically condition whatever may be validly asserted as objective.[2] At the same time, it

---

[1] Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume Two: Mythical Thought, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

[2] Cassirer writes that "what distinguishes science from the other forms of cultural life is not that it requires no mediation of signs and symbols and confronts the unveiled truth of 'things in themselves,' but that, differently and more profoundly than is possible for the other forms, it knows that the symbols it employs are symbols and comprehends them as such." The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Vol. II, ibid., p. 26. In distinguishing Cassirer from Kant by noting that the former sought to achieve for the humanities what the latter had attempted for Newtonian physics, Carl H. Hamburg writes that the "objectivity" of Kant's first Critique "actually turns out to be an exclusively physical one. The transcendental method as used here has not provided us with a key for 'objectivity' as such, but

47.

finds Kant to be insufficiently aware of both the range and
depth of human experience.[1] The development of this line
of response is open to a two-fold directive. On the one
hand it could lead to a fresh recognition of the influence
of mythical consciousness upon even the restricted "objec-
tivity" with which the Critique of Pure Reason deals. Also

---

specifically for just one type of objectivity, i.e. the one
that can be formulated within the set of principles con-
stitutive of Newtonian physics." Carl H. Hamburg, Symbol
and Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 42. Ham-
burg sees Cassirer then as attempting to extend the critical
method to domains of reality not structured by this precise
form of objectivity.

[1] Cassirer indicates that his own project can be regarded
as an extension of the critical philosophy, though by an em-
bellishment of the meaning attributed to "objectivity": "It
is one of the first essential insights of critical philosophy
that objects are not 'given' to consciousness in a rigid,
finished state, in their naked 'as suchness', but that the
relation of representation to object presupposes an indepen-
dent, spontaneous act of consciousness. The object does not
exist prior to and outside of synthetic unity but is consti-
tuted only by this synthetic unity; it is no fixed form that
imprints itself on consciousness but is the product of the
formative operation effected by the basic instrumentality of
consciousness, by intuition and pure thought. The 'Philoso-
phy of Symbolic Forms' takes up this basic critical idea, this
fundamental principle of Kant's 'Copernican revolution', and
strives to broaden it. It seeks the categories of the con-
sciousness of objects in the theoretical, intellectual sphere,
and starts from the assumption that such categories must be
at work wherever a cosmos, a characteristic and typical world
view, takes form out of the chaos of impressions. All such
world views are made possible only by specific acts of ob-
jectivisation, in which mere impressions are reworked into
specific, formed representations....Our investigation has al-
ready shown that this direction is by no means 'simple'...
that the ways in which the diversity of sensory impressions
can be synthesized into spiritual unities can reveal the most
diverse nuances. And this conclusion is strikingly confirmed
when we contrast the mythical process of objectivisation with
that of theoretical, pure empirical thought." Cassirer, Ibid.,
p. 29.

it might eventually join theology with the results of those

disciplined investigations (undertaken also under the spon-

sorship of the phenomenological movement) into the signifi-

cant patterns or elements of the pre-reflective life.[1]

Each of the foregoing modes of response are represen-

tative of what must be regarded as alternatives to the nega-

tive theological implications of the <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Pure</u> <u>Reason</u>.

Though they differ with respect to the patterns they out-

line and develop, they are in fundamental agreement that

---

[1] We note, for example, the significant work being done
in the field of "phenomenology of religion" by such scholars
as G. Van der Leeuw (cf. <u>Religion</u> <u>in</u> <u>Essence</u> <u>and</u> <u>Manifesta-
tion</u>, trans. J. E. Turner. New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1963---see especially Van der Leeuw's "The History of Pheno-
menological Research", pp. 690-695), his students, and others.
Certainly these efforts have become possible by virtue of the
kind of Neo-kantianism which Ernst Cassirer helps to develop.
Cassirer himself seems to have indicated a direction for
these studies; when commenting on Edmund Husserl, for exam-
ple, he states that the task of phenomenology "is not ex-
hausted in the analysis of cognition but calls for an in-
vestigation of the structures of entirely different objec-
tive spheres, according to what they 'signify' and without
concern for the 'reality' of their objects." Cassirer be-
lieves that this kind of investigation should also include
"the mythical 'world', not in order to derive its specific
actuality by induction from the manifold of ethnological
and ethnic-psychological experience, but in order to appre-
hend it in a purely ideational analysis." Writing in 1925,
Cassirer adds this to his footnote about Husserl: "As far as
I can see, however, no attempt of this sort has been under-
taken either in phenomenology or in mythological research,
where the genetic-psychological approach still holds almost
uncontested sway."(Cassirer, <u>The</u> <u>Philosophy</u> <u>of</u> <u>Symbolic</u> <u>Forms</u>,
<u>Vol.</u> <u>II</u>, op. cit., p. 12.) Perhaps that sway is not as un-
contested today as it was at the close of the first quarter
of the twentieth century, yet, significantly, the direction
of phenomenological studies in religion do not seem to strongly
manifest the Husserlian model or precedent. See C. Jouco
Bleeker, "The Phenomenological Method," in <u>Numen</u>. Vol. VI
(1959), pp. 96-111.

the basis (or locus) of religion must be distinguished from
the area of discourse and experience which is illumined by
the Kantian analysis. For one, religion is associated with
morality under the rubric of purposeful action. For another
theology stresses the "wholly otherness" of the divine, which
is defined, in turn, by its lack of correspondence with that
for which empirical evidence is available. Another seeks a
grounding for a unique and exclusive a priori which will
allow religion a status and function sui generis, indepen-
dently of the Kantian manner of establishing validation.
Even the sort of philosophy of religion which may be built
upon a distinction between "objectivity" as Kant uses it in
the Critique of Pure Reason and "objectivity" as it might be
extended to apply also to mythical consciousness is not
exempt from this interpretation. Each is like the other in
regarding the critical analysis as more or less circumscrip-
tive of theoretical or conceptual knowledge, to which reli-
gion exists by some specifiable contrast.

Distinct from these efforts to adjust religion's place
within the organon is an interpretation which is based upon
a positive aspect of the analysis. This form of reaction is
implicit in the Critique, though only partially developed
there. It is made available to successive readers through
a series of revisions of Kant's critical work. Fundamentally,
it regards the Critique as a work to which an understanding
of the ingredients or constituents of coherent discourse

50.

can conceivably be referred. It allows the distinction between reflection and other kinds of experience, but notes that theology is assuredly an instance of the former no matter to what extent it is also aligned with examples of the latter. It argues that the nature or character of theology (as a form of reasoned discourse) should become illumined and clarified by the analysis of conceptualisation which Kant's critical work presents. Its obstacle is its awareness that Kant was not simply analyzing a pattern of conceptualisation. But its opportunity is its contention that the application of the _Critique_ for theological clarification requires a distinction between a valid methodological procedure and the particularity of that which it utilized as illustrative material.[1]

The question of "objectivity" (which was raised earlier in connection with Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms) has fostered a claim that the validity of the transcendental deduction is relative to that world outlook of which Newtonian physics, Euclidean geometry, and Aristotelian logic is characteristic. Hence, it appears entirely plausible that the particular Kantian categorial scheme is subject to revision when other types of physics, geometry,

---

[1] To this kind of interpretation one can append the judgment of Martin Heidegger (_Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics_, trans. James S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) that the _Critique of Pure Reason_ "does not provide a 'system' of transcendental philosophy but is a treatise on the method thereof" (p. 21).

and logic are disclosed as applicable to both knowledge
and the knowable. George Schrader, for example, thinks
Kant to have persuasively argued that the categories pre-
suppose an original unity of apperception:

> But he does not explain how or why the unity
> of apperception differentiated itself into
> twelve moments. This is not in itself a cri-
> ticism of Kant, for it may indicate only that
> his theory is incomplete....Nonetheless it
> leaves us in the position of not knowing how
> seriously we are to take Kant's remark that
> we cannot explain why it is that there are
> twelve categories, no more, no less, and pre-
> cisely these twelve categories.[1]

The question is whether or not it is possible to give ex-
plicit recognition to formal entities which seem to be

-----

[1] George Schrader, "Kant's Theory of Concepts," in
Kant Studien. Vol. XLIX (1958), p. 269. A discussion of
this issue is undertaken by W. W. Walsh ("Categories," in
Kant Studien. Vol. XLV, 1953, pp. 274-285) who writes that
though there are alternative categories to the ones Kant
sets forth, this in no sense can be used as an argument
that categorial principles can be changed arbitrarily.
The stability of categories is dependent upon their lack
of amenability to change, and to substitution. Walsh
accounts for alternatives among categories in the follow-
ing way: "...it is a property of categorial principles...
that they cannot be falsified in this way; functioning as
they do as rules, there is no evidence which can definite-
ly count against them....How then do changes in empirical
knowledge affect our attitude to categorial principles?..
..As empirical knowledge accumulates, we find that princi-
ples which we used to apply with ease become increasingly
difficult to apply; we are confronted increasingly with
situations to which they are inappropriate. We tend in
these circumstances to drop categorial principles, not as
having been shown to be false, but as having proved inap-
plicable" (p. 282). For a survey and analysis of the way
in which the categorial system was interpreted and altered
in post-Kantian philosophy, see Heinz Heimsoeth, "Zur Ges-
chichte der Kategorienlehre," in Studien zur Philosophie-
geschichte. No. 82 (1961), pp. 211-239.

presupposed in experience[1] if experience can be known in a variety of ways. The answers range from suggestions that Kant was probably not fully aware of the difficulty,[2] to arguments for the validity of Euclidean geometry,[3] to completely relativistic statements such as the following:

> The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry shows that the axioms of the traditional geometry are convenient assumptions and not a priori necessities of thought or perception.[4]

The less extreme position of Stephan Körner proceeds by distinguishing that which is of permanent significance regarding the transcendental deduction from that which is of a

---

[1] On this question, see D. R. Cousin, "Kant on the Self," in Kant Studien. Vol. XLIX (1957), p. 25 ff.

[2] T. D. Weldon, "Schematism," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1947-48), suggests that Kant "never seriously considered the question. Having only one system of physics to philosophize about, he quite naturally assumed without inquiry that this was the only one which would fulfil his requirements" (p. 147).

[3] Paul Henle, for example, criticizes H. W. Cassirer (cf. Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954) for relativizing the notions of space and time, saying: "While it is of course true that Kant's views about arithmetic and geometry were formulated prior to many important developments in the foundation of mathematics, it does not follow that they have been disproved by subsequent progress." Paul Henle, "The Critique of Pure Reason Today," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LIX, No. 9 (1962), p. 228. Henle goes on to argue for the necessity of Euclidean space, since the mere existence of non-Euclidean geometries can be admitted by a Kantian as being "mere exercises in deduction having nothing to do with actual space" (p. 232).

[4] Morris R. Cohen, A Preface to Logic (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 23.

relative nature. He notes that there are two fundamental but questionable assumptions in the Kantian thesis that to each logical form there is a corresponding category and a form for every category:

> The first is that to list all the possible
> logical forms of objective empirical judge-
> ments is a possible task, which is highly
> doubtful...The second assumption is that no
> new apriori concepts can be formed which
> would unify presentations in a new manner.
> There are such concepts.[1]

Körner is quick to reaffirm "the importance of Kant's method for the discovery of a priori concepts,"[2] however, despite his dependence on traditional logic. The "essence" of that important method

> lies in the distinction between objective
> empirical and corresponding perceptual judge-
> ments, and in the examination of how the
> former confer objective reference and general
> validity on the latter. This is based on the
> realization that to apply concepts is to uni-
> fy presentations.[3]

---

[1] Stephan Körner, Kant (New York: Penguin Books, 1955) p. 50. Körner illustrates the opposing evidence by referring, in the first place, to the possibility that there is more than one form of hypothetical or 'if-then' judgment: "hypo-thetical judgements have a grammatical similarity which dis-guises fundamental logical differences amongst them" (p. 50). A new a-priori concept which falls outside the Kantian scheme would be "Whitehead's concept of four-dimensional events" (p. 50).

[2] Ibid., p. 51.

[3] Ibid.

The suggestion of Körner, and others with him,[1] could prepare the way for an interpretation or adaptation of the critical philosophy to this general project: Kant's precise specification of a priori categories as universal norms is to be regarded as a measure unduly restrictive. To account for that specification by reference to a particular categorial system, however, is not to invalidate the Kantian procedure. Instead it might be used to indicate ways in which an extension of the Kantian method would allow for additional logical or conceptual systems.[2] Critical philosophy would thereupon be responsible for "making universally accepted but hidden intellectual commitments explicit" in their variety of contexts.[3]

A prime supporter of the foregoing position is C. I. Lewis. In his Mind and the World Order Lewis contends that the logical priority of first principles is not equivalent

---

[1] A variant on this interpretation, for example, is included in the article by Morris Schlick, "Is There a Factual a Priori?" in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 277 ff.

[2] The ongoing discussion concerning the possibility of 'alternative logics' should be noted in this regard. See F. Waisman, "Are There Alternative Logics," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1945-46), p. 77 ff; Ernest Nagel, "Logic Without Ontology," in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit., pp. 191-210; Robert S. Brumbaugh, "An Aristotelian Defense of 'Non-Aristotelian' Logics," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLVIII, No. 19 (1951), pp. 582-585.

[3] Stephan Körner, Conceptual Thinking. A Logical Inquiry. (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 5.

55.

to their self-evidence or undeniability, that "axiom" is nothing but "postulate", and that non-Euclidean geometries have precisely the same logical structure as the Euclidean one. The mind, which retains its function in classification and determination, must at the same time be regarded as _truth creating_. Whereas Kant would assert that the categories of the mind both regulate and constitute the truth which depends upon sensible intuition, Lewis insists that experience is itself a "product of the mind".[1] The a priori is never independent of experience, nor is it simply the case that "all fact follows from the logical structure of thought."[2] However, "the world of experience is not given in experience" but rather is "constructed by thought from the data of sense."[3] Hence Lewis can refer to the a priori, even the traditional laws of logic, as "principles of procedure," or, as "parliamentary rules of intelligent thought and speech."[4] As Arthur E. Murphy summarizes it:

> This amounts to saying that there is a truth
> about physical reality which depends simply
> upon the way we interpret it, and that in res-
> pect of this truth...the mind legislates for
> reality.[5]

---

[1] C. I. Lewis, _Mind and the World Order_ (New York: Dover, 1929), p. 34.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 22.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 29.

[4] C. I. Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori," in _Readings in Philosophical Analysis, op. cit._, p. 287.

[5] Arthur E. Murphy, "Mr. Lewis and the A Priori," in _The Journal of Philosophy_. Vol. XXXIX, No. 7 (1932), p. 170.

Bella K. Milmed compares this pragmatic legislation of mind with the earlier Kantian ideal of unification: for Lewis, the a priori-synthetic judgment

> implies nothing whatever about the existing
> world but does imply something about the
> nature of explanation and our understanding
> of that world.[1]

Indeed, the a priori-synthetic judgment implies nothing whatever for Lewis about existing minds except that the force of habit, experience, and exchange of ideas has created a fundamental likeness among human beings. Categories and definitions are social products. The a priori needs neither historical continuity nor universal agreement. Even the most stable of categories is not exempt from possible alteration. Lewis puts the point succinctly:

> If experience were other than it is, the defini-
> tion and its corresponding classification might
> be inconvenient, useless, or fantastic, but
> it could not be false. Mind makes classifica-
> tions and determines meanings; in so doing, it
> creates that truth without which there could be
> no other truth.[2]

---

[1] Bella K. Milmed, Kant and Current Philosophical Issues (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 237.

[2] C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, op. cit., p. 240. Other works by Lewis on this topic include the following: An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1947); "The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge," in The Philosophical Review. Vol. LXI (1952), pp. 168-175; "Professor Chisholm and Empiricism," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLV, No. 19 (1948), pp. 517-524; "Experience and Meaning," in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, eds. Feigl and Sellars, op. cit.,

The next stage in this line of deviation away from the
initial transcendental deduction no longer requires Kantian
terminology. Whereas C. I. Lewis continued to speak of an
a priori, even though it was pragmatically disclosed, Stephen
Pepper, for example, attempts access to what he calls simply
world hypotheses.[1] His assumption that there are varieties
of such hypotheses and that they in some sense are built on
"common sense" understandably precludes the use of the term
"a priori". And instead of by a transcendental deduction,
Pepper attributes the "selection" of the particular hypo-
thesis to such factors as instrumentality and creative

---

pp. 128-145; "The Meaning of Liberty," in Revue Internationale
de Philosophie. Special Number (1948), pp. 14-22; see the re-
view article by Paul Henle, "An Analysis of Knowledge and
Valuation," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLV, No. 19
(1948), pp. 524-532; Everett W. Hall, Philosophical Systems:
A Categorial Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960), pp. 135-137; Arthur Child, "On the Theory of the Cate-
gories," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol.
VII (1946-47), p. 316.

[1] Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1961). Asserting that the to-
tality of individual common senses provides a trustworthy
criterion, Pepper seeks to achieve the refinement of know-
ledge by what he refers to as "multiplicative and struc-
tural corroboration". Such corroboration refers to the
repetition and convergence of evidence through the pene-
tration of knowledge by means of a variety of world hypo-
theses. A "world hypothesis" is one of unrestricted scope
which excludes "no evidence as irrelevant on the ground of
being outside the field under discussion, and which ac-
cept(s) the task of trying to find the bearing of any sort
of evidence upon any other if any such bearing can be found"
(p. 326). The selection of the world hypothesis is based
upon the application of "the root metaphor theory". By
this theory Pepper contends that the traditional schools
of philosophy build themselves upon some seven or eight
distinct ways of constructing unrestricted hypotheses.
Distinguishing "world hypothesis" from any dogmatic claim

58.

ingenuity. Further, "categorial systems" have been extended to include non-Kantian---and even non-Aristotelian---types. And the project can now be carried out without reference to the Kantian language. The permanent significance of that critical philosophy has not only been lost. Through a renunciation of any claim to universal validity, it has also been destroyed.

It is obviously not within the particular province of this essay in theological reflexivity to adjudicate all the factors at issue in each of the foregoing reactions to the Kantian proposals.[1] Its purpose is rather to survey an area

---

to universal validity in its behalf, Pepper sets forth in brief description those total world-views which have been selected on the basis of "a superior degree of adequacy". Individually the hypotheses represent alternative theories, but, taken as corroborative evidence they "supply us with a great deal more information on the subject than any one of them alone could have done" (p. 331).

[1] If it were, it would be this writer's responsibility to call attention to some of the major criticisms of these innovations on the Kantian deduction. C. I. Lewis' interest in the "independence of the conceptual and the empirical" (Mind and the World Order, op. cit., p. ix), for example, makes it difficult for him to pay attention to Kant's theory of empirical concepts. In this regard, George Schrader's statement is appropriate: "Some of Kant's interpreters have, I think, slurred over what seems to be a serious inconsistency. They treat a priori concepts such as quantity, quality, and substance as rules for the combination of empirical concepts, insisting quite properly that apart from such rules there would be no combination to be recognized. They accept Kant's claim that the categories are constitutive of experience. But at the same time they regard empirical concepts as abstracted from empirical intuition. Now it may be the case that empirical concepts are arrived at by a process of abstraction....But is this not flatly inconsistent with his contention that the understanding cannot and does not intuit? It is a virtual dogma with Kant that intellectual intuition

of discussion in order to acquire for theology, as Karl

Barth puts it, "a clear conception of the method of reason

which it also uses in the construction of its tenets."[1]

In this regard, our attention was drawn to the Kantian

analysis via the following basis of relevance: if ordered

reflection requires extra-mental factors and formal elements,

then the specification of such factors and elements would ap-

pear to aid theological self-scrutiny. The ability to denote

such formal ingredients seems necessary to a clarification of

the way in which theological systematisation occurs. And

this ability to specify such factors seems especially re-

quired when one formal system appears in conflict with an-

other.

---

of any sort is impossible. He sought to give an account of
knowledge solely in terms of empirical or sensible intuition
and intellectual synthesis. If...the possibility of intuiting
forms requires that they be antecedently constituted by an
act of understanding, the same thing would appear to hold
for empirical concepts. If I can derive an empirical form
which serves to unify any sensibly given many-fold by ab-
straction from the manifold, then I must already have ef-
fected a unity of the manifold." (George Schrader, "Kant's
Theory of Concepts," op. cit., pp. 265,6.) For a Kantian
'critique' of Lewis, see Lewis W. Beck, "Die Kantkritik von
C. I. Lewis und der Analytischen Schule," in Kant Studien.
Vol. XLV, No. 1 (1953-54), pp. 3-20 (note especially the five
principal criticisms of Lewis, pp. 12-15). Hans Wagner, in
Philosophie und Reflexion (Munchen: Ernst Reinhardt, 1959),
argues that empirical rules and concepts must be regarded as
a priori. See the following studies on Wagner: J. Claude
Piguet, "Philosophie und Reflexion," in Revue de Theologie
et de Philosophie. Vol. X (1960), p. 261; George A. Schrader,
"Philosophy and Reflection: Beyond Phenomenology," in The
Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 81-107.

[1] Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, op. cit., p. 157.

But, certainly, Kant would not have regarded his _Critique_ as an illustration of the way in which extra-mental factors are required by ordered reflection. Indeed, he touches on that issue, but within the context of his more basic one, i.e. the question concerning the possibility of knowledge. Further, if one chooses to read his analysis as providing the rudiments of a conceptual or categorial system, he would not find that it lends itself readily to a disclosure of a basis for comparing and contrasting such systems. The tacit universal validity which Kant ascribes to that system to which the Aristotelian categories are appropriate prevents his examination of the way in which formal elements may operate also in other instances. It is an abiding question whether his perspective and self-consciousness regarding his critical task would admit the possibility of alternative instances. His dependence upon experience would demand that the analysis which he conducts pertain not simply to "system", but, indeed, to knowledge of reality (or, at least of phenomena). And if it is to this that his analysis is directed, then it is difficult to know how the _Critique_ might also aid theological reflexivity.

It is with respect to these considerations that the characteristic responses to the transcendental deduction become intriguing. The modifications of the Kantian analyses which we have traced represent proposals in two directions: 1) to extend the range of that which qualifies as a priori; and 2) to increase the number of valid logical

61.

systems. The reaction of the theological community shares a certain affinity with the primarily philosophical response. Each has contended that even when conditions are established whereby the general lines of the Kantian procedure can be retained, an analysis of the conditions of knowledge need serve neither philosophy nor religion in the way prescribed by the initial Critique. Those who also use the Critique as a means of orientation characteristically seek an additional locus for religious activity and experience. The philosophical response has become a request for the inclusion of alternative conceptual systems. But implicit in both forms of criticism is the pointed suggestion: the product of the question "how is a priori-synthetic knowledge possible?" is not equivalent necessarily to an exhaustive account of the nature of the world.

Kant, it would seem, has closely identified these two. Indeed, the identification is so close that it becomes difficult to tell whether this is an account of how knowledge is possible, or, on the other hand, a self-reflexive description of how experience is read under these particular auspices.[1] Yet, in

---

[1] One might illustrate this contention by noting how Kant treats the matter of "time". Time, with space, are forms of intuition upon which knowledge depend. But Kant is not content merely to indicate that such forms (together with the categories) are antecedent to experience and are conditions of judgment. In addition he gives a certain character or structure to time. By describing time in terms of serial order, Kant implies that at least some of the other ways of depicting time do not correspond to the order determinant of intuited experience. But it would appear that none of those alternative forms of time can

some sense, the critique is possible only by virtue of the

distinction between that which can be known viz-a-viz that

which can be. However, that particular differentiation can

only be achieved by abstraction: the distinction itself is

as complex as that between the formal and the contentual.

Hence, while one can suggest that religion's location within

the organon issues from Kant's account of the nature of

reality and not necessarily from his epistemological prin-

ciples,[1] he must also acknowledge that those principles are

---

be validated or excluded simply by referring to time as a
form of intuition. See Ingeborg Heidemann, Spontaneität und
Zeitlichheit: ein Problem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Köln:
Köln Universitäts-Verlag, 1958); Newton P. Stallknecht, "Time
and Possibility in Kant," in The Heritage of Kant, eds. George
T. Whitney and David F. Bowers (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1939), pp. 87-113; James L. Mursell, "The Critical
Philosophy and the Theory of Types," in The Journal of Philo-
sophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method. Vol. XVI (1919),
pp. 347-352; Werner Gent classifies five standpoints from which
Kant approaches time (i.e. phenomenologically, psychologically,
mathematically and physically, critically, and metaphysically)
in his "Das Zeitproblem in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in
Archiv für Philosophie. Vol. IV, No. 4 (1952), pp. 390-399.

[1] One could argue this point by calling attention to the
striking structural similarities between the perspectives of
Kant, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas. (See Newton P. Stall-
knecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh, The Compass of Philosophy. New
York: Longmans, Green, 1954, chap. III, pp. 50-88.) In each
case a pervasive teleology serves to unify the network of in-
teracting organisms within a functional system. For each the
telos is accessible by motion, and in terms of matter and form.
Two of the instances refer such motion to the self-constitution
of the will. All regard the realization of the totality of or-
ganisms to be dependent upon the proper function of each part
in careful reciprocal balance. The distinctions between the
arts and sciences, for example, or between morality and philo-
sophy, are never nullified or equalized by an absorption into
that which transcends them all. Each provides a basis for re-
taining an ontological disjuncture between the divine and the
human. Kant speaks of this as being of a moral necessity---see
Richard Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung, trans. John E. Smith (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago, 1956). Even Thomas as theologian

characteristic of that particular account. The use of the

Critique for purposes of theological reflexivity rather than

to specify the arrangement among the sorts of things there

are demands a retention of that abstraction.

The ability to retain the distinction between a) the

product of the question concerning the possibility of a priori

synthetic knowledge, and b) the account of the nature of the

totality, depends upon a different kind of evidence from that

---

cannot attribute the disjuncture solely to the effects of sin,
nor as the precise situation to which divine grace stands as
antidote. Rather it appears to issue from the disposition to
associate religion with final causation, i.e. that for which
no sensible intuition is available. Even St. Thomas, who
could undergird that association by means of Christian faith,
found it structurally necessary, nevertheless, to retain the
distinction between reason and revelation. And Aquinas too,
with the necessary refinement, could define "faith" as Kant
has, i.e. as "the moral attitude of reason as to belief in
that which is unattainable by theoretical cognition" (Critique
of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard. New York: Hafner Publishing
Company, p. 324).
　　If it is possible to characterize these examples of the
"organicist" orientation as being formed by responses to cer-
tain questions, convenient distinctions may be appropriate.
It might be suggested that the philosophy of Aristotle replies
to the question "what sorts of things are there?" (See William
A. Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," op. cit., pp. 47-89.) The
Kantian scheme issues from the question "how is knowledge pos-
sible?" The interest of Thomas is an explanatory account, or
a basis of referral, as to "why the-sorts-of-things-there-are
are directed in the way they are." It is apparent that Thomas
thought himself to have associated his Christian interpreta-
tion of the significance and direction of those things with
their Aristotelian classification. In turn, Kant looked upon
his task as being a demonstration of the fittingness of the
a priori-synthetic judgment with respect to the structure
which the Aristotelian account would demand. But Kant could
not demonstrate that same fittingness with respect to Thomas'
explanatory referral. Indeed, it was Kant's contention that
the "how" and the "why" can never be adequately correlated on
each other's grounds. Nor can either be utilized to establish
the other. See articles by Stanislas Breton on some of the

which either Anders Nygren or C. I. Lewis, for examples, would present. The distinction cannot be sustained, that is, on the basis of alternative accounts of the nature of reality. Nygren can make the distinction simply by arguing that the a priori in cognitive judgment is not the only instance of a priori within experience or culture. For him the account of the nature of reality must be expanded or altered to allow such other in-clusions---especially the religious a priori about which he is fundamentally concerned. Lewis could make that distinction simply by contending that the world is open to alternative re-presentations not accounted for---though perhaps neither disal-lowed---by the Kantian deduction. But his elaboration of that contention is also amenable to the criticism that it pays in-sufficient attention to the dependence of concepts upon em-pirical requirements.[1] And Nygren's project involves him in an implicit project of denoting and relating the sorts of things there are. Hence, while both kinds of revision of the original Kantian analysis are directed toward a similar differ-entiation (i.e. between the response to the question concerning the possibility of a priori-synthetic knowledge and an exhaustive account of the nature of things) neither is able to sustain it.

---

relations between Kant and Thomas: "La deduction thomiste des categories," in Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Vol. LX, No. 1 (1962), pp. 5-32; "Image, Scheme, Concept," in Sciences Ecclesiastiques. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1963), pp. 7-20; "Logique Formelle de la theologie deductive," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (1960), pp. 409-440.

[1] See footnote pp. 58-59, above.

By these attempted renovations, neither the extension of the range of the a priori nor the increase of logical systems can escape the original _Critique_'s dependence upon knowledge of data for which empirical evidence is available.

But the distinction between the epistemological principle and the account of the sorts of things there are can be sustained by virtue of the nature of theology. That theology is a formal discipline is itself sufficient reason to 'bracket' Kant's account of the relationship of the a priori to the synthetic from the context from which he chooses his illustrative material. Reality may or may not be known according to the precise manner Kant indicates: theology, nevertheless, can be understood only as an a priori-synthetic procedure.[1] Hence the legacy to be received from the critical philosopher is not his _Weltanschauung_, but the reflexivity he exhibits concerning the way in which categorial patterns are ordered. Theological interest in Kant is to be sustained, therefore, not by discovering possibilities

---

[1] This is to paraphrase Henry Dumery's definition of theology as "the choosing of a philosophy in view of faith's reflection" (_Critique et Religion_. Paris: Sedes, 1957, p. 271). The context for the definition is as follows: "Ainsi, les responsabilités sont mieux définies: la foi transcende tous les systèmes; mais, sans recours à un systeme, elle ne saurait recevoir une expression cohérente au plan intellectuel. Dans ce sens, une théologie, c'est d'abord le choix d'une philosophie en vue de 'reflechir' la foi" (p. 271). Upon this definition Dumery finds his task to be an investigation of the formal structures, categories, and schemes which theology employs in orienting the world with respect to the divine. Since Dumery's project possesses certain resemblances to our own, we submit the following bibliography: "Critique et religion," in _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_. Vol. LIX, No. 4 (1954), pp. 435-453; "Postface a un dialogue," in _Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques_. Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (1960), pp. 89-97;

for a basis of commonality between its data and his world. For
theology the given data (e.g. the events which mark God's redemp-
tive activity) are already included in the affirmations which are
regarded as normative to the Christian faith. Theology is the
coherence exercised with respect to such affirmations by means
of formal procedures. Indeed, because theology has been conducted
as a discipline in which the determinant orders the determinable
by supplying its regulation and unification, theological reflexi-
vity can be modelled according to the Kantian a priori-synthetic
pattern. And, since theology's formal determinants serve to uni-
fy the affirmations which in turn have ordered appropriate data,
the emulation of the critical analysis must occur primarily at
the level of transcendental dialectic rather than judgment. Thus
interest in theological reflexivity is most rightly pointed to
the way in which the relation between logical principles and
interests of reason regulates systematic formalisation. It is
to a more specific development of this positive use of the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason that we shall now turn.

"La Theoretique," in Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. XVI, No.
4 (1961), pp. 349-355; "Aspiration et Reflexion," in Les Etudes
Philosophiques. Vol. IX, No. 4 (1954), pp. 420-427; "Une philo-
sophie de la religion, est-elle possible?" in Actes XIe Congres
International de Philosophie (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1953), pp.
26-34; La Foi n'est pas an Cri (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1957); Philosophie de la Religion. Vols. I, II
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), 1957.

The use of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason to illumine the problem of "unity and diversity" is created by theology's dependence upon the constituents of systematic reflection. To refer to the Kantian critical analysis as a paradigm of the activity which would also disclose the formal structure of theology is to make a suggestion which requires detailed specification. Theology is not simply reflection, but reflection of a particular order with respect to distinctive content. Critical analysis of theological reflection must be patterned not only to retain this particularity and distinctiveness, therefore, but also to disclose them. Simultaneously, the presence of alternative systematic patterns demands that critical analysis be sensitive both to the peculiarities of that order of reflection and to the variety which is manifested within it.

The Kantian critical analysis also exhibits a particularity and distinctiveness. Its author has already traced a line of its possible congruent religious implications, and the general direction of its theological implications is summarized in the chapter "Critique of all Theology". Neither of these statements of implications appears appropriate to the theological problem of "unity and diversity" without extension and/or alteration. And any intended or discovered

propriety would be dissolved were extension and alteration so extreme as to imply destruction of the context of the original analysis.

It has been a primary thesis of this study that the analysis provided by the _Critique_ _of_ _Pure_ _Reason_ becomes fruitful to the clarification of theological "unity and diversity" when a distinction is made between Kant's critique of reflection and its processes (the product of the question concerning the possibility of a priori-synthetic knowledge) and his _Weltanschauung_ (the account presupposed concerning the way in which the totality of things is related). Not only does this distinction allow an application of the _Critique_ to theology, as an instance of reflection; but it also finds it to be a mistake that application should first of all be made to religion, as a member of the organon. But this distinction can only be sustained, we have argued, by an abstraction which is founded upon the nature of reflection. Theological reflection is bracketed[1] simply by the clear intention that our exercise be analysis and not construction. But the opportunity to so distinguish analysis from construction (or critique from _Weltanschauung_) is created

---

[1] The word "bracketing" (or _Einklammerung_) both relates and distinguishes this exercise viz-a-viz the practice of reduction, or parenthesizing, in contemporary Phenomenology. (See Edmund Husserl, _Ideas_, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books, 1962, pp. 158-163.) For Phenomenology "bracketing" refers to "the act by which the general thesis

69.

by the systematic character of the activity which theological reflection represents. According to the dictum that "everything that has its basis in the nature of our powers must be appropriate to, and consistent with, their right employment", it would seem proper to refer theological reflection to what Kant calls the faculty of principles rather than to the faculty of rules. That is, the theological formulations to which the problem of "unity and diversity" is addressed are characterized by their respective systematic renderings of religious affirmations. Those same affirmations have already been utilized, as it were, to order the given data. As reason regulates understanding, as judgments are presupposed in dialectic, so systematisation unifies affirmations in which data have been assumed. By directing abstraction to those systematic presentations, analysis is enabled to examine the manner in which their respective structures are constituted

---

of belief in factual existence characteristic of the natural attitude is inhibited, suspended, bracketed (eingeklammert), or turned off (ausgeschaltet), and which uncovers in transcendental subjectivity the acts which constitute pure phenomena" (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. Volume II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 724). In our exercise, bracketing occurs not in order to isolate the experiential roots of phenomena but to separate the systematic process in reflection from other procedures upon which systematisation depends. Hence, while Husserl can appropriately term the introduction to his project "Cartesian meditations" (see E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Corion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), our analysis must be construed as a commentary upon Kant. The distinction may be approached as follows: while Husserl investigates the most fundamental evidences of conscious experience and is thus pointed to the Lebenswelt, Kant limits his analysis to reflective consciousness' formal structures, principles, rules, categories, and concepts.

without being dependent upon specifying in detail the relationship between those systematic patterns and the data presupposed by the affirmations which they make cohere.

This would direct our thesis to Kant's analysis of the formal systematisation of thought. Here, the same distinction between methodological examination and **Weltanschauung** also requires a differentiation between Kant's account of the way in which systematisation is constituted and the particular system from which he derives his illustrative material. It is our contention that the author of the **Critique of Pure Reason** sets forth a highly illuminating account of systematisation, finding the coherence of reason to depend upon the correlation of **logical principle** and **interest of reason**. At the same time, the significance of his account for our purposes depends largely upon its flexibility in allowing other principles and interests than his own to be identified with systematisation's constituents. But, by referring theology to Kant's account of systematisation, one has refocused attention upon the latter portions of the **Critique**. It is here that the author is concerned directly with the use of transcendental ideas for purposes of systematising concepts and manifesting the connection of parts within a body of knowledge in conformity with a single principle. It appears quite possible that the connection of parts can occur in ways other than Kant traces. Nevertheless, systematisation is

71.

itself such that any of its possible forms will exhibit the interdependence of principle and method. The way in which this occurs and its significance for a clarification of the problem of theological "unity and diversity" will both be specified in the delineation which follows.

Appropriately, Kant's argument in this regard depends upon a distinction between speculative knowledge and knowledge of nature.[1] Whereas the theological use of the _Critique_ can translate this distinction into the context of analysis viz-a-viz _Weltanschauung_, Kant directs the differentiation toward the question of the dependence of knowledge upon that for which experience is available. For Kant speculative knowledge concerns those objects or conceptions of objects which cannot be reached in experience. The knowledge of nature, on the other hand, concerns the objects or predicates of objects which can be given in a possible experience.[2] The distinction has a bearing on the use to which reason can be put in Kant's view of theology:

> Now I maintain that all attempts to employ
> reason in theology in any merely speculative
> manner are altogether fruitless and by their
> very nature null and void, and that the prin-
> ciples of its employment in the study of
> nature do not lead to any theology whatso-
> ever.[3]

---

[1] _Critique of Pure Reason_, op. cit., A 634,5 ff., pp. 526 ff.

[2] _Ibid._, A 635, p. 527.

[3] _Ibid._, A 636, p. 528.

The point is clear: since theology concerns objects or concepts of objects for which no experience is available, knowledge is not possible. Hence there is no means of establishing the objective reality of any such concepts as those, for example, of the supreme being. A priori-synthetic knowledge is possible only in so far as it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience.[1]

But this does not mean for Kant that speculative knowledge of reason is inappropriate to theology. While a speculative employment cannot be used for purposes of demonstration, it is helpful in the task of correcting, making consistent, and removing from empirical admixture those objects or concepts of objects of transcendental proportions.[2] Kant proposes the following task: if on some other basis

> the presupposition of a supreme and all-suffi-
> cient being...established its validity beyond
> all question, it would be of the greatest im-
> portance accurately to determine this concept
> on its transcendental side, as the concept of
> a necessary and supremely real being, to free
> it from whatever...is out of keeping with the
> supreme reality, and at the same time to dis-
> pose of all counter-assertions.[3]

---

[1] "Consequently, the only theology of reason which is possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from them." A 635, p. 528.

[2] A 640, p. 530.

[3] A 640, pp. 530,1.

The presuppositions on which theology depends cannot be established on theoretical grounds. But, once established, such presuppositions are appropriate to clarification and determination by the application of strictly transcendental criteria. The concept of a supreme being, for example, must be determined by such attributes as necessity, infinity, unity, etc., which only transcendental theology can provide.[1] But even this employment of reason is regarded as a corrective, or, as a censor, and must be classified as of limiting, and, hence, negative use.

It is in his discussion of metaphysics (and theology only indirectly) that Kant develops the way in which transcendental ideas function with respect to the systematisation of knowledge. In the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic", Kant states that while all attempts of pure reason "to lead us beyond the field of possible experience are deceptive and without foundation", nevertheless, reason possesses "a natural tendency to transgress these limits".[2] It is Kant's purpose in that regard to disclose the irresistible illusions which the transcendental ideas produce. The thesis can, therefore, be stated as follows: while transcendental ideas never admit a constitutive employment,[3] they are necessary to a unification of understanding. The function of reason is analogous

---

[1] A 642, p. 531.

[2] A 642, p. 532.

[3] A 645, p. 533.

to that of the understanding.

> Just as the understanding unifies the mani-
> fold in the object by means of concepts, so
> reason unifies the manifold of concepts by
> means of ideas, positing a certain collec-
> tive unity as the goal of the activities of
> the understanding...[1]

While this rules out any constitutive employment, a regula-
tive employment of ideas is necessary. Transcendental ideas
direct the understanding to a unity or systematisation which
is regarded as "a goal upon which the routes marked out by
all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersec-
tion".[2] It is when the whole range of knowledge obtained
by the understanding is considered that reason seeks "to ex-
hibit the connection of its parts in conformity with a single
principle".[3]

An idea of unity is thus presupposed by the systemati-
sation which reason seeks to achieve. But Kant is quick to
insure that the idea by which unity is postulated be not un-
derstood as a concept of the object. It is rather the idea
of "the thorough-going unity of such concepts".[4] For know-
ledge as a whole, the unitary idea serves as a rule for the
understanding, a logical principle, as a subjective require-
ment.

---

[1] A 644, p. 533.

[2] A 645, p. 533.

[3] A 646, p. 534.

[4] Ibid.

The systematisation of knowledge is dependent upon
the operation of the principle of unity. Indeed, in order
to insure that the systematic unity of the manifold know-
ledge of understanding is a hypothetical construction, Kant
calls it a logical principle.[1] At the same time, the mani-
fold knowledge of understanding is such that the logical
principle of unity also depends upon the law of specifica-
tion. The twofold interest of reason consists of unity and
specification. Specification has primary association with
"lower concepts"; unity retains fundamental relation with
the "higher concepts".[2] Hence, in the systematisation of
knowledge the principle of unity utilizes the law of speci-
fication. And, just as unity is necessary to specification,

---

[1] Kant considers the possibility that the unity of rea-
son is not purely a hypothetical construction, but is based
upon the objective nature of reality. His typical response
to this possibility comes in terms of the familiar distinc-
tion between regulation and constitution: "in order...to se-
cure an empirical criterion we have no option save to pre-
suppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid
and necessary" (A 651, p. 538). Though the unity of reason
may conform to a supposed objective unity (as a state of af-
fairs), Kant is nevertheless careful to prescribe that the
fact of such objective unity cannot be demonstrated on the
basis of the conditions of knowledge.

[2] Characteristically, Kant refers to the variety of in-
stances of the law of specification as "principles" or "laws"
too. He states that the similarities present in appearances
require that a logical law of genera (difference) be presup-
posed as a transcendental principle. Further, that which dis-
closes diversity within identical genera is the logical prin-
ciple of species. He also refers to this interest as "the
faculty of distinction" and the "principle of discriminative
observation" (A 644, p. 540). Specification can occur at a
variety of levels of generalisation.

so is it dependent upon it. Because of the necessary inter-dependence of higher and lower generality, Kant comes to distinguish three kinds of principles in the systematisation of knowledge: homogeneity, specification, and that by which these two are related, i.e. affinity.[1] Each of these laws or principles rests upon transcendental grounds:

> The remarkable feature of these principles...
> is that they seem to be transcendental, and
> that although they contain mere ideas for the
> guidance of the empirical employment of rea-
> son...they yet possess, as synthetic a priori
> propositions, objective but indeterminate
> validity, and serve as rules for possible
> experience.[2]

Again, so that these principles for "the systematic unity of all employment of the understanding"[3] be not construed as of constitutive employment, Kant chooses to refer to them as "maxims of reason".[4]

---

[1] "Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: 1) through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under higher genera; 2) through a principle of the variety of the homogeneous under lower species; and 3) in order to complete the systematic unity, a further law, that of the affinity of all concepts---a law which prescribes that we proceed from each species to every other by gradual increase of the diversity. These we may entitle the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms. The last named arises from union of the other two, inasmuch as only through the processes of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to the lower species do we obtain the idea of systematic connection in its completeness." A 657,8, p. 542.

[2] A 663, p. 545.

[3] A 665, p. 547.

[4] A 666, p. 547.

77.

Though he does not give evidence of considering whether systematisation may demand still more subtle logical principles (or perhaps even alternative ones) Kant does admit the possibility of variety and discusses its location. The occasion for diversity among "students of nature" is the difference among interests of reason.[1] One may possess a dominant interest in specification, another in unity. Disputes arise from reason's twofold interest. But systematisation can only occur when specification is placed within the interest of unity and homogeneity.

In addition to these maxims of reason, the systematisation of knowledge by reason assigns a regulative function to the transcendental ideas. In latent Cartesian fashion[2] there are three of these: the self, the world, and God. Each possesses a specific systematic function with respect to the disciplines of psychology, cosmology, and theology respectively. The unity of knowledge requires: 1) a connection between the appearances and actions of the self; 2) a ground or condition for the appearances of nature; and 3) a unitary ground, or all-sufficient reason, for the sum of all appearances.[3] In

---

[1] A 654, p. 540, and A 666-668, pp. 555,6.

[2] Strictly speaking, this threefold division is not simply 'latent Cartesianism', however, but can probably be traced back to the tripartition of being into three spheres (theologicals, mathematicals, and physicals) which Aristotle reports as Platonic. See Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953).

[3] "the idea is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to reason

each case a regulative idea is employed for the achievement of systematisation and to serve as a rule for reason's empirical employment.[1] An idea of a self-subsistent being is necessary, for example, to the systematic unity and extension of the world of sense. Such an idea is posited in the interests of unity, indeed, both systematic and purposeful, as "a regulative principle that must underlie all investigation of nature".[2]

The precautions are again sounded. The ideas cannot be used to extend knowledge beyond the limits of experience. Nor do they provide a basis upon which their own reality or existence can be objectively assumed. When purged of all admixture of any attempted constitutive employment, the ideas provide knowledge with a systematic unity to the highest possible degree.[3]

Again, the reader notes that this account of systematisation does not honor the distinction between critique of

---

and so beneficial to the understanding, can be further extended. In short, this transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of experience." A 681,2, p. 557.

[1] A 675, p. 553.

[2] A 669, p. 567.

[3] "We recognize the necessity of the principle, but have no knowledge of the source of its necessity; and in assuming that it has a supreme ground, we do so solely in order to think its universality more determinately..." A 677, p. 554.

reflection and _Weltanschauung_ to which our treatise drew attention above. Hence one could not expect the author of the _Critique_ to have considered the possibility of alternative accounts. Even in the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic"---where it would appear if it were to appear---Kant does not seem to have considered whether the interest of reason, purely as a subjective requirement, might unify concepts in ways distinct from that which the _Critique_ specifies. His purposes seem not to include a recognition of the possibility that the disputes of pure reason are real not because of lack of evidence concerning their resolution but by virtue of the conflict between alternative systematic principles even as regulatively employed. The possibility of alternatives was not of central concern to the author of the _Critique._ It is not an issue which his purposes oblige him to examine. But it is of central concern when one seeks to apply the Kantian analysis of systematic reflection to a comparative endeavor.

.It is therefore for purposes of fitting that analysis for extension into an area for which it was not originally suited that the following illustration is submitted. Kant has stated that there can be no apodictic assurances for the reality of any of the objects corresponding to the three transcendental ideas: self, world, and God. But while apodictic assurances are missing regarding the existence of these, they are equally lacking with respect to their number. God's function with respect to the systematic unity of

knowledge, for example, is not exhaustively described by means of the distinction between regulation and constitution. Indeed, it is a significant methodological fact that God's candidacy as a potential regulative idea is introduced and advanced when the interest of reason is unity and synthesis.[1] Were systematisation of knowledge attempted under other interests, then God might also be assigned another role. Were affinity the dominant interest, for example, then God might be called upon to insure connections within the totality rather than to comprehend difference: God's function in that case would more appropriately resemble a regulative agent than it would a principle of unification.[2] When the interest is further altered, another idea might be chosen as the dominant principle. Similarly, when the interest of reason is neither homogeneity or affinity, an idea such as God may not be employed at all. And with alternations with respect to the regulative function of God would occur variations in the location, status, and purpose of the world.

---

[1] This, a paraphrase of Kant's own account in his "Critique of all Theology", would seem to illumine the fittingness some formal systems possess for affirming the divine reality. Thomas Aquinas' statement following each of the demonstrations---"and this everyone understands to be God" (Summa Theologica I, Q. 2, Art. 3)---is appropriate within the architectonic which, under the interest of unity or completeness, leads reason to such a systematic or unifying principle.

[2] Newton P. Stallknecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh, in The Compass of Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954), pp. 208-214, discuss the place and interpretation of

81.

Kant comes closest to dealing with such problems in Part Two of the _Critique of Pure Reason_, i.e. in the section "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method".[1] In connection with his discussion of method (or "the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason"[2]) he considers the following issues: a) philosophical disputes and antitheses; b) reason's internal conflicts; c) possible methods; and d) the polemical employment of the discipline of pure reason. The complete system of pure reason is that which coordinates the various faculties and respective methods of knowledge. The method of mathematics, for example, is distinguished from the method of philosophical knowledge: the latter is "knowledge gained by reason from concepts" and the former is "gained by reason from the construction of concepts".[3] In mathematics reason is employed in a discursive manner; in the construction of concepts reason is intuitively employed.[4] The perennial "babel of tongues" issues in large

---

God in three characteristic philosophical orientations. From this account one might infer that in those patterns whose dominant interest is _affinity_ between component parts God may be assigned the role of causing or insuring continuity. This, in rudimentary form, may be the structural pattern which, when refined, conceives God to function as "the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends" (Alfred North Whitehead, _Process and Reality_. New York: Macmillan, 1929, p. 345).

[1] _Critique_, _op. cit._, A 707-856, B 735-879, pp. 573-669.

[2] A 708, p. 573.

[3] A 713, p. 577.

[4] A 719, pp. 580,1.

part from a lack of discipline, disobedience of rules, or from an illegitimate application of a method used properly in one field to subject matter for which it is not suited. Thus the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" continues one of the chief purposes of the Critique: "to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets its limits."[1]

In this respect Kant's distinction between philosophical and mathematical knowledge is crucial. Respectively, these two methods represent reason's twofold employment.[2] Yet, because these "two modes of employment resemble each other in the universality and a priori origin of their knowledge",[3] attempts have been made to apply the method of mathematics toward the problems which properly belong to philosophy. The distinction is that philosophical knowledge considers the particular in the universal while mathematical knowledge considers the universal in particulars. But the difference is founded on the fundamental distinction that philosophy's discursive knowledge is gained from concepts while the knowledge which depends upon intuition derives from the construction of concepts. When the attempt is made to illumine "the precarious ground of pure and even transcendental concepts"[4] by a method which depends upon

---

[1] A 735, p. 591.

[2] A 719, p. 581, and A 723, p. 583.

[3] A 723, p. 583.

[4] A 725, p. 585.

83.

sensibility, then it becomes Kant's repeated duty

> to cut away the last anchor of these fantastic
> hopes, that is, to show that the pursuit of
> the mathematical method cannot be of the least
> advantage in this kind of knowledge (unless it
> be in exhibiting more plainly the limitations
> of the method).[1]

This specification of the range and limits of the two-fold employment of reason does not serve Kant only in restricting the mathematical method from philosophical pursuits. There is also the more positive aspect that in this way each step of reason is presented "in the clearest light."[2] It is on this basis that Kant's treatment of method is directed to an analysis of systematisation.[3] Indeed, the third chapter of this section is entitled "The Architectonic of Pure Reason", and is given to a discussion of the art of constructing systems. Kant states, for example, that a system is that which unifies "the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea".[4] He also suggests that this idea requires a schema in order to organize the system's constitutive parts.[5] And philosophy becomes "the system of all philosophical knowledge".[6]

---

[1] A 726, p. 585.

[2] A 737, p. 592.

[3] See A 738, p. 592.

[4] A 832, p. 653.

[5] A 833, p. 654.

[6] A 838, p. 657.

84.

But it becomes evident that the form of systematisation with which the architectonic deals is the coherence rendered to the various modes of knowledge. Kant does not specifically refer this methodological account of systematisation to his earlier chapter wherein the natural dialectic of reason was also conceived to depend upon systematic coherence. Yet it is apparent that the two accounts follow the same general lines. Both require a _technique_ (by means of an idea, principle, or law) by which the particular can be referred to the universal, and a _schema_ by which the interrelatedness of parts can be established. For Kant the movement from particularity to universality in both cases parallels the series of gradations between the sensibly conditioned and the transcendental. Neither attempts to trace the successive distinctions can be achieved apart from an exposition of the way in which the determinant's influence upon the determinable serves also to delimit and circumscribe appropriate ranges of operation. Hence Kant emphasizes that neither philosophy (on the side of knowledge) nor the regulative ideas (as required by the natural dialectic of reason) are enabled to ascribe objective reality to the _loci of unification_ upon which the modes of knowledge and the scale of being both depend.[1]

---

[1] Kant's notion of "totality" and "system" are discussed in Robert R. Ehman, "The Ideas of Reason," in _The Review of Metaphysics._ Vol. XV, No. 2 (1961), pp. 225-235.

When one submits these two accounts of systematisation
to the methodological analysis which our treatise seeks to
achieve it appears significant that both manifest or imply
the correlation of principle and interest. Kant has stated
that reason is itself, subjectively, a system which supplies
thought with principles of unity. He has also made it evi-
dent that unity also requires specification or diversity,
that specification requires unity or homogeneity, and that
unity and specification together demand affinity, since sys-
tematisation depends upon all three. When order is achieved
by means of the operation of determinants upon determinables,
then it would seem that systematisation can occur in no other
way: unity, specificity, affinity---each is required. But
this would not imply that systematisation must always be
directed to what Kant selects as his dominant technical in-
terest. Specificity may not always be so subordinate to,
or subsumed within, the interest in homogeneity. Indeed,
within systematisation a variety of interrelations are pos-
sible. Diversity may not always be sought in the interest
of unity, for example, but systematisation would imply that
that search be advanced under the auspices of coherent order.
While, on occasion, it is within the interest of reason to
unify or to specify, it might also be its function to demon-
strate differentia or to discriminate. Each of these could
become alternative bases of systematisation, the characteris-
tics of which would depend upon that which is regarded as

86.

its dominant interest.

Given the bipolarity upon which the distinction between determinant and determinable depends, this would suggest that systematisation implies the relationship between that which is regarded as _constant_ and that which is regarded as _variable_. The constant serves as the point of orientation to which the variable is referred. This would also attest that the characteristic marks of _system_ can be discerned by means of the way in which such terms as _all_, _nothing_, _everything_, etc., function to relate variables to constants.[1] Not only does the relation between unity and difference give occasion for a variety of focal points within that which is regarded as constant and variable; it also implies that the relationship

------

[1] See Gilbert Ryle, _Dilemmas_ (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 112. In his analysis of Plato's dialogue "Parmenides" Ryle describes such concepts as unity, manifoldness, similarity, changelessness, etc., as follows: "...these concepts or most of them, and several others, differ from most ordinary concepts not just in level of generality but in type. They are formal concepts, not peculiar to any special subject matter, but integral to all subject matter. They belong, so to speak, not to this or that special vocabulary of knowledge, but to its general syntax..../They/ have a different sort of logical behavior from most ordinary concepts...because they are not terms in the proposition which we think but the forms of the combination of those elements into propositions" (p. 146). Because such concepts fulfill this function, Ryle chooses to call them "syncategorematic" (p. 312). Gilbert Ryle, "Plato's 'Parmenides'," in _Mind_. Vol. XLVIII, No. 190 (1939), pp. 129-151, and No. 191 (1939), pp. 302-325.

Willard Van Orman Quine, in _From a Logical Point of View_ (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 13, writes: "The variables of quantification, 'something', 'nothing', 'everything', range over our whole ontology, whatever it may be; and we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presupposition has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true."

itself is in some sense regulative of the appropriate systematic order.

> ...relations possess properties or character-
> istics which determine, given any relation,
> what terms can stand in that relation and,
> given any collection of terms, what relations
> subsist between the terms.[1]

Systematisation in thought implies the operation of relata and referents with their appropriate properties and tendencies.

But it is possible to give a more precise account. No matter to what extent their identification may allow alternation, Kant has made it clear that *principles* and *interests* of reason (and in mutual or reciprocal influence) are required by systematisation.[2] In any such context, regulative "ideas"

---

[1] George M. Van Sant, "A Proposed Property of Relations," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LVI, No. 1 (1959), p. 26.

[2] It is appropriate to trace this occasion for comparative analyses of conceptual systems to some of its recent or current developments. (See the excellent review by Richard Rorty, "Recent Metaphilosophy," in Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XV, No. 2, 1961, pp. 299-318.) A veritable pioneer in such endeavors is Professor Richard P. McKeon of the University of Chicago. In his analyses of "Method and Metaphysics" Professor McKeon refers both the variation in method and the starting point for orientation in reflection to the factors which can be distinguished in the process of knowing: a) the knower, or the person instigating the process; b) knowledge, or the process through which thought goes; c) the knowable, or the possibilities underlying the concrete in the moment of knowing; and d) the known, the end to be achieved. Depending upon which of these is used as the point of focus (as the point to which or from which reflection is directed) variation in the patterns of thought can be charted. In his article "Philosophy and Method," in The

88.

will be called upon to serve the purposes of systematisation.

But with principles, interests, and techniques of regulation,

systematisation need not occur in exactly the manner Kant con-

ceives of it in the Critique.   Principles and interests can

be identified in other ways, for example, as can whatever is

utilized as the means of coherence. Descartes called upon

Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLVIII, No. 22 (1951), pp. 653-682,
McKeon distinguishes between three methods and three principles
which have been operative in western philosophical reflection.
He chooses to call the three principles: 1) comprehensive; 2)
simple; and 3) reflexive. And his methods are listed as 1) the
dialectical method; 2) the logistic method; and 3) the method
of inquiry. A comprehensive principle, for example, is "sought
by transcending and reconciling differences, conflicts, and
contradictions", the simple "by decomposing wholes into indi-
visible elements and simple relations", and the reflexive "by
analyzing a problem or a subject into a whole sufficiently homo-
geneous and independent to permit solution of the problem or
statement of the subject" (pp. 665-7). The methods involve
assimilation, discrimination or specification, and resolution.
These various processes differ so radically "that they completely
transform the contents, forms, and purposes of philosophy. Yet
they are so closely related that the same statements can be re-
peated and seem to refer to the same subject-matter and problems
and yet have meanings so different in dialectic, in logistic,
and in inquiry that a vast portion of philosophical literature
is devoted to pointing out the absurdities which no one could
fail to recognize in what philosophers have said" (pp. 664,5).
While there is a certain propriety or fittingness in the way in
which principles and methods correlate with each other---such
that comprehensive principles often serve the interests of
dialectical methods---there are a variety of combinations pos-
sible. Noting that the distinctive methods take on peculiar
forms and multiple uses from their association with principles,
McKeon writes: "Comprehensive, simple, or reflexive principles
may be employed in any of the methods or may be differently
employed in any one method, and the interrelations among philo-
sophies lead later philosophers to borrow, transform, and in-
vert principles and to combine methods and principles in what
would have been, in their earlier uses, heterogeneous and in-
compatible combinations" (pp. 668,9).
      A fuller exposition of the relations between methods and
principles, and a description of the use to which such com-
parative analysis can be put, is included in McKeon's article

identical "ideas" for purposes of regulation, for example,

but under a strikingly different "interest of reason". In

the Cartesian example it would appear that <u>self</u>, <u>world</u>, and

<u>God</u> become components of a system whose dominant intention

is specificity. Here the basis of coherence is discovered

"Principles and Consequences," in <u>The Journal of Philosophy</u>. Vol. LVI, No. 9 (1959), pp. 385-401. Here McKeon argues that a discussion of how principles are discovered and used can be separated from controversies concerning how principles can be stated and justified. Thus he reaffirms a contention made explicit in others of his writings, i.e. that the discovery of methods and principles can be put to irenic utility by clarifying the basis of philosophical disputes. "Scrutiny of principles is required if philosophy is to be more than a correction of linguistic errors committed in the statement of intellectual and moral revolutions or the statement of the rules of a game paralleling the serious business of science and morality. It focuses on different aspects of the contemporary situation. It recognizes that in the significant clash of opposed hypotheses the verification of one and the establishment of a system which elaborates its implications is not the end of scientific inquiry, but that the opposed principles may be adapted to the new knowledge and may provide hypotheses for further inquiry..." (p. 401).

These kinds of considerations are developed also in the following books and articles by Richard P. McKeon: <u>Thought, Action, and Passion</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); "Dialogue and Controversy in Philosophy," in <u>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</u>. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1956), pp. 143-163; "Introduction: The Meanings of Society and the Relations among Traditions of Thought," in <u>Revue Internationale de Philosophie</u>. Vol. XV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 3-16; "Philosophie et Culture," in <u>Les Etudes Philosophiques</u>. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1952), pp. 75-95; "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," in <u>Ethics</u>. Vol. LIV, No. 4 (1944), pp. 235-262; "The Development and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility," in <u>Revue Internationale de Philosophie</u>. Vol. XI, No. 1 (1957), pp. 3-32; "Aristotle's Conception of the Development and the Nature of Scientific Method," in <u>Journal of the History of Ideas</u>. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1947), pp. 3-44.

On this general topic, see Everett W. Hall, <u>Philosophical Systems: A Categorial Analysis</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Henry W. Johnstone, "Argumentations and Inconsistency," in <u>Revue Internationale de Philosophie</u>.

by means of an effort to isolate and establish the select number of "indubitables" upon which the reality of all else depends. Yet these "indubitables" are not made the ingredients of still higher syntheses, nor is their sum necessarily equivalent to the totality of things. This is not the kind of movement which refers species to larger or more comprehensive genera. For Descartes, on the contrary, the "indubitables" remain distinct; their individual realities are affirmed; and yet there is a basis of conceptual order. A careful analysis would disclose the use of both logical principles and interests of reason. Though the identification of neither of these is identical to that by which the Kantian account is constituted, though "God", "self", and "world" regulate in alternative ways, nevertheless the characteristics of systematic order are evident. Should principles and interests be discovered as variable, the fact of order is necessary, and, hence, invariable to coherent reflection. With coherent order, interests and principles are implied. The logical principle is necessary to locate the point of

---

Vol. XV, No. 4 (1961), pp. 353-365; George K. Plochmann, "A Theory of Systems: A Rough Sketch," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 45-59; George K. Plochmann, "Metaphysical Truths and the Diversity of Systems," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 51-66; Charles Perelman, "Opinions et verite," in Les Études Philosophiques. Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1959), pp. 131-138; Charles Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Traite de L'Argumentation (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958); Isabel C. Hungerland, "Contextual Implications," in Inquiry. Vol. III, No. 4 (1960), pp. 211-258; Richard Rorty, "Realism, Categories, and the 'Linguistic Turn'," in International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. II, No. 2 (1962), pp. 307-322.

orientation; it is that which fixes the vantage point or referent. The interest of reason is necessary to establish the kind of relationship which is to exist between referent and relata, determinant and determinable, unity and differentia, the principle of orientation and that which it orders. The interest indicates the type of concern or preoccupation for which the system is intended. The principle signifies the project's basis of stability, the locus of its origin, direction, and constant reference. And by some technique of affinity, principle and interest can be seen to belong together according to the kind of systematisation which is intended. The variety among kinds of systems would appear to accompany the possibility to utilize various principles, under divergent interests, for establishing reflective order. But, by virtue of the nature of reflection, such possibilities and their modifications are not infinite in number,[1] but are limited by the combinations which systematisation allows when the principle of orientation serves as determinant within a bipolar relationship.

The problem of theological "unity and diversity" concerns the location, and, if possible, the negotiation of the variety

---

[1] George K. Plochmann's statement is appropriate here: "it should be easy now to show that philosophies are not actually infinite in number, not because we reckon that only finite numbers of men have created systems...but because we know that each proposition cannot have an infinity of contradictories or contraries; and internal consistency, in its strenuous demands,

92.

and uniformity of thought which the Christian tradition mani-
fests. The particular aspect of that problem to which this
thesis is addressed concerns the variety which is evident in
the classic (or characteristic) systematic presentations of
the Christian faith. Such presentations appear to be distinct
from other kinds of religious expression by virtue of their
dependence---if only implicitly---upon formal techniques. Such
characteristics as are necessary to formalisation, however, pro-
vide the occasion by which variability can be assessed. Hence,
it would appear that this issue might be clarified were a Kan-
tian-modelled reflexivity with respect to systematic order also
tailored to apply to those representative patterns of Christian
thought. The primary obstacle in this undertaking, as was noted,
concerns the absence of a basis whereby the Kantian critique can
be put to serve comparative analysis. The _Critique_ _of_ _Pure_ _Rea-_
son was not written for that purpose, nor does the repetition
and application of its examination to theological data neces-
sarily result in that achievement.

The opportunity is present to overcome that difficulty
by one of two tempting but foreshortened procedures. One can
seek to understand the various theological systems within a
prior classification of types. This would be a characteristic
maneuver of the many attempts to refer theological reflection

_____

would pare off most permutations and combinations." George
K. Plochmann, "Metaphysical Truths and the Diversity of Sys-
tems," _op._ _cit._, p. 65.

to a presumed philosophical background. One could proceed by attempting to specify the relationship between Thomas and Aristotle, Tertullian and the Stoics, or Origen and Augustine to various blends of Platonism, for examples.[1] Or, the procedure can be reversed, and types can be located as being created by the several instances. The problems are evident whichever lead is taken. The movement from type to instance implies some "decision in advance" concerning the possibilities that can exist, since a list of classifiable alternatives must comprise the types to which the variety is assumed to fit. But such a procedure can provide no guarantee that the peculiarities of the theological tradition will ever be retained, recognized, or manifested. A strong probability exists---as developed out of this procedure's dominant disposition---that instances will be controlled by the classification of types. To allow the instances the ability to create the types, on the other hand, is to ascribe a power to them which they are incapable of possessing. Just as the fitting of religious affirmations to and for the theological system implies their transposition into a new mode of expression, so too is more demanded by a comparative examination of such new expressions than either the affirmations or the systems can provide. The procedure must be more complex than either of the type-instance alternatives are, and yet it must retain the respective individual sensitivities of each.

---

[1] These specific examples are taken from Jean Danielou's article, "Unite et pluralite de la pensee chretienne," op. cit.

94.

It is a contention of this thesis that the prescribed use of a _concept_ which disposes reflection into one or another systematic pattern can provide more fundamental access to the locus of structural unity and variety than is available to either combination of the type-instance basis of comparison. As a technique for use in comparative analysis such a concept cannot simply replace "type" or "instance" but must instead provide a basis for their correlation. The concept must retain the centrality and formative character which Anders Nygren ascribed to his 'agape-motif', i.e. that without it the theological pattern (in some sense) would not be what it is. But the validity of that ascription must issue from the concept's formal (and not necessarily kerygmatic) quality. That is, the concept itself is not identifiable with the normative or formative structure. Nor is it able to discern the locus of "unity and diversity" within a variety of patterns unless it provides access to their respective constituents of formal order. The chosen concept must be such that its own ordered expression will provoke a choice between ways of formalizing the relation between the determinant and the determinable in systematic instances. It should possess such provocative or

---

To relate theological formulations to philosophical patterns in this way seems to beg the critical and crucial question. If both parties to comparison can be shown to depend upon the same philosophic source, then a basis has been established by which limited analysis can proceed some distance. If the two parties to comparison can be shown to depend upon two different philosophic sources, then even greater distance has been traversed. But ultimately the analyst must come to terms with the distinguishing marks of whatever philosophical bases are so used.

95.

dispositional ability that an analysis of its presence within such instances will be tantamount to a recognition of the respective principles and interests which are necessary to provide its formulation. Because of this capacity, the concept possesses a kind of critical "regulative" function in the reflexive analysis of systematic reflection.

Kant seems to suggest such a concept which might be able to serve in this capacity. In his <u>Prolegomena</u> <u>to</u> <u>Any</u> <u>Future</u> <u>Metaphysics</u>, he refers to it as that "which is the problem of metaphysics".[1] With "God" and "immortality" it is the topic to which metaphysics is addressed.[2] It is that problem to which Kant turns---or returns!---at the close of his <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Pure</u> <u>Reason</u>. As the subject of the <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Practical</u> <u>Reason</u>, it provides a kind of bridge between critical analysis and morality or religion. Yet it is the one problem which comes neither within the provinces of pure or practical

---

[1] Immanuel Kant, <u>Prolegomena</u> <u>to</u> <u>Any</u> <u>Future</u> <u>Metaphysics</u>, trans. Lewis W. Beck (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1951), p. 92 n.

[2] Kant, <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Pure</u> <u>Reason</u>, op. cit., A 799, p. 631, and A 801, p. 632. "The ultimate aim to which the speculation of reason in its transcendental employment is directed concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. In respect of all three the merely speculative interest of reason is very small" (p. 631). "The whole equipment of reason, in the discipline which may be entitled pure philosophy, is in fact determined with a view to the three above-mentioned problems. These, however, themselves in turn refer us yet further, namely, to the problem what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world" (p. 632).

96.

reason.[1] It pertains to the distinction between <u>what</u> <u>is</u> and <u>what</u> <u>ought</u> <u>to</u> <u>be.</u> It refers to one of the two types of causality which operate in human existence.[2] It is the concept, the property, the problem, the principle, and the law which Kant calls "freedom".

For Kant, freedom is the property by which the will can act independently of external causes. It is the causality of rationality as distinct from natural necessity.[3] As the possibility of self-determination, freedom is the presupposition of moral or responsible action, "the faculty of starting an event spontaneously".[4] In that respect freedom refers to that which is not conditioned by the determining causes of the sensible world. But Kant also ascribes to the spontaneity of will the ability to create a new law as an ideal which the

---

[1] "Transcendental freedom is thus, as it would seem, contrary to the law of nature, and therefore to all possible experience; and so remains a problem. But this problem does not come within the province of reason in its practical employment .../It is/ a matter for speculative knowledge only, and when we are dealing with the practical, we can leave it aside as being an issue with which we have no concern." <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Pure Reason</u>, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, A 803,4, p. 632.

[2] See <u>Critique</u> <u>of</u> <u>Pure</u> <u>Reason</u>, <u>ibid.</u>, A 632, p. 526, e.g.

[3] "...freedom would be that property of this causality by which it can be effective independently of foreign causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the property of the causality of all irrational beings by which they are determined in their activity by the influence of foreign causes." Immanuel Kant, <u>Foundations</u> <u>of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Metaphysics</u> <u>of</u> <u>Morals</u>, trans. Lewis W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 64.

[4] Kant, <u>Prolegomena</u>, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, p. 92.

moral subject seeks to legislate. Freedom, in this positive sense, "is by no means lawless even though it is not a property of the will according to laws of nature".[1] As distinct from the heteronomy of natural causality, freedom of the will is autonomous: the will is a law to itself.[2] On this positive side, freedom is self-legislation.[3]

The significance of this abbreviated account of the Kantian doctrine of freedom (at least for purposes of this study) is the clarity it affords that concepts such as "unconditioned" and "determined" cannot be conceived apart from a specification of their counterparts. As Lewis W. Beck suggests, for Kant

---

[1] Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., p. 65.

[2] For a discussion of the relation of heteronomy and autonomy, especially with respect to categorical obligation as supported by socially-anchored law, see George A. Schrader, "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral Imperatives," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LX, No. 3 (1963), pp. 65-77.

[3] Kant's fuller treatment of freedom is presented in his Critique of Practical Reason, and in his Lectures on Ethics (trans. Louis Infield. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), in addition to the works already cited. See also W. T. Jones, Morality and Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (London: Oxford University Press, 1940); Rupert Sigl, Kants Kulturbegriff: Ein Beitrag zur Lösung der Natur-Freiheitsproblematik (Druck: Attenkofer Straubing, 1954); A. R. C. Duncan, Practical Reason and Morality: A Study of Immanuel Kant's Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals' (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957); H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 176-208; Lewis White Beck, "Apodictic Imperatives," in Kant Studien. Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (1957), pp. 7-24; John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," in Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,

"freedom and unconditional law reciprocally imply each other".[1]
Autonomy cannot be established, for example, without specifying
its range as over against that wherein dependence rules. Free-
dom, while it does not always necessarily contrast with nature,
nevertheless requires an explication of order or law. Freedom
may imply conformity to law. It may be equivalent to law. It
may be defined as the antithesis of the law-like. Freedom and
law may be regarded as aspects of something more comprehensive
than either of these individually.[2] But in any case freedom
cannot be conceptually fixed without prompting a choice of
variables and constituents by which coherent reflection is
ordered.

This conceptual capacity would not alone fit freedom as
the focus upon which a theological comparative analysis might

---

op. cit., (introduction), pp. lxxxvi-xciv; Gaston Mauchaussat,
La Liberte Spirituelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1959), pp. 167-185; Robert E. Gahringer, "The Metaphysical As-
pect of Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Ethics. Vol. XLIV (1954),
pp. 277-291; also see extensive German bibliography, pp. 107-
110, as well as the excellent analysis of Fritz Böversen, Die
Idee der Freiheit in der Philosophie Kants, inaugural disser-
tation (Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karl-Universität, 1962).

[1] Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Rea-
son, op. cit., p. 197.

[2] The possibility that freedom and law may point to some-
thing more comprehensive seems entertained in Kant's question
as to whether freedom which prescribes laws may not be nature
again with respect "to higher and more remote causes". Critique
of Pure Reason, op. cit., A 803, p. 634. This possibility is
also discussed in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op.
cit., p. 66 ff.

be conducted. Its necessary added qualification is its apparent perennial interest to those theologians who have fashioned systems. Being the subject of major treatises of representative theological spokesmen across the ages, freedom possesses an almost unique ability to recapture and sustain dominant attention. In addition, it comes bound up with a complex of controversial and crucial topics (law, providence, omniscience, omnipotence, grace, nature, grace-nature, et al) concerning which much of theological discussion and argumentation has dealt. Thus a critical examination of freedom should achieve at least two methodological purposes: 1) it should aid in disclosing the principle and interest which are implicit to a particular theological orientation; 2) it should provide some principled access to the orientation's interpretative tendencies with respect to a variety of concepts and issues.

The following analysis utilizes three illustrative cases. In order of their presentation, these are: Irenaeus' Adversus Haereses, Martin Luther's Tractatus de Libertate Christiani, and Thomas Aquinas' "De Voluntario et Involuntario" from his Summa Theologica. These three have been selected by virtue of their ability to span something over a millenium of Christian theological history. Their representative qualities are also evident through their association with the three eras to which major divisions in Christendom still point. But the three essays have been selected

not only because of their representational qualifications. Beyond that, each one is significant for an analysis of theological systematisation, as it were, in his own right. Irenaeus stands as one of the first to formulate what might be called a "Christian theological system". Luther is treated because of the questions which have been raised as to whether he is the recipient of the usual influences of the hellenizing process. Thomas comprises a natural inclusion by virtue of his self-conscious effort to synthesize the religious and the philosophical in the theological summary which he presents. Each essay is directed in a fundamental way toward formulating a position on the question of human freedom.[1]

Hence, what began as an attempt to distinguish a positive form of response to Kant's <u>Critique</u> which might provide the occasion for an exercise in theological reflexivity is now also being equipped to treat variant cases. Noting that theological systematisation is the locus and source of the problem of "unity and diversity", this project has endeavored to fashion a technique by which the regulative characteristics of systematic structures might be discerned. It has also sought---and on the basis of the nature of theological reflection---to isolate Kant's

---

[1] In placing its treatment of Luther between that of Irenaeus and Thomas, our study is conscious of breaking chronological order. This is merely an aid (albeit a literary one) in illustrating the diversity which exists between the three accounts. As contrasted both with the account whose interest is to maintain continuity and with that one which seeks the peculiar within the totality, Luther reflects an interest in the particular, the simple, the uncomplex.

101.

account of formal systematisation from strict dependence upon his _Weltanschauung_, and to extend it for comparative methodo- logical purposes. It has not tried to effect this extension, however, by constructing a classification of possible types of formal principles, interests, and their interrelations. Nor has it attempted to create such types out of the instances which appear relevant. Instead, it has nurtured the hope that a concept whose articulation disposes reflection into patterns of order will itself serve as access to the _principles_ and _in- terests_ by which given patterns are characterized. This is both an extension of a deliberate methodological use of the _Critique_, and a refinement whose theological sensitivities are amenable to further cultivation through examination of the ap- propriate literature. The program of comparative theological reflexivity thus becomes dependent upon the distinctive lan- guage which theologians through the ages have found it neces- sary to speak. Its task is to teach a method of listening to the way in which that language (and those languages) is for- mally patterned.

PART TWO

Three Essays on Human Freedom

I

> The real significance of Irenaeus is that it
> is in his writings that we find for the first
> time an organized Christian front, a church
> that can be regarded as catholic, and a de-
> tailed and specific concern to draw up and
> define just what one may and may not believe.
> In a word, in Irenaeus we find the first sys-
> tematic theologian which the new movement had
> produced...[1]

Methodologically, the exposition of freedom which can
be traced through the pages of Irenaeus' Adversus Haereses
is characterized by its dominant interest in unity and con-
tinuity. From the very beginning, Irenaeus makes it evident
that his controlling interest is the comprehension of dif-
ference within synthesis. The difference which is to be
ordered is of two fundamental kinds. There is the chrono-
logical distinction between past, present, and future; and
there is the difference in kind between Creator and created
order. The former can be described by means of segments upon
a temporal line. The latter refers to a qualitative distinc-
tion between two substantial realms. But both sides of each
kind of diversity are to be sustained. And yet, under the

---

[1] Morton S. Enslin, "Irenaeus: Mostly Prolegomena," in
Harvard Theological Review. Vol. XL, No. 3 (1947), p. 144.

interest in continuity, successive ages and grades of being
can only be sustained by transforming them into distinct
modalities within one and the same comprehensive process.
A comprehensive principle is called upon to insure diver-
gence without destroying its own primary characteristic.
Temporal succession is incorporated within one and the same
unitary process. The boundary between Creator and creature
is regulated by a pattern which affirms that reality itself
is one. The process and the pattern are brought together
by the correlation of temporal sequence and Creator-creature
continuity. And freedom is to be identified with the workings
of this normative process, pattern, or plan which establishes
order by sustaining differences through comprehension.

The full treatment of freedom in Books III and IV of the
Adversus Haereses is introduced in Books I and II by an arduous
summary of the positions of those Gnostic-oriented thinkers
whose errors Irenaeus' essay seeks to disclose. It is neces-
sary to approach the project in this way, the author states,
because of the elusiveness of false doctrine. Erroneous
teaching is nevertheless often alluring and "craftily decked
out in an attractive dress".[1] By outward form alone it can

----

[1] Irenaeus of Lyons, Detection and Overthrow of the Pre-
tended but False Gnosis /usually and herein called Adversus
Haereses/, trans. A. Roberts and W. H. Rambaut, in The Ante-
Nicene Christian Library. Vol. I, "The Apostolic Fathers,
with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus" (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
W. B. Eerdmans, reprint of 1885 edition), Book I, chapter 1,
p. 315. Note: since this treatise utilizes both the Greek

105.

readily be made to appear "more true than the truth itself".[1]
And yet criteria (both internal and external) can be estab-
lished by which truth and illusion become clearly distin-
guishable.

Book I consists of a detailed description of the vision
of reality of those various Gnostic-oriented sects whom the
Bishop of Lyons (during the latter quarter of the second cen-
tury) regarded as formidable opponents of the Christian faith.
He names his adversaries as "the disciples of Ptolemy" who
stem from the teachings of Valentine.[2] The task of unmasking

---

and Latin text in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, Sancti Ire-
naei Contra Haereses. Vol. VII, 1-2, Paris, 1857, and the Eng-
lish translation of Roberts and Rambaut, all references and
citations will be made according to Massuet's divisions in-
stead of those of W. W. Harvey. Where appropriate we shall
include both the English translation and the Latin text; page
numbers will refer to the English with those of the Latin placed
in parentheses. On the textual problem, see Johannes Quasten,
Patrology, Vol. I, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature (West-
minster: Newman Press, 1962), p. 290 ff; and Gustaf Wingren,
Man and the Incarnation, trans. Ross Mackenzie (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1959), pp. ix-xi.

[1] Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses (hereafter referred to as
A. h.), Bk. I, Praef., p. 315.

[2] A. h., Bk. I, Praef., p. 316. Many recent attempts have
been made to identify these groups precisely, and to amplify the
information which Irenaeus supplies. G. Quispel, for example,
in "The Original Doctrine of Valentine," in Vigiliae Chris-
tianae. Vol. I, No. 1 (1947), pp. 43-73, traces the develop-
ment of Valentinianism into two dominant schools: the Italic
school (represented by Ptolemy and Heracleon); and the Orien-
tal school (represented chiefly by Theodotus). Heracleon is
noted for his commentary on the Fourth Gospel which even
Origen viewed with respect. A certain Mark also belongs
as a disciple of Valentine on the Italic side, and is known
for his translation of his master's mysticism into what Quis-
pel calls "the cryptic language of gematric occultism" (p.46).
Quispel also states that Ptolemy had an attitude of recon-
ciliation toward Christianity not found to the same degree

106.

has begun. The Gnostic world is characterized by a genesis

---

in his more visionary, mystic-minded teacher. R. A. Markus, in "Pleroma and Fulfillment. The Significance of History in St. Irenaeus' Opposition to Gnosticism," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1954), pp. 193-224, suggests that the form of Gnosticism which the emanationist scheme Irenaeus outlines represents is that of Ptolemy, a Roman disciple of Valentine. (On this point see also F. Sagnard, La Gnose Valentinienne et le Temoignage de Saint Irenee. Paris: 1947.) Markus agrees with Quispel that Ptolemy departed from his master "by moulding his language with a view to being as inoffensive to Christian ears as possible" (p. 210). This would make it vitally important that the Christian theologian engage in the project of establishing clear distinctions between the true and the erroneous. The same kind of departure must also be attributed to the disciples of Basilides with respect to their teacher. Robert M. Grant writes that the original speculation of Basilides "was too abstruse for his successors, and they therefore introduced something essentially different into their teaching" ("Gnostic Origins and the Basilidians of Irenaeus," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1959), pp. 121-125). Grant suggests that the doctrine which Irenaeus reports concerning Basilides was the creed of the Basilidians some half a century after Basilides had written. (See G. Quispel, "Note sur Basilide," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. II, No. 2, 1948, pp. 115-116.) It is obvious that these kinds of transitions occurred frequently, and that Irenaeus addressed a situation which found changes in original Gnostic doctrine merging with innovations in Christian teaching.

More detail concerning Valentine's life and writings, and Ptolemy, is included in G. Quispel, "The Writings of Valentinus Recently Discovered in Upper Egypt," in Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Classical Studies (Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1948), Vol. I, pp. 225-234; W. C. van Unnik, Newly Discovered Gnostic Writings. A Preliminary Survey of the Nag-Hammadi Find (Naperville: A. R. Allenson, 1960), esp. p. 61 ff.; G. Quispel, "The Original Doctrine of Valentine," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. I, No. 1 (1947), p. 46.; G. Quispel, Gnosis als Weltreligion (Zurich: Origo Verlag, 1951).

While much importance must be attached to the prominence which Irenaeus attributes to Valentine, there are certainly a variety of other sects and teachings to which the Adversus Haereses is also directed. Before Book I is complete, Irenaeus has named Colorbasus, Marcus, Simon Magus, Menander, Saturninus, Marcion, Tatian, the Eucratites, the Barbeliotes, the Ophites, the Sethians, and the Cainites. The great variety makes the establishment of backgrounds only the more elusive. Indeed, in many instances, the information the Adversus Haereses supplies regarding the sects is the most complete yet available.

More of the background can now, since 1946, be filled in

107.

of aeons (in primarily bi-polar, male-female form) according
to a scale of descending and ascending order.[1] This _pleroma_

---

more exactly, with the discovery of forty-eight treatises at
Nag Hammadi, north of Luxor, in Upper Egypt. These writings
constitute a veritable Gnostic library and include Ptolemy's
Letter to Flora, _The Gospel of the Egyptians_, _The Apocryphon
of John_, and other writings to which Irenaeus alludes or which
must be attributed to some of the lesser-Gnostic sects which
his first book mentions. See H. C. Puech, "Les nouveaux ecrits
gnostiques decouverts en Haute-Egypte," in _Coptic Studies in
Honour of Walter Ewing Crum_ (Boston: 1950); G. Quispel, "La
letter de Ptolemee a Flora," in _Vigiliae Christianae_. Vol. II
No. 1 (1948), pp. 17-56 (including French translation and
analysis); Togo Mina, "Le papyrus gnostique du Musee Copte,"
in _Vigiliae Christianae_. Vol. II, No. 3 (1948), pp. 129-136;
J. Doresse, "Trois livres gnostiques inedits," in _Vigiliae
Christianae_. Vol. II, No. 3 (1948), pp. 137-160; W. C. van
Unnik, _Newly Discovered Gnostic Writings_, op. cit. A coptic
codex (Codex Jung) contains translations of four Greek-written
Valentinian writings from the second century---_The Apocryphon
of John_, _A Letter to Rheginos on the Resurrection_, _The Gospel
of Truth_, and a titleless systematic exposition of Valentinian
theology---and was acquired by G. Quispel on May 10, 1952. Of
special significance to an understanding of _Adversus Haereses_
is _The Gospel of Truth_ which Irenaeus refers to in Book III,
chapter 11, paragraph 9, and _A Letter to Rheginos_ which Valen-
tine may perhaps have composed. (See G. Quispel, "Note of an
Unknown Gnostic Codex," in _Vigiliae Christianae_. Vol. VII, No.
4, 1953, p. 192; H. C. Puech and G. Quispel, "Les ecrits gnos-
tiques du Codex Jung," in _Vigiliae Christianae_. Vol. VIII, No.
1, 1954, pp. 1-51.) Translations of these works are now in
process. Kendrick Grobel presents an English summary and
analysis in his _The Gospel of Truth_ (New York: Abingdon, 1960).
   See also J. D. McCaughey, "The Nag Hammadi or Chenobos-
kion Library and the Study of Gnosticism," in _The Journal of
Religious History_. Vol. I, No. 2 (1960), pp. 61-71; H. J.
Downing, "Popular Christianity and the Theologians in the
Early Centuries," in _The Journal of Theological Studies_. Vol.
XIV, Part 2 (1963), pp. 294-310; Robert M. Grant, "Irenaeus
and Hellenistic Culture," in _Harvard Theological Review_. Vol.
XL, No. 1 (1949), pp. 41-51; W. den Boer, "Hermeneutic Prob-
lems in Early Christian Literature," in _Vigiliae Christianae_.
Vol. I, No. 3 (1947), pp. 150-167.

   1 One must note at the outset the gnostic variants on
the various issues which this treatise seeks to summarize.
On the conception of the godhead, Valentine regarded Propator

108.

is not only the means by which the universe is arranged and
its parts related; it also serves as framework for the myth
according to which life is interpreted and its destiny es-
tablished and expressed. The emanationist scheme provides
a productive or generative link. At its top is Propator (or
Proarche, or Bythus, or the Father) who transcends all know-
ledge and comprehension, from whom emerges Monogenes, or Nous,
from whom comes the series of yoked pairs which comprise the
pleroma.[1] Perfect order is maintained within the pleroma when
the subordination of aeons to Propator reverences (or assures)
his distinctiveness. The one alone able to contemplate Propa-
tor is Monogenes, or Nous, who in turn communicates this great-
ness to the others. The order is broken, however, through the
impulses and impetuosity of one of the lesser and later aeons,
Sophia (one of the twelve aeons generated by Logos and Zoe),
who unwisely desires to contemplate the nature of Propator.[2]

---

as a dyad; Ptolemy put more stress on the unity of the Father;
and the disciples of Ptolemy conceived the Father as one. See
G. Quispel, "The Original Doctrine of Valentine," op. cit., p.
45.

[1] An excellent summary of the Gnostic myth is included in
G. Quispel, Gnosis als Weltreligion, op. cit., p. 78 ff.

[2] Here again a dominant variant must be recorded. R. A.
Markus, in "Pleroma and Fulfillment. The Significance of History
in St. Irenaeus' Opposition to Gnosticism," op. cit., refers to
a distinction F. Sagnard makes between the "A theme" and a later
theme. According to "A theme" sin is regarded as a passion to
know the unknowable. In the later theme, sin is seen in terms
of a desire to imitate the non-bisexual fertility of the Father.
Sophia's sin is interpreted in both of these ways, though in
the particular system which Irenaeus seems here to report the
"A theme" appears as the dominant one.

109.

This passion to know the unknowable (which is tantamount to insubordination and displacement) also directs Sophia beyond her appropriate partner on the emanationist scale. In her anxiety she tries through love to attain unto the Father. But realizing the incomprehensibility and impenetrability of the Father, Sophia is forced to lay aside her original design.

Sophia herself was restored to the pleroma by Horos, but not until she had endeavored to seek after the light which had forsaken her. This 'light' is equivalent to the 'original design' which she had laid aside, and is that 'in-born idea', the <u>enthymesis</u> (also called Achamoth), which, when separated from her, was expelled outside the pleroma.[1] Though Sophia is restrained by Horos to stay within the ple-roma, the presence of her enthymesis outside of it has disruptive significance for the entire emanationist perspective. The danger is that the substance of the pleroma will slip into kenoma, the void---following the path of enthymesis---and be lost. Horos acts once again then to secure pleroma's boundary so that this cannot occur. And Nous gives origin to another conjugal pair, Christ and the Holy Spirit, in order to further fortify the pleroma. Christ becomes the teacher

---

[1] According to the variants, sometimes it is Sophia's product (enthymesis) who falls from the pleroma; sometimes it is Sophia herself. In the same way (see next page) the product of Achamoth is often regarded as the demiurge, and Achamoth himself is sometimes called demiurge.

to instruct the aeons as to the nature of their "conjunction" and relation to each other, and to announce that the Father is known only through Monogenes or Nous. The Holy Spirit "taught them to give thanks on being all rendered equal among themselves and led them to a state of true repose".[1] As a result, the heavenly aeons in harmony and perfect rest sing hymns to Propator. And, merging their respective qualities, the entirety of harmonious aeons produce a being most perfect, the one called Jesus.

The systems of the Gnostics, however, depends upon a retention of the original synthesis, or upon its restoration, in all respects. Horos, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, serve to bring about a re-unification of the pleroma following the misdirection or insubordination of Sophia. But, outside the pleroma---still not given up to kenoma---is the shapeless production of Sophia, i.e. Achamoth. If the Gnostic picture is going to provide an interpretation of human destiny, some measure must be supplied by which the enthymesis is either restored or given an established status.

Some Gnostic sects report that Achamoth produces a son, demiourgos, the creator-god of the Old Testament, who shapes the world from the emotion or suffering of his mother. Since Achamoth is of heavenly origin, the inhabitants of the world

---

[1] Spiritus vero sanctus adaequatos eos omnes, gratias agere docuit, et veram requiem induxit. A. h., Bk. I, ii, 6, p. (463).

are created as possessing a remembrance or hint of the heaven-
ly pleroma. Other Gnostic sects attest that Christ took pity
on the enthymesis of Sophia and gave her a figure or substance
to enable her to become aware of her own suffering. The suf-
fering itself issues from a separation from the pleroma, and
consciousness of such suffering creates the possibility of
being influenced by the desire of better things. According
to this account, Achamoth's effort to discover those better
things is thwarted by Horos whose task it is to maintain
the boundaries of pleroma. Her further progress obstructed,
Achamoth experienced the variety of passions characteristic
of "the innate opposition of nature to knowledge".[1] The col-
lection of these passions, or emotions, becomes "the substance
of the matter from which this world was formed".[2]

The disquietude which the fragments of truth---or hints
of light---create implies that the created world is constituted
by ambiguous or contradictory elements. It has been shaped
by an ggency whose estrangement from the pleroma has not
destroyed its divine lineage nor its ability (eventhough
unwittingly) to implant heavenly seed. At the same time,
the boundary between pleroma and that which exists outside
of it has been set and fortified to preclude transposition
from one to the other. Redemption occurs, however, through

---

[1] A. h., Bk. I, iv, 1, p. 321.

[2] Ibid., Bk. I, iv, 2, p. 321.

112.

the restoration of the light to its point of origin in the
pleroma. Hence, a soter, or paraclete,(or both), is sent
whose healing consists in imparting form and intelligence,
and in separating the passions from each other. That which
is spiritual is caught up and reunited with the pleroma.
That which is material (or the product of Achamoth's---or
Achamoth's product's---insolence) is eventually destroyed.
That which is animal, if it chooses the spiritual over the
material, is saved from destruction, though, with Achamoth,
not readmitted into the pleroma.[1] The differentiation bet-
ween natures refers to ethical as well as to "ontological",
or perhaps more properly, physical categories. While mate-
rial natures are incapable of salvation, spiritual substances
contain the capacity for perfect knowledge of God. The sal-
vation appropriate to animal nature, in the absence of such
perfect knowledge, is achieved by means of faith and good
works.

Indeed, while redemption is possible, the damaging mark
of sin remains. The restoration of all things cannot occur
since the sin of misdirection and misplacement leads to a
production of that which no longer retains a status within
the pleroma. That production cannot be assumed by the pleroma

---

[1] Again, there are variants regarding the fate of the ani-
mal natures. Some regard this destiny as mixed, finding it
possible that a further differentiation be made between those
of animal nature who become capable of receiving spiritual
seed and those who do not. A. h., Bk. I, vii, 5, p. 326.

without violating its very nature. Loss is to be acknowledged though not given status. The Gnostic goal can be expressed as a striving for a wholeness which is not violated by loss. The pleroma is not conceived to contain all that is. Rather the emphasis is upon the character of the procession of aeons from the highest. Orderly procession implies homogeneity or fulfilment; inappropriate procession implies emptiness or a void. The emanations which proceed orderly from yoke-pairs are called *pleromata* (an instantation or confirmation of wholeness); those which proceed from one agent alone, rather than from a couple, are called *images*. Difference is not assumed within homogeneity. Rather the ambiguity which the presence of difference and homogeneity implies is expressed in terms of a new emanationist scheme, i.e. that one by which the created world is fashioned and regulated.

The necessary distinction in Gnosticism between the pleroma and the created world is the focal point of the first of Irenaeus' criticisms. The formal charge is that the Gnostic account does not agree with the Scriptures, eventhough it utilizes its terminology and arranges its content.[1] This is no idle charge. Irenaeus contends that the way in which the Gnostics conceive the relation between spirit and matter precludes their understanding of the Scriptural testimony concerning the nature and work of Christ. The Gnostics distinguish the Word, or Nous, from Jesus, or Soter. Consistency

---

[1] See A. h., Bk. I, ix, 3-5, pp. 329,30.

114.

demands such differentiation, since the homogeneity and distinctiveness of the pleroma cannot be maintained should the Word become flesh. To become flesh involves a passage outside of the pleroma. But the Gnostics, intent upon maintaining the boundary between spirit and flesh, devise a scheme which does not find the Word becoming flesh; rather, the Saviour who did become flesh "was of later date than the Word".[1]

Irenaeus' point can be made from the other approach. Not only is an external measure available (i.e. the Holy Scriptures) against which the characteristic affirmations and procedures of the Gnostics can be tested. Also, one can apply the criterion of internal consistency to discover whether or not the Gnostics present a harmonious testimony.[2]

---

[1] Secundum autem illorum argumentationem, non Verbum caro factum est, quod quidem nec venit unquam extra Pleroma: sed qui ex omnibus factus, et sit posterior Verbo, Salvator. A. h., Bk. I, ix, 2 (p. 542).

[2] D. B. Reynders, in "La polemic de saint Irenee: Methode et principes," in Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, Vol. VII, No. 1 (1935), pp. 5-27, suggests that Irenaeus' attack on the false teachers includes the following three factors: 1) exposition and refutation by reason; 2) refutation by the Scripture; and c) the external criteria of truth and error (p. 5). Reynders also stresses the usage Irenaeus makes of an ad hominem technique, i.e. the counter question which forces the dilemma. William R. Schoedel, in "Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus," in Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 22-32, illustrates that such devices and argumentation belong to the educational pattern of that hellenistic period. A typical model of hellenistic rhetoric would consist of the four principal parts:

115.

By the simple method of using the words of one spokesman against those of another who also purports to be representing the truth, Irenaeus is led to reflect that the evident discontinuity bespeaks inspiration "by different spirits of error".[1] In sharp contrast is the unity of the teaching of the Christian Church throughout the world. That tradition owns a <u>regula fidei</u>, an authoritative and unitary summary of confession:

> The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world...has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith: (She believes) in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them; and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who became incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Spirit, who proclaimed through the prophets the dispensations of God and the advents, and the birth from a virgin, and the passion, and the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and his manifestation from heaven in the glory of the Father...[2]

---

a) exordium; b) narratio; c) divisio; and d) confutatio-confirmatio. These parts, Schoedel suggests, provide an outline of the argument in <u>Adversus Haereses</u>. The <u>exordium</u>, early in Book I, is followed by the narration which describes the Valentinian system. In the <u>divisio</u>, the forecast of the main line of the argument, Irenaeus presents the affirmations of Christian faith. Books II-V "are the confirmatio of the Church's faith and the confutatio of the Gnostic errors" (p.28). Schoedel does not argue for a strict and direct reproduction of hellenistic rhetoric here, but sees rather the evidence of an exposure to that kind of discipline and training.

[1] A. h., Bk. I, ix, 5, p. 330.

[2] Ecclesia enim per universum orbem usque ad fines terrae seminata, et ab apostolis et a discipulis eorum accepit eam fidem, quae est in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, qui fecit coelum et terram, et mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt: et in unum Jesum Christum Filium Dei, incarnatum pro nostra salute:

116.

It is in connection with this elaboration of distinctions
between Gnostic and Christian teaching that one can see the
emergence of Irenaeus' principle of orientation. Belief in
one God, he states, is not only a matter of recognizing the
demands of Scripture: it is also a "matter of necessity".[1] The
necessity does not issue simply from the attempt to formulate
Scriptural affirmations consistently, but is also a requirement
of thought. The author of Adversus Haereses illustrates this
contention when he speaks of the limits and territories to which
reality is conceived to conform. He questions whether, on Gnos-
tic grounds, there is any restraint upon supposing still addi-
tional regions beyond the limits of the territory proper to Pro-
pator.[1] The question is meant to be suggestive, and, perhaps,
clearly illustrates the rhetorical device of the counter question

---

et in Spiritum sanctum, qui per prophetas praedicavit dispo-
sitiones Dei, et adventum, et cam, quae est ex Virgine,
generationem, et passionem, et resurrectionem a mortuis, et
in carne in coelos ascensionem dilecti Jesu Christi Domini
nostri, et de coelis in gloria Patris adventum ejus...A. h.,
Bk. I, x, 1, p. 330 (p. 550). See also Bk. I, xxii, 1, p. 347
(p. 669). See Henri Holstein, "Les formules du symbole dans
l'oeuvre de saint Irenee," in Recherches de Sciences Reli-
gieuse. Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (1947), pp. 454-461; Bengt Hägglund,
"Die Bedeutung der 'regula fidei' als Grundlage theologischer
Aussagen," in Studia Theologica. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1958), pp.
1-44; V. Ammundsen, "The Rule of Truth in Irenaeus," in The
Journal of Theological Studies. Vol. XIII (1912), pp. 574-
580; Hans Lietzmann, "Symbolstudien," in Zeitschrift für Neu-
testamentliche Wissenschaft. Vol. XXI (1922), pp. 1-34; Vol.
XXII (1923), pp. 257-279; and Vol. XVI (1927), pp. 75-79.

[1] A. h., Bk. II, i, 2, p. 359.

[2] A. h., Bk. II, i, 3-5, p. 360.

which makes its point through the appropriate line of reasoning
which preparation for its answer requires. It becomes obvious
that the Gnostic system cannot assure that there are no ad-
ditional dominions beyond that under Propator's jurisdiction.
It is more strikingly obvious that without such assurances
there can be no incontestable basis for establishing the divin-
ity of Propator. If there is anything above (or beyond) that
which God's territory circumscribes, than that which is con-
tainer (and not the contained) would be greater, and, hence,
God. Irenaeus states that the movement of thought cannot go
on ad infinitum to beings above and below. Indeed, God is the
one whose dominion extends over all:

> For it must be either that there is one Being
> who contains all things, and formed in His own
> territory all those things which have been
> created, according to His own will; or, again,
> that there are numerous unlimited creators and
> gods, who begin from each other, and end in
> each other on every side; and it will then be
> necessary to allow that all the rest are con-
> tained from without by someone who is greater,
> and that they are each of them shut up within
> their own territory, and remain in it. No one
> of them all, therefore, is God.[1]

It is important to notice in this regard that Irenaeus' criti-
cism is focused ultimately at the very structure of the Gnostic
perspective. The sharp separation between pleroma and created

---

[1] Oportet enim aut unum esse, qui omnia continet, et in
suis fecit unumquodque eorum quae facta sunt, quemadmodum ipse
voluit: aut multos rursus et indeterminates factores et deos,
ab invicem quidem incipientes, ad invicem autem desinentes per

118.

(such that passage between implies not only violation but dis-
juncture) precludes any occasion by which either dominion, or
their combination, can be regarded as exhaustive of the to-
tality.

The same contention has implications also for the status
which is assigned to the created world. The Gnostics have
relegated the created order to a position as 'shadow' or
'image'.[1] Irenaeus criticizes this notion on the basis of
the argument utilized earlier to demonstrate the inconclu-
siveness surrounding the Gnostic attempt to ascribe divinity
to Propator. It is put simply: if creation is mere shadow,
then God is not God. That is, an image is at least a like-
ness such that the created world reflects the pleroma in some
sense. If the Gnostics admit this likeness, then they cannot
retain the separation between the two orders in their charac-
teristically bold manner. If they do not admit the likeness,
and the created order nevertheless in some sense is, then they
have not allowed God to fill or contain all things; nor is God's
dominion necessarily authoritative over all territories.[2]

---

omnem partem: et alios omnes a foris ab altero quodum majore
contineri, et velut inclusos et manentes in suis, unumquemque
eorum confiteri necessitas erit; neminem autem horum omnium esse
Deum. A. h., Bk. II, i, 5, p. 360 (p. 712).

[1] See discussion of 'images' above, p. 113.

[2] Si autem non secundum id quod obumbretur, dicent eam
umbram esse, sed secundum id quod multo ab illis separata
sint; paterni luminis ipsorum pusillitatem et infirmitatem
accusabunt, quasi non attingat usque ad haec, sed deficiat

119.

The argument is a subtle one, and its direction must be carefully charted. Implicit in it is Irenaeus' presentation of a principle of orientation which he proposes to be more adequate than the Gnostic way of accounting for the coherence of things. This is not a simple accusation of "dualism". To establish such a criticism, one must assume that both reality and status can be ascribed to the created order. This, in any unqualified sense, the Gnostics were unwilling to do. Thus it would be quite "pointless" to accuse them of a bifurcation which only the juxtaposition of pleromatic reality and created reality would produce. Irenaeus, and not the Gnostics, is arguing for the ascription of real status to the created world; his adversaries seem quite willing to restrict such status to that which the pleroma comprises. Instead, Irenaeus focuses attention upon both the upper and lower boundaries of the Gnostic pleroma, and contends that neither of these can be fixed except in an arbitrary manner. Without clear determinants, it is impossible to specify that which the pleroma circumscribes. Fulness cannot determine the range of reality since the pleroma is structured according to an emanationist progression. Emanationist progression---as similar to causal explanation---does not possess any restriction upon the infinite regress. Explanation by emanation cannot produce the technique by which the upper

---

adimplere id quod est vacuum, et dissolvere umbram, et hoc quando nemo sit impedimento. A. h., Bk. II, viii, 2, p. 368 (p. 732).

120.

limit of the pleroma can be determined. (Why need one stop, Irenaeus asks, with the three hundred and sixty five heavens which Basilides included?[1]) Nor can such an orientation provide the basis for fixing its lower limit in any but a presumptuous way.

This then is the methodological basis for finding it appropriate to interpret Irenaeus' criticism as being directed toward the Gnostic "dualism". The emanationist scale by which the Gnostics describe or explain the totality and coherence of things moves from higher to lower generality as unity is diffused through diversity. Without the arbitrary establishment of the pleroma's lower limits, diversity may easily become so extensive as to destroy the usefulness of the unitary pattern of interpretation. The emanationist scheme is calculated to provide a means of explanation of diversity; and within the pleroma diversity is comprehended within the series of emanations. But the emanationist scale cannot specify its own beginning or ending, and without such beginnings and endings this means of comprehending diversity within unity is unintelligible. Irenaeus notes that the Gnostics have made the emanationist scheme workable by setting its lower limit at the distinction between spirit and matter. Matter cannot be accounted for by means of the rightful operation of emanationist progression. But this, Irenaeus argues, is tantamount to a denial that God

---

[1] A. h., Bk. II, xvi, 2, p. 380 (p. 760).

121.

fills <u>all</u> <u>things</u>.

> Let them then no longer declare that their
> Bythus is the fulness of all things, if in-
> deed he has neither filled nor illuminated
> that which is vacuum and shadow; or, on the
> other hand, let them cease talking of vacuum
> and shadow, if the light of their Father
> does in truth fill all things.[1]

Just as explanation by emanation is unable to establish its own beginning point, so too must it imply an arbitrary limit with respect to that which it is able to include. By seizing upon the distinction between spirit and matter, Irenaeus is not only contending that the pleroma is insufficiently equipped to account for that which transcends its circumscription. More precisely, he is discovering the occasion by which an alternative scheme may be submitted to replace the one which interprets by emanationist progression.

Affirming the reality of the created order and of the <u>one</u> God upon whom both truth and piety compel the mind to fix,[2] Irenaeus locates the determinative point not where spirit and matter are distinct but where being is called out of nothingness. The result is a new pattern of interpretation, principled in another way, and, with it, Irenaeus' doctrine of human freedom. Indeed, the scheme which Irenaeus suggests is what Professor

---

[1] A. h., Bk. II, viii, 2, p. 368.

[2] Quanto igitur tutius et diligentius, quod est verum statim initio confiteri, quoniam fabricator Deus hic, qui mundum fecit, solus est Deus, et non est alius Deus praeter eum; ipse a semetipso exemplum et figurationem eorum quae

Calhoun believes to be the first formulation of the doctrine

of creation ex nihilo which is underscored often enough "so

that there is no chance for mistaking his meaning".[1]

> While men, indeed, cannot make anything out
> of nothing, but only out of matter already
> existing, yet God is in this point preeminently
> superior to men that He Himself called into
> being the substance of His creation when pre-
> viously it had no existence.[2]

It provides for a simultaneous affirmation of both the reality

of creation and the reality of creation. And yet it establishes

a basis for distinction between Creator and created. The ascrip-

tion of status and reality to the created does not remove man

from his subordination to the divine. Since the Creator cannot

be contained, He also cannot be measured. The creature, by con-

trast, is marked by limits and conditioned by change. Perfect

knowledge is unattainable to man in that

> he cannot have experience or form a conception
> of all things like God; but in the same propor-
> tion as he who was formed but today, and re-
> ceived the beginning of his creation, is in-
> ferior to Him who is uncreated, and who is always

---

facta sunt, accipiens: quam post tantam irreligiositatem et
circuitum defessos, cogi aliquando in aliquo une statuere
sensum, et ex eo figurationem factorum confiteri? a.h., Bk.
II, xvi, 3, p. 380 (p. 760).

[1] Robert L. Calhoun, "History of Christian Doctrine," unpub-
lished lecture notes, Yale Divinity School, November 1962.

[2] Quoniam homines quidem de nihilo non possunt aliquid
facere, sed de materia subjacenti; Deus autem, quam homines
hoc primo melior, eo quod materiam fabricationis suae, cum
ante non esset, ipse adinvenit. A.h., Bk. II, x, 4, p. 370
(p. 736).

the same, in that proportion is he, as respects
knowledge and the faculty of investigating the
causes of all things, inferior to Him who made
him.[1]

But man is not without recourse. There is a specific range
of things to which human knowledge is appropriate.[2] God has
also provided a means of human growth by bestowing upon the
creatures a _faculty_ _of_ _increase_.[3] Beyond that, the relation-
ship in which God stands with respect to men allows an adapta-
tion of his activities to their specific natures and tenden-
cies.[4] Each of these refinements of the Creator-created re-
lation give Irenaeus' doctrine of freedom its characteristic
shape.

The notion of freedom---only prefigured at this point in
Adversus _Haereses_---is given fuller development beginning with
Book III. The third book also serves as a next stage in its
author's calculated refutation of the Gnostic perversion. Book
I was given primarily to an exposition of the various sorts of

---

[1] Si autem et aliquis non invenerit causam omnium quae
requiruntur, cogitet quia homo est in infinitum minor Dei, et
qui ex parte acceperit gratiam, et qui nondum aequalis, vel
similis sit factori, et qui omnium experientiam et cogita-
tionem habere non possit, ut Deus; sed in quantum minor est
ab eo, qui factus non est, et qui semper idem est, ille qui
hodie factus est, et initium facturae accepit; in tantum
secundum scientiam, et ad investigandum causas omnium, minorem
esse eo qui fecit. A.h., Bk.II, xxv, 3, p. 396,7 (p. 799).

[2] A.h., Bk. II, xxviii, 3, p. 399 (p. 804).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., Bk. II, xxxv, 4, p. 413 (pp. 841,2).

124.

doctrine which Irenaeus' adversaries represent. Book II was intended as an interpretative disclosure and critique of the implications of that opinion. In Book III Irenaeus seeks to bolster his argument by adducing proofs from the Holy Scripture. The direction of this development recalls a prior declaration: the Gnostic innovators consent neither to Scripture nor to tradition.[1] But the articulation of that declaration involves its author not only in the task of unmasking error; in addition he is given to a constructive exposition of his own cherished testimony to which he contrasts the Gnostic position. This begins with a discussion of the significance of the catholicity and perpetual succession of the Church.

> We have learned from none others the plan of
> our salvation than from those through whom
> the Gospel has come down to us, which they
> did at one time proclaim in public, and, at
> a later period, by the will of God, handed

---

[1] Evenit itaque, neque Scripturus jam, neque Traditioni consentire eos. A. h., Bk. III, ii, 2, p. 415 (p. 847). On the importance of Scripture to Irenaeus, and the relationship between Scripture and tradition, see the very helpful article by D. B. Reynders ("Paradosis. Le progres de l'idee de tradition jusqu'a saint Irenee," in Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, op. cit.). Reynders suggests that Irenaeus' Gnostic opponent, Ptolemy, could also testify to "an oral tradition, transmitted by succession, which is also apostolic" (p. 191). This may have been a source, Reynders believes, for Irenaeus' own gathering of these elements together, and perhaps is one of the reasons why Irenaeus found it necessary also to distinguish between tradition and Scripture. That contrast was necessary because the Gnostic apostolic tradition was of a vive voix variety and not set forth in clear, everywhere-accepted writing. Irenaeus thus contrasts oral tradition with written communication as sources of truth. And in just this way, Reynders considers, the importance of the apostles as indispensable mediators becomes very evident.

down to us in the Scriptures, to be the ground
and pillar of our faith.[1]

Not only is the testimony of Irenaeus in full accord with the

apostolic witness, but, by contrast, it discloses the recent

origin of the Gnostic position.

Irenaeus' claim in this regard is carefully measured. He

does not simply argue for the advantages of continuity and/or

longevity over divergence and/or novelty. He notes, for example,

that many of the Gnostic fallacies can be accounted for on the

basis of their adherence (eventhough unwittingly) to the teachings

---

[1] Non enim per alios dispositionem salutis nostrae cog-
novimus, quam per eos, per quos Evangelium pervenit ad nos:
quod quidem tunc praeconaverunt, postea vero per Dei volun-
tatem in Scripturis nobis tradiderunt, fundamentum et colum-
nam fidei nostrae futurum. A.h., Bk. II, i, 1, p. 414 (p. 844).
In elucidating such claims, Irenaeus provides a basis upon
which the primacy of Rome in Catholic Church theory comes to
develop. He writes as follows in the passage to which later
discussion is directed: "...the tradition derived from the
apostles of the very great, the very ancient, and universally
known church, founded and organized at Rome by the two most
glorious apostles, Peter and Paul; as also the faith preached
to men, which comes down to our time by means of the succession
of bishops. For it is a matter of necessity that every church
should agree with this church, on account of its preeminent
authority /Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potiorem principali-
tatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam/, that is, the
faithful everywhere, inasmuch as the apostolic tradition has
been preserved continuously by those (faithful men) who exist
everywhere." A. h., Bk.III, iii, 2, p. 415. On the propriety
of the use of this statement as an ecclesiastical claim, see
the following discussions: P. Nautin, "Irenee 'Adv. haer.' III,
3, 2. Eglise de Rome ou Eglise Universelle?" in Revue de l'His-
toire des Religions. Vol. CLI, No. 1 (1957), pp. 37-78; B. Botte,
"A propos de l'Adversus haereses III. 3. 2 de saint Irenee," in
Irenikon. Vol. XXX (1957), pp. 156-163; Wilfred L. Knox, "Ire-
naeus Adv. Haer. 3. 3. 2," in Journal of Theological Studies.
Vol. XLVII (July-October 1946), pp. 180-184; Einar Molland,
"Irenaeus of Lugdunum and the Apostolic Succession," Journal

126.

of the classical philosophers---men certainly of less recent

origin than the apostles by whom Irenaeus has been taught.[1]

It is not solely a matter of durability, as though the authen-

ticity of any tradition could be assessed according to the

uniformity it is able to maintain across the ages. In some

sense, the character of the tradition is what it is because

of its substance or structure. That which appears to be

---

of Ecclesiastical History. Vol. I, No. 1 (1950), pp. 12-28;
Christine Mohrmann, "A propos de Irenaeus. Advers. Haeres.
3, 3, 1," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. III, No. 1 (1949),
pp. 57-61.

[1] The question of Irenaeus' regard for the classical
philosophers and the extent to which he attributes Gnostic
error to the recurrence of certain kinds of philosophic
teaching is very complex. In Book II (xiv, pp. 376-78) Ire-
naeus charges that the philosophers are the originators of
heresies; they do not know God; they are ignorant of the
truth. Thereupon one or another Gnostic error is referred
to one or another characteristic philosophic teaching. The
notion of the void is taken from Democritus and Epicurus
(II, xiv, 3, pp. 376,7); pre-existent matter as a basis for
the formation of the world is characteristic of the stance
of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, the Stoics, even Plato (II, xiv,
4, p. 377). The ability to conceive the world in terms of
numbers has been derived from the Pythagoreans (II, xiv, 6,
p. 377). Other examples are readily available. In III (xxiv,
2, p. 459 and xxv, 5, p. 459), for instance, Irenaeus contrasts
the Gnostic conception of God, as based upon Epicurus, with the
view of Plato. In sum, Andre Benoit (Saint Irenee. Introduc-
tion a l'Etude de sa Theologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1960, p. 65) lists seven references to Plato, four
to Pythagoras, three to Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus,
two to both the Cynics and Aristotle, and one each for Thales,
Empedocles, and Anaxagoras.
    This apparent wholesale condemnation of some of the ear-
lier philosophers must be tempered, however, by a recognition
that it was precisely these passages which Irenaeus borrowed
from other sources. H. Diels in Doxographi Graeci (Berlin,
1879) states that Irenaeus took quotations of Greek philoso-
phical opinion from handbooks of such information, or doxo-
graphical collections, which were in circulation at the time.
The one which Irenaeus appears to have used was compiled by

necessary to the differentiation between the Christian tradition and the Gnostic tradition is the former's insistence upon the unity and oneness of God together with an ascription of real status to the created (even material) world. It is these truths to which the written Scriptures testify, i.e. that it was one and the same God who created all things, who was foretold by the prophets, and declared by the Gospel.[1]

It is in his exegesis of the Scriptures, particularly as he develops his interpretation of the significance of this unitary tradition, that Irenaeus comes to focus more directly upon an articulation of the meaning of freedom. Earlier he had declared that God adapts divine activity to human exigency. Now in Book III he elaborates, calling attention to the new phase in God's dealing with man, or, to what is to be called "the

---

Aetius, used by Philo of Alexandria, re-edited by Plutarch, and came to be known as Pseudo-Plutarch. This has prompted such commentators as Robert M. Grant, in "Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture," in Harvard Theological Review, op. cit., to regard Irenaeus' personal attitude or interest as being "more rhetorical than philosophical" (p.47), a thesis to which William R. Schoedel would also agree ("Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus," in Vigiliae Christianae, op. cit.). For discussion of doxographical tradition, see G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4-7. For discussion of the extant to which both Gnosticism and second-century Christianity could be regarded as kinds of philosophical theology, see R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 129-150.

[1] This is not to say that the sacred writings, tradition, and apostolicity are not to be regarded as the normative criteria by which Christian truth is assessed. By focusing attention upon both the structure of that norm and its constituents, we are recalling that Irenaeus was both a heresiologist and a systematician. The assumption of one or the other vantage point creates different emphases.

128.

new dispensation of liberty".[1] By elucidating the marks of
this new dispensation according to the following structure

> ...since God made all things in due propor-
> tion and adaptation, it was also fit that the
> outward aspect of the Gospel should be well
> arranged and harmonized[2]

Irenaeus is able to outline that true Gospel of God as dis-
tinct from the so-called Gospel of Truth of the Gnostics.[3]

Freedom, then, becomes associated with the dispensation
to which both Scripture and tradition testify. It would be
appropriate in Gnostic language to speak of a dispensation,
primarily with respect to the internal activity or economy
of the pleroma.[4] Irenaeus refers dispensation not to the
emanationist scheme but rather to a uniform historical plan.[5]
The plan is characterized by its continuity from beginning,
middle, to end.[6] Within continuity, stress is given to due

---

[1] Per haec autem omnia unus Deus demonstratur, novam
libertatis dispositionem per novum adventum Filii sui homi-
nibus aperiens. A.h., Bk.III, x, 5, p. 425 (p. 878).

[2] Etinem cum omnia composita et apta Deus fecerit, opor-
tebat et ispeciem Evangelii bene compositam, et bene com-
paginatam esse. A.h., Bk.III, xi, 9, p. 429 (p. 891,2).

[3] A.h., Bk. III, xi, 9, p. 429 (p. 891,2).

[4] See A. d'Ales, "Le mot oikonomia dans la langue theo-
logique de saint Irenee," in Revue des Etudes Grecques. Vol.
XXXII (1919), pp. 1-9.

[5] Jean Danielou, "Saint Irenee et les origines de la
theologie de l'histoire," in Recherches de Sciences Religieuses.
Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1947), pp. 227-231.

[6] ...pen initia, et medietates, et finem, et per universam
Dei dispositionem. A.h., Bk.III, xxiv, 1, p. 458 (p.966).

season, proper time, perfect order, and fitting sequence, for the activity of God has been adapted to the natures of those who are conditioned by limits and marked by change. And yet the dispensational arrangements refer to the one and same Father who knows no beginning, no middle, no ending, who acts in a manner uniform and consistent with his own nature.

Irenaeus must make both affirmations simultaneously. So to adapt the activity of God to the exigencies of creatures that God is conditioned by limits would be to confuse the container with the contained. On the other hand, to conceive of God in such fashion that adaptation to the created order is impossible is to reassert the Gnostic perspective against which the Adversus Haereses is directed. What is necessary instead is the manifestation of a fittingness between the divine and human so that the former is neither violated nor qualified in its ministration to the latter. Irenaeus calls the manifestation and exercising of such fittingness the "dispensation of freedom". Freedom is the product of the simultaneous expression of affirmations which such fittingness between divine and human implies. Freedom is to be located at that point where divine adaptation and human increase are brought together.

The setting is Christological. Jesus, who (as opposed to the Gnostic rendering) is indeed the Word, is referred to characteristically as the first begotten in all creation. As such he is always present with the human race. Irenaeus

130.

states that "in every respect" Jesus is _man_; then he quickly adds "man, the formation of God".[1] Thus the Christological context cannot be understood apart from the structure which Irenaeus' theology assumes as opposed to the Gnostic innovations. When the emanationist scheme is replaced by the one which demands the oneness and unity of God together with the ability to ascribe real status to the created order, then the dispensation or movement from divine to human is taken from the causal series of pleromata and projected out upon an historical line whose limits are contained only by the beginning and the future time of increase. But to refer the dispensation to an historical process rather than to spiritual emanations is to assert that that process is in some sense regulative of the relation between the divine and the human. Hence, the union between the divine and human in Jesus is not simply "instantialized" in the Word made flesh, but it is also "serialized". That is, that supreme instance of God-man union is projected out along the line of the historical process which is both normative and regulative. The adaptation of the divine to human exigency implies a conformity to the limits of _time_ as well as to the conditions of the created order. Indeed, time is characteristic of that historic process or dispensation which Irenaeus calls freedom. Thus the Christ, who was one with God, finds it fitting to _pass_ _through_ each successive period of life, gathering the beginning, middle, and end

---

[1] A.h., Bk.III, xvi, 6, p. 442.

(as the process includes the beginning, middle, and end) into one.

Thus a key term in Irenaeus' presentation of the activity of the Word-made-flesh is recapitulation.[1] The Saviour "sums up" all things. He experiences and renews each stage in the human life process. He introduces into the status of the created order an instance of perfect fulfillment. At each point in the human career he perfectly achieves the full stature of man. The telos of human life is linked with the beginning. As the first Adam (as by a kind of seminal presence) contained within himself all his descendants, so Christ recapitulated within himself the whole race of mankind from the

---

[1] One passage in which Irenaeus' use of "recapitulatio" is particularly striking is from Bk. III, xvi, p. 443 (p. 925,6): "Unus igitur Deus Pater, quemadmodum ostendimus, et unus Christus Jesus Dominus noster, veniens per universam dispositionem, et omnia in semetipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo, plasmatio Dei: et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et Verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans..." For studies of Irenaeus' use of this term see Martin Widmann, "Irenaeus and seine theologischen Väter," in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. Vol. LIV (1957), pp. 156-173; Jean-Marc Dufort, in "La recapitulation paulinienne dans l'exegese des Peres," in Sciences Ecclesiastiques. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 21-38 (esp. pp. 24-27), compares Irenaeus' use of the term with that of Origen, Tertullian, and John Chrysostom; R. Potter, "St. Irenaeus and 'Recapitulation'," in Dominican Studies. Vol. IV (1951), pp. 192-200, believes "recapitulation" to represent the "quintessence" of Irenaeus' thought, a judgment agreed to by Johannes Knudsen, in "Recapitulation Christology and the Church Today," in Dialogue. Vol. II, No. 2 (1963), pp. 126-133; J. N. D. Kelly presents an able summary in Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958), pp. 170-174.
     The presence of this term in Irenaeus has been regarded as a chief clue to the sources upon which his work depends, particularly in that the words assigned to Justin Martyr (in

132.

very beginning.[1]

The implications are many. The emanationist scale of the Gnostics has been replaced by one whose degrees or gradations are comprehended within a redemptive process marked by hours, seasons, and orders. The discontinuity between Creator and created order has been nullified by a providential order which finds no categorical opposition between either the spiritual and the material or the action of God with respect to the beginning, middle, and end points. There is continuity and consistency throughout the pattern. Abraham, for example, desired to see the day of the advent of the Son of God.[2] The prophets of Israel foresaw the manifestation of the Lord: Moses especially spoke of him, and he is testified to throughout the Old Testament.[3] But, beyond that, the words of the Lord also

---

Bk. IV, ii, 2) may be the starting point for Irenaeus' use of recapitulation. See F. Loofs, "Theophilus von Antiochen Adversus Marcionem und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus," in Texte und Untersuchungen. Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (1930); J. Armitage Robinson, "On a Quotation from Justin Martyr in Irenaeus," in The Journal of Theological Studies. Vol. XXXI (1930), pp. 374-378; M. Hitchcock, "Loofs' Theory of Theophilus of Antioch as a Source of Irenaeus," in The Journal of Theological Studies. Vol. XXXVIII (1937), pp. 254-266; Robert M. Grant, "Scripture, Rhetoric and Theology in Theophilus," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 33-45.

[1] See A. h., Bk. III, xxi, 10, p. 454 (pp. 954,55), and Bk. III, xxii, 3, p. 455 (p. 958).

[2] A. h., Bk. IV, vii, 1, p. 469 (p. 991).

[3] "...because the Son of God is implanted everywhere throughout his writings: at one time, indeed, speaking with Abraham, when about to eat with him; at another time with Noah, giving to him the dimensions; at another, inquiring after Adam, at another, bringing down judgment upon the

testify to his oneness with the Father from the beginning and his continuity with the Father's pattern of action. The dispensation of liberty cannot refer to any new order as opposed to that associated with the Old Testament patriarchs and prophets, as Marcion would have it. Nor can that dispensation be identified with the spiritual which is purified through retention of the separation from the material. The dispensation can be neither of these if God is one and the same, if his manner of dealing with man is continuous, and if his presence and dominion indeed fill all things:

> ...it was one God the Father who spake with
> Abraham, who gave the law, who sent the pro-
> phets beforehand, who in the last times sent
> His son...[1]

That against which the dispensation of liberty is set is not some previous covenantal order. When the totality of creation is taken as the perspective, the primary distinction is between seed which grows, progresses, and matures, and that which does not.[2] Increase is contrasted with deterioration, and

---

Sodomites; and again, when He becomes visible, and directs Jacob on his journey, and speaks with Moses from the bush. And it would be endless to recount the occasions upon which the Son of God is shown forth by Moses." A.h.,Bk. IV, x, 1, p. 473 (p. 1000).

[1] ...unum Deum Patrem eum, qui locutus sit ad Abraham, qui legisdationem fecerit, qui prophetas praemiserit, qui novissimis temporibus Filium suum misit... A.h., Bk. IV, xli, 4, p. 525 (p. 1118).

[2] For an analysis of the way in which this theme gives occasion to an educational theory, see Hampus Lyttkens, "Guds

perfection with deficiency. Directed tending is set over against motionlessness, as is realization viz-a-viz thwarted progress. Wilhelm Hunger, using an image which recalls Heraclitus' analogy of the stream into which man cannot step twice,[1] suggests that Irenaeus regards mankind as a river which is viewed not simply from one or another point along its course but at a glance, from source to consummation.[2] Yet this is so because the divine determination of the human requires that the totality be seen in its comprehensive wholeness.

The normative process is not calculated then to return man to the beginning, but rather directs him to a point superior to his point of departure.[3] If Irenaeus does not expressly

---

Pedagogi hos Irenaeus," in _Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift._ Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (1959), pp. 222-246, and Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (1960), pp. 13-37. Jean Danielou also treats the progressive education of mankind in "Saint Irenee et les origines de la theologie de l'histoire," in _Recherches de Science Religieuse_, op. cit.

[1] Heraclitus' Fragment 21: "You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on." (cf. Philip Wheelwright, _Heraclitus_. New York: Atheneum, 1964, p.29) Heraclitus is not one of the classical philosophers to whom Irenaeus refers, however.

[2] Wilhelm Hunger, "Der Gedanke der Weltplaneinheit und Adameinheit in der Theologie des Irenäus," in _Scholastik_. Vol. XVII, (1942), p. 170: "Irenäus schaut nicht den Strom der Menschheitsgeschichte seitlich vom Ufer aus, indem er diesen Strom erst an seinem Ursprung ins Auge faszte und dann bis zur Mündung ihm Stück für Stück folgte, sondern er steht gleichsam an seiner Quelle und überschaut den Strom von seinem Ursprung bis zu seiner fernen Mündung mit ein und demselben Blick."

[3] Some scholars have questioned the authenticity of passages which speak of human progress beyond the point of a return to

utilize the word "deification" in this description, as Gustaf Wingren notes, he does present that idea.[1] The movement is _telos_ directed. And, by virtue of the mediating function of the normative process it becomes possible to ascribe divinity to both the Father and the Son together with those whose destiny is shaped by the salvation which the dispensation of liberty effects:

> Since, therefore, this is sure and stedfast,
> that no other God or Lord was announced by
> the Spirit, except Him who, as God, rules
> over all, together with His Word, and those
> who receive the Spirit of adoption.[2]

By the increments of time those creatures marked by beginning, middle, and end points---to whose exigencies the redemptive process has been adapted---are made fit for the ascription

---

Adam's original situation. Andre Benoit (_Saint Irenee. Introduction a l'Etude de sa Theologie, op. cit._) thinks it illegitimate to thus link recapitulation with evolution or progress for the following two reason: 1) it detracts theologically from the force of the doctrine of original sin, since it implies that Adam was not created perfect but required progress and growth even prior to sin; 2) it is most strongly expressed in those passages which most clearly show Irenaeus' dependence upon other sources. (Benoit, pp. 277-233.)

[1] Wingren, _Man and the Incarnation_, op. cit., p. 209.

[2] Cum sit igitur hoc firmum et constans, neminem alterum Deum et Dominum a Spiritu praedicatum, nisi eum qui dominatur omnium Deus, cum Verbo suo, et eos qui adoptionis Spiritum accipiunt... A.h., Bk. IV, i, 1, p. 463 (p. 975). The frequent use of "Spirit" in this declaration bespeaks a Trinitarian preoccupation. Though Irenaeus characteristically thinks in terms of two---e.g., Creator and Saviour, God's two hands (see Jean Mambrino, "Les deux mains de Dieu dans l'oeuvre de saint Irenee," in _Nouvelle Revue Theologique_. Vol. LXXIX, No. 4, 1957, pp. 355-370---the dispensation of liberty itself

"deus".[1] Thus Irenaeus can declare: _Gloria enim Dei vivens homo_.[2]

> And therefore the creation is suited to man;
> for man was not made for its sake, but crea-
> tion for the sake of man.[3]

But such glory is man's only through the preservation of the framework, as the workmanship of God awaits the hand of the Maker in due season, at the time of increase.[4]

Freedom then consists in conformity to the normative process. Methodologically, it is entirely appropriate that this should be so. If one cannot supply a genetic account of a certain formation of thought on the basis of its contrast with another, one can indeed approach a methodological interpretation in that way. From the very outset, the contrast which Irenaeus seeks between normative Christian faith and the Gnostic and Marcionite-influenced innovations concerns the relation

---

refers to the work of the Spirit. Cf. Bk. V, xx, 2, p. 548.

[1] Commenting upon the false opinions of the heretics, Irenaeus writes: "...they are both ignorant of God's dispensations, and of the mystery of the resurrection of the just, and of the kingdom which is the commencement of incorruption, by means of which kingdom those who shall be worthy are accustomed gradually to partake of the divine nature." A.h. Bk. V, xxxii, 1, p. 561.

[2] A.h., Bk. IV, xx, 7, p. 490 (p. 1037).

[3] Et propter hoc conditio insumitur homini: non enim homo propter illam, sed conditio facta est propter hominem. A.h., Bk. V, xxix, 1, p. 558 (p. 1201).

[4] "Preservation of framework" is expressly mentioned by Irenaeus in Bk. IV, xxxix, 2, p. 523 (p. 1110): "But by preserving the framework thou shalt ascend to that which is perfect, for the moist clay which is in thee is hidden by the

137.

between what T. Andre Audet calls the <u>deux poles de toute
gravitation theologique</u>.[1] As opposed to a disjunction be-
tween the divine and the human, the Creator and the created
order, Irenaeus endeavors to establish a basis of coordina-
tion. As over against a separation between dispensations
and covenantal orders, Irenaeus argues for continuity. Both
"vertically" and "horizontally" Irenaeus' dominant interest
is in manifesting and establishing the comprehensiveness and
coherence of the order by which God determines the course of
the world. His principle of orientation is that very compre-
hensive process which refers both chronological distinctions
and differences in being to that concordance which is marked
by divine adaptation and human increase as befits a unitary
pattern. Irenaeus calls the manifestation of this fittingness
the dispensation of freedom. Freedom is to be located there
where the comprehensive process is exercised. That process is
the product of the simultaneous affirmations which Irenaeus'
belief in the oneness of God and the real status of the created
order compel him to make. Freedom is the name given the
directed tending of the process.

---

workmanship of God....If, then, thou shalt deliver up to Him
what is thine, that is, faith towards Him and subjection, thou
shalt receive His handiwork, and shalt be a perfect work of
God." A very helpful discussion of such passages is provided
by D. B. Reynders, "Optimisme et theocentrisme chez saint Ire-
nee," in <u>Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale</u>. Vol.
VIII, No. 3 (1936), pp. 225-252.

[1] T. Andre Audet, "Orientations theologiques chez Saint
Irenee," in <u>Traditio</u>. Vol. I, No. 1 (1943), p. 27.

138.

The principle of orientation serves as determinant in a very precise way. While it is calculated to comprehend the two dominant kinds of difference, it also seeks to maintain them. The Creator is maker while the creature is made. The creature is characterized by beginning, middle, and measure, while the Creator is the same and fills all things. These distinctions must be given status, though not such extension as to imply the positing of additional or alternative principles of orientation. This is in fact the charge against the Gnosticizers, i.e. that the mental disposition which proposes dominions beyond dominions---or principles in addition to principles---finally leaves one incapable of establishing any of these as a locus of origin. The mind no longer retains a resting point. Irenaeus instead will comprehend diversity within unity without thereby destroying either its reality or distinctiveness. Hence the comprehensive principle---which is identified with the normative process--- is ordered by a dialectical method. Neither change nor measure are annulled. Rather difference is established and regulated by the process which also comprehends it.

The comprehension of diversity within unity is achieved by time, by motion, and by gradations of increase. Time serves as the coordinant of the diversity which the process comprehends. God regulates the world---though He is not thereby ruled---by time and its increments. It is time which fixes the distinction between Creator and created order. It is also

139.

time which provides the mediation of that distinction. Time supports both aspects (both the continuity and the separation) of the relationship between God and the world. And, yet, it is by the increase of time that separation yields to union. By time, the dispensation is not an apparent endless series of dominions, but rather a purpose-directed succession within one and the same and the only dominion which is God's. By the dialectic within that comprehensive process, such succession is also progress, advancement, and a tending toward perfection.

Freedom is the name for it. Freedom is that regulative motion which is characterized by the increments of time. Freedom is the process, and it is conformity to that process. Freedom is the way in which fulfillment is achieved, born and nurtured by union with the law-like presence of the dispensational arrangements. Freedom is that directed tending toward perfection through subjection to a normative comprehensive pattern wherein Creator and created are distinct though mediated by growth and the increments of time. In formulating this concept, Irenaeus has reflected the characteristics of a systematic pattern whose principle of orientation is comprehensive and synthetic, and whose interest of reason is the specification of the way in which difference is made to cohere within a totality.

This was not a random mob of ideas, united
only by the fact that, in some mysterious
fashion, one man could believe all these
things at the same time. Yet these were not
tin soldiers either, who stayed in line be-
cause they were tin and had no life. These
were living ideas, deployed in as orderly a
fashion as their military purpose required,
held together by the discipline of a common
source, and a common master. If this was
not systematic theology, we may well need
another and a better term.[1]

Luther's principal work can only be appre-
ciated in the context of this increasing ob-
scurity of the original tradition amidst a
labyrinth of rival authorities.[2]

The conceptual pattern which Martin Luther's Tractatus

de Libertate Christiani exhibits does not exemplify systema-

tisation as this was originally understood in the Kantian

Critique. The interest of reason is clearly not the unifi-

cation of the totality of things by means of a principle of

orientation which serves as the basis of homogeneity or syn-

thesis. The direction is rather the opposite. Luther intends

to locate and specify the substantial core, the irreducible

---

[1] Jaroslav J. Pelikan, Luther the Expositor. Companion
Volume to Martin Luther Works (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1959), p. 45.

[2] John M. Headley, Luther's View of Church History (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 78.

141.

point of reference. This outlook, in language appropriate to conceptual analysis, is "meroscopic" rather than "holoscopic".[1] Its intention is to discriminate, isolate, and establish an irreducible basis for construction rather than to demonstrate likenesses and affinities. The interest in the particular rather than in the comprehensive does not prohibit Luther's essay from qualifying as an example of systematisation however. As the analysis which follows will illustrate, systematisation from this perspective requires two distinct steps. First, the Reformer reduces the scope of his concern to those core elements which can qualify as unalterable bases of stability. The second task requires an indication of the relation between such discriminated core elements. A unique "system" is the product, one which the discussion of freedom both inspires and discloses.[2]

---

[1] "Holoscopic" and "meroscopic" are terms coined by Professor McKeon to refer to two distinctive, alternative methods of approach. The "holoscopic" method begins with the totality and then refers part to whole. The "meroscopic" method begins with the part, either to isolate it or to use it as a basis of constructing the whole. Contrary to Irenaeus' method of approach, Luther seizes upon the irreducible part: the way in which coherence is then achieved is an illustration of the use of a "meroscopic" method. See Richard McKeon, Thought, Action, and Passion, op. cit., pp. 85-88.

[2] By utilizing "freedom" in the way specified in Part I of this treatise, and by restricting our analysis to one particular significant essay, we are attempting to circumvent much of the range of issues associated with the question of Luther's theological method. For one, there is no opportunity in this way to utilize the essay as a criterion for measuring Luther's theological development. Excellent materials on that issue however include the following: Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951); Henri Strohl, L'Evolution religieuse de Luther jusqu'a 1515 (Paris:

The search for this indubitable substratum is announced in Luther's brief chronological review of his struggle with those who have opposed him (as presented in the preface to the Tractatus) in the "Open Letter to Pope Leo X". The rehearsal of this conflict is in no sense to be understood as mere introduction to what follows in the essay, but rather

---

Librairie Istra, 1922); Edgar M. Carlson, The Reinterpretation of Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1948); Lennart Pinomaa, Der existentielle Character der Theologie Luthers (Helsinki: 1940); Heinrich Boehmer, Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research, trans. E. S. G. Potter (London: G. Bellard Sons, 1930); Karl A. Meissinger, Der katholische Luther (Munich: L. Lehnen, 1952); Preserved Smith, "A Decade of Luther Study," in Harvard Theological Review. Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1921), pp. 107-135; Ernst Bizer, Fides ex Auditu. Eine Untersuchung über die Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther (Kaiserswerth: Kurt Wolff, 1958). Nor does such an analytical and critical approach need to depend upon an assessment of the extent to which Luther's theology shows dependence upon philosophical nominalism. Were this a genetic account, we would make more of the obvious correlation between Luther's attempt to isolate the normative and the dissolution of the divine-human continuity in the nominalist reaction to the scholastic synthesis. It would also appear that certain methodological affinities are present, for example, in the dialectics of the powers of absoluta and ordinata (as in nominalist theology) and Luther's "bipolar" approach. Significantly, these possible bases of comparison and contrast, and others, have been utilized to produce conflicting conclusions concerning Luther's dependence---if dependence it is---upon the nominalist precursors. Bengt Hägglund (in Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Occamistischen Tradition: Luthers Stellung zur Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheiten. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1956) argues that while Luther gained initial guidance and stimulation from his nominalist instructors he nevertheless diverged from them so sharply as to render any remaining resemblances quite superficial. Paying particular attention to the contrast between the Occamist and Lutheran teaching on justification and the relation between theology and philosophy, Hägglund asserts that what first appear as minimal differences are seen on further examination to be evidences of a profound transformation of all theological methodology. (See also the following amplifications by Hägglund: "Was Luther a Nominalist," in Concordia Theological

143.

indicates something of the foundation the Reformer seeks in
clarifying his own position. Here he provides a summary of
the reasons for his repeated criticism of those who have of-
ficially advocated the Roman cause---men like Sylvester,

Monthly. Vol. XXVIII, No. 6, 1957, pp. 441-452; "The Background
of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology,"
in Lutheran World. Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1961, pp. 24-46; see also
reviews of Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Oc-
camistischen Tradition by David Lofgren, in Lutheran World. Vol.
V, No. 3, 1958, pp. 305-309, and by Gordon Rupp, in The Journal
of Theological Studies. Vol. VIII, 1957, pp. 361-2.) On the
other hand, claims have also been made to refer many of the
dominant motifs in Reformation affirmation to nominalistic in-
fluence. Louis Bouyer, in his The Spirit and Forms of Protes-
tantism, trans. A. V. Littledale (Westminster: Newman Press,
1961), asserts that a Lutheran reticence concerning the doc-
trine of "participation" must be attributed (at least in part)
to its nominalist background. Variations on this interpreta-
tion are illustrated by C. Moeller and G. Philips, Grace et
Oecumenisme, op. cit; Robert Rouquette, "Du Protestantisme a
l'Eglise," in Etudes. Vol. 285, April 1955, pp. 109-114; Yngve
Brilioth, Eucharistic Faith and Practice, Evangelical and Catho-
lic (New York: Macmillan, 1931); for review of Roman Catholic
interpretation see Wilhelm Forster, "Die Ursachen der Reforma-
tion im Lichte der neueren kirchengeschichtlichen Literatur,"
in Wissenschaft und Weisheit. Vol. XVIII, 1955, pp. 122-136.
Pertinent literature on this issue also includes: Wilhelm Link,
Das Ringen Luthers um die Freiheit der Theologie von der Philo-
sophie (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1955); George Lindbeck,
"Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as Illustrated by Pierre
D'Ailly on Predestination and Justification," in Harvard Theo-
logical Review. Vol. LII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 43-60; Heiko A.
Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Atten-
tion to its Relation to the Renaissance," in Harvard Theological
Review. Vol. LIII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 47-76; Oberman, "'Facienti-
bus Quod In Se Est Deus Non Denegat Gratiam.' Robert Holcot, O.P.
and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," in Harvard Theological
Review. Vol. LV, No. 4 (1962), pp. 317-342; Oberman, The Harvest
of Medieval Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963);
Paul Vignaux, Nominalisme au XIVe Siecle (Paris: Librairie J.
Vrin, 1948); Francis Oakley, "Pierre D'Ailly and the Absolute
Power of God: Another Note on the Theology of Nominalism," in
Harvard Theological Review. Vol. LVI, No. 1 (1963), pp. 59-73.
Since the focus of our comparative analysis is not Luther and
the nominalists but rather Luther with Thomas and Irenaeus, we
list this relevant material and suggest a methodological exami-
nation which could also be applied to these particular instances

144.

Karl Miltitz, Cajetan, and John Eck. Though his sharp and unequivocal rejection of that cause reaches to the point of condemning the Curia as already lost---Christiani sunt qui Romani non sunt[1]---Luther is careful nevertheless to restrict that reiterated criticism to papal representatives: it does not, and never did, reach to Leo personally. Instead Leo is "a lamb in the midst of wolves", a "Daniel in the midst of lions", and even an Ezekiel among scorpions.[2] Therefore it is with Leo (or with the image Luther would want Leo to retain) that the Reformer seeks to stand in opposition to all whose actions and words corrupt the Roman See. Soberly and

---

of coherent reflection, i.e. one which proceeds by discovering principle and method. It is not our purpose herein to discover the source of the distinctiveness of Luther's theological formulation, nor to assess the relative influences of possible sources. One might, for example, contrast nominalistic influence with the significance of Luther's vocation as a biblical exegete. (See J. Pelikan, Luther the Expositor, op. cit; Karl Bauer, Die Wittenberger Universität Theologie und die Anfänge der deutschen Reformation. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928; Gerhard Ebeling, "Evangelische Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung zu Luthers Hermeneutik," in Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus. Series 10, No. 1, 1942; Ebeling, "Word of God and Hermeneutics," in G. Ebeling, Word and Faith, trans. James W. Leitch. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963, pp. 305-332; Kemper Fullerton, "Luther's Doctrine and Criticism of Scripture," in Bibliotheca Sacra. Vol. LXIII, 1960, pp. 1-34, 284-99; B. A. Gerrish, "Biblical Authority and the Continental Reformation," in Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. X, No. 4, 1957, pp. 337-60; Paul L. Lehmann, "The Reformer's Use of the Bible," in Theology Today. Vol. III, 1947, pp. 328-44; J. K. S. Reid, The Authority of Scripture: A Study of the Reformation and Post-Reformation Understanding of the Bible. New York: Harper, 1957.) We are content simply with a descriptive account of an implicit methodology.

[1] D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe; Weimar, 1883, Vol. 7, p. 45, line 19.

[2] Ibid., p. 44, lines 19-20.

145.

unambiguously Luther attempts in this treatise to set forth
a summary statement of his position to aid in establishing
the conditions upon which the Pope also might be led to in-
tervene in the controversy for purposes of peace.

The comprehensiveness of the subject matter has been es-
tablished: Luther states that it contains nothing less than
"the whole of Christian life in a brief form".[1] After recal-
ling that it is impossible to write of faith unless one is
acquainted with its power during time of tribulation (thus
once again referring to the attempt to secure a foundation
point amidst turmoil) Luther sets forth two fundamental but
contradictory theses:

> A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all,
> subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly
> dutiful servant of all, subject to all.[2]

The contradictoriness implied in subjecting a Christian to all
and to none, in referring to him as perfectly free lord of all
and perfectly dutiful servant of all, is given a Biblical pre-
cedent. Luther notes that Paul has written: "though I am free
from all men, I have made myself a slave to all" (I.Cor. 9.19).

---

[1] ...parva res est, si corpus spectes, sed summa (nisi
fallor) vitae christianae compendio congesta, si sententiam
captes. WA 7, p. 48, lines 35,6, and p. 49, line 1.

[2] Christianus homo omnium dominus est liberrimus, nulli
subiectus. Christianus homo omnium servus est officiosissimus,
omnibus subiectus. WA 7, p. 49, lines 22-25.

146.

Paul had also referred to the Christ who 'being in the form of God assumed the form of a servant' (Phil. 2:6-7). That this contradictoriness is to be both acknowledged and retained would indicate that Luther is seeking the means whereby the two declarations can be harmonized at no expense to the tension which their simultaneous expression demands.[1]

With only these preliminary clues it is nevertheless evident that whatever subject matter is discussed will refer in some way to one or the other (or their interrelation) of the two theses. Both of them are to be maintained. Their simultaneous maintenance, together with the contradiction which their author attests they form, will have some formative influence upon the resulting discussion. At this stage, however, Luther has not yet indicated in what way the two theses will be utilized.

---

[1] Nor is this approach via contradictory statements unique to Luther's _Tractatus_ de _Libertate_ _Christiani_. In his _Disputation_ _Concerning_ _Man_, for example, Luther begins his argument with a distinction between the philosophical definition of man and that provided in the Holy Scriptures. (See "The Disputation Concerning Man," in _Luther's_ _Works_. _Vol_. _XXXIV_. _Career_ _of_ _the_ _Reformer_ _IV_, trans. Lewis W. Spitz. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960, p. 137 ff.) In the same way, Luther begins his _Disputation_ _Concerning_ _Justification_ by attempting to establish a fundamental distinction, as follows: "that the method of justifying man before God must be distinguished from the method of justifying him before man." (See "The Disputation Concerning Justification," in _Luther's_ _Works_. _Vol_. _XXXIV_. _Career_ _of_ _the_ _Reformer_ _IV_, trans. Lewis W. Spitz. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960, Thesis 1, p. 151.) Thereupon the second thesis contrasts _coram_ deo and _coram_ hominibus (p. 151). In the commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, Luther begins by noting that Paul's concern is that we "know the difference

147.

Then, quite abruptly, and almost as a radical shift in
focus, Luther asks to speak of "something more remote from
our subject but more obvious".[1] His task then becomes the
description of the bipolar nature of man. Man, Luther states,
is both spiritual and bodily, and at one and the same time.
When reference is being made to the spiritual nature, man is
to be called inner or new man. When reference is being made
to man's bodily nature, he is to be called carnal, external,
or old man:

> Homo enim duplici constat natura, spirituali
> et corporali: iuxta spiritualem, quam dicunt
> animam, vocatur spiritualis, interior, novus
> homo, iuxta corporalem, quam carnem dicunt,
> vocatur carnalis, exterior, vetus homo.[2]

But the shift from the initial contradictory theses con-
cerning lordship and servanthood to a description of the nature
of man is not really as abrupt as it might appear to the reader.
It becomes evident that the tension between the contradictory
theses is to be referred (if possible to be explicated by) man's
bipolar nature:

---

between Christian righteousness and all other righteousness."
(See Luther's Works. Vol. XXVI, Lectures on Galatians, trans.
Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963,
p. 4.) Then in setting forth another summary of his own theo-
logy, Luther writes as follows: "This is our theology, by which
we teach a precise distinction between these two kinds of
righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality
and faith, works and grace, secular society and religion may
not be confused. Both are necessary, but both must be kept
within their limits" (p. 7).

[1] WA 7, p. 50, line 5.

[2] WA 7, p. 50, lines 5-8.

148.

> Because of this diversity of nature the Scrip-
> tures assert contradictory things concerning
> the same man, since these two men in the same
> man contradict each other.[1]

Not yet has it been made known how the "contradictory things"
are to be referred to the "contradictory man", nor even the
extent or range of either contradiction. But in some speci-
fic sense Luther is seeking a basis upon which the relation[2]
of bipolarity can be articulated so as to apply in either the
apparent variety of situations of which it is characteristic,
or in the variety of forms which it is able to assume.

The essay itself is divided into two major parts. The
two major portions of the essay are given to a specification
and description of these two _men_ which Luther calls _homo
spiritualis_ and _homo_ _carnalis_. The task is undertaken pri-
marily by means of establishing the obligations, responsi-
bilities, and characteristics ascribed to each man in con-
trast with the other. And yet the assessment of these res-
pective features presupposes that the intention is a discus-
sion of that which is necessary to, and required by, the two
homines. Indeed, such needs and that which needs require
can only be enumerated after the relation between things (ex-
ternal and inner) and men (external and inner) is established.

---

[1] WA 7, p. 50, lines 10-11.

[2] "Relation" however may be the wrong word. In Luther's
Disputation _Concerning_ _Justification_ (op. cit., p. 159) a dis-
tinction is set forth between "relation" and "contradiction":

Things are required by men, but in a way which only the two
sets of relations of external to inner can specify.

The elucidation which follows is a clear exhibition of
discrimination, isolation, and analysis. Luther states quite
axiomatically that external things have no influence whatever
in producing that which is needed by the inner man; nor, in-
deed, do they even supply anything which could be regarded as
appropriate to those needs.[1] External things do not "touch"
the inner man, nor could they with any effectiveness. The
kind of thing which does touch the inner man with effective-
ness is a spiritual reality. And, just as external things
do not apply toward spiritual necessities, so too is a spiri-
tual thing misapplied if directed toward external necessities.

At this stage in the argument one major assertion has
been made. Assuming things (in Luther's prescribed sense) to
be that which is required by man, the Reformer has stated that
spiritual things alone apply to spiritual man. Put in the
negative, the assertion requires two statements: 1) external
things do not apply to spiritual man; and 2) spiritual things

---

"...man is not existence or a positive element of justification.
Nor are his works able to justify man, but God is his justifica-
tion and God alone justifies, not man. It is therefore a con-
tradiction, not a relation."

1 ...nullam prorsus rerum externarum, quocdnque censean-
tur nomine, aliquid habere momenti ad iustitiam aut libertatem
Christianam, sicut nec ad iniustitiam aut servitutem parandam,
quod inductione facili persuadetur. WA 7, p. 50, lines 15-17.

150.

do not apply to external man. To misapply thing to need in either of two possible ways is to fail to understand the nature of man.

Having stated this thesis, Luther proceeds by supplying an identification of that inner thing which is alone appropriate to inner human necessity:

> One thing, and only one thing, is necessary
> for Christian life, righteousness, and free-
> dom. That one thing is the most holy Word of
> God, the gospel of Christ...[1]

It is the Word of God, i.e. "the Gospel of God concerning his Son who was made flesh, suffered, rose from the dead, and was glorified through the Spirit who sanctifies,"[2] which is necessary to the inner man. Luther, however, does not merely provide a precise location of that thing which is necessary to homo spiritualis. He also ascribes a strict exclusiveness to it. It is not only the needful thing, but is indeed the one thing needful. He had prefigured it in the following declaration: "One thing and only one thing is necessary for Christian life, righteousness, and freedom." Now it becomes more precise:

> Therefore it is clear that, as the soul needs
> only the Word of God for its life and righteous-
> ness, so it is justified by faith alone and not

---

[1] Una re eaque sola opus est ad vitam, iustitiam et libertatum Christianam. Ea est sacrosanctum verbum dei, Euangelium Christi... WA 7, p. 50, lines 33-35.

[2] ...Euangelium dei de filio suo incarnato, passo, resus-citato, et glorificatio per spiritum sanctificatorem. WA 7, p. 51, lines 14-15.

> any works; for if it could be justified by
> anything else, it would not need the Word,
> and consequently it would not need faith.[1]

The first (and, at this stage, the only) stable core element has been discovered: the Word of God which is received and cherished by faith.

It is not simply the case, however, that _homo spiritualis_ can rely only upon an inner instead of an external thing for his justification. The rigor of Luther's exclusiveness is not exhausted either by the fact that there is but one spiritual thing which is of necessity to the spiritual man. No, beyond that, that one spiritual thing, i.e. the Word of God as apprehended by faith, is itself necessary only to the spiritual man. Thus one can say that the Word alone is necessary, and, also, that the Word is alone necessary. Nor is such exclusiveness modified by Luther's contention that the Word includes and contains within its productivity all spiritual things which are appropriate to the spiritual life. If the soul has the Word, without which it has nothing at all, it also has all other spiritual necessities.[2]

---

[1] Ideo clarum est, ut solo verbo anima opus habet ad vitam et iustitiam, ita sola fide et nullis operibus iustificatur. Si enim alio quopiam iustificari posset, verbo non haberet opus, ac per hoc nec fide. WA 7, p. 51, lines 21-24.

[2] Animam posse omnibus rebus carere excepto verbo dei, sine quo nullis prorsus rebus est illi consultum. Habens autem verbum dives est, nullius egens, cum sit verbum vitae, veritatis, lucis, pacis, iustitiae, salutis, gaudii,

152.

The implications from the exclusive necessity of the Word can be set forth in more schematic fashion. Luther speaks of the three _virtutes_ or powers which issue from a rightful appropriation of the Word by the inner man. The first of these reaffirms the release of the inner man from any necessary dependence upon externals in the form of the law or good works. Significantly, it is at this point that Luther chooses to deal with the question concerning the place of the law, works, and ceremonies which the Holy Scriptures prescribe. He is aware that this is a crucial point, one which it is necessary to clarify in order that his thesis be not charged with inconsistency, inadequacy, or error. Earlier he had acknowledged no fixed rules for the interpretation of the Bible. Now he introduces a distinction within the Scriptures between commandments and promises.[1] The commandment (the teaching of the good things that ought to be done) cannot bring life since it provides no vitality to enable

---

.libertatis, sapientiae, virtutis, gratiae, gloriae et omnis boni inaestimabiliter. WA 7, p. 50, line 40, and p. 51, lines 1-3. One may note that it appears that Luther will make no determined effort to distinguish between spiritual things, which, under the Word are applied to the inner man.

[1] WA 7, p. 52 line 20 ff. The referral of the distinction between inner and external to the Scriptural distinction between commands and promises is a characteristic practice in Luther's writings. In his Galatians Commentary (op. cit., p. 115) he writes as follows: "Therefore whoever knows well how to distinguish the Gospel from the Law should give thanks to God and know that he is a real theologian...The way to distinguish the one from the other is to locate the Gospel in heaven and the Law on earth, to call the righteousness of the Gospel heavenly and divine and the righteousness of the Law

one to do what it teaches (<u>virtutem faciendi non donant</u>).[1]
The commandment functions instead to disclose man to himself,
making him aware of his helplessness and his inability to
satisfy the law. Man is rendered helpless because none of
the things which he could produce can be identified with the
Word and its receptivity by faith: that which is alone neces-
sary. Such receptivity is occasioned in turn, however, by
the realization of the nature of both the demand and that by
which the demand is met. Then, and only then, do the promises
of the Scripture come to one's aid. In Christ one receives
all those things which he inordinantly attempts to achieve by
means of fulfilling the law. All things depend upon faith
through which all things are bestowed. Hence Luther can say:

> Thus the promises of God give what the com-
> mandments of God demand and fulfil what the
> law prescribes so that all things may be
> God's alone, both the commandments, and the
> fulfilling of the commandments. He alone
> commands, he alone fulfils...No good work
> can rely upon the Word of God or live in
> the soul, for faith alone and the Word of
> God rule in the soul.[2]

---

earthly and human and to distinguish as sharply between the
righteousness of the Gospel and that of the Law as God dis-
tinguishes between heaven and earth or between light and dark-
ness or between day and night. Let the one be like the light
and the day and the other like the darkness and the night. If
we could only put an even greater distance between them."

[1] WA 7, p. 52, line 27.

[2] Sic promissa dei hoc donant, quod praecepta exigunt,
et implent quod lex iubet, ut sint omnia solius dei, tam
praecepta et plenitudo eorum. Ipse solus praecipit, solus

154.

The all-sufficiency of the Word for the necessities of homo spiritualis produces the second and third virtutes. These deal with topics of rightful authority, in the one case, and with transfer of ownership. The appropriation of the Word by the inner man enables an obedient ascription of all things to God. This is an evidence of one's trust, the very highest of one's worship, and serves to glorify one's righteousness: faith works truth and righteousness by giving God what belongs to him.[1] And using the image of the marriage relationship to illustrate the character of the exchange of possessions, Luther states that Christ, the bridegroom, takes upon himself the things of the bride as he, again simultaneously, bestows upon her the things that are his.[2]

The first two virtutes derive readily from the fundamental thesis. The release of the spiritual man from dependence upon external things can be counted as a recognition that external things do not apply to spiritual man. Also, the appropriation of the necessary inner thing by homo spiritualis, as a proper ascription of all things to God, is a reaffirmation of the theme

quoque implet....quia nullum opus adherere verbo dei nec in anima esse potest, sola autem fides et verbum in ea regnant. WA 7, p. 53, lines 11-13, and 25-26.

1 Fides enim facit veritatem et iustitiam, reddens deo suum... WA 7, p. 54, lines 23-24.

2 Note that Luther frequently uses the image of the marriage partnership in speaking of the transfer of ownership which the apprehension of the Word of God by faith achieves. In his essay

155.

that spiritual things alone apply to spiritual man. But the
third _virtus_ involves something more. By faith the things
that are Christ's are given to the soul, as the things which
are the soul's are given to Christ. The things that were the
soul's before its identification with Christ are swallowed up:
Christ suffered, died, and descended into hell that he might
overcome them all. Therefore, by means of the transfer of
ownership there can be an identity of principle. The entire
transaction and resulting communion is referred to the form
of the One who is both God and servant of men.

In reference to the third _virtus_ Luther states that the
commandments are fulfilled by faith and not by works.[1] This
implies not only that external things cannot be applied ef-
ficaciously to inner necessities, but also, as Luther puts it,
that faith "is the righteousness of the Christian".[2] In the

_____

on _Two Kinds of Righteousness_ (in _Luther's Works_. Vol. XXXI,
Career of the Reformer I, ed. Harold J. Grimm, trans. Lowell
J. Satre. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957, p. 297), when
dealing with the relationship between Christ and the one jus-
tified by the alien righteousness, Luther writes: "Therefore a
man can with confidence boast in Christ and say: 'Mine are
Christ's living, doing, and speaking, his suffering and dying,
mine as much as if I had lived, done, spoken or suffered, and
died as he did.' Just as a bridegroom possesses all that is
his bride's and she all that is his---for the two have all
things in common because they are one flesh---so Christ and
the church are one spirit."

[1] WA 7, p. 56, lines 4-5.

[2] Hoc nomine fides sola est iustitia Christiani hominis
et omnium praeceptorum plenitudo. WA 7, p. 56, lines 5-6.

156.

same context he speaks of the kingdom in which God reigns as a spiritual imperium.[1] This declaration traces the spiritual-external bipolarity beyond the perspective of human orientation to the very character of the activity of God. It also demonstrates the cosmic dimensions of that bipolarity: Luther is concerned not simply to discover a stable basis of authority and activity against the criticisms and threats of human and ecclesiastical judgment, but also one which is able to withstand celestial and spiritual forces, principalities, and powers.

Freedom is called justification, therefore, and is equated with the righteousness which issues through faith from the appropriation of the Word.[2] More particularly, freedom denotes the effective release with respect to external demands. Man is unshackled from illegitimate claims and misdirected intentions. Freedom involves appropriate referral, the ability to distinguish mandates from promises, and the limits which establish boundaries between idolatry and devotion.

> Enough now of freedom. As you see, it is a
> spiritual and true freedom and makes our
> hearts free from all sins, laws and commands,
> as Paul says, I Tim. 1 "The Law is not laid
> down for the just." It is more excellent
> than all other liberty, which is external,
> as heaven is more excellent than earth.[3]

---

[1] WA 7, p. 56, lines 21-26.

[2] The equating of freedom with righteousness occurs in WA 7, p. 50, lines 15-17.

[3] Et haec de libertate satis, quae, ut vides, spiritualis

157.

All this is implied in calling a Christian a free lord of all: "Since faith alone suffices for salvation, I need nothing except faith exercising the power and dominion of its own liberty."[1]

The treatment of _homo spiritualis_ exhausts but one aspect of the bipolarity implicit to the nature of man. Man is also (simultaneously and contradictorily) _homo carnalis_. Previously, in treating _homo spiritualis_, Luther provided a series of contrasts between that man and _homo carnalis_. Now he must describe and contrast the two men from the perspective of _homo carnalis_. This is not a mere repetition of the prior task. Indeed, by virtue of the nature of bipolarity, it constitutes a fresh vantage point. The total man cannot be known in his comprehensiveness except through the simultaneous perspectives of the two men which totality comprises. Neither of the men can be described except by reference to the other, since the character of the existence of the one is formed by his relation to the other. The vision from the one standpoint, however, is not identical to that from the other. Nor is totality simply the product of the composite. Each standpoint retains its own individual

---

veraque est, libera faciens corda nostra ab omnibus peccatis, legibus et mandatis, sicut dicit Paulus 1. Timo. 1. 'Lex iusto non est posita', quae superat omnes alias libertates externas, quantum coelum superat terram... WA 7, p. 69, lines 19-22.

[1] Nulla tamen mini opus est, cum sola fides sufficiat ad salutem, nisi quod fides in ea virtutem et imperium libertatis suae exerceat. Ecce haec est Christianorum inaestimabilis potentia et libertas. WA 7, p. 57, lines 20-23.

158.

comprehensiveness while dependent upon the other also for the fuller account. Since man is not <u>simply</u> (and not "not solely") <u>homo spiritualis</u>, Luther must proceed with the second but correlative affirmation: <u>the</u> <u>Christian</u> <u>is</u> <u>a</u> <u>perfectly</u> dutiful <u>servant</u> <u>of</u> <u>all</u>, <u>subject</u> <u>to</u> <u>all</u>.

But, as was the earlier discussion concerning the Scriptural injunctions to good works, this issue is posed in reply to a request for clarification, or, perhaps, in response to an innuendo of threatening criticism: if the Word and its apprehension by faith is all-sufficient for salvation, what place, service, function, or value can be given to external demands?[1] Is the necessity of such demands with respect to <u>homo</u> <u>carnalis</u> of the same kind as that which applies to the Word with respect to <u>homo</u> <u>spiritualis</u>? At stake in the question is the extent to which a treatment of <u>homo</u> <u>carnalis</u> requires the setting forth of a thesis which was not included in the discussion of <u>homo</u> <u>spiritualis</u>. Through the Word <u>homo</u> <u>spiritualis</u> receives justification. From that perspective it could only be an exercise in misdirection to speak of the value of good works. That would be to misconceive the propriety of external things, which in turn is coincident with a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of man. This, however, does not in itself invalidate good works or render them to be impossible. Instead Luther believes himself to have established the basis upon which their

---

[1] Si fides omnia facit et sola ad iustitiam satis est, cur ergo praecepta sunt bona opera? WA 7, p. 59, lines 26-27.

159.

propriety and necessity are established. One can interpret
the fundamental thesis, i.e. that spiritual things alone ap-
ply to spiritual man, to provide for the following: external
things apply to carnal man.

In a very precise sense, external requirements are to
homo carnalis what justification is to homo spiritualis. The
reasoning in this regard takes something of the following form.
Since good works are not required for justification (but solely
the Word of God apprehended through faith) one need not fear
that he lacks anything in the sight of God. The Christian, how-
ever, does not exist simply coram deo but also mortally and on
earth:

> Here the works begin; here a man cannot enjoy
> leisure; here he must indeed take care to dis-
> cipline his body by fastings, watchings, labors,
> and other reasonable discipline and to subject
> it to the Spirit so that it will obey and con-
> form to the inner man and faith.[1]

Hence because the Christian has been given all that is neces-
sary, he is both in a position, and possesses the goods, to pro-
vide for the needs of other men. He need not do this for the
purpose of satisfying demands. But because the necessary demand

---

1 Hic iam incipiunt opera: hic non est ociandum: hic certe
curandum, ut corpus ieiuniis, vigiliis, laboribus aliisque dis-
ciplinis moderatis exerceatur et spiritui subdatur ut homini
interiori et fidei obediat et conformis sit... WA 7, p. 60,
lines 2-5.

has been satisfied, the Christian has been freed to "submit his will to that of others in the freedom of love".[1]

The "addendum" with which the _Tractatus_ de _Libertate Christiani_ closes guards against possible misconceptions. Freedom, Luther warns, does not give license to do away with ceremonies, traditions, and human laws on the basis that these are not necessary to salvation. Again an aspect of the fundamental bipolar relation is invoked: those who find it possible to do away with rules and regulations and those who rely upon reverent observance are both victims of misdirection. Such ceremonies and laws are rather to be likened to the plans and models which builders and artisans utilize. Without such models nothing could be built. But this in itself does not qualify such aids to be made part of the permanent structure. It is the false estimate of their potency which becomes destructive of that bipolarity which must regulate even the place and function of such guidelines.

Hence the scheme 'external requirements are to _homo carnalis_ what justification is to _homo spiritualis_' does not give an accurate description unless it retains the tension implied in the affirmation: _homo est spiritualis-carnalis_. But even the use of the hyphen cannot capture the true nature of Luther's

---

[1] ...ut per haec non iustitiam, sed corporis sui subiectionem exerceret aliis in exemplum, qui et ipsi opus habent corporis sui castigatione, Deinde ut aliis dumtaxat obsequerentur ad eorum voluntatem gratuita charitate... WA 7, p. 67, lines 34-37.

conception of bipolarity unless it is able to denote a simultaneity within the totality: man, in his entirety, at one and the same time, is spiritual and carnal. It is precisely for this reason that _homo spiritualis-carnalis_ is justified by the Word alone. But then, lest one proceed without caution toward conceiving the bipolarity as a simultaneity of "modes" within the totality of one person, it becomes necessary to emphasize that man is ultimately either one or the other. For this reason the fulfillment of external demands finds as its spiritual purpose the subjection of the external to the inner. Freedom is both the effective release of the inner man from external demands through his appropriation of the Word and the establishment of a range of unrestricted activity for the external man. But the absence of restraint which characterizes the activity of the external man is the focus of the assertion that the Christian is a servant of all, subject to all. By means of an effective release from external demands the Christian's subjection to the needs of the neighbor can be described as the exercise of free activity. But the way in which lordship and servitude are both necessary to freedom becomes more clear when one puts the perspectives of _homo spiritualis_ and _homo carnalis_ together.

Luther began by advancing two admittedly contradictory theses: 1) a Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none; and 2) a Christian is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all. He asserts that both of the

162.

theses and their contradictoriness can be clarified by ref-
erence to a like contradiction, i.e. that which characterizes
the twofold nature of man. Man is both spiritual and carnal.
From there he announces that the clarification will be divided
into two parts: the inner man will be dealt with first, fol-
lowed by a discussion of the external man. Two working axioms
are presented and developed concerning the explication of inner
and external man: A) spiritual things alone apply to spiritual
man; and B) external things apply to external man. Thus far
Luther has set forth the following sets or kinds of ingredients
which comprise the necessary material for the discussion of the
Christian understanding of human freedom: two initial theses
concerning lordship and servitude; a declaration of the bipolar
nature of man; two axioms concerning the way in which the two
kinds of man relate (by faith or by works) to the two kinds of
things. The interpretation of freedom depends upon the way in
which theses, men and things, and axioms mutually imply and il-
lumine each other.

It is important to note that the theses cannot be equated
with the axioms. The declaration that "the Christian is a per-
fectly free lord of all" is not identical with the statement
that "spiritual things alone apply to spiritual man". Nor is
the declaration that "the Christian is a perfectly dutiful
servant of all" equivalent to the statement which is explicated
in the second portion of the essay, i.e. that "external things

apply to external man. In a very precise sense, however, the ability to make each declaration depends upon the establishment of each axiom. Nor is the relationship between axioms specified by either or both of the initial contradictory theses. Axiom "A" could be contradictory to Axiom "B", though the simultaneity which governs their presentation would argue against their mutual exclusiveness. Axioms "A" and "B" may be complementary, although the placing of them side-by-side does not by itself disclose in what way. Neither is the relation between theses supplied by either their simultaneous presentation or by their dependence upon axioms.

Finally neither the theses nor the axioms can be correlated except Luther specify the relation between spiritual and carnal which constitutes both the kinds of things there are and the kinds of man there are. The spiritual and the carnal are the determinants of all that comes within Luther's range of concern. The spiritual and the carnal designate the principles by which man is characterized, by which things are structured, and by which modes of appropriation are legislated. Freedom depends upon the way in which the spiritual and the carnal serve as determinants to characterize, structure, constitute, and legislate.

Luther had announced his intention as the presentation of a summary of the Christian faith. The summary was to be directed toward specifying the foundation not only upon which the

164.

faith rested but also upon which one could stand against the multiform criticism to which Luther (or the Christian) was being subjected. The essay seeks to assess legitimate and illegitimate forms of subjection. This in turn leads to an evaluation of the place in both the human and divine economies for lordship and servitude. But neither the assessment nor the evaluation can proceed until Luther has framed an answer to his dominant question: what is the one thing needful? It is only after he has discovered and established the one needful thing that he can delineate the relationship between men (spiritual and carnal), things (spiritual and external), and between men and things. The one needful thing will serve as Luther's principle of orientation, and his interest of reason will be reflected in his discrimination between kinds of things and men and in the selective priority which the singularity of his principle ascribes to one of them.

Luther finds the one thing needful from among the spiritual things. The Word of God is that needful thing which is alone necessary to the spiritual man. But in selecting the one thing needful from among spiritual things Luther is not discriminating primarily between the kinds of spiritual things there may be. Rather discrimination is exercised to differentiate the spiritual from the carnal: the Word of God contains (or implies) all other spiritual goods. The phrase "the Word alone" does not isolate one member from others of its kind but

165.

rather prevents mixture of kinds. It is inconceivable that
the Word would be identified as the principle of orientation
under Luther's prescribed interest and not be "Word alone".
The ascription "alone" marks the convergence of principle and
interest.

Yet this presentation would not be an example of systema-
tisation unless some further technique were available to serve
in the capacity originally assigned by Kant to affinity. When
utilized to discriminate and to specify the particular, the
principle of orientation cannot achieve the coherence in re-
flection which systematisation requires. Discrimination would
rule that freedom is destroyed when the spiritual and the car-
nal are mixed or confused. The opportunity to select one thing
as the principle of orientation requires another thing in dis-
tinction to which the one thing is made known. But systemati-
sation would demand that the relation between the one and the
other be articulated.

The pattern is given a variety of formulations. Luther
states that God rules in spiritual things and that earthly
things are also made subject to him.[1] The same sort of rela-
tionship is applied to homo spiritualis and homo carnalis; the
former receives the one thing needful to which (and to whom)

---

[1] In coelestibus et spiritualibus ipse regnat et conse-
crat, quae sunt Iustitia, veritas, sapientia, pax, salus, etc.
Non quod non omnia etiam terrena et inferna subiecta sint ei
...sed quod non in iis nec ex iis regnum eius constet. WA 7,
p. 56, lines 21-26.

166.

the latter is subjected. A basis of priority is established
between them according as the one needful thing is put in re-
lation to that which is also necessary. External things can-
not be used to satisfy spiritual demands, but external things
are also required. At the same time, the necessity with res-
pect to external things does not nullify the ascription of
"necessary alone" to spiritual things. Indeed, the relation
between spiritual and carnal is an asymmetrical one.[1] Asym-
metrical bipolarity is the form of coherence in which these
two determinative poles stand with respect to each other. Each
is necessary not only to the relation and to coherence but to
the determination of men and things. Yet in the bipolarity the
carnal is subjected to the spiritual which is alone necessary.
The "alone necessary" and the "also necessary" are mediated by
the asymmetry which locates lordship and servanthood. Asymmetry
characterizes the relation between the simple (isolated and un-
complex) principle and that other locus of determination which
it also regulates.

Freedom therefore implies an exercise in arbitrating ten-
sion. It requires the establishing of two loci of power and
authority together with an assessment of their proper and il-
legitimate claims upon and services toward each other. The

---

[1] W. H. Werkmeister, in An Introduction to Critical Thinking
(Lincoln, Nebraska: Johnsen Publishing Company, 1948), p. 264,
defines asymmetrical relation as follows: "Relations are said to
be asymmetrical when they are of such nature that if A stands in

goal of freedom is unrestrained activity. By insulating the
spiritual against the many possible forms of alien incursion
and compulsion, Luther has demonstrated a way in which the
quest for the one thing needful can be utilized as a basis
for the ascription of all things to God as is most justly
due. God reigns in spiritual things yet carnal things are
also made subject to Him. Jesus Christ came in the form of
God and in the form of a servant. This is the pattern of
the asymmetry which also informs the simultaneous presence
of natures in homo spiritualis-carnalis. Hence, Luther can
define man as justified by faith.[1] Freedom is justification
as established by appropriate referral viz-a-viz the deter-
minant loci of men and things. And the uniqueness of Luther's
account is that coherence is effected from an irreducible but
simple and particular point of reference by means of a form
of asymmetry which regulates the bipolar relation between
that principle and that which is also determinative.

---

a given relation to B, B cannot possibly stand in the same re-
lation to A." We shall elucidate the form of asymmetry which
appears to characterize Christian theological systematisation
in the summary chapter of this treatise.

[1] Luther defines man in just this way in The Disputation
Concerning Man (in Luther's Works. Vol. XXXIV. Career of the
Reformer IV, trans. Lewis W. Spitz. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg
Press, 1960, pp. 133-144): "Paul in Romans 3, 'We hold that a
man is justified by faith apart from works,' briefly sums up
the definition of man, saying, 'Man is justified by faith.'"
(Thesis No. 32, p. 139.)

III

> The Thomist synthesis is enormously impres-
> sive. It skillfully combines diverse tradi-
> tions, integrating within a Christian frame-
> work the Aristotelian sensitivity to the par-
> ticular and the concrete with the participa-
> tionist emphasis on the unity of all in and
> through the divine being.[1]

When one turns from Luther's exposition of freedom to
its treatment by Thomas Aquinas he is aware of having been
transported into a new environment. No longer is the tem-
per an impassioned plea for a sympathetic hearing to that
which is presented as a summary of conviction. Left behind
are the many references to the historic situation, the con-
crete struggle which has prompted this attempt to clarify a
central issue. Instead one is confronted with a methodical,
calculated, reasoned deliberation which proceeds by assessing
possible answers to what are regarded as significant ques-
tions. The significance of those questions is based not only
upon the interest and concern they evoke from the age in
which they are posed, but also upon their integrative ability
to provide a pattern of development which, when followed in

---

[1] George Lindbeck, "Participation and Existence in the
Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas," in Franciscan Studies.
Vol. XVII, No. 2 and 3 (1957), p. 125.

169.

step-by-step progression, gives access to a unified perspec-
tive on the world.

And yet one cannot simply adjudge the difference between
the respective approaches of Luther and Thomas to be the for-
mer's "existential involvement" as opposed to the latter's
technique of treating the concept of freedom by implication
within the more fundamental task of articulating a pattern of
theological reflection. On the contrary, each spokesmen would
regard the matter as central to the exposition of the Chris-
tian faith, though alternative literary forms are chosen for
that exposition. Luther, as noted, can label his work "a sum-
mary in brief form". Thomas, while not giving it such stressed
attention, does include it as essential to the ultimate purpose
of all human activity. But we shall return to a more detailed
comparative analysis of the two positions after examining the
fundamental lines of the Thomistic approach. For this we have
chosen to discuss Thomas' development of the concept of human
freedom as presented in his _Summa Theologica_ (_Prima Secundae_)
in the section "De Voluntario et Involuntario".[1]

The development of freedom is preceded by a discussion of
the relation between Parts I and II of the _Summa Theologica_.
Thomas states that both deal fundamentally with the relation

---

[1] S. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae._
from Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera
Omnia. Tomus II, text of Petri Fiaccadori (New York: Musurgia
Publishers, 1948).

170.

between God and the world. However, generally speaking, the
first part of the _Summa_ deals primarily with God as _exemplar_
whose _image_, man, becomes the focal point of the second por-
tion. Thus man will herein be treated in relation to God,
and as a being who is in some sense the principle of his ac-
tions, the possessor of free will. The reader who is given
direction by which to perceive the continuity between parts
of the _Summa_ is also aware of the logical precedent for
treating both man and God as related yet individual points
of focus. The _analogia entis_ requires that neither God nor man
can be approached or described except in terms of the other.
A description of man will therefore demand a method which pro-
vides access to his fundamental uniqueness, and, at the same
time, insures that that uniqueness be referred to man's rela-
tion to God. In the development which follows Thomas makes
it quite clear also that man's relation to God, _ex hypothesi_,
involves a specific relation to other creatures.

The discussion of freedom is directly preceded in the more
comprehensive consideration of human activity by a treatise on
man's last end. Thus the _telos_ which, for Aristotle, had been
the means by which change is accounted for, becomes the way in
which Thomas approaches an understanding of the human creature.
To understand man's _telos_ is also to understand that in which
his happiness consists. The Good is that which ultimately
brings fulfillment, satisfaction, or beatitude.

171.

> Therefore the thing itself which is desired
> as end is that which constitutes happiness,
> and makes man happy.[1]

Every agent, therefore, acts for an end. The end is that by which a thing is determined and that by which it is understood.

At the outset, then, Thomas sketches the framework of thought which will be filled in in succeeding paragraphs in greater detail. He makes it clear, for example, that explanation will always be teleological, that description will always utilize causal terminology, and hence that motion will serve as the means by which fulfillment, or happiness, is achieved. Such motion occurs within nature which is itself the totality of sensible objects in which articulation and the reduction of potentiality to actuality are achieved by teleological motivation.[2]

---

[1] Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit. S.T. II, I, Q.ii, Art. vii, p. 11.

[2] This definition of nature is taken by Thomas from Book II of Aristotle's _Physica_. (See _The Basic Works of Aristotle_, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941, pp. 236-238, and Thomas' discussion of this definition in St. Thomas Aquinas, _Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics"_, trans. Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, pp. 69-76.) In her "The Meaning of 'Nature' in the Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature," in _The Thomist_. Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1961), pp. 383-401, Sheilah O'Flynn Brennan discusses the variety of meanings which Aristotle gave to the term "nature". The term can refer to the entire system of inter-related active and passive potencies. More usually, nature denotes the principle of movement. But this can refer to either matter or form, since both are principles of motion.

172.

Much of the story is already told therefore in the forecasting of the task at hand. In no conceivable way, Thomas has asserted, can human happiness exist apart from human activity. Such activity is not only constitutive of purposeful motivation, but, by that, also of life itself. As there is the universal and the particular in being, so too is there a universal and particular in action. The discovery of proper human action comes by establishing that which is particular to the human agent as distinct from that which is universal in all activity. And freedom, in a precise sense, depends upon a specification of the range of action appropriate to the human agent with respect to the attainment of his ultimate good.

It is appropriate also that the sequence of thought moves from a discussion of man's _telos_ to an examination of the character of the acts proper to man. This would imply that an awareness of the former is logically prior to a specification of the latter, that the _telos_ is established and thus not created by specific acts. While the good is that which all men desire, they desire it in fact because it is good.[1] This,

---

To make the situation more complex, there are varieties of motion concerning which nature is principle. Nature is then principle of movement in the variety of situations where this is appropriate. See also Joseph de Tonquedec, _La Philosophie de la Nature_ (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1959).

[1] Etienne Gilson, in _The Elements of Christian Philosophy_ (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 267, discusses the statement

however, does not imply that the achievement of happiness issues from indiscriminant human action. On the contrary, since

> happiness is to be gained by means of certain
> acts, we must as a consequence consider human
> acts in order to know by what acts we may ob-
> tain happiness, and by what acts we are pre-
> vented from obtaining it.[1]

Since not every human sequence of action is conducive to hap- piness, one must be given criteria by which to separate those which are from those which are detrimental and preventive.[2]

There are two kinds of motion: self-movement and movement by another. There are two kinds of activity: voluntary and in- voluntary.[3] The distinction between kinds of beings can be referred to the distinction between kinds of motion and be- tween kinds of action. That which distinguishes man from other

---

"the good is what all things desire" as follows: "What it says is true, but one should not understand it, as many feel tempted to do, as if it meant that good is such because all things de- sire it. In the realism common to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, good is not such because it is desired, but rather it is desired because it is good. If an action is itself desired as an end, it must be that the action is good. If the effect of the action is the end desired by the agent, then it must be that this ef- fect itself is good. In both cases, the object of the desire is good because it is a being befitting another being."

[1] Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de humanis actibus con- siderare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem vel impediatur beatitudinus via. S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Prologus, p. 29.

[2] Robert S. Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, _Philoso- phers of Education: Six Essays on the Foundation of Western Thought_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 60, write concerning Aristotle: "The crucial point is this: man as animal has a natural tendency for habit formation, but there is no necessity that he form one rather than another complete set of habits."

[3] See Aristotle's _Nicomachean Ethics_, Book III, in _Basic_

174.

animals is that man is master of his actions.[1] To assert man's

mastery over actions is to acknowledge that man is determined by

self-movement, or that determination is voluntary. But self-

movement is possible to a man because he is one who is motivated

by a rational nature.

> Therefore those things that are possessed of
> reason move themselves to an end, because they
> have dominion over their actions...But those
> things that lack reason tend to an end by nat-
> ural inclination, as though moved by another
> and not by themselves...[2]

Self-movement, voluntary action, is therefore determination by

a _rational_ _appetite_ as distinct from movement-by-another, in-

voluntary action, which proceeds from a _natural_ _appetite_. To

say that man is one who has dominion over his actions is to

note that man is determined by what Thomas calls the _facultas_

voluntatis _et_ _rationis_. It is by means of these distinctions

between appropriate faculties and operations that this thir-

teenth century theologian undertakes the project announced

Works, _op_. _cit_., pp. 965-971, for the Aristotelian precedent
for Thomas' distinction between voluntary and involuntary.

[1] Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in
hoc quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones
vocantur proprie humanae quarum homo est dominus. S.T. II, I,
Q. i, Art. i, p. 1.

[2] Illa ergo quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem,
quia habent dominium suorum actuum /per liberum arbitrium,
quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis/; illa vero quae
ratione carent, tendunt in finem propter naturalem inclina-
tionem, quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis... S.T. II,
I, Q. i, Art. ii, p. 2.

for Part Two of the <u>Summa</u>, i.e. the treatment of God's image
"inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having
free-will and control of his actions."[1] It is also the con-
text to which the account of man's freedom is referred.

The network of reciprocal activity between appetites,
powers, faculties, and operations---which an articulation of
freedom requires---is discussed more methodically in Thomas'
discussion of Aristotle's <u>De Anima</u>. Aristotle had distin-
guished four powers, or potencies, of the soul, or, what
Thomas refers to as "the four modes in which life is manifes-
ted".[2] Thomas notes that the philosopher had "already distin-
guished five main types of vital activity,"[3] the power of <u>ap</u>-
petition being added to those of <u>vegetation</u>, <u>sensation</u>, <u>intel</u>-
<u>lection</u>, and <u>motivation</u>. The four "modes" refer to distinct

---

[1] ...restat ut consideremus de ejus imagine, idest, de
homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium,
quasi liberum arbitrium habens, et suorum operum potestatem.
S. T. II, I, Q. i, Prologus, p. 1.

[2] <u>Aristotle's "De Anima" in the Version of William of
Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas</u>, trans.
Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1959), p. 184.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>. For helpful background discussion of Thomas' un-
derstanding of the role of <u>De Anima</u> in the Aristotelian organon
and the biological and physical order it indicates, see A. M.
Festugiere, "La place du 'De Anima' dans le systeme Aristo-
telicien," in <u>Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du
Moyen Age</u>. Vol. VI (1931), pp. 25-47.
    In <u>De Anima</u>, when speaking of the faculties of the soul,
Aristotle states that the souls of animals are characterized
by "(a) the faculty of discrimination which is the work of
thought and sense, and (b) the faculty of originating local

176.

degrees of animate being; the appetitive power does not how-
ever imply a distinct degree of being but rather accompanies
sensation. The distinct degrees of animate being, therefore,
are characterized by the absence or presence of the respective
potencies. All of the powers mentioned belong to the human
being; some of them are manifested in other animals; and only

---

movement" ("De Anima," in Basic Works, op. cit., p. 596). But
then in trying to decide the question concerning the "parts of
the soul, or how many we should distinguish" (p. 596), Aristo-
tle refers to earlier opinion or theories on the matter. /Note
here what might be an example of Werner Jaeger's thesis, in
Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934, that the
Aristotelian corpus was not intended to provide a finished or
completely definitive account on all the matters with which it
dealt./ Since there is in a sense "an infinity of parts",
simple formulation is impossible; yet Aristotle ventures the
following four: "the nutritive, which belongs both to plants
and to all animals, and the sensitive, which cannot easily be
classed as either irrational or rational; further, the imagina-
tive, which is, in its being, different from all, while it is
very hard to say with which of the others it is the same or
not the same, supposing we determine to posit separate parts
in the soul; and lastly, the appetitive, which would seem to
be distinct both in definition and in power from all hitherto
enumerated" (p. 596). Clearly, therefore, the hesitancy to
provide a definitive enumeration of parts followed by a for-
mulation in which such parts are enumerated would indicate
that Aristotle has approached this problem with a particular
question. It is obviously not "of how many parts does the
soul consist?" but rather "what is the function of soul in
both its particular and universal manifestations?" The ap-
propriate answer therefore is in terms of faculties and powers,
the complexity of which issues from the diversity and graduated
fulness of being. Again, that which regulates the inquiry is
the distinction between the kinds of things there are. Thus,
in the Nicomachean Ethics, continuing to ask "what then is the
good of each" (Basic Works, op. cit., p. 941), Aristotle writes:
"we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, there-
fore, the life of nutrition and growth....There remains then
an active life of the element that has a rational principle"
(p. 942).
    William A. Christian, in "Some Uses of Reason," op. cit.,
lists the kinds of questions Aristotle asks, as follows: what

177.

the vegetative, or nutritive, is present in plants.

> Thus among living things there are some, i.e.
> plants which have only the vegetative capacity.
> ...Next are the animals, with sensitivity as
> well as vegetative life; and sensitivity im-
> plies a third power, appetition, which itself
> is divided into three: into desire,...anger...
> and finally will, which is the intellectual
> appetite and follows intellectual apprehen-
> sion.[1]

> Now besides these three powers, the vegetative,
> the sensitive, and the appetitive, some animals
> also have the capacity to move from one place
> to another. Some, too, i.e. human beings and
> any other kind of beings, if such exist, resem-
> bling or even perhaps excelling mankind, have,
> in addition to these four capacities the power
> of understanding or intellect.[2]

The human being, distinct from all other types of animate

being by virtue of the presence of all the potencies or powers

of the soul, is thus alone capable of manifesting life in all

its known modes.

In its totality, then, the universe consists of "dynamic,

active, and spontaneously operating substances,"[3] arranged in

_____

primary causes are there? What sorts of things are there?
What sorts of things are real? p. 59.

[1] Aristotle's "De Anima" in the Version of William of
Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit.,
pp. 200-201.

[2] Ibid., p. 202.

[3] Etienne Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy
(New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 271.

178.

an order which is characterized by levels or degrees of being, and representing distinct kinds of motion. Everything that is is in movement, and everything in movement either acts or is moved for an end _intrinsically_ or by an _external agent_. The distinction between externally-motivated movement and intrin- sically-principled movement is that also which divides inani- mate from animate being.[1] Among the kinds of animate being (which divisions are characterized not only by types of po- tency but also by degrees of restriction by materiality[2]) there are some which move themselves and some which do not.

---

[1] Thomas writes in his Commentary on _Aristotle's "De Anima"_, _op. cit._, for example: "Inanimate bodies are brought into being. and maintained by an exterior moving principle, whereas animate beings are generated by an intrinsic principle...and are kept in existence by an intrinsic nutritive principle. It seems characteristic of living things that their activities should thus proceed from within themselves"(pp. 199-200.).

[2] In Lectio Five of his Commentary on "De Anima", _ibid._, Thomas states that the beings (whose potencies are referred to as vegetative, sensitive, intellective, and motive) include two differentiating factors, i.e. the material and the unmaterial. Insofar as a thing is material "it is restricted by its matter to being this particular thing and nothing else" (p. 199). In- sofar as a thing is unmaterial "a thing is free from the restric- tion of matter and has a certain width and infinity, so that it is not merely this particular subject, but, in a certain sense, it is other things as well" (p. 199). The distinction between the factors of materiality and unmateriality is related to the threefold division of being into: 1) the vegetative; 2) the sensitive; and 3) the intellectual. The vegetative is associated purely with the material, the intellectual with the unmaterial, and the sensitive with their combination. The intellectual is "free from the restriction of matter and has a certain width and infinity" (p. 199). In sensation things are free from mat- ter "but are not without their individuating material condi- tions" (p. 199). The vegetative "is restricted by its matter to being this particular thing and nothing else" (p. 199). By the presence or absence of materiality "it is usual to distin- guish three kinds of soul: vegetative, sensitive, intellectual" (p. 200).

179.

As Thomas writes:

> For since every agent or thing moved acts or
> is moved for an end...those are perfectly
> moved by an intrinsic principle whose intrin-
> sic principle is one not only of movement but
> of movement for an end. Now in order that a
> thing be done for an end, some knowledge of
> the end is necessary.[1]

Beings capable of voluntary activity are those whose motion
is intrinsically principled and who also possess a knowledge
of the end.[2] More sharply, voluntary activity is that whose
motion and whose motion for an end both proceed from the
agent's inclination.[3]

Thomas considers that those beings whose action is thus
voluntary can still be distinguished according as they are
capable of perfect or imperfect knowledge of the telos. Im-
perfect knowledge of the end, he states, "consists in a mere

---

[1] Cum enim omne agens, seu motum agat, seu moveatur prop-
ter finem,..illa perfecte moventur a principio intrinseco in
quibus est aliquod intrinsecum principium, non solum ut move-
antur, sed ut moveantur in finem. Ad hoc autem quod fiat
aliquid propter finem, requiritur cognitio finis aliqualis.
S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Art. i, p. 29.

[2] Quodcumque igitur sic agit vel movetur a principio
intrinseco, quod habet aliquam notitiam finis, habet in
seipso principium sui actus, non solum ut agat, sed etiam
ut agat propter finem. S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Art. i, p. 29.

[3] ...non solum cujus principium est intra, sed cum
additione scientiae. Unde cum homo maxime cognoscat finem
sui operis, et moveat seipsum, in ejus actibus maxime volun-
tarium invenitur. S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Art. i, p. 30.

apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end"[1] Consequently, perfect knowledge of the end requires apprehension of the end as end and the ability to deliberate concerning one's disposition toward it. Ultimately this is what separates the irrational animal from the rational being.

> Therefore the voluntary in its perfection be-
> longs to none but the rational nature, whereas
> the imperfect voluntary belongs also to irra-
> tional animals.[2]

At the same time, the distinction between the voluntary in its perfection and the voluntary in its imperfection also differentiates between the types of potencies characteristic of the human being and other animals. The possession of know-ledge of the end in an imperfect sense is indicative of the apprehension which is limited to knowledge through the senses and by what Thomas calls "a natural estimative power". Though knowledge in a sense, this apprehension (of which irrational beings are capable) is nevertheless by natural instinct. As Thomas contrasts it, the knowledge of which the rational being is capable is distinguished by an intellectual potency. And this rational appetite, in turn, is referred to as the _facultas voluntatis et rationis_.

---

[1] Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis et proportio actus ad finem. S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Art. ii, p. 30.

[2] Unde soli rationali naturae competit voluntarium secun-dum rationem perfectam; sed secundum rationem imperfectam com-petit etiam brutis. S.T. II, I, Q. vi, Art. ii, p. 30.

To call it the faculty of will and reason, or the rational appetite, or even to admit that in voluntary action the will is moved by both the intellect[1] and the sensitive appetite[2] is to imply a very specific relationship between the powers of the soul. Voluntary action, that is, proceeds not simply from one or another of the soul's potencies but rather from them all as in a reciprocity of function. By a thesis reportedly borrowed from Dionysius and thereafter never violated, i.e. that "it belongs to the divine providence not to destroy, but to preserve the nature of things,"[3] Thomas makes it clear that in man there is continuity as well as difference between the appropriate ranges and actions of the soul's powers. That which distinguishes the human created being from other animate creatures is the power of intellection. Yet the fulfillment (or appropriate operation) of that faculty requires the analogous function of those powers which man also shares with other animals. Separate ends are regulated by a comprehensive one.

Thomas illustrates the nature of this reciprocity of action and function when he discusses the will, especially as regards the act of choice. Certain guidelines are provided: a) "the end is in the order of appetibles what a principle is

---

[1] S. T. II, I, Q. ix, Art. i, pp. 39,40.

[2] S. T. II, I, Q. ix, Art. i, pp. 40,41.

[3] ...ad Providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. S.T. II, I, Q. x, Art. iv, p. 46.

182.

in the order of intelligibles";[1] and b) choice "is materially
an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason".[2] The

---

[1] S. T. II, I, Q. ix, Art. iii, p. 41.

[2] S. T. II, I, Q. xiii, Art. i, p. 51. In his Commentary
on Aristotle's "De Anima", op. cit., Thomas places will as one
of three divisions within the potency of appetition. Appeti-
tion, that is, divides itself into three: "into desire, in the
stricter sense, which springs from the concupiscible appetite;
anger, corresponding to the irascible appetite (both of these
being in the sensitive part and following sense-knowledge);
and finally will, which is the intellectual appetite and fol-
lows intellectual apprehension" (p. 200-201). In the same Com-
mentary (Book III, Lectio One, p. 473) he describes the unity
in motion of intellect and appetition as follows: "Now it can-
not be said that appetite is a moving principle through sharing
the specific nature of intellect, but rather e converso; for
intellect only moves anything in virtue of appetition. It
moves by means of the will, which is a sort of appetition."
    Since it has been suggested that significant changes oc-
curred in Thomas' understanding of the function and place of
will (see Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., "St. Thomas' Thought on
Gratia Operans," in Theological Studies. Vol. III, December,
1942, pp. 533-535), and that the interpretation reflected in
Prima Secundae represents the mature Thomas, it also seems
significant to note that obvious differences exist between the
accounts of will in Aristotle and in Thomas. Though Thomas
refers to Aristotle as a basis for his understanding---e.g.
"choice implies something pertaining to reason or intellect,
and something pertaining to will; for the Philosopher says in
the sixth book of the Ethics: 'choice is an appetitive under-
standing, or an intellective appetite.'" (S.T.II, I, Q. xiii,
Art. i, pp. 278-279)---he nevertheless makes use of a passage
which George P. Klubertanz, S.J. (in "The Unity of Human Ac-
tivity," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1950,
pp. 75-103) notes does not find Aristotle speaking directly
of the will. Klubertanz writes: "In him /i.e. in Aristotle7
as in Plato, will does not appear as a distinct power or part
of the soul, which could be related to appetite (concupiscible
and irascible), sense, and intellect." W. D. Ross (Aristotle.
New York: Meridian Books, 1959, p. 195) acknowledges that
while there is evidence to suggest that the psychology of
Plato and Aristotle had "no distinct conception of the will,
Aristotle's doctrine of choice is clearly an attempt to for-
mulate such a conception..." At the same time, Ross concedes
that while Aristotle shared "the plain man's belief in free
will," he nevertheless "did not examine the problem very
thoroughly and did not express himself with perfect consistency"
(p. 197). Etienne Gilson (The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy,

183.

act of choice, which brings at least two distinctive orders[1]
into relation, is therefore a composite operation. The con-
tinuity between orders which choice implies is provided by

New York: Charles Scribner's, 1940, esp. pp. 306,7 and 314)
believes Aristotle to be using the term freedom or liberty
primarily in a political sense and not as clearly in psycho-
logical terms. See also A. H. Armstrong, The Greek Philoso-
phical Background of the Psychology of St. Thomas (London:
Blackfriars, 1952) for an account of the relation between
Aristotle's and Thomas' understanding of man, especially as
regards Thomas' development of Platonic themes; D. A. Rees,
"Theories of the Soul in the early Aristotle," in Aristotle
and Plato in the mid-Fourth Century, eds. I. During and G. E.
Owen (Goteborg: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1954), pp. 191-200;
Endre von Ivanka, "Aristotelische und Thomistische Seelen-
lehre," in Aristote et Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Publications
Universitaires de Louvain, 1955), pp. 221-228.
    In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics (Basic Works, op.
cit., p. 1106) Aristotle mentions will in the following con-
text and in perhaps characteristic fashion: "It is debated,
too, whether the will or the deed is more essential to virtue,
which is assumed to involve both." Perhaps Thomas' development
of the concept of will can be seen in the light of a later
Christian emphasis upon the contrast between salvation and
damnation, the way of life and the way of death, the select
community (i.e. those Augustinian themes which appear unwilling
to refer all differentiation and necessary deviation among men
solely to providence and divine activity). In addition, the
Aristotelian notion of soul had to correlate with Christian
affirmations concerning resurrection, the status of matter,
etc. These sorts of preoccupations might have led Thomas to
develop Aristotelian themes in the way we have noted. See
Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the
Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

    [1] For an excellent discussion of the arrangement of plu-
rality or composite operation in Thomas, see Brian Coffey, "The
Notion of Order According to St. Thomas Aquinas," in The Modern
Schoolman. Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (1949), pp. 1-18. See also E. A.
Pace, "The Concept of Order in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,"
in New Scholasticism. Vol. II (1928), pp. 51-72; A. Silva-
Tarouca, "L'Idee d'ordre dans la philosophie de saint Thomas,"
in Revue Neoscolastique de Philosophie. Vol. XL (1937), pp.
341-384; Melvin A. Glutz, "Order in the Philosophy of Nature,"

185.

motion. Hence, in finding it appropriate to speak of the relation of will and intellect as according to that of matter and form, Thomas is at the same time admitting the propriety of causal explanation. The relation of order to that which is ordered is as that between the determinant and that which is determinable:

> Now in such matters, the substance of the act
> is as the matter in comparison to the order im-
> posed by the higher power. Therefore, choice
> is substantially not an act of the reason but
> of the will; for choice is accomplished in a
> certain movement of the soul towards the good
> which is chosen. Consequently, it is evidently
> an act of the appetitive power.[1]

The relation between matter and form (as articulated in the thesis that the act of choice is materially an act of will and formally an act of reason) utilizes teleological principles to which the plurality of order is disposed according to anteriority and posteriority. As Brian Coffey suggests: "order is the arrangement of a plurality of things or objects according to anteriority and posteriority in virtue of a

---

in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1961), pp. 402-418; G. J. McMahon, The Order of Procedure in the Philosophy of Nature (Quebec: La Librairie Philosophique M. Doyen, 1958).

[1] In hujusmodi autem substantia actus materialiter se habet ad ordinem qui imponitur a superiori potentia: et ideo electio substantialiter non est actus rationis, sed voluntatis; perficitur enim electio in motu quodam animae ad bonum quod eligitur. Unde manifeste actus est appetitivae potentiae. S.T. II, I, Q. xiii, Art. i, p. 51.

185.

principle."[1]

The relationship is therefore expressed as follows. Within the act of will, Thomas has said, one can distinguish _exercise_ from _specification_.[2] In the exercise of choice, the will reduces itself from potency to act, from matter to form. However, with regard to the specification of its act, the will is determined by the intellect. At one and the same time, then, Thomas can assert that "the appetite tends to the ultimate end naturally,"[3] and that the act of intellect "precedes the will and directs its acts, namely, insofar as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason."[4] Choice is free, and, simultaneously, choice is determined by the intellect. It is a composite operation, yet of a single soul.[5] Will, as efficient

---

[1] Brian Coffey, "The Notion of Order According to St. Thomas Aquinas," op. cit., p. 7.

[2] S.T. II, I, Q. x, Art. ii, p. 44.

[3] Appetitus autem in ultimum finem tendit naturaliter. S.T. II, I, Q. xv, Art. iii, p. 59.

[4] Manifestum est autem, quod ratio quodammodo voluntatem praecedit, et ordinat actum ejus, inquantum scilicet voluntas in suum objectum tendit secundum ordinem rationis.. S.T. II, I, Q. xiii, Art. i, p. 51.

[5] On the question of the unity of soul in Thomas, see Melvin A. Glutz, "Toward an Integrated Psychology," in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (1958), pp. 139-148; W. R. Thompson, "The Unity of the Organism," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1947), pp. 125-157. For a lively discussion concerning the implications of unity for the relation between will and the attainable end---even concerning whether the nature of natural appetite is movement or relation---see Robert P. Sullivan, "Natural Necessitation of the Human Will," in The Thomist. Vol. XIV,

186.

cause, can be distinguished from the end, as final cause. And

both of these can be differentiated from the order of means to

end and from the movement of the appetite to the good.[1] Yet,

in the act of choice the composite operation occurs in simul-

taneity: only by means of abstraction---since the sequence of

action implies gradations---can the following order be dis-

cerned:

> first, there is the apprehension of the end
> (act of the intellect); then the desire or
> volition for the end; after this comes the
> realization of the end as attainable (intel-
> lect). This is followed by a desire for the
> end as the term towards which something is
> ordained, which desire is called intention.
> The intellect then reflects upon the means
> in general. This is the act of counsel, which
> arouses immediately in the will a desire for
> the means, a sort of general consent.[2]

In this way Thomas is able to locate unity and diversity within

the living subject. He has distinguished between nutritive,

sensitive, and rational principles in man, and has referred to

---

No. 3 (1951), pp. 351-399, and Vol. XIV, No. 4 (1951), pp. 490-
528; and William R. O'Connor, "Natural Appetite," in The Thomist.
Vol. XVI, No. 3 (1953), pp. 361-409.

[1] Marianne M. Childress analyzes causal explanation with
respect to the movement of will in "Efficient Causality in Human
Actions," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (1951),
pp. 191-222. For a discussion of the use of abstraction in such
causal accounts (together with extensive bibliography on the
subject) see Edward D. Simmons, "The Thomistic Doctrine of the
Three Degrees of Formal Abstraction," in The Thomist. Vol. XXII,
No. 1 (1959), pp. 37-67; see also Leo Ferrari, "Abstractio Totius
and Abstractio Totalis," in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (1961),
pp. 72-89.

[2] S.T. II, I, Q. xv, Art. iii, as summarized by Henri Renard,
"The Functions of Intellect and Will in the Act of Free Choice,"

these as perfections, potencies, or powers. Thus he has not

postulated a plurality of forms with respect to man, but a

unity of form, one soul.[1]

> And just as the appetite is the principle of
> human acts in the measure in which it parti-
> cipates in reason, so moral virtue is human
> virtue in the measure in which it is in con-
> formity with reason.[2]

When analyzed strictly methodologically, the treatment of

freedom in Thomas discloses an approach which differentiates

between the kinds of being present within the totality of beings

which depend upon motion for the achievement of actuality. By

noting the kinds of things there are, and, then, that which is

necessary to the fulfillment of each kind, one is able to speak

of the appropriate functions, operations, faculties, and powers

by which each thing is characterized. One begins, therefore, by

---

in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (1947), pp. 85-92.

[1] For a history of antecedents to Thomas' notion of the
unity of soul, see Daniel A. Callus, "Origins of the Problem
of Unity of Form," in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (1961),
pp. 257-285; and Dom Odon Lottin, "La doctrine morale des
mouvements premiers de l'appetite sensitif aux XIIe et XIIIe
Siecles," in Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du
Moyen Age. Vol. VI (1931), pp. 49-93.

[2] Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, op. cit., p.
261. Anton C. Pegis (in "Introduction" to Introduction to St.
Thomas Aquinas. New York: Random House, 1948, pp. xx-xxi) pre-
sents a succinct summary of man's unity: "Composite in nature,
man yet is for St. Thomas one being....to St. Thomas that means
that man is the sort of being that requires the simultaneous and
inter-ordinated activity of his several powers to achieve the
unitary purpose of his nature..../Man is/ a unity in the sense
that he has to act through several powers at the same time, con-
tributing to one another, so that by their togetherness one
work, distinctively human, may be the result."

posing the question "what is peculiar?"[1] But the question concerning the peculiar and the particular cannot be resolved without implying the question concerning the universal or that which all things have in common. Ultimately, the point of differentiation is referred to a specific _telos_ which exhibits a thing's uniqueness. But this reference can only occur through an analysis of a thing in terms of its potency and act to which the four explanatory causes provide access. The peculiarity of a thing is disclosed by means of an analysis of the principle of its movement.

Some have referred to this Aristotelian method as being "operational" while others have called it "problematic". By designating it "operational" James F. O'Brien, for example, calls attention to Aristotle's belief that an approach to the nature of things (and to the things of nature) should come by an analysis of operations and function.[2] Fundamental in an operational interpretation, O'Brien suggests, is the scholastic axiom that "a thing operates in that manner in which it is."[3] Speaking of Aristotle, O'Brien writes:

---

[1] Aristotle illustrates this in Book I of _Nicomachean Ethics_ (Basic Works, op. cit., p. 942): "Presumably...to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given if we could first ascertain the function of man....Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man."

[2] James F. O'Brien, "Structural and Operational Approaches to the Physical World," in _The Thomist_, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (1959), pp. 389-400.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 390.

189.

> Form becomes for him the unseen principle of
> activity and operation. In adopting this view
> Aristotle is affirming a deep faith in the
> ability of our intellects to understand the
> natures of things in the physical world. Never-
> theless, precise elucidation as to what these
> forms are is only determined by how they mani-
> fest themselves, that is, how the bodies of
> which they are forms operate.[1]

Although not in fundamental disagreement with the above, Profes-
sor McKeon prefers to utilize the designation "problematic" or
"the method of inquiry" when specifying the approach of Aristo-
tle (which Thomas has also incorporated).[2] This would call at-
tention to Aristotle's practice of seeking solutions or clarifi-
cation with respect to the varieties of problems encountered in
experience.[3] The structure of life and thought which that variety
implies also demands distinctive methods of analysis as appro-
priate to the respective ingredients of the organon which clas-
sification compiles.

-----

[1] O'Brien, "Structural and Operational Approaches," op.
cit., p. 390.

[2] Richard McKeon, "Philosophy and Method," op. cit., esp.
p. 664; and "The Method of Science and Philosophy," in The Basic
Works of Aristotle, op. cit., pp. xvi-xvii.

[3] "The method of inquiry therefore is a plurality of
methods: a general logic common to all the sciences and parti-
cular methods adapted to the problems, the subject-matters, and
the principles of the particular sciences. Thus Aristotle laid
the foundations in a book which was later called the "Organon"
of the 'instrument' or the discipline which was later called
'formal logic', and he collected in his other books aporiai or
problems treated according to methods which he showed to vary
from subject-matter to subject-matter and from science to
science....different problems require different methods for
their solution despite the common elements and the common con-
ditions of things and the common methods of general logic....
relations are found among the sciences by examining their

190.

In choosing either "operational" or "problematic" as an apt designation, one must take care that neither of these be used to suggest a notion characteristic of the Sophists, i.e. that man is the measure of all things. "Operational", that is, is appropriate chiefly as it refers to the operations (or functions and powers) which become central to the understanding of anything; "problematic" refers primarily to a differentiation between kinds of things on the basis of that which each requires for its actualization. And though both operational and problematic are terms which signify the establishing of distinct frames of reference, Thomas' reciprocity between determinants within the totality of things requires that these frames be neither conceived nor utilized in isolation from each other. Suffice it to say that Thomas has taken over an organic structure which was created in response to an interest in distinctiveness and peculiarity whose method of inquiry can be designated either "problematic" or "operational".

---

characteristic problems, their social conditions, or their creative forms." R. McKeon, "Philosophy and Method," op. cit., p. 664. Significant works dealing with this methodological issue include the following: Daniel C. O'Grady, "Thomism as a Frame of Reference," in The Thomist. Vol. I, No. 2 (1931), pp. 213-236; Tad W. Guzie, "Evolution of Philosophical Method in the Writings of St. Thomas," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (1960), pp. 95-120; Robert E. Brennan, "The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy," in The Thomist. Vol. I, No. 1 (1939), pp. 62-79; C. Dumont, "La reflexion sur la methode theologique," in Nouvelle Revue Theologique. Vol. LXXXIV, No. 1 (1962), pp. 17-35; M. D. Chenu, "Position de la theologique," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XXIV (1935), pp. 232-257.

191.

Thus, by distinguishing between animate and inanimate being, and then between that which is common to all animate being and that which is peculiar to each grade or distinct level, the approach of Aristotle and Aquinas distinguishes man as the one in whom the rational principle is operative. Voluntary activity demands the spontaneous action of that organism in terms of his peculiar capacities and potentialities. But the peculiarity of one's potentiality can only be determined by reference to actuality. And the distinctiveness of that movement from potentiality to actuality can only be discerned through an analysis (or abstraction) of the causal sequence which it implies. Freedom denotes determination by that to which man's distinctiveness refers, i.e. his _facultas voluntatis et rationis_. _Freedom_ is then the _spontaneous realization of potency in accordance with one's nature_. Efficiently, materially, formally, and even finally, freedom will at least be this. To say more would require a further analysis of Thomas' principle of orientation, since man's nature is determined by the character of his _telos_. This is the aspect of the theologian's thought which most obviously constitutes an innovation upon the prior Aristotelian structure. To be sure, as with the distinction between method and principle, so too an isolation of the final cause can occur only by abstraction (as by the order of anteriority to posteriority). Hence, in this stage of our analysis the recognition of _interest of reason_ stands to _principle of orientation_

192.

as Thomas' "exercise" stands to "specification".

It is the major conclusion of Aristotle's <u>Nicomachean</u> <u>Ethics</u> which Thomas adjudges to be incomplete.[1] In that essay Aristotle had identified happiness with an activity rather than with an end.[2] To define happiness as activity in accordance with virtue, and virtue as a state of character concerned with choice, is to set forth a formula which Thomas too will advocate.[3] Even the referral of virtue and happiness to contemplation[4] would be acceptable to the theologian. But none of this would entail, according to Thomas, that contemplation

---

[1] The word "incomplete" seems to be the proper one here. F. C. Copleston (in <u>Aquinas</u>. London: Penguin Books, 1955, p. 198) states that Thomas "did not say that Aristotle in his teaching about the good for man was simply wrong or that he was a benighted pagan who could know nothing of morality....But Aquinas was convinced that Aristotle's outlook on the world and on human life was incomplete and inadequate rather than simply wrong or untrue."

[2] "Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle...if this is the case (and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case) human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete." Aristotle, <u>Nicomachean Ethics</u>, Book I, in <u>Complete Works</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 942-3.

[3] <u>Ibid.</u>, Book X, p. 1104, and Book II, p. 959.

[4] <u>Ibid.</u>, Book X, p. 1107. After surveying other possibilities Thomas concludes in Book III, Chapter 32 of <u>The Summa Contra Gentiles</u>, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 123, that "the ultimate felicity of man lies in the contemplation of truth".

193.

should be exercised, yet, indeed, loved, simply for its own sake.[1] It is not the contemplation which becomes troublesome for Thomas but rather the reflexivity with which Aristotle regards it. For Thomas, happiness does not consist in contemplation as such, but in contemplation of God.[2] And contemplation itself demands the achievement of the vision of the Divine Essence.

The deviation represented here between Aristotle and Thomas is not simply a difference of opinion regarding the way in which the life of contemplation is to be understood. Beyond that, it also reflects a comprehensive structural shift. One can approach it from two ways. In the first instance, it is necessary to recall that Thomas views freedom as it pertains to the subject of the second part of the Summa, i.e. to man as imago dei. To speak of exemplar and image is to denote a relationship to which reflexivity as such cannot provide access. Certain religious demands are placed upon the relation of the human telos to God which structure the character of Thomas' principle of orientation. Secondly, innovation becomes possible not simply because the account of the Philosopher is amenable to a variety of interpretations, but, perhaps, because of a discovery of a fundamental structural weakness. As Robert S. Brumbaugh interprets

---

[1] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, in Complete Works, op. cit., p. 1104.

[2] S. T. II, I, Q. iii, Art. viii, p. 50-1.

194.

it: Aristotelian philosophy

> runs into difficulty when it tries to determine
> its own frontier points which hold it together
> as a unity: there must be, one finds by extra-
> polation along causal lines, an ultimate, final,
> material, and formal cause; but none of these is
> the four-dimensional reality to which Aristotle's
> analytic and explanatory method can apply. The
> prime mover has no matter, no efficient causal
> activity; prime matter has no determinate goal,
> force, or form; the good as order of nature is
> not a goal, has no matter, exerts no force....The
> temptation or opportunity is very strong to fill
> in the frontier with a Platonic revealed theology,
> to supply what is lacking or felt as obscure in
> the system.[1]

Under Christian affirmation, the Aristotelian 'frontier points'

are 'filled in' but by means of a transformation of the nature

and function of the structure's principle of orientation.[2] The

---

[1] Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 213. Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 225, pinpoints one of the difficulties which Thomas had respecting the Aristotelian structure. Merlan suggests that Thomas assumed the Aristotelian tripartition of knowledge (metaphysicals, mathematicals, and physicals) and interpreted these in terms of degrees of abstraction. To do this presupposes that the objects of metaphysics are "abstractible" in the same sense in which the objects of physics or mathematics are supposed to be. But Thomas could not be satisfied with this, Merlan notes, in that "immaterial beings cannot be made objects of abstraction in the same sense in which this is possible for physicals and mathematicals." See also Merlan's "Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas' Summa," in Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. XIV (1953), pp. 284-291. Thomas also creates a difficulty when the Aristotelian tripartition of knowledge and explanation by the four causes are placed within a scheme given fundamentally to determining the relation between Creator and creature.

[2] On the question of the "Neoplatonism" of Thomas, especially as this has influence upon Thomas' understanding of "participation" and the hierarchy of being, the following are helpful;

195.

First Cause is not only the supreme contemplator of contemplation, nor is the Prime Mover simply the necessary support for the motion and kinds of motion which occur within the totality of things. Thomas' God is no longer simply that, yet He is at least that. Beyond that, God must be regarded as the Supreme Act of Existence, i.e. _Ipsum Esse_.[1] In _Ipsum Esse_ the various kinds of existing being participate to the measure of their respective limiting principles of potentiality. The movement toward the human _telos_ is at the same

---

L. B. Geiger, _La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin_ (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953); Paul Grenet, _Les Origines de l'Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon_ (Paris: Vrin, 1948); R. J. Henle, _Saint Thomas and Platonism_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956); Arthur Little, _The Platonic Heritage of Thomism_ (Dublin: Golden Eagle, 1949); Hampus Lyttkens, _The Analogy Between God and the World_ (Uppsala: A. B. Lundequistska, 1953); Lyttkens, "Nyplatonskt och Kristet: Thomas' av Aquino Teologi," in _Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift_. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (1962), pp. 15-25; W. Norris Clark, "Saint Thomas and Platonism," in _Thought_. Vol. XXXII (1957), pp. 437-443; Clark, "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism," in _The New Scholasticism_. Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (1952), pp. 167-194; Charles A. Hart, "Participation and the Thomistic Five Ways," in _The New Scholasticism_. Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (1952), pp. 267-285; Anton C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity; a Platonic Incident in Christian Thought," in _Essays in Thomism_, ed. Robert Brennan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), pp. 151-183; Hilary Carpenter, "The Ontological Roots of Thomism," in _Essays in Thomism_, op. cit., pp. 83-100; Raymond Klibansky, _The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages_ (London: Warburg Institute, 1949).

[1] George Lindbeck, in "Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas," op. cit., pp. 112,3, describes the contrast between Aristotle and Thomas at this level as follows: "...the decisive divergence from Aristotle comes in the treatment of universal, transcendental, reality. Here ontological structures are described in terms of participation. Aquinas finds it necessary to think of the relation between God and creatures in a participationist way, and God, of course, is

time a striving toward union with God in Whom there is nothing
of potency or limitation.

Methodologically, one could chart the difference between
Aristotle's and Thomas' principle of orientation as a distinc-
tion between "reflexivity" and "reciprocity". The First Cause
and Prime Mover may be able to support the motion of other be-
ings by its own operational activity. But this reflexive opera-
tion is incapable of providing the relationship between Ipsum
Esse and human telos for which exemplar-to-image is the para-
digm. What it does insure is the uniqueness of organic opera-
tions of which the totality of things consists. Thomas will
not destroy the separation between God and man which the dis-
tinction between cause and effect would imply. Nor will he
violate the occasion for spontaneity and for the propriety of
such terms as causa sui in choosing reciprocity over reflexi-
vity. At the same time, to pattern the relation of cause-to-
effect to that of exemplar-to-image is to temper reflexivity
with some form of synthetic coherence.[1] Indeed, it would seem

---

subsistent. God therefore is the simple and unlimited "form"
of that which is common to absolutely everything. This is be-
ing. However, participation in being is more difficult to des-
cribe than participation in less universal perfections. There
is no factor other than being which can limit and pluralize it.
The solution is to say that being, as it applies to creatures,
is itself complex....That which differentiates one thing from
another is its intelligible, that is, essential, determinations.
Essence, therefore, serves as the pluralizing limit. Existence
is left as the positive factor whose essence is to be Simple,
Unique, and Infinite."

[1] Gabriel Widmer, in his review of the thought of Pierre
Thevenaz, in "Un essai de philosophie protestante," in Revue de

that when the relation of exemplar-to-image is understood in terms of being, and not simply in terms of operation, reflexivity in its original sense has already been transcended. By means of a reciprocity of determination, the divine comprehends the human without nullifying its uniqueness or the efficiency of its own operation. Such comprehension is not however the sort of assimilation which mitigates the reality (or variety) of grades of being which reflexivity establishes and the problematic method requires. The divine does not destroy but preserves the natures as well as the nature of things. Yet, synthetically, or in their composite order, these same natures derive their being from the God who is Essential Being. As Thomas states, "everything can be called good and a being inasmuch as it participates in the first being by way of a certain assimilation."[1]

Theologie et de Philosophie. Vol. XII, No. 2 (1962), pp. 93-106, gives Thomas' pattern the designation "synthese par hierarchisation" (p. 102). As an appropriate label, this phrase seems to combine the distinctive aspects of both comprehension and reflexivity which we have tried to capture by calling Thomas' principle a reciprocal one. (Widmer's work appears in English translation by Rosemary Z. Lauer, in Philosophy Today. Vol. VI, No. 2, 1962, pp. 112-124.)

[1] S.T. I, Q. vi, Art. iv. Thomas had earlier described the relation between Creator and creature as follows: "Now everything seeks after its own perfection, and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent...and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness....To have limit, species, and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause." S.T. I, Q. vi, Art. i.

198.

The structure of thought within which this conception
of freedom is framed is marked by the presence of an opera-
tional or problematic method together with a reciprocal prin-
ciple. This implies that the focus of attention is upon the
peculiar or the distinctive within the totality. It also in-
dicates that the peculiar or distinctive becomes intelligible
by means of the determination of its essential properties. But
this determination can only occur through the causal explana-
tion upon which the analysis of the relation of the peculiar to
the totality in any given case depends. Human freedom is then
discernible when man is located or placed within the network of
interacting organisms of which the totality of things is com-
prised. The initial distinction between kinds of organisms is
referred to the types of vital activity, or powers of vegeta-
tion, appetition, sensation, intellection, and motivation, whose
presence implies levels and degrees of being. All such being
are in motion toward an appropriate _telos_. Man, in whom all the
vital potencies are present, moves from potency to act by means
of voluntary motion, since man, as distinct from all other ani-
mate being, is principled by the _facultas voluntatis et rationis_.
Hence, for man, freedom comes to denote _spontaneity_. Voluntary
action implies self-causation and the appropriate operation of
the characteristic human powers and faculties. Even when the
theological _virtues_ are added (because of the incommensurability
between the transformed human _telos_ and natural power) spontaneity
of action is not destroyed. Human freedom, for Thomas, is the

199.

spontaneous realization of potentiality in accordance with one's nature.

But man's nature is not simply determined by the _facultas voluntatis et rationis_. Hence, freedom is not exhaustively understood solely in terms of spontaneous realization of potency. While there is freedom in self-caused movement toward the end, freedom itself, in a certain sense, depends upon the attainment of the end. Hence, one can say that freedom increases (according to the order of anteriority to posteriority) in direct ratio to the rate of progress.[1] The end is determinative of the motion toward it, and freedom is conceived also in terms of the character of the end. Thomas states that man's end is the contemplation of God.[2] That end, so conceived, is also determinative of man's nature. Thus freedom must also include this final causative factor in its spontaneous realization of potentiality. That is, freedom denotes the entire movement from potency to act wherein man is determined both by the _facultas voluntatis et rationis_ and by the relation of

---

[1] See Gustaf J. Gustafson, _The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas_ (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), p. 85.

[2] "Contemplation" or "knowledge" of God is itself an argument for reciprocity between the human _telos_ and the divine being. Though contemplation is a mode of apprehension, it is nevertheless one which maintains the distinction between knower and object of knowledge. Though contemplation might pass into vision, even vision retains the separation appropriate to reciprocity. It is reciprocal, however, by virtue of the Thomist thesis that to know is also to contain the form of another.

image-to-exemplar in which his being stands to God. Therefore, the _facultas_ _voluntatis_ _et_ _rationis_ compositely orders both spontaneity and knowledge of the end, and, in the same reciprocal balance, the voluntary motion by which man is distinguished implies God as causative agent. The achievement of freedom is dependent upon knowledge of God, and the realization of the human _telos_ implies man's final determination by the _imago_ _dei_. Freedom, as the spontaneous realization of potentiality, can be understood as the natural movement which culminates in the vision of God. And the reciprocity between that by which the human being is determined and that by which the divine being is characterized insures that the creature's dependence upon Creator for his perfection will not be construed as a limitation upon God. Nor does determination of the creature by the Creator violate the spontaneity of self-caused motion. The human being, the rational animal who was fashioned in the image of God, is capable of and characterized by a free operation because of his distinctiveness within the network of interacting organisms.

Summary and Conclusions

> N'est-ce pas une tendance innée, une loi de
> l'intelligence humaine que de chercher à saisir
> les choses dans leur rapports mutuels et à les
> embrasser dans une vue synthetique? Pas plus
> que les autres domaines du savoir, la science
> sacrée n'échappe à cette exigence de l'esprit.[1]

The preceding chapters have been devoted to an exercise
in comparative theological analyses. They have attempted to
specify a technique for the critical assessment of the formal
variations which occur within the Christian theological tra-
dition. They have sought to establish that analysis as a means
of illuminating some of the issues implies in the problem of
"unity and diversity". Accordingly, their intention has been
the cultivation of a discipline of critical reflexivity which
might provide access to the constituents of representative
theological patterns. The occasion for that technique, analy-
sis, and discipline is provided by the definition which an
examination of a repeated practice has assigned: theology is
a formative activity in which religious affirmations are given
coherence through the employment of formal schemes.

The preceding chapters have been divided into two domi-
nant parts. The first seeks access to the characteristics
of formal systematisation. The second consists of an exami-
nation of three representative views of "human freedom" in
Christian theological literature. Both parts are separately

---

[1] Henri Cloes, "La systematisation theologique pendant
la premiere moitie du XIIe siecle," in Ephemerides Theologi-
cae Lovanienses. Vol. XXXIV (1958), p. 327.

necessary in order that the reciprocal influence of formal and contentual elements in coherent discourse might be discerned. The two parts become the ingredients of one investigation, however, through the access the formulation of freedom provides to the constituents of formal systematisation.

The project was inspired by the use to which abstraction was put in Adolph Harnack's interpretation of the history of Christian doctrine. Harnack's distinction between the "core element" and the product of the process of hellenization seemed illuminative as a basis of interpreting the transition which is evident within historical Christianity's theological tradition. It also appeared to prefigure the related task of examining the transitions which occur between those systems which comprise the process of hellenization. Theology, in this sense, can only be understood when abstraction of its formal and contentual elements becomes more rigorously cultivated toward an examination of the relationships between such systems. Hence, our project sought a refinement of Harnack's technique by reference to the prior analyses of the distinction between formal and contentual as these appear in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Though the Critique was not directly prepared to illumine this precise theological issue, it can be seen to possess a remarkable fittingness when certain conditions are established. When a distinction is made between

the response to the question concerning the possibility of
a priori-synthetic knowledge and an exhaustive account of
the nature of reality, then it appears that the _Critique_ il-
lumines theological systematisation by disclosing the synthe-
tic procedures implicit in this form of reflection. This dis-
tinction takes quite seriously Kant's prescription that his
critical analysis pertain to the _knowable_. It also seems
bolstered by the realization that critical analysis does not
lead ineluctably to construction, at least not without depen-
dence in more specific detail upon the transition which the
joining of these two endeavors implies. The distinction is
also implied in the post-Kantian discussions that the _Critique_
must be expanded to include the possibilities of additional or
alternative categorial schemes. But, for our purposes, the
distinction between _analysis_ and _Weltanschauung_ can be sus-
tained upon the basis of the nature of that reflection which
characterizes those systems of which the theological tradition
consists. That theology is a formal discipline through which
religious affirmations are ordered is itself the occasion by
which Kant's account of the relationship of the a priori to
the synthetic can be differentiated from the context from
which Kant chooses his illustrative material. Our extension
of Harnack's use of critical reflexivity viz-a-viz dogmatic
history demands a Kantian analytic but as directed toward the
comparative instances of theological systematisation.

Thus, our initial task implied an application of that
same distinction between formal and contentual to Kant's own

account of systematisation. The specific Kantian organon had
to be distinguished from its author's examination of synthetic
procedures, in order to provide for the possibility of alterna-
tive cases. The constituents of systematisation as systemati-
sation had to be isolated from the representative principles of
possible individual systems. Noting that systematisation of
thought, as Kant accounts for it, depends upon the correlation
of logical principles and interests of reason, the project sought
a means of gaining access to the alternative principles and in-
terests by which selected systems are characterized. Kant him-
self seemed to point to such a means through his discussion of
the uniqueness of the concept "freedom". The systematic formu-
lation of freedom requires a selection of characteristic forma-
tive principles and interests of reason by which systems are
constituted. Freedom provides access to the constituents of
formal systematisation by virtue of its ability to provoke a
formulation of the relation between that which is regarded as
the locus of determination and that which determination orders
or regulates. The procedures necessary to the conceptualisation
of freedom are equivalent to those techniques upon which syste-
matic order also depends. Hence, the disclosure of the principle
and interest by which freedom is treated in a given systematic
pattern is tantamount to a discovery of its formative charac-
teristics.[1] And, while the formulation of freedom evokes order

---

[1] Here one must sound a precautionary note. One cannot be
sure on this basis alone that the pattern will be consistently
implemented when other topics are dealt with, or should changes

and coherence, it is itself amenable to expression by a variety of such schematic patterns.[1] Nor can one ever know prior to an examination of the relevant literature that with which the appropriate determinative systematic principle is identifiable. Thus, freedom's amenability to variety implies the presence of divergent principles and methods. And, through the application of a Kantian reflexivity to the Harnackian occasion, the disclosure of such alternative principles and methods in essays which represent transitions within the Christian tradition sets the basis for a comparative exercise in theological "unity and diversity".

The concept freedom has been formulated in three different ways in the three examples which have been approached from this perspective. None of the essayists duplicates the formulation of any of the others. Nor is it readily conceivable that any

---

occur in the particular theologian's outlook. In the instances we have cited, however, it appears fairly certain that the three representative essays are indeed representative, and that subsequent changes in each theologian's perspective do not so drastically occur as to more than modify the pattern disclosed here. If our thesis is valid, it would imply that even any such crucial theological fissions would require methodological innovations to which this analysis could gain access.

[1] For studies of freedom's variety, see Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry into the Freedom of Decision (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1961); Harold Laski, "Liberty", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. IX (1933), pp. 442-446; Albert Dondeyne, "Approaches du mystere de la liberte," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Special Number VI (August, 1948), pp. 23-44; Raymond Ledrut, "Dialectique de la liberte," in Enquete sur la Liberte (Paris: Federation Internationale des Societies de Philosophie, 1933), pp. 107-114; Richard P. McKeon, "Philosophic Differences and the Issues of Freedom," in Enquete sur la Liberte,

of the formulations is understandable apart from the perspective in which it initially occurs. In the one case freedom is conceived as the fulness-directed, regulative motion of a comprehensive process. In the second it is associated with the unrestrained rule of a center of force and authority. In the third instance it is regarded as the spontaneity of the individual organism within a network of interaction. And any and all of these can be utilized---and have been!---to articulate Biblical declarations concerning the freedom which is occasioned by the Christian gospel. Hence, it appears that the development of freedom in the three cases is tantamount to providing the lineaments of three variant but coherent systematic outlooks. Indeed, as we shall argue, the Christian theological tradition is marked by a kind of pluralistic vision, whose individual members nevertheless exhibit common characteristics.

It has been the contention of this treatise that formal theological variety is recognisable when the analyst pays particular attention to the starting point of a particular orientation and the manner, purpose, method, or auspices under which the argument proceeds. It is significant for an understanding of the differences which exist between Irenaeus, Thomas, and Luther, for example, to note that the one attempts to achieve the continuity of that which had threatened to become disjoimed

---

op. cit., pp. 115-152; "La Liberte," entire issue of Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1959).

208.

and disparate, that the other seeks the variety of kinds of
things and then the activity appropriate to each, and that
the third attempts to secure that which is alone the final
and necessary authority. The resulting structural patterns---
regardless of that with which their respective principles of
orientation are identified---will necessarily exhibit the pur-
poses for which their authors intended them.

The differences between the three formulations are equally
implicit in the manner in which that which is regarded as the
principle of orientation serves as referent to its respective
relata. Luther utilizes a principle to which "alone" is the
most suitable ascription. Thomas, however, conceives the mat-
ter-form composite to be the principle by which reciprocity can
confirm specific and generic likenesses within a synthetic
hierarchy. The network of interacting organisms is necessary
not only to the maintenance of individual beings and their ap-
propriate powers and operations, but also to the retention of
the totality of grades within the plenitude of being. Irenaeus
conceives the comprehensive and regulative process to serve as
the means by which difference is included within a specifiable
chronological and ontological totality: the principle is one of
synthesis and unification, the means through which disparity
and opposition are correlated.

It is apparent from the outset that the systematic res-
ponse to the question 'what is the one thing needful?' will

vary from presentations whose scope is virtually an incorpora-
tion of the entirety of things. The former will proceed by an
exercise in elimination until an ultimate, authoritative foun-
dation can be established. The latter will attempt to achieve
completeness by apprehension of the totality, or by discovering
the rule by which things are made to cohere. The author of the
Tractatus de Libertate Christiani begins, for example, by seeking
the one thing to which the validity of anything else must finally
be referred. But that one thing cannot be isolated unless there
are also other things within which, or, in contrast to which, the
one thing can be differentiated. Hence, Luther discovers deter-
minants which regulate two things and two men: determinants which
are known in each instance by their contrast with the other. The
concept of freedom under these auspices depends upon one's percep-
tion of the significance of that contrast with respect to both men
and things——a task made exceedingly difficult by the simultaneous
presence of their two orders. The author of the Adversus Haereses,
on the other hand, seeks the comprehensive rather than the parti-
cular. His goal is not the isolation of the individual and the
unique, but the tracing of a normative process whose dialectic
includes, mediates, and completes the fundamental boundaries
which the totality exhibits. Irenaeus' task is then the demon-
stration of the dimensions of unification and fulness which free-
dom achieves. The author of De Voluntario et Involuntario begins
in still another way. For him the goal is not a discovery of
one thing (though he does seek the peculiar) nor the totality

of things (though the peculiar is made intelligible within the
totality). His approach is to gather into one, as it were, the
whole range of possible or existent things. Then he distinguishes
between kinds of beings on the basis of the kinds of operations
and faculties characteristic of peculiar beings. And freedom
depends upon the spontaneity of the differentiated being to
operate in its appropriate manner as prescribed by its place,
function, and purpose within the network of interacting organisms.

For Irenaeus the reality of parts is dependent upon the to-
tality. A synthesis of parts for Luther, on the other hand, would
be their destruction, since the existence of each is nurtured by
opposition. Hence for that approach which proceeds by decomposing
wholes into indivisible elements and simple relations, the reality
of opposition and conflict becomes the occasion for freedom. It
also creates the need for subordination and regulation. When
differentiation becomes conflict, then exclusiveness demands that
the one thing needful be rescued from the tyranny of any other
thing (or released from domination by a foreign rule).[1] For the

---

[1] Again, we must caution that our project intends only to be
a methodological study and does not pretend to provide a genetic
account of the influences which carry responsibility for the dis-
tinct pattern of theological formulation. Luther's characteristic
"bipolar" interest has been argued as being traceable to a variety
of sources. Lennart Pinomaa, for example, in his "Die Heiligen in
Luthers Frühtheologie," in Studia Theologica. Vol. XIII (1959),
pp. 1-50, undertakes to stress the influence of the idea of the
Holy especially in Luther's early exegesis of the Psalms. Such
familiar distinctions as Luther makes between opus alienum and
opus proprium, coram deo and coram hominibus, as well as the con-
cepts of theologia crucis and iustitia aliena Christi, can be

211.

approach which proceeds by the opposite tendency (i.e. holo-
scopically rather than meroscopically), freedom is created by
the comprehension (dialectically, reflexively, reciprocally,
or synthetically) of both opposition and conflict.

_____

seen as referrable to the four marks of the Holy (i.e. humili-
tas, sanctitas Dei, contrarium, and profectus). /See also Ernst
Bizer, Fides Ex Auditu, op. cit., for an analysis of the concept
"humilitas" in Luther's theological development./ Of special
interest to Pinomaa is the influence of "das Gesetz des Gegen-
satzes" upon the distinctions between the inner and the outer,
the invisible and the visible, the holy and the godless, etc.
Pinomaa believes that the duality which this "law of contrari-
ness" represents finds its source in Luther's understanding of
the holiness of God, and that it is upon this foundation that
the distinctiveness of Reformation thought rests. Regin Prenter
develops a related interpretation in his article "Luther's Theo-
logy of the Cross," in Lutheran World. Vol. VI, No. 3 (1959),
pp. 222-233, wherein he stresses the influence of theologia
crucis upon the antitheses of "judgments and righteousness,
anger and mercy, death and life, evil and good..." (p. 222).
Though emphasizing different sources, both of these accounts
illustrate the opposition and conflict which seem basic to
Luther's theological orientation.
    More prominently, the distinctiveness of Luther's methodo-
logy has been traced to its source in Scriptural exegesis. (See
footnote 2, p. 141, especially p. 144 above.) Gerhard Ebeling
in his "Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik," in Zeitschrift
für Theologie und Kirche. Vol. XLVIII (1951), pp. 172-230, for
example, illustrates the way in which Luther's characteristic
"dualism" is bound up with the way in which he found it neces-
sary to alter the traditional "vierfache Schriftsinn". "Der
vierfache Schriftsinn" becomes referred to "der Gegensatz von
spiritus und litera", which, when Christologically interpreted,
is reflected in such distinctions as that between Law and Gos-
pel. In this way Ebeling is enabled to stress the close cor-
relation between the genesis of Reformation thought and the
resolution of hermeneutical problems which were Luther's as a
legacy from the Middle Ages. And, it is this kind of interpre-
tation of Luther's hermeneutical principles which provides the
occasion for the summary by Werner Schultz, in "The Problem of
Hermeneutics in Current Continental Philosophy and Theology,"
in Lutheran World. Vol. VI, No. 1 (1959), pp. 33-52: "Luther's
hermeneutics showed that every interpretation of Scripture is
conditioned by two factors. One is that interpretation is
bound to the grammatical construing of the text. The second
is that interpretation in the sense of encounter, sola gratia,
with the living Christ does not have understanding at its beck

212.

The distinctiveness of the three patterns is evident when
one notes the sorts of structural requirements the correlation
of interest and principle creates in the respective instances.
In both holoscopic cases, i.e. in <u>Adversus Haereses</u> and in <u>De
Voluntario et Involuntario</u>, the achievement of freedom depends

-----

and call" (p. 52).

Significantly, the distinction between <u>sensus spiritualis</u>
and <u>sensus literalis</u> with respect to Luther's Biblical hermen-
eutics and the distinctions which Pinomaa finds implicit in the
influential concept of the Holy seem to be of the same kind.
The primary difference between "das Gesetz des Gegensatzes" and
"der Gegensatz von spiritus und litera", that is, is not that
the former refers to the concept of the Holy and the latter is
to be associated with Biblical interpretation, but that the for-
mer is a pervasive rule which the latter characterizes. Both
define the same kind of "ambiguous duality" which Bernhard
Löhse sees reflected in Luther's understanding of the relation
between faith and reason (in <u>Ratio und Fides. Eine Untersuchung
über die ratio in der Theologie Luthers.</u> Göttingen: 1958). (See
also B. A. Gerrish, <u>Grace and Reason.</u> Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1962; and Robert H. Fischer, "A Reasonable Luther," in <u>Reforma-
tion Studies. Essays in Honor of Roland H. Bainton,</u> ed. Franklin
H. Littell. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1962, pp. 30-45.) The
same form of opposition is also discovered to regulate the rela-
tionship between the two kingdoms (see Franz Lau, <u>Luthers Lehre
von den Beiden Reichen.</u> Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1953;
Heinrich Bornkamm, "Luthers Lehre von den zwei Reichen im Zusam-
menhang seiner Theologie," in <u>Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte.</u>
Vol. XLIX, No. 1, 1958, pp. 26-49; Gustaf Törnvall, <u>Geistliches
und weltliches Regiment bei Luther. Studien zu Luthers Weltbild
und Gesellschaftsverstandnis.</u> München: 1947). The same pattern
is also attributed to Luther when attempts are made to compare
and contrast his thought with those nominalist precursors who
also developed a "law of contrariness" (as well as an ascription
of "wholly otherness" to God), resembling some of the features
of Pinomaa's account of the Holy but on the basis of <u>de potentia
Dei absoluta.</u>

In short, though wide divergence exists as to the source of
Luther's distinctive theological pattern---and there is no intrin-
sic reason for not combining many of these accounts---there is a
certain unanimity in accepting "der Gegensatz von spiritus und
litera" as regulative. Our concern is not primarily with the
origin of this rule, but with a methodological analysis of it
as seen reflected in the relationship which Luther conceives be-
tween servant and lord---a significant instance of bipolarity.

213.

upon growth. Irenaeus' dispensation of liberty is marked, for example, by the continuity of progression which God has bestowed through the faculty of increase and the Saviour's recapitulation of all things. For Thomas, growth is required if the potentiality of the organism is to be realized. At this stage the difference between the two accounts of the relation of freedom to growth must be referred to the distinctions between the respective principles and interests. Thomas' concern for human nature directs him to stress organic growth; the synthesis which the dispensational process effects gives Irenaeus the opportunity to emphasize cosmic growth. But in both of these perspectives the principle of orientation relies upon motion for the comprehension and regulation of difference and change. For both Thomas and Irenaeus motion is necessary not only as an explanation of change but also as the measure by which ends are reached. Without motion both growth and the _telos_ are inconceivable. Hence without growth there is no conceivable salvation for either Irenaeus or Thomas. Even divine grace does not work apart from motion. Salvation necessarily implies the traversing of the distance which systematic closure demands when the differentiable is made intelligible through comprehensiveness.

The account of freedom in the _Tractatus de Libertate Christiani_, however, possesses none of these unifying (or structurally mediating) characteristics. And growth, if,

214.

indeed, there is growth, is not regarded as basic. Motion, if
there is motion, is not directed. Teleological purposes are
not listed. There is no evidence of "distance" to be overcome.
Or, if any of these characteristics are present, none can be
regarded as integral to the salvation or to the freedom which
is therein outlined. Since the only possible "motion" refers
to one's placement with respect to the basis of one's justifi-
cation, it becomes exceedingly difficult to give expression, or
status, to the phenomenon of change.[1] What is necessary is the
relocation of one's loyalty, confidence, and devotion. In a
certain sense, when this has occurred, all has been accomplished.
No further specifiable integral telos (either cosmic or organic)
is to be achieved except that the clarity of the subjection ac-
cording to the priority scheme is to be the rule more and more.

Irenaeus and Thomas are enabled to chart the change which
freedom achieves. Luther, while lacking the bases for continuity,
is however better equipped to express the phenomenon of radical
change, i.e. the change implied in the displacement of one source
of justification by another. Transposition under the auspices of

---

[1] Hence Luther is frequently criticized for allowing merely
token change and extrinsic justification. Louis Bouyer, for
example, recalls the familiar simile with respect to Luther's
conception, i.e. that "the grace of God envelops us as in a
cloak, but this leaves us exactly as we were. The sinner, after
receiving grace and so saved, is no less a sinner than before."
Bouyer, The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, op. cit., p. 139.
Frequently, the issue is referred to what C. Moeller and G. Philips
describe as Luther's inability to understand "the real significance
of created grace" (in Grace et Oecumenisme, op. cit., p. 21). It
is not always noted, however, that the concept habitus cannot be

215.

discrimination is relocation. It becomes evident, therefore, that the spontaneity which initiates change, for Thomas, will require that grace not violate the reciprocal continuity between man's functions and powers: grace, as related to motion, will perfect rather than destroy nature. Luther, on the other hand, must refer grace and the transition it effects to the fundamental discrimination which regulates the order of both men and things. For either Thomas or Luther to do otherwise would be to violate the structural patterns on which their respective interpretations depend.

Thus Luther's account of freedom will not be able to chronicle the sequences of events or activity in the transposition which freedom implies. For him the priority of the divine in human salvation is not essentially a chronological primacy, but one based upon the necessary discrimination between the heavenly and the earthly, the inner and the outer, the spiritual and the carnal. In each instance the latter is not rightly conceived unless it is finally brought into subjection to the former (according to the requirements of the asymmetrical relationship). Irenaeus, on the other hand, can account for old and new covenants, the seed which atrophies as over against the seed which matures, the beginning, middle, and

---

incorporated within the pattern which is regulated by discrimination and an indivisible principle without conflicting with the formative characteristics of that particular orientation.

216.

"in these last days". Thomas is able to go into great detail

concerning the sequences of operation within organic develop-

ment, the divisions within divine grace, the order among things

required for justification, for example.[1] Charity is the greatest

of the theological virtues in that it _comes_ _nearer_ to the object

than do the others.[2] Counsel precedes while use follows choice.[3]

Accordingly, freedom in the three accounts reflects three

variant views of time. Luther speaks of time in terms of simul-

taneity in order to insure the concurrence of both imperia.[4]

---

[1] In S. T. I, II, Q. cxiii, Art. viii, Thomas states for exam-
ple: "The aforesaid four things required for the justification of
the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of
the ungodly is not successive...but in the order of nature, one
is prior to another. According to the order that is natural
among them, the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the
movement of free choice towards God; the third, the movement of
free choice against sin; the fourth, the remission of guilt. The
reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover
is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the move-
ment of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in
which the motion of the mover rests is last."

[2] S. T. I, II, Q. lxvi, Art. vi.

[3] S. T. I, II, Q. xiv, Art. ii, and Q. xvi, Art iv.

[4] As John M. Headley summarizes Luther's position on time
(in Luther's View of Church History, op. cit., p. 114): "For
Luther the Christian participates in two times: he carries
within himself the time of the law and the time of grace, al-
ternating. Here time is conceived as a total spiritual condi-
tion under either law or gospel." A graphic example of Luther's
use of simultaneity occurs in his Grund und Ursach aller Artikel
D. Martin Luthers so durch römische Bulle unrechtlich verdammt
sind (March, 1921, WA 7, pp. 308-357, translated by Charles M.
Jacobs and revised by George W. Forell, as "Defense and Explana-
tion of all the Articles," in Luther's Works: Career of the Re-
former, II, p. 84): "I have shown that all the saints struggle
against their sinful flesh, and continue to be sinners as long

217.

Thomas, retaining the Aristotelian definition of time as the measure of motion with respect to before and after, stresses the respective stages of organic growth as grace perfects nature.[1] Irenaeus, alternatively, looks upon time as that which provides the cohesion for the normative process. By time, the beginning, end, and increase are the necessary factors to the fulfillment of the cosmic process which salvation implies. The simultaneity with which Luther associates time becomes a basis for the contemporaneity which the immediate identification with

---

as they live in the flesh which is at war with the spirit. At one and the same time, they serve God according to the spirit, and sin according to the flesh." This 'at one and the same time' is never destroyed, but only superseded in the future life wherein the subjection of the one domain to the other is perfected. See Tractatus de Libertate Christiani, WA 7, p. 59, line 34 ff., and p. 60, lines 1-2.

[1] Aristotle, Physica, Bk. IV, chapter 9, 217 b, in Basic Works, op. cit., p. 288 ff. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's definition of time is recorded in the Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics", trans. Richard J. Bakewell, Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 189-285.

For discussions of Aristotle's and/or Thomas' views of time and their interrelationships, see the following: Joseph Moreau, "Le temps selon Aristote," in Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (1948), pp. 57-84, and No. 3, pp. 245-274; A. Mansion, "La theorie aristotelicienne du temps," in Revue Neo-Scolastique de Philosophie. Vol. XXXVI (1934), pp. 275-307; W. von Leyden, "Time, Number and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle," in The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. LIV, No. 54 (1964), pp. 35-52; Johnny Christensen, "Actus Purus," in Classica et Mediaevalia. Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1958), pp. 7-40, esp. pp. 18-21; Joseph de Torquedec, La Philosophie de la Nature (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1959); Herman Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1957); John M. Quinn, The Doctrine of Time in St. Thomas (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1960); F. Pelster, "Die Ubersetzungen der aristotelischen Metaphysik in den Werken des hl. Thomas v. Aquin," in Gregorianum. Vol. XVII,

218.

the locus of justification requires. Thomas puts emphasis
upon the functions of time's gradations for the motion from
potentiality to actuality. And Irenaeus relates the increase
of time to the normative process by which recapitulation is
exercised.[1]

Even the Christological interpretations which are appro-
priate to these three accounts of freedom reflect the presence
of the variant principles and interests. Jesus Christ, for
Irenaeus, is understood in terms of the recapitulative process
which regulates this comprehensive outlook. Indeed, Jesus, as
the "logos" of the manifold likenesses and differences which
the relation between Creator and creature implies, serves to
effect the same sort of recapitulation which the normative pro-
cess does. Hence Irenaeus can refer to the Christ as being

(1936), pp. 377-406; B. W. Ashley, "Aristotle's Sluggish Earth,"
in New Scholasticism. Vol. XXXII (1958), pp. 1-31.

[1] Both Irenaeus and Luther draw upon history to clarify
the issues which their essays attempt to face. History, for
Thomas, however, at least as this is included within the treat-
ment of freedom, refers primarily to the ways in which the
development of the organisms can be chronicled. (Henri Rondet,
"Saint Thomas a-t-il une philosophie de l'histoire," in Recher-
ches de Science Religieuse. Vol. LI, No. 2, 1963, pp. 177-
195, refers first of all to "the eternal dynamism of all crea-
tion" in assessing whether Thomas has a philosophy of history;
Rondet concludes that Thomas has a theology of history rather
than a philosophy of history since he places Christ and the
Church at the center of his interpretation of the significance
of the eternal dynamism.) Hence, Thomas does not as readily
utilize his discussion of freedom to illumine the problem of
the significance of historical order. Irenaeus notes that the
Marcionite deviation depends upon the possibility of disjoining
the sequence of the Old Testament history from that of the New.

extended in all the world, encompassing its length, breadth, height, and depth, and "inscribed cross-wise upon it all".[1] The Thomistic account, on the other hand, refers the redemption effected through Jesus Christ to the realization of man's telos. The _Imago Dei_, Jesus Christ, is the divine likeness to which man is created. As true man he is the _telos_, the manifestation of perfected humanity. Yet in revealing Himself also as true God he affirms the insufficiency of all things human. In him humanity is made one with the _Imago Dei_ as nature is exalted to participate in the divine life.[2] But the basis of the relation between Jesus Christ and the human being is the _telos_ which reflects the reciprocity between _Image_ and its

---

Accordingly, he stresses continuity and coherent arrangement. Luther, characteristically, seeks for "paradigm instances" of the permanent activity of the Word in time (Headley, op. cit., p. 107). Accordingly he endeavors to identify both himself and those others to whom he belongs with the various heroes whose faith is manifested among tribulation and suffering--- the Ezekiels among scorpions, the Daniels amidst the lions, even the Leo's among the wolves of the Roman See.

[1] Irenaeus, _Proof of the Apostolic Preaching_, trans. Joseph P. Smith from the Armenian manuscript as edited by Karapet Ter Mekerttschian (Westminster: Newman Press, 1952), No. 34, p. 70. This phrase, as Smith notes, recalls _The First Apology of Justin Martyr_, 60.1 (see _Early Christian Fathers. Library of Christian Classics_, ed. Cyril C. Richardson, and translated by Edward R. Hardy. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953, p. 281) which in turn is an adaptation of Plato's _Timaeus_, 36 b-c.

[2] Thomas' account of freedom is the only one of the three herein examined which does not refer directly to Christology. A probable explanation for this is that the section in the _Summa_ on "De Voluntario et Involuntario" is not a self-contained entity but comprises one segment within an interrelated and more comprehensive exposition. Hence the relationship between the spontaneity of the organism and the redemption effected through Jesus Christ must be traced by linking "De Voluntario et Involuntario"

220.

likeness. Luther's ordering principle, calculated neither to
comprehend nor to discover the peculiar within the total (but
rather to discriminate in order to establish), identifies Jesus
Christ with the Word---the isolated normative locus of life and
authority. According to the pattern which also found simultane-
ity to be the most suitable description of the necessary rela-
tion of the two imperia, Luther stresses the transfer of owner-
ship and the singleness of the possession which Jesus Christ es-
tablished---and becomes!---for the sinful man. In each of the
three cases, one is able to perceive that Christological direc-
tives are implicit in the distinctive and respective correla-
tions of principle and interest. The one which seeks the com-
prehensive also understands soteriology as involving an all-
encompassing process whose very dialectic is equivalent to the
distinctions which are integral to the recapitulation which is
regarded as Jesus Christ's primary work. When the peculiar is

---

with Thomas' Christological development in Summa Theologica III.
Thomas asserts that man must reach his ultimate end by his own
operation. However, man needs divine aid in order to attain
happiness since he is hindered by sin and its impediments, and
since the ultimate human good transcends the capacity of human
nature. God works through grace then to motivate man to his
meritorious good, without violating the spontaneity of the will
by which the human being is characterized. Grace is the dispo-
sition which the infused virtues presuppose as their principle
and root; and the death of Christ is the universal cause of sal-
vation which is applied singly to each of its effects through the
Holy Sacraments. See S.T. III, Q. xlviii, "Of the Efficiency of
Christ's Passion," and S.T. III, Q. 1, "The Death of Christ,"
especially Art. vi, "Whether Christ's Death Conduced in Any Way
to our Salvation." See also Andre Hayen, "La structure de la
Somme Theologique et Jesus," in Sciences Ecclesiastiques. Vol.
XII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 59-82.

221.

sought within the totality, and causal explanation depends upon
teleological determination, then it seems appropriate that the
Christ should be located at that 'gradus' which comprehends the
reciprocity between human realization and the divine nature.
Luther's Christological disposition, on the other hand, seems
consistent with his concern for "the one thing needful" and his
restriction of kinds of relation to identity and opposition.

But to utilize these two subjects of special formal and
religious significance (i.e. the concept of time, and the place
of Jesus Christ with respect to human freedom) as illustrations
of the divergence which seems traceable to alternative principles
and methods is also to address the related question concerning
theological unity. Such unity must be of a more fundamental
quality than that all three men are at one in attempting to ex-
plicate the Christian gospel. The selected literature in that
regard are not variant commentaries on the same passages of
Scripture. Nor is the continuity between them simply referable
to their inclusion within the same historic religious tradition.
More fundamentally, their unity is in some way implicit in the
very fact that an analysis of freedom will provide access to
their respective principles and methods.

Each of the systems is ordered according to a "bipolar
scheme". For each, the determinative principle is designated.
Then, according to the controlling interest, its manner of
regulation is specified. In each case, freedom provokes (and

222.

comes to denote) a certain manner of distinguishing the determinant as over against that which it functions to determine. For one, the principle of determination serves to comprehend that which it orders. For another, the aim is reciprocity between determinants and determined. For the third, the determinative principle seeks to isolate its own uniqueness and particularity. But in none of the instances is the fundamental bipolarity between determinant and determinable violated.

Not only does each of the treatments of freedom refer to a bipolar relationship for the order upon which it depends. Furthermore each of the writers characteristically identifies his principle of orientation with the locus of divine determination and its relata with the human or the created. The context in which determinant functions with respect to determinable is the relationship conceived between God and the world. The manner according to which God is conceived to determine the world differs from scheme to scheme, as does that with which the locus of divine determination is identified. But each discussion of freedom occurs under the auspices of the kinds of conceptual determinations which are possible when God and the world stand in bipolarity as referent and relata.[1]

---

[1] It seems appropriate to refer the problem of theological "unity and diversity" to the relationship conceived between God and the world. In his essay "The Heart of the Problem," in Jean Bosc, Jean Guitton, and Jean Danielou, The Catholic Protestant Dialogue (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960), pp. 113-130, Danielou contrasts the Protestant irreconcilability of God and man with the Catholic notion that man is the image of God. Each of these

223.

More precisely, bipolarity functions so that none of the
essayists identifies his principle of orientation with God as
such. Rather the principle denotes the locus, and the interest
the manner, of the divine determination of the world. In bi-
polarity, that with which the principle is identified can be
regarded as the "accessible divine" with respect to human order
and recognition.[1] The locus of the divine determination of the

_____

positions, however, can be regarded as ways of conceiving the
relation between the divine and the human.

[1] Were this a genetic rather than a strictly methodological
account we would argue that the basis for the identification of
the formal bipolar determinants with the divine and the human
may be traced to the association of the relation between "God"
and "world" with the relation in classical philosophy between
"Being" and "Becoming". The Greek categories became, as it were,
the model or structure to which Christian theological reflection
was fitted. God was (at least structurally) identified with
Being since both demanded the status of eminent reality. Hence,
God-world and Being-becoming were not simply relations which
operated in identical ways though in parallel columns, but also
came to be interchangeable with each other.
The use of the relation between Being and Becoming to both
describe and denote the relation between God and the world seems
referable (if not to that author himself) to subsequent inter-
preters of Plato's dialogues, notably the Timaeus and the Par-
menides. (See P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, op.
cit., and C. J. de Vogel, "A la recherche des etapes precises
entre Platon et le neoplatonisme," in Mnemosyne. Vol. VII,
1954, pp. 111-122.) If there is a question as to whether or
not Plato identifies his conception of the absolute Good with
his conception of God, it is clear that the theory of Forms is
not a speculative theory about the kinds of being there may be
but instead issues fundamentally from an analysis of the knowing
process. As Eric A. Havelock points out (in Preface to Plato.
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1963, pp. 259-60): "What he is ap-
pealing for is to get away from that kind of story of the hea-
vens of which Hesiod's calendar is the epic prototype and from
those ingenious orreries and constructs which confined them-
selves to trying to model and reproduce the visible appearances
and motions of the heavenly bodies." There was a kind of tri-
partition of being (into ideas, world-soul, and sensibles) in

224.

world for Irenaeus is the normative process, for example, as
for Luther, it is the Word alone, and, for Thomas, the matter-
form composite within the hierarchical network of organisms.
Each of these, though variantly, can be regarded as the iden-
tifiable vantage point through which determination occurs: the
form and manner of determination is then accessible through an

---

the Timaeus, however, and the possibility for four different
levels or grades in the Parmenides. Indeed, there was also
the opportunity to identify "the One" of the Parmenides with
the Form of the Good of the Republic, and, in addition, to
hypostatise both (and/or the product) of these. (See Fried-
rich Wilhelm Kohnke, "Plato's Conception of to ouk ontos ouk
on," in Phronesis. Vol. II, No. 1, 1957, pp. 32-45; E. R.
Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neo-
Platonic One," in Classical Quarterly. Vol. XXII, 1928, pp.
129-142; Ludwig Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posi-
donius," in American Journal of Philology. Vol. LVII, 1936,
pp. 286-325.) The occasion is also present by which the Ideas
(the most abstract level of the tripartition) can be located
as thoughts of God. J. H. Loenen suggests, for example, in
his "Albinus' Metaphysics. An Attempt at Rehabilitation," in
Mnemosyne. Vol. IX, 1956, pp. 296-319, and Vol. X, 1957, pp.
35-56, that the conception of the Ideas as thoughts of God was
introduced into Platonism by Antiochus, and that Albinus trans-
posed the interpretation of Antiochus to the level of a trans-
cendent God. Kevin F. Doherty (in "Location of the Platonic
Ideas," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1960,
pp. 57-72) reports T. C. Rosenmeyer to have admitted that the
adequation between Ideas and thoughts of God is not Plato's
but rather a later heritage of Philo Judeaus and of some of
the Christian Platonists. As an alternative, Audrey N. M.
Rich suggests the possibility of an Aristotelian origin of
the adequation, as based upon a conflation of the theory of
Ideas and the Aristotelian doctrine of the divine self-thought.
(See Rich's "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God," in
Mnemosyne. Vol. VII, 1954, pp. 123-133.) All of these ten-
dencies would create a transition from the formal One which is
necessary to systematic closure in knowledge to a metaphysical
or theological One. Indeed, under a combination of these in-
fluences, it would become appropriate to affirm a one-one
correspondence between the respective determinative poles of
both the Being-Becoming relationship and the relationship con-
ceived between God and the world. The opportunity is then
present not only to assert a correspondence between the de-
terminative poles of both sets of structural relations but

225.

analysis of the principle and method which are implicit in the
formulation of freedom in these variously systematic outlooks.

But, as Claude Tresmontant has suggested, there are cer-
tain religious requirements which inform the way in which the
relation between God and the world is to be conceived.[1] The
affirmation of both realities, together with the goodness of
both realities (in a certain sense), requires the retention
of a certain ambiguity in the relationship which is to be con-
ceived between them. God is alone real, in a certain sense,
and the "reality" of the world is derivative and dependent

---

also to claim an identity between poles and/or kinds of rela-
tions. Hence, though Whitehead's comment may refer to illus-
trative material which is somewhat premature in this regard,
there is a point to the statement that the theologians who
declared themselves to be giving expression to the Faith were
in fact (also) "groping after the solution of a fundamental
metaphysical problem". (Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures
of Ideas. New York: Macmillan, 1933, pp. 134 and 171.) The
occasion for the correlation of this joint effort seems trace-
able to the identification of the problem of Being and Becoming
with the problem of the relationship between God and the world.
And that identification seems to have already been made in (or
by the time of) the writings of Philo Judeaus. For an exten-
sion and elaboration of this problem, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The
Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960). See
also Maximilian Beck, "Plato's Problem in the Parmenides," in
Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1947), pp.
232-236; R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1937); Raymond Klibansky,
The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages
(London: Warburg Institute, 1939).

[1] Claude Tresmontant, "Biblical Metaphysics," in Cross
Currents. Vol. X, No. 3 (1960), pp. 229-250; and La Metaphy-
sique du Christianisme et la Naissance de la Philosophie
Chretienne (Paris: Seuil, 1961). See also A. Thiry's review
of La Metaphysique in Nouvelle Revue Theologique. Vol. LXXXV,
No. 1 (1963), pp. 225-238.

upon God. Yet, in another sense, the created order retains
its own reality and goodness.[1] And, in this sense, the reality
of the created order is not simply referable to the reality of
God. Beyond that, while the world is internally dependent upon
God, God does not so depend upon the world. The relationship
Between God and the world is an asymmetrical one. The charac-
terisation of either of the two terms by means of the other is
the only device available within the bipolar context, yet Chris-
tian affirmation (and the asymmetry which it implies) would de-
mand the simultaneous perspectives of both vantage points. At
the same time, those same affirmations (and the asymmetry which
they imply) would also attest that that bipolarity can ultimately
admit but one true center or locus. The particular form of
asymmetry viz-a-viz God and the world which Christian convic-
tion requires leads to the simultaneous expression of several
necessary statements which, though in conflict with each other
when isolated, together comprise the completeness and accuracy
of the total account.[2]

The attempt to capture the manifold asymmetrical relation
between God and the world is evident in each of the three es-
says on freedom which it has been this treatise' purpose to

---

[1] See William A. Christian's article on three ways of rela-
ting God and the world, especially his discussion of what occurs
when considerations of Christian revelation are expressed in pub-
lic language, in "God and the World," in *Journal of Religion.*
Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (1948), pp. 255-262.

[2] The writings of St. Augustine on the Christian doctrine of

examine. The particular form of asymmetry which the Christian understanding of the relation between God and the world requires seems implicit, for example, in Irenaeus' affirmation (and, indeed, insistence) of the reality of the created order as opposed to the Gnostic-inspired tendency to reduce the human and the carnal to shadow or derivative image. On the other hand, Thomas rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternality of matter on the basis of the same doctrine of creation ex nihilo which is implied in Irenaeus' account.[1] For Thomas, the contingency of the world must be safeguarded, and, at the same time, an affirmation is required that grace does not destroy but rather perfects

---

creation ex nihilo seem especially illustrative of the way in which a variety of necessary statements respecting the relation between God and the world (or Creator and creature) must be held together to form this asymmetrical bipolarity. See especially Book XI ff., of The Confessions, as well as the following discussion: William A. Christian, "The Creation of the World," in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. Roy Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 315-342.

    Note: In speaking about the way in which the doctrine of creation informs the Christian conception of the relation between God and the world, we are not suggesting that this particular doctrine is the exclusive source of that which most clearly distinguishes Christian thought. Nor are we hereby ascribing to that doctrine the status and function which others have attributed to the kerygma, i.e. that it is Christianity's core element. We are rather asserting that the bipolarity which characterizes the systematic structure within which Christian theological reflection occurs is an asymmetrical one, and that this is in accord with a systematic articulation of the relation between God and the world which creation ex nihilo requires. It may be that the kerygma is also the source of the peculiar structure implicit in creation, or even that the pattern of the relation between the divine and the human in that doctrine mirrors normative Christological theory. But these are causal questions and extensions which elude the critical assessment of formal unity and variety.

    [1] For the sense of creation ex nihilo in Thomas, see S. T. I, I, Q. xlv, Art. i-iii, and De Potentia 3.1-7. See also Regis Jolivet, Essai sur les Rapports entre la Pensee Grecque et la

228.

nature. These sorts of structural innovations and corrections seem attributable to the effort to retain the necessary asymmetry in the relationship conceived between God and the world.

But, while each theologian (by Christian conviction) must honor the asymmetry within the bipolar relation between God and the world, each must also refer that relation to the locus of determination which is appropriate to his own systematic structure. That is, the asymmetrical form of bipolarity must be negotiated and established by means of those principles and methods which are characteristic of the theological patterns. The relation between God and the world must be expressed by means of the determinant-determinable relation, as this is specified within systematic order. Within systematisation, the principle of orientation denotes the locus of divine determination, and the method (or interest) its manner. But asymmetry itself prescribes that principle and interest be correlated to safeguard the form of bipolarity which Christian understanding of the relation between God and the world requires.

Hence, Luther, for example, must exhibit this asymmetrical bipolarity from his own locus of divine determination, i.e. the Word alone, and in harmony with the manner according to which that simple principle is conceived to order that to which it is related. Luther is enabled to discriminate between his chosen principle of

---

Pensee Chretienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955); and James F. Anderson, The Cause of Being. The Philosophy of Creation in St. Thomas (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1952).

orientation and all other aspirants to that position by means of an interest which is intent upon disclosing the one thing needful. However, given this characteristic starting point under these specified auspices, asymmetrical bipolarity must nevertheless characterize the operation of the _Word alone_ with respect to the other locus of vitality and activity by which it is distinguished. The bipolarity which is characteristic of the relation between God and the world must now regulate the order which proceeds from this selected locus of divine determination. That is, asymmetry itself requires the establishment of the reality of the other imperium. It also demands that the one who has been released by identification with the Word live out that liberty in relation to the neighbor and to external demands. Asymmetry prescribes that exclusive necessity be attributed to spiritual things, for Luther, while necessity is also ascribed to carnal things. Were both forms of necessity not present, then, by a kind of parallel ascription, Luther would be susceptible to the same charge of "gnosticism" which is appropriate to the restriction of reality to the spiritual. Indeed, all of the several characteristic marks of asymmetry are implicit in Luther's specification of the order which proceeds from his locus of divine determination with respect to "the world" to which it stands in bipolarity.

The respective principles and methods therefore seem to condition the techniques according to which asymmetry can be achieved. The holoscopic perspectives of Irenaeus and Thomas both enable a negotiation and establishment of asymmetrical bipolarity by means

of motion. Irenaeus' locus of divine determination, i.e. the normative process, is so dialectically ordered that it allows a projection of asymmetry out along a directed succession wherein distinctions are maintained and mediated by divine adaptation and human increase. The boundary between the Creator and creature is honored: the creature is marked by time, limits, and change. But that boundary is not such as to violate the continuity which asymmetry also requires. For Irenaeus, the asymmetrical relationship is implicit within the normative process which is characterized by its synthetic principle and its dialectical method. Thomas Aquinas, also, is enabled to refer asymmetry to motion since the action of the supernatural comes to sustain the movements of the natural from potency to act: the operations of creatures causally imply God as _Actus Purus_. But the dependence of the natural upon the supernatural does not violate the reality of the former. Indeed, by substantiating the reality and efficacy of natural powers at the same time as it demonstrates their insufficiency, the human _telos_, as reciprocally understood, is itself illustrative of the asymmetry which actualisation implies.

The asymmetrical form of bipolarity is more difficult to capture, however, in the meroscopic orientation of Martin Luther. The structure of the _Tractatus de Libertate Christiani_ no longer retains the ability to conceive that relationship by means of the increments of time and change, or by submitting its implicit tension to a scheme of synthetic-hierarchisation. Instead, the Reformer finds it necessary to set forth two fundamental theses which are illuminated by two stated axioms in a presentation

231.

which consists of two distinct parts. The asymmetrical relation
is implicit both in the necessary succession of the two theses
and in the determinations which they foster. The two declara-
tions are illusory, and, hence, invalid, when taken individually
or in isolation from each other. Luther's task is to establish
both the fundamental opposition between the spiritual and the
carnal (as regulative of both men and things) and the necessity
for each. And this can be established through the scheme of
priority which informs the relation of the one to the other.
If the attempt is made to render this subjection consistent
with discrimination by simply keeping the spiritual and the
carnal separate, then the priority which exists between them
will be destroyed and, with it, the occasion for asymmetry.
And if the effort is made to insure the reality of the one by
reducing the reality of the other to it, then bipolarity will
be dissolved. Instead Luther affirms both statements and both
determinants of men and things in simultaneity, and ascribes
to freedom (as well as the Christian man by faith) the power
to perceive the necessary tension and balance.

All three of the essayists are united in prescribing an
asymmetrical bipolarity to the relationship conceived between
God and the world. Indeed, the "unity" which our chosen treat-
ments of freedom exhibit seems ultimately to refer to the pre-
sence of an identical formal asymmetry in each of the three ac-
counts. The "diversity" which the treatments of freedom mani-
fest seems traceable to the utilization of variant principles

and methods, as these are appropriate to characteristic systematic presentations. The formal theological <u>unity</u> between the respective formulations of freedom by Irenaeus, Luther, and Thomas implies that the fundamental relationship between God and the world has been conceived according to an identical pattern. The formal theological <u>diversity</u> seems referable to the alternative starting points and interests from which the systematic presentation of that identical pattern is undertaken.

But, beyond this it is difficult for a critical analysis of theological "unity and diversity" to go. Indeed, there is a tendency to go beyond. A positive ecumenical theology which seeks to comprise the variety and continuity of the classic theological tradition seems further to require a specification of the relationship between the variant principles of orientation. It would be tempting, perhaps even cavalier, to assert that each of the treatments of freedom is necessary. But this would not only require the application of synthetic procedures to formal analysis; it would also obscure the Kantian-derived reminder that not that easily can the product of formal analysis be transposed into positive content. The results of a critical project are not necessarily the ingredients of a constructive one. The sum of abstracted "parts" is not that readily equal to the "whole". The response to the question concerning the possibility of a priori-synthetic knowledge is not equivalent to an exhaustive account of the nature of reality. The comparative examination of the methods and principles of those

233.

theological patterns of Irenaeus, Luther, and Thomas is not identical to an exposition of the respective 'theologies' of Irenaeus, Luther, and Thomas. Further, one is prevented from entertaining the synthetic possibilities which an application of this analysis to positive ecumenical theology would require by the recognition that none of these illustrative patterns can admit the conception of freedom which is characteristic of either of the others without destroying that which is both unique and representative of its own.

Yet, the fact that the respective principles and methods are describable (and even nameable) seems to point to a 'beyond' to which a strictly formal analysis is unable to go.[1] The necessity of the bipolar scheme seems to imply that some sort of 'beyond' is already present. Given the requirements asymmetrical bipolarity places upon the way in which the locus of determination serves as a principle of order, it would appear that a certain "rhythm" or "logic" regulates the relationship between respective starting points. The principles used in the treatments of freedom are not simply alternative names for one and the same locus of referral, but represent distinct orientations and operate over a range of concern to

---

[1] We are indebted to Pierre Thevenaz for the use of the word "beyond" in this context. Though Thevenaz writes of critical reflexivity primarily with respect to philosophical rather than theological thought, the following statement concerning the activity of "going-beyond" seems also to be appropriate to our project: "Philosophical thought is never simple explicitation, simple analysis, pure observation or

which none of the others provides equivalent access.[1] Within bipolarity, holoscopic and meroscopic orientations seem to comprise the list of alternatives. That is, the span of systematic structural possibilities is contained within comprehensive and particular principled perspectives. In the examples herein cited, freedom has been treated from both ways. At the one extreme is the essay which considers freedom comprehensively by means of a continuous inclusive process; at the opposite side is the attempt to treat freedom by isolating the one thing necessary among discriminated possibilities. Beyond these two kinds of formulations are alternatives which asymmetry cannot allow. Were comprehensiveness to become so extensive as to nullify the reality of the differentiable, then asymmetry would also be destroyed. In the same way, if particularity becomes so pervasive that determinability is an impossibility, then bipolarity would also be destroyed, and, with it, the occasion for asymmetry. A

---

constatation. An initial amazement marks the opening of a new dimension, of a transcendence....The world is reorganized from another point of view whose discovery and formulation is precisely the job of philosophy." Pierre Thevenaz, _What is Phenomenology?_ trans. James M. Edie, Charles Courtney, and Paul Brockelman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962), p. 137.

[1] One could argue for the exclusivity of these respective ranges of concern by noting that which appears to be the particular weakness of each. The kind of continuity which Irenaeus' recapitulation prescribes, for example, is little able to recognize, treat, or give status to individuality. Differentiations between men (except as these are equivalent to the distinctions between the two fundamental races of men) are hardly given status at all. Categorical distinctions among parties to the dispensation of liberty often become blurred. In short, the comprehensive orientation cannot readily account for uniqueness among the various candidates for continuity. Luther's realm of neglect, however, will predictably be

significant clue to the detection of such destruction would be the absence of the possibility for freedom: freedom would be lost by either extension which destroys bipolarity. Without differentiation there can be no freedom; differentiation so prominent that it dissolves concordance is equally destructive of freedom. And ranged between the approaches which utilize the concordant and the differentiable as respective bases of orientation is the attempt of Thomas to treat the peculiar within and by means of the totality. This latter alternative is not simply the product of the conjunction of the other two, but rather leads to a distinctive form of determination which neither of the alternative possibilities is able to incorporate.

This is not to suggest that the three selected orientations herein illustrated exhaust the possible ways of relating determinant to differentiable within asymmetrical bipolarity. Certainly the Christian tradition manifests additional alternatives

---

of the opposite kind. Individuality will be honored by the concern to discriminate, isolate, and to establish the particular. But it will be difficult, under these auspices, to specify a basis for the relatedness of things. Luther does not have access to the totality in that sense, nor does his theological structure imply a basis for correlating disparate parts. (Accordingly, E. S. Abbott, Catholicity, op. cit., refers to Luther's "radical errors" in terms of "disassociation", p. 25; Luther, in turn, repeatedly accuses the Scholastics of a tendency to "obscure" the essential matters.) On the other hand, the reciprocity which the Thomist synthetic-hierarchisation disposes is dependent upon a careful interdependence between the particular and the totality. In some sense, the existence of either is dependent upon the other. But that necessary balance and tension cannot be dissolved by making the existence of the one derivative from the other. As the peculiar is obscured when the totality is threatened, so only through reciprocity does either possess a reality which is characteristically its own.

as well as modifications upon these selected examples. Yet, when the analyst moves from Irenaeus to Thomas to Luther, he becomes aware that the respective principles of orientation have become increasingly and progressively narrowed in scope and in range of concern. In the first pattern determination occurs through a comprehensive process which is regulative of the totality. The second outlook focuses upon part-whole structures as determination is referred to the peculiar within the totality. The third perspective restricts the locus of determination to a distinguishable Word which is alone necessary. In each transition the focus becomes more particularized. In the third alternative the concern for the simple and isolatable is so dominant that the perspective loses the capacity to be all-encompassing. Luther can no longer contend for the coherence which is integral to Irenaeus', and implicit within Thomas', pattern. But neither does Irenaeus' perspective possess a capability to isolate the individual as is fundamental to a meroscopic outlook; nor can Thomas' outlook safeguard the reality of the isolatable should the totality itself be in jeopardy. And yet, while the determinative principles are narrowed in scope (as one proceeds from Irenaeus to Thomas to Luther), each is nevertheless able to achieve within systematisation the asymmetrical bipolarity which Christian understanding of the relation between God and the world requires.

This implies, therefore, that the relationship between God and the world is itself such that its explication requires

a number of starting points. The fundamental asymmetry is implicit in the necessary variety of loci of determination, just as it regulates the respective systematic patterns which proceed from those same loci. Indeed, were our project to attempt an exhaustive account of the starting points required by an explication of asymmetry, it would need to undertake a dialectical exercise such as the relation of the One to the Many inspired in Plato's Parmenides.[1] As a certain thesis in that dialogue is necessary to establish unity and another to safeguard diversity, so also are the respective starting points necessary to establish continuity and distinctiveness with respect to God and the world. As Plato seemed to imply that each of the theses of the dialogue is necessary to the completeness of the relationship,[2] so also does asymmetrical bipolarity require a succession of individual standpoints: the distinct but precisely interdependent realities, i.e. God and the world, can be correlated in no

---

[1] This, again, is not to identify the One with God and the Many with the world, but to note that in asymmetry the two relations are structured in similar ways. As we have argued in this thesis, the relations between Being and Becoming (for which Plato used his analysis of the One and the Many) and God and the world become interdependent in western religious reflection. Methodologically, however, the structures are distinguishable in that theology's commitment to the asymmetrical relation requires it to achieve that form of bipolarity from whatever locus of determination it chooses as starting point. Not so committed, the philosophic patterns need not proceed in the same way. This differentiation seems implicit in the innovations theologians find it necessary to make with respect to basic philosophical structures.

[2] Brumbaugh, Plato on the One, op. cit., p. 192.

238.

other way.

But the purpose of our project is not to classify the
starting points which are required by, and comprised within,
an analytical approach to asymmetrical bipolarity. Rather,
our task has been to approach the problem of "unity and diver-
sity" through a methodological analysis of selected essays in
the Christian tradition on the concept of human freedom. The
diversity which the three accounts exhibit appears traceable
to the principles and methods by which their respective sys-
tems are structured. The unity seems referable to the presence
of the fundamental asymmetrical relation between God and the
world which is ordered from diverse forms of determination and
under variant auspices. The "unity amidst diversity" seems amen-
able to clarification by virtue of a distinction between the
two contexts in which asymmetry appears, i.e. in the required
alternative standpoints from which that relation can be ap-
proached, and in the various ways of systematically articula-
ting that polarity as these proceed from those alternative stand-
points. Freedom, that is, is useful to this analysis not only
because of its disclosive ability with respect to the systematic
principles and methods which its articulation disposes. It also
retains a capacity to safeguard the integrity of alternative
starting points. With God and the world, freedom is also of
greater multiform depth than its determination within the
necessary partiality of systematic presentations would allow
it to be. Just as one must distinguish God and the world from

239.

the locus of divine determination and its appropriate relata, so also must one differentiate that concept which denotes the appearance of the distinguishable within concordance from the denotation which occurs under various systematised forms of determination.

There are certain times and occasions, as asymmetry would prescribe, when freedom is dependent upon the continuity between God and the world. There are also occasions and a time, as appropriate to the same pattern, when freedom requires the assertion of the "I" or the "we" or the "community of those who bear a mark" as over against, or within, any implicit concordance. There is a time when freedom knows that reliance upon a given oneness between God and the world need not preclude a dependence upon a oneness which has not yet been created. There is also a point at which the significance of the present moment need not issue from its placement between the before and the after. There are times and a point from which the importance of the Now does not conflict with purposes whose realization is dependent upon the future. And there are occasions and a certain time and point at which freedom needs to affirm that the past, present, and future be recorded within a providential concordance.

Conformity to a regulative process, spontaneity of operation, the absence of restraint amidst conflict and opposition—the freedom which safeguards the integrity of the created order requires all of these, and also their distinctiveness. Absence

of restraint need not depend upon spontaneity, however, nor does freedom's requiring all imply that conformity be synthesized with identification. Comparative analysis recognizes the partiality required by fulness when asymmetry is the rule. Asymmetry sustains the partiality of distinct starting points by saving them as bases for a pluralistic vision. And in the present economy an exercise in such vision and orientation may also be an aspect of freedom's dominion. At least the melody from here and from there follows the same rhythmic pattern as the music from the other side. And melodies may be the same though every note is different when played in composition and modulated from a different key.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Works:

Irenaeus. *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, Sancti Irenaei Contra Haereses*, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris: 1857), Vol. VII, 1-2.

Kant, Immanuel. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith as *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Macmillan, 1961).

Luther, Martin. *Tractatus de Libertate Christiani*, in *D. Martin Luthers Werke* (Weimar: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 1883), Vol. VII.

Thomas Aquinas. *Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae*, from *Sancti Aquinatis, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera Omnia*, text of Petri Fiaccadori (New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1948), Vol. II.

Secondary Material:

Adam, Karl. *The Roots of the Reformation*, trans. Cecily Hastings (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951).

d'Ales, A. "Le mot oikonomia dans la langue theologique de saint Irenee," in *Revue des Etudes Grecques*. Vol. XXXII (1919), pp. 1-9.

Ammundsen, V. "The Rule of Truth in Irenaeus," in *The Journal of Theological Studies*. Vol. XIII (1912), pp. 574-580.

Anderson, James F. *The Cause of Being. The Philosophy of Creation in St. Thomas* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1952).

Arendt, Rudolph. "Religiöst Apriori hos Anders Nygren," in *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift*. Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 89-108.

Aristotle. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

Armstrong, A. H. *The Greek Philosophical Background of the Psychology of St. Thomas* (London: Blackfriars, 1952).

Armstrong, Hilary. "Platonism," in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ian Ramsey (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 93-109.

Arnold, Franz Xaver. Zur Frage des Naturrechts bei Martin Luther (Munich: Max Hueber, 1936).

Ashley, B. W. "Aristotle's Sluggish Earth," in New Scholasticism. Vol. XXXII (1958), pp. 1-31.

Audet, T. Andre. "Orientations theologiques chez saint Irenee," in Traditio. Vol. I, No. 1 (1943), pp. 25-54.

Aulen, Gustaf. The Faith of the Christian Church, trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom and G. Everett Arden (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1948).

Bakhuizen van den Brink, J. N. "Traditio im theologischen Sinne," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1959), pp. 65-86.

------------------------------------. "La tradition dans l'eglise primitive et au XVIe Siecle," in Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses. Vol. XXXVI (1956), pp. 271-281.

Bakker, J. T. Coram Deo (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1956).

Barth, Karl. From Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens (London: S.C.M. Press, 1959).

Bauer, Karl. Die Wittenberger Universitat Theologie und die Anfange der deutschen Reformation (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1928).

Beck, Lewis White. "Apodictic Imperatives," in Kant Studien. Vol. XLIX (1957), pp. 7-24.

------------------------. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

------------------------. "Die Kant Kritik von C. I. Lewis und der Analytischen Schule," in Kant Studien. Vol. XLV (1953), pp. 3-20.

Beck, Maximilian. "Plato's Problem in the Parmenides," in Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. VIII, No. 2 (1947), pp. 232-236.

Bellon, K. L. "Unite et Pluralite des Religions," in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. Vol. XXXIII (1957), pp. 5-35.

Benoit, Andre. Saint Irenee. Introduction a l'Etude de sa Theologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960).

244.

Berdyaev, Nikolai. Slavery and Freedom, trans. R. M. French (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944).

Bergson, Henri. The Creative Mind (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945).

--------------. Time and Free Will (New York: Harper Torch-books, 1960).

Bird, Graham. Kant's Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

Bizer, Ernst. Fides Ex Auditu. Eine Untersuchung über die Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther (Kaiserswerth: Kurt Wolff, 1958).

Bleeker, C. Jucco. "The Phenomenological Method," in Numen. Vol. VI (1959), pp. 96-111.

Blondel, Maurice. "The Unity of the Christian Spirit," in Cross Currents. Vol. I, No. 3 (1951), pp. 1-12.

Bluck, R. S. "Forms as Standards," in Phronesis. Vol. II, No. 2 (1957), pp. 115-127.

Boehmer, Heinrich. Luther and the Reformation in the Light of Modern Research, trans. E. S. G. Potter (London: G. Bellard and Sons, 1930).

Boehner, Philotheus. "The Metaphysics of William Ockham," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. I, No. 4 (1948), pp. 59-86.

Boer, W. den. "Hermeneutic Problems in Early Christian Literature," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. I, No. 3 (1947), pp. 150-167.

Bornkamm, Heinrich. "Luthers Lehre von den zwei Reichen in Zusammenhang seiner Theologie," in Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte. Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (1958), pp. 26-49.

Bosc, Jean, Jean Guitton, and Jean Danielou. The Catholic Protestant Dialogue (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1960).

Botte, B. "A propos de l'Adversus haereses III, 3, 2 de saint Irenee," in Irenikon. Vol. XXX (1957), pp. 156-163.

Bouyer, Louis. The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, trans. A. V. Littledale (Westminster: Newman Press, 1961).

Böversen, Fritz. Die Idee der Freiheit in der Philosophie Kants (Heidelberg: Ruprecht-Karl Universität, 1962).

245.

Brandon, S. G. F. "The De-eschatologizing of Christian Doctrine," in The Hibbert Journal. Vol. LIV (1955-56), pp. 392-396.

Brennan, Robert E. "The Mansions of Thomistic Philosophy," in The Thomist. Vol. I, No. 1 (1939), pp. 62-79.

Brennan, Sheilah O'Flynn. "The Meaning of 'Nature' in the Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature," in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1961), pp. 383-401.

Breton, Stanislas. "La deduction thomiste des categories," in Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Vol. LX, No. 1 (1962), pp. 5-32.

——————————————. "Image, Scheme, Concept," in Sciences Ecclesiastiques. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1963), pp. 7-20.

——————————————. "Logique formelle de la theologie deductive," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XLIV, No. 3 (1960), pp. 409-440.

Broad, C. D. "Kant's Theory of Mathematical and Philosophical Reasoning," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1941-42, pp. 1-24.

Brumbaugh, Robert S. "An Aristotelian Defense of 'Non-Aristotelian' Logics," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLVIII, No. 19 (1951), pp. 582-585.

——————————————. Plato on the One (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

——————————————. "Plato's Divided Line," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. V (1952), pp. 529-34.

——————————————. "Plato's Parmenides and Positive Metaphysics," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 271-277.

Bultmann, Rudolf. Primitive Christianity In Its Contemporary Setting, trans. R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian, 1956).

Caird, Edward. The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Vol. II (Glasgow: James Mackhose, 1889).

Callahan, John F. Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948).

Callus, Daniel A. "Origins of the Problem of Unity of Form," in The Thomist. Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1961), pp. 257-285.

246.

Carlson, Edgar M. The Reinterpretation of Luther (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1948).

Carnap, Rudolf. "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. IV (1950), pp. 20-40.

Carpenter, Hilary. "The Ontological Roots of Thomism," in Essays in Thomism, ed. Robert Brennan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942), pp. 83-100.

Cassirer, Ernst. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Volume Two: Mythical Thought, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

Cassirer, H. W. Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954).

Catholicity: A Study in the Conflict of Christian Traditions in the West, ed. E. S. Abbott et al (London: Dacre Press, 1957).

Chadwick, Owen. From Bossuet to Newman (London: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

Chenu, M. D. "Position de la theologique," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XXIV (1935), pp. 232-257.

------------. La Theologie comme Science au XIIIe Siecle (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1957).

Cherniss, Harold. "Parmenides and the Parmenides of Plato," in American Journal of Philology. Vol. LII (1932), pp. 122-138.

------------------. "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas," in American Journal of Philology. Vol. LVII (1936), pp. 445-456.

Child, Arthur. "On the Theory of the Categories," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. VII (1946-47), pp. 316-324.

Childress, Marianne M. "Efficient Causality in Human Actions," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (1951), pp. 191-222.

Christensen, Johnny. "Actus Purus," in Classica et Mediaevalia. Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1958), pp. 7-40.

Christian, William A. "The Creation of the World," in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. Roy Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955).

247.

Christian, William A. "God and the World," in *Journal of Religion*. Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (1948), pp. 255-262.

----------------------. "Some Uses of Reason," in *The Relevance of Whitehead*, ed. Ivor Leclerc (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 45-89.

Clark, Mary T. *Augustine. Philosopher of Freedom* (New York: Desclee, 1957).

Clark, Norman. *An Introduction to Kant's Philosophy* (London: Methuen, 1925).

Clark, W. Norris. "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism," in *The New Scholasticism*. Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (1952), pp. 167-194.

----------------. "Saint Thomas and Platonism," in *Thought*. Vol. XXXII (1957), pp. 437-443.

Cloes, Henri. "La systematisation theologique pendant la premiere moitie du XIIe siecle," in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*. Vol. XXXIV (1958), pp. 277-329.

Cochrane, Charles N. *Christianity and Classical Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

Coffey, Brian. "The Notion of Order According to St. Thomas Aquinas," in *The Modern Schoolman*. Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (1949), pp. 1-18.

Cohen, Morris R. *A Preface to Logic* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956).

Copleston, F. C. *Aquinas* (London: Penguin Books, 1955).

Cranz, Edward. *An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law and Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

Cullmann, Oscar. *Die Tradition* (Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1954).

Daly, Sister Jeanne Joseph. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Free Will as a Transcendental Aspect of the Act of Existence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1958).

Danielou, Jean. *Message Evangelique et Culture Hellenistique aux IIe et IIIe Siecles* (Paris: Desclee, 1961).

----------------. "Saint Irenee et les origines de la theologie de l'histoire," in *Recherches de Science Religieuse*. Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1947), pp. 227-231.

248.

Danielou, Jean. "Unite et pluralite de la pensee chretienne," in *Etudes*. Vol. 312 (January 1962), pp. 3-16.

De Plinval, G. "Anticipation de la pensee augustinienne dans l'oeuvre de Platon," in *Augustinianum*. Vol. I, No. 2 (1961), pp. 310-326.

Dettloff, Werner. *Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther* (Munster: Aschendorffsche, 1963).

Devaraja, N. K. "Notes Towards a Definition of Philosophy," in *The Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. LVI, No. 7 (1959), pp. 319-327.

Diels, H. *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1879).

Dodds, E. R. "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neo-Platonic One," in *Classical Quarterly*. Vol. XXII 1928), pp. 129-142.

Doherty, Kevin F. "Location of the Platonic Ideas," in *The Review of Metaphysics*. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1960), pp. 57-72.

Dondeyne, Albert. "Approaches du mystere de la liberte," in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*. Special No. 6 (August 1948), pp. 23-44.

Downing, H. J. "Popular Christianity and the Theologian in the Early Centuries," in *Journal of Theological Studies*. Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1963), pp. 294-310.

Drummond, Edward J. *The Pursuit of Truth to Make Men Free* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955).

Ducoin, Georges. "Saint Thomas commentateur d'Aristote," in *Recherches de Philosophie*. Vol. I (1955), pp. 85-107.

Dufort, Jean-Marc. "La recapitulation paulinienne dans l'exegese des Peres," in *Sciences Ecclesiastiques*. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 21-38.

Dumery, Henry. "Aspiration et Reflexion," in *Les Etudes Philosophiques*. Vol. IX, No. 4 (1954), pp. 420-427.

--------------. *Critique et Religion*. (Paris: Societe d'Edition d'Enseignement Superieur, 1957).

--------------. *Foi et Interrogation* (Paris: Tequi, 1953).

--------------. *La Foi n'est pas un Cri* (Paris: Casterman, 1957).

249.

Dumery, Henry. Philosophie de la Religion (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957).

----------------. "Une philosophie de la religion, est-elle possible?" in Actes XIe Congres International de Philosophie (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1953), pp. 26-34.

----------------. "Postface a un dialogue," in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (1960), pp. 89-97.

----------------. Le Probleme de Dieu en Philosophie de la Religion (Paris: Desclee, 1957).

----------------. "La Theoretique," in Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1961), pp. 349-355.

Dumont, C. "La reflexion sur la methode theologique," in Nouvelle Revue Theologique. Vol. LXXXIV, No. 1 (1962), pp. 17-35.

Duncan, A. R. C. Practical Reason and Morality: A Study of Immanuel Kant's 'Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals' (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957).

Düring, I., and G. E. L. Owen. Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century (Gothenburg: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960).

Ebeling, Gerhard. "Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik," in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche. Vol. XLVIII (1951), pp. 172-230.

----------------. "Evangelische Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung zu Luthers Hermeneutik," in Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus. Series 10, No. 1 (1942).

----------------. Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963).

Edelstein, Ludwig. "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," in American Journal of Philology. Vol. LVII (1936), pp. 286-325.

Ehman, Robert R. "The Ideas of Reason," in The Review of Metaphysics. Vol. XV, No. 2 (1961), pp. 225-235.

Eklund, Harald. "Die Denkformen der Theologie," in Studia Theologica. Vol. X (1955-57), pp. 67-76.

Emmet, Dorothy M. The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (London: Macmillan, 1957).

250.

Enquete sur la Liberte (Paris: Hermann, 1953).

Enslin, Morton S. "Irenaeus: Mostly Prolegomena," in Harvard Theological Review. Vol. XL, No. 3 (1947), pp. 137-165.

------------------. "The Pontic Mouse," in Anglican Theological Review. Vol. XXVII, No. 1 (1945), pp. 1-16.

Ermeneutica et Tradizione, ed. E. Castelli (Rome: Instituto di Studi Filosofici, 1963).

Ewing, A. C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1938).

Eynde, P. D. Van den. Les Normes de la Doctrine Chretienne selon la Litterature Patristique des Trois Premiers Siecles (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933).

Ferrari, Leo. "Abstractio Totius and Abstractio Totalis," in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 72-89.

Ferre, Nels. Swedish Contributions to Modern Theology (New York: Harper, 1939).

Festugiere, A. M. "La place du 'De Anima' dans la systeme Aristotelicien," in Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age. Vol. VI (1931), pp. 25-47.

Fischer, Robert H. "A Reasonable Luther," in Reformation Studies. Essays in Honor of Roland H. Bainton, ed. Franklin H. Littell (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1962), pp. 30-45.

Forest, Aime. "Grace et Liberte," in Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1959), pp. 53-58.

Forster, Wilhelm. "Die Ursachen der Reformation im Lichte der neueren kirchengeschichtlichen Literatur," in Wissenschaft und Weisheit. Vol. XVIII (1955), pp. 122-136.

Frank, E. "Plato's Theology," in American Journal of Philology. Vol. LXVI (1945), pp. 92-96.

Fransen, Peter. "Three Ways of Dogmatic Thought," in The Heythrop Journal. Vol. IV, No. 1 (1963), pp. 3-24.

Gahringer, Robert E. "The Metaphysical Aspect of Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Ethics. Vol. XLIV (1954), pp. 277-291.

Geiger, Louis B. "On Freedom," in Philosophy Today. Vol. IV, No. 2 (1960), pp. 126-137, and No. 3 (1960), pp. 184-195 (translated by Mary T. Clark from Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques. Vol. XLI, No. 4, 1957, pp. 601-631).

Geiger, Louis B. La Participation dans la Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953).

Gent, Werner. "Das Zeitproblem in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in Archiv für Philosophie. Vol. IV, No. 4 (1952), pp. 390-399.

Gerrish, B. A. "Biblical Authority and the Continental Reformation," in Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. X, No. 4 (1957), pp. 337-360.

--------------. Grace and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

Gilson, Etienne. Being and Some Philosophers (New York: Scribners, 1939).

--------------. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956).

--------------. God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).

--------------. The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955).

--------------. Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Scribners, 1938).

--------------. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Scribners, 1940).

Glutz, Melvin A. "Order in the Philosophy of Nature," in The Thomist. Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (1961), pp. 402-418.

--------------. "Toward an Integrated Psychology," in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (1958), pp. 139-148.

Grant, Robert M. "Gnostic Origins and the Basilidians of Irenaeus," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1959), pp. 121-125.

--------------. Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

--------------. "Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture," in Harvard Theological Review. Vol. XL, No. 1 (1949), pp. 41-51.

--------------. "Scripture, Rhetoric, and Theology in Theophilus," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XIII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 33-45.

Grenet, Paul. Les Origines de l'Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948).

252.

Grobel, Kendrick. The Gospel of Truth (New York: Abingdon, 1960).

Guelley, Robert. Philosophie et Theologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947).

Guitton, Jean. La Philosophie de Newman (Paris: Boivin, 1933).

Gustafson, Gustaf J. The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy of St. Thomas (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1944).

Guzie, Tad W. "Evolution of Philosophical Method in the Writings of St. Thomas," in The Modern Schoolman. Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (1960), pp. 95-120.

Hägglund, Bengt. "The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology," in Lutheran World. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1961), pp. 24-46.

——————————. "Die Bedeutung der 'regula fidei' als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen," in Studia Theologica. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1958), pp. 1-44.

——————————. Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Occamistischen Tradition (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1956).

——————————. "Was Luther a Nominalist?" in Concordia Theological Monthly. Vol. XXVIII, No. 6 (1957), pp. 441-452.

Hall, Everett W. Philosophical Systems: A Categorial Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Hamburg, Carl H. Symbol and Reality (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956).

Hanson, R. C. P. Tradition in the Early Church (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962).

Harnack, Adolph. History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan (New York: Dover, 1961).

——————————. The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries, trans. James Moffatt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962).

——————————. What is Christianity? trans. Thomas Bailey Saunders (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957).

Hart, Charles A. "Participation and the Thomistic Five Ways," in The New Scholasticism. Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (1952), pp. 267-285.

Havelock, Eric A. Preface to Plato (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1963).

253.

Hayen, Andre. "La structure de la Somme Theologique et Jesus," in _Sciences Ecclesiastiques_. Vol. XII, No. 1 (1960), pp. 59-82.

Headley, John M. _Luther's View of Church History_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

Heidegger, Martin. _Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics_, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

Heidemann, Ingeborg. _Spontaneität und Zeitlichheit: ein Problem der Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ (Koln Universitäts-Verlag, 1958).

Heikkinen, J. W. "The Basic Principles of Anders Nygren's Theological Thought," in _The Lutheran Quarterly_. Vol. I, No. 2 (1949), pp. 123-134.

Heimsoeth, Heinz. "Zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre," in _Studien zur Philosophiegeschichte_ (Koln Universitäts-Verlag, 1961), pp. 211-239.

Henle, Paul. "The Critique of Pure Reason Today," in _The Journal of Philosophy_. Vol. LIX, No. 9 (1962), pp. 225-234.

Henle, R. J. _Saint Thomas and Platonism_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956).

Hessen, Johannes. _Griechische oder Biblische Theologie? Das Problem der Hellenisierung des Christentums in neuer Beleuchtung_ (Leipzig: Koehler und Amelang, 1956).

Hitchcock, F. R. M. "Loofs' Theory of Theophilus of Antioch as a Source of Irenaeus," in _Journal of Theological Studies_. Vol. XXXVIII (1937), pp. 254-266.

Hoffmann, Ernst. _Platonismus und Christliche Philosophie_ (Stuttgart: Artemis-Verlag, 1960).

Holstein, Henri. "Les Formules du symbole dans l'oeuvre de saint Irenee," in _Recherches de Science Religieuse_. Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (1947), pp. 454-461.

Hunger, Wilhelm. "Der Gedanke der Weltplaneinheit und Adameinheit in der Theologie des Irenäus," in _Scholastik_. Vol. XVII (1942), pp. 161-177.

Hungerland, Isabel C. "Contextual Implications," in _Inquiry_. Vol. III, No. 4 (1960), pp. 211-258.

Husserl, Edmund. _Cartesian Meditations_, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

Husserl, Edmund. Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

Irenaeus. Against Heresies, trans. A. Roberts and W. H. Rambaut, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Vol. I., The Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1885), pp. 315-578.

--------. Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, trans. Joseph P. Smith, in Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation, Vol. XVI (Westminster: Newman Press, 1952).

Ivanka, Endre von. "Aristotelische und Thomistische Seelenlehre," in Aristote et Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1955), pp. 221-228.

Jaeger, Werner. Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of His Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

Jaffa, Harry V. Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

Johansen, Karsten Friis. "The One and the Many," in Classica et Mediaevalia. Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (1957), pp. 1-35.

Johnstone, Henry W. "Argumentation and Inconsistency," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. XV, No. 4 (1961), pp. 353-365.

Jolivet, Regis. Essai sur les Rapports entre la Pensee Grecque et la Pensee Chretienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955).

Jones, W. T. Morality and Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (London: Oxford University Press, 1940).

Josefson, Ruben. Den Naturliga Teologins Problem hos Luther (Uppsala: Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1943).

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis W. Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

--------. Critique of Teleological Judgment, trans. James C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).

--------. The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964).

--------. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. T. K. Abbott (London: Longmans, Green, 1928).

--------. Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

Kant, Immanuel. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Paul Carus (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1933).

——————————. *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (Chicago: Open Court, 1934).

Kantzenbach, Friedrich W. *Evangelium und Dogma* (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959).

Kelly, J. N. D. *Early Christian Creeds* (London: Longmans, Green, 1960).

——————————. *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958).

Kirk, G. S. and J. E. Raven. *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge University Press, 1960).

Klibansky, Raymond. *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages* (London: Warburg Institute, 1939).

Klubertanz, George P. "The Unity of Human Activity," in *The Modern Schoolman*. Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (1950), pp. 75-103.

Knox, Wilfred L. "Irenaeus Adv. Haer. 3. 3. 2," in *Journal of Theological Studies*. Vol. XLVII (1946), pp. 180-184.

Knudsen, Johannes. "Recapitulation Christology and the Church Today," in *Dialogue*. Vol. II, No. 2 (1963), pp. 126-133.

Kohnke, Friedrich Wilhelm. "Plato's Conception of 'to ouk ontos ouk on'," in *Phronesis*. Vol. II, No. 1 (1957), pp. 32-45.

Körner, Stephan. *Conceptual Thinking. A Logical Inquiry* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959).

——————————. *Kant* (New York: Penguin Books, 1955).

Kroner, Richard. *Kant's Weltanschauung*, trans. John E. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

——————————. *Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959).

Lafont, Ghislain. *Structure et Methode dans La Somme Theologique de Saint Thomas D'Aquin* (Paris: Desclee, 1961).

Laistner, M. L. W. *The Intellectual Heritage of the Early Middle Ages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

Lambert, Bernard. La Probleme Oecumenique (Paris: Editions du Centuries, 1962).

Lazerowitz, Morris. The Structure of Metaphysics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).

Lau, Franz. Luthers Lehre von den Beiden Reichen (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1953).

Leclerc, Ivor. "The Structure of Form," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. XV, No. 3 (1960), pp. 185-203.

Leeuw, G. Van der. Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. J. E. Turner (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

Leff, Gordon. Bradwardine and the Pelagians (London: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

------------. Gregory of Rimini (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961).

------------. Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958).

Lehmann, Paul L. "The Reformer's Use of the Bible," in Theology Today. Vol. III (1947), pp. 328-344.

Lewis, Clarence Irving. Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover, 1929).

------------------------. "Professor Chisholm and Empiricism," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLV, No. 19 (1948), pp. 517-524.

Leyden, W. von. "Time, Number, and Eternity in Plato and Aristotle," in The Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. LIV, No. 54 (1964), pp. 35-52.

La Liberte. Actes du IVe Congres des Societies de Philosophie de Langue Francaise (Neuchatel: 1949).

"La Liberte," Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1959).

Lietzmann, Hans. A History of the Early Church, trans. Bertram Lee Woolf (New York: World Publishing, 1961).

------------. "Symbolstudien," in Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft. Vol. XXI (1922), pp. 1-34; Vol. XXII (1923), pp. 257-279; and Vol. XXVI (1927), pp. 75-79.

Lindbeck, George A. "The Future of Roman Catholic Theology in the Light of the First Session of the Second Vatican Council," in Dialogue. Vol. II, No. 3 (1963), pp. 245-253.

Lindbeck, George A. "Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as Illustrated by Pierre D'Ailly on Predestination and Justification," in Harvard Theological Review. Vol. LII, No. 1 (1959), pp. 43-60.

----------------. "Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas," in Franciscan Studies. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 1-22, and No. 3 (1957), pp. 107-125.

Lindroth, Hjalmar. "Anders Nygren und der Kritizismus," in Studia Theologica. Vol. X (1955-57), pp. 89-188.

Link, Wilhelm. Das Ringen Luthers um die Freiheit der Theologie von der Philosophie (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1955).

Little, Arthur. The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin: Golden Eagle, 1949).

Loenen, J. H. "Albinus' Metaphysics. An Attempt at Rehabilitation," in Mnemosyne. Vol. IX (1956), pp. 296-319, and Vol. X (1957), pp. 35-56.

Loewenich, Walther Von. Luthers Theologia Crucis (Munich: 1954).

Lohse, Bernard. Ratio und Fides (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958).

----------------. "Reason and Revelation in Luther," in Scottish Journal of Theology. Vol. XIII (1960), pp. 337-365.

Loisy, Alfred. The Gospel and the Church, trans. Christopher Home (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909).

Lonergan, Bernard J. "St. Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans," in Theological Studies. Vol. III (1942), pp. 533-535.

Lottin, Dom Odon. "La doctrine morale des mouvements premiers de l'appetite sensitif aux XIIE et XIIIe siecles," in Archives D'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age. Vol. VI (1931), pp. 49-93.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960).

Luther, Martin. "Against Latomus," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), Vol. 32, pp. 133-260.

----------------. The Bondage of the Will, eds J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston (London: James Clarke, 1957).

258.

Luther, Martin. "Defense and Explanation of All the Articles," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), Vol. 32, pp. 3-99.

——————————. "Disputation Against Scholastic Theology," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), Vol. 31, pp. 3-16.

——————————. "The Disputation Concerning Justification," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960), Vol. 34, pp. 145-196.

——————————. "The Disputation Concerning Man," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1960), Vol. 34, pp. 133-144.

——————————. "The Freedom of a Christian," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), Vol. 31, pp. 327-377.

——————————. Lectures on Galatians, 1535. Luther's Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), Vol. 26.

——————————. Luther: Lectures on Romans. The Library of Christian Classics, XV, ed. Wilhelm Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961).

——————————. "Two Kinds of Righteousness," in Luther's Works, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), Vol. 31, pp. 293-306

Lynch, William F. An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato Through the Parmenides (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1959).

Lyttkens, Hampus. The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almquist, Wiksell, 1952).

——————————. "Guds Pedagogi hos Irenaeus," in Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift. Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (1959), pp. 222-246, and Vol. XXXVI, No. 1 (1960), pp. 13-37.

——————————. "Nyplatonskt och Kristet: Thomas' av Aquino Teologi," in Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (1962), pp. 15-25.

McCaughey, J. D. "The Nag Hammadi or Chenoboskion Library and the Study of Gnosticism," in The Journal of Religious History. Vol. I, No. 2 (1960), pp. 61-71.

259.

MacDonald, A. J. Authority and Reason in the Early Middle Ages (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).

McInery, R. M. The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).

McKeon, Richard P. "Aristotle's Conception of the Development and the Nature of Scientific Method," in Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1947), pp. 3-44.

——————————. "The Development and Significance of the Concept of Responsibility," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. XI, No. 1 (1957), pp. 3-32.

——————————. "Dialogue and Controversy in Philosophy," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. XVII, No. 2 (1956), pp. 143-163.

——————————. "Discussion and Resolution in Political Conflicts," in Ethics. Vol. LIV, No. 4 (1944), pp. 235-262.

——————————. "Introduction: The Meanings of Society and the Relations among Traditions of Thought," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie. Vol. XV, No. 1 (1961), pp. 3-16.

——————————. "Philosophic Differences and the Issues of Freedom," in Enquete sur la Liberte (Paris: Hermann, 1953), pp. 115-150.

——————————. "Philosophie et Culture," in Les Etudes Philosophiques. Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1952), pp. 75-95.

——————————. "Philosophy and Method," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XLVIII, No. 22 (1951), pp. 653-682.

——————————. "The Present Situation in French Philosophy," in Philosophic Thought in France and the United States, ed. Marvin Farber (Buffalo: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950), pp. 337-362.

——————————. "Principles and Consequences," in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LVI, No. 9 (1959), pp. 385-401.

——————————. Thought, Action, and Passion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

McMahon, G. J. The Order of Procedure in the Philosophy of Nature (Quebec: Librairie Philosophique M. Doyen, 1958).

Malet, A. "Hermeneutique et Philosophie," in Eglise et Theologie. No. 73 (September 1961), pp. 2-22.

260.

Mambrino, Jean. "Les Deux Mains de Dieu dan l'oeuvre de saint Irenee," in Nouvelle Revue Theologique. Vol. LXXIX, No. 4 (1959), pp. 355-370.

Mansion, Augustin. "La theorie aristotelicienne du temps," in Revue Neo-Scolastique de Philosophie. Vol. XXXVI (1934), pp. 275-307.

Marin-Sola, F. La Evolution Homogenie du Dogme Catholique (Fribourg: Imprimerie et Librairie de l'oeuvre de Saint-Paul, 1924).

Maritain, Jacques. The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Scribners' Sons, 1959).

Markus, R. A. "Pleroma and Fulfillment. The Significance of History in St. Irenaeus' Opposition to Gnosticism," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1954), pp. 193-224.

Markus, R. A. and Hilary Armstrong. The Great Dialogue (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1960).

Mauchaussat, Gaston. La Liberte Spirituelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959).

Meissinger, Karl August. Der Katholische Luther (Munich: L. Lehnen, 1952).

Merlan, Philip. "Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas' Summa," in Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. XIV, No. 3 (1953), pp. 284-291.

-----------------. From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953).

Milmed, Bella K. Kant and Current Philosophical Issues (New York: New York University Press, 1961).

Moeller, C. and G. Philips. Grace et Oecumenisme (Paris: Chevetogne, 1957).

Mohrmann, Christine. "A propos de Irenaeus, Advers. Haeres. 3, 3, 1," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. III, No. 1 (1949), pp. 57-61.

-----------------. "Linguistic Problems in the Early Christian Church," in Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. XI, No. 1 (1957), pp. 11-36.

Molland, Einar. "Le development de l'idee de succession apostolique," in Revue D'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses. Vol. XXXIV (1954), pp. 1-29.