CAPPS: I want to make some announcements before we start tonight. Can everybody hear in the back of the room? No? You all know that this is the last meeting of this class. I'm smiling, but I didn't expect applause. We will have a final exam next week for all of you who are taking this course for credit. And the examination questions have been distributed, or they are available in the religious studies office, political science office, and Bob O'Brien has copies of those. There will be a meeting of Bob O'Brien's discussion group, as scheduled, this Wednesday, at two o'clock. I will not have my office hours tomorrow. I am going to be out of town, but I will have some extra office hours this week. I will be in my office most of Thursday afternoon, except for the time when I am teaching a class. I will also be there on Friday morning from nine to twelve, if any of you would like to come by and talk about any of the questions or anything else. Now we are expecting about two-thirds of you, those of you who are taking this course for credit, to be present next Monday night at this very hour in this very room, to take the final exam. You will not be taking the exam in this room, but we will all meet here and then we'll walk across campus to the various places where you will be taking the examination, and most of those places will be in classrooms, I think. We'll have the room numbers ready to tell you about next week, on Monday. We will go through the same procedure on Thursday night of next week. That's the regular assigned time for the final exam for this course. Our estimate is that

about two-thirds of you will be taking the examination on Monday, and a third of you taking it on Thursday. I think that comes out right. If there's any change in that, we'll be prepared, but we will be getting rooms assigned on the basis of those anticipations.

There are a number of things we could announce tonight, but I don't want to take time from Mr. McGovern's lecture. Although I only wanted to say one thing. I want to say this in a careful way. There have been a lot of people who have contributed to the success of this course. And I think it would be apprpriate, I think it would be appropriate if you are of a mind to do this, to let some of these people know that you have appreciated the extra effort that they put into it, if you have appreciated it, and I take it that you have. I have had lots of evidence of that. What I had in mind specifically is, you might if you feel like it jot a note to Dean Sprecher(?), who has gone out of his way to make this course happen. I would say the same thing about the two departmental chairpersons involved, Richard Comstock in religious studies and John Moore in political science, who have been very supportive and very helpful. And there's also Vice-chancellor Birch, who has picked up the tab for some of the expense of using this particular room and setting up the PA system and so forth. If I begin identifying people whom we ought to thank I am sure that I'll forget somebody very important. Television services have been involved in this. I certainly want to thank everyone involved in the Nexus, the Daily Nexus for the support,

the coverage, the editorial last week, which I appreciated very, very much. And then there's Jerry Rankin from the Santa Barbara News-Press, and the News and Review, Joan Walsh, and the television people and lots of others. But my major responsibility tonight is to reintroduce George McGovern. He came here at the beginning of the course, and he has returned tonight I would say to finish t he course. We are talking tonight about the nuclear peril. As all of you know, he is a co-instructor of the course. Some of you know something of his background by now. I didn't realize until I looked it up that he was born in Avon, South Dakota. I knew that his father was a Methodist minister. I didn't know that his mother was known in that area as the Avon Lady,but that apparently. I learned most of that from the Encyclopædia Britannica. He was born fifty-nine years ago, decorated--these events don't fall in neat sequences, but decorated during World War II, earned a Ph.D. in history and government from Northwestern University, came back after the Second World War to teach history at Dakota Western University. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1956, re-elected in 1958. He tried for the Senate in 1960, was defeated, began working then for President John F. Kennedy as the director of the U.S. Food for Peace program, and a special assistant to the President. He was elected to the Senate in South Dakota in 1962, re-elected 1968 and 1974. As we all know, he was the Democratic nominee for the Presidency of the United

States in 1972. He was defeated by Richard Nixon. In 1976 he was appointed by Gerald Ford as a delegate to the United Nations. In 1978 he was appointed by Jimmy Carter as a delegate to the United Nations for the special session on disarmament. He was defeated in his bid for re-election to the Senate from South Dakota in 1980.

Now, many of us remember he was among the first in the Senate to speak out against the Vietnam war. I have just completed a book on the Vietnam war, and I found references as far back as August, 1964, which is right during the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, when Senator McGovern was raising questions about the propriety of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

He was responsible in 1972 for changing the rules at the Democratic Convention, thereby giving increased representation to minority groups.

Since he left here, again I am suggesting not all of these things are in sequence, but since he left here just a few weeks ago, he has become known for his piano playing ability. He gave a piano recital not long ago, and among the pieces that he played were "Embraceable You" and the "Maple Leaf Rag." I think that the fact that he had to listen to Paul Whiteman the last time he lectured may have had some effect on his taking up that musical career. I don't think that had anything to do with it. Just part of my notes.

I am from the State of Nebraska originally, which is

very close to Avon, South Dakota, and people in Nebraska and in South Dakota are not really known for sort of extravagant overstatement. So I am going to say some things rather modestly about George McGovern, and then turn it over to him. I am going to say, first of all, that I regard him currently as one of America's most important citizens. I think he was ahead of his time in 1964, he was ahead of his time in 1972, he is ahead of his time in 1980, he is ahead of his time in 1982. I am also going to say that I have enjoyed all of my dealings with him in connection with the planning and execution of this course. And I have found him in all respects to be a thorougly genuine human being. And finally I am going to say that I think that for longer than he perhaps realizes, he is the embodiment, I would say, of America's national character. The topic tonight is the nuclear peril. George McGovern.

McGOVERN: Thank you. Well, I believe in keeping the anxiety level as low as possible. So I want to assure you that I am not going to play the piano tonight. I have a rather eccentric instructor who lays down a condition for taking you as a student, particularly when you start at the age I did. And that is that you have to agree to a public recital every six months. I thought he was kidding about it when I agreed to that bargain, but I discovered a month ago he wasn't. So I have been working very hard at the piano the last thirty days. Gaylord Nelson, my former colleague in the United States Senate, suggested we turn that recital into a fund-raiser.

And his formula was that it cost you ten dollars to hear me play, and a hundred dollars not to hear me play.

A year ago, following my departure from the United States Senate, which was not entirely a voluntary move on my part, I formed a public interest group, as I mentioned a couple of months ago, entitled Americans for Common Sense, which had a two-fold purpose. The first being to build a counterforce of concerned people who would be alerted to the activities of the so-called new Right, the new Right being a group of some fifty-five extremist organizations of one kind or another. And our second purpose was to develop a, common-sense proposals relating to the central questions that face the country. Now, in that effort, from the very beginning, I have had the advice of some of the most thoughful people in the country, including my former colleagues, who have gone down to defeat: Senator McIntyre of New Hampshire, Senator Clark of Iowa, who were defeated in 1978, and then in 1980, Senator Frank Church, Gaylord Nelson, John Culver, Birch Bayh, and others who left the Senate as a result oftargeting operations by the new Right in 1980.

Now, recognizing that it is impossible for me to be totally unbiased about this matter, I nonetheless must tell you that I think the nation is paying a painful price for the loss of these senators that I have just mentioned. And this is not a partisan judgment, because there are some Republican members of the United States Senate that I admire every bit as much as I do some of

my former Democratic colleagues. But the targeting operation of the new Right was focused on some of the ablest members of the United States Senate, and without exception those senators were replaced by men of lesser vision, and lesser capabilities. I think by any reasonable test, the United States Senate is a less well-endowed body today, and less capable of serving the national interest, than it was in 1978, or 1980. And it was to help in preventing a further erosion in the character and capability of the Senate that I took the lead in forming this group, Americans for Common Sense. All in all it is clear that tonight many Americans are more alerted to the negative tactics of the new Right than was the case in 1978 or 1980. It goes without saying that I am not claiming that our group was principally responsible for that, although I think we helped. But it is clear that candidates targeted for defeat in 1982, and there are some twenty-two of them already on the list, including several prominent Republican members of the United States Senate, that they are not so likely to be caught off-guard by the tactics of the new Right as was the case in these other elections.

But I am also convinced that the substantive problems before the nation, relating especially to the great issues of war and peace, and to the American economy, have gotten worse rather than better during the past year and a half. Beyond the serious dislocations of our economy, and the highly questionable budget priorities, they are not questionable in my mind, they are just wrong,

but questionable in the minds of even many Administration supporters, behind all of that looms the rising threat posed by the nuclear arms race and concurrent with that the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is my personal growing belief that either b y accident or design we are drifting steadily toward a nuclear holocaust that could end human life on this planet. The accumulation of nuclear force is now so huge in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and is spreading so rapidly across the world, that only a radical reversal of present policies can save us from the very real danger of human extinction.

Now, those facts have been known to us for many, many years. Indeed, we have probably known that the potential for annihilation has been with us ever since Albert Einstein and his colleagues unlocked the secret of the atom, more than a half-century ago, a discovery that led a few years later to the incineration of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, under two blinding fireballs in the summer of 1945.

Human life, and perhaps even the very life of this planet, hung in the balance from that day to this. But the danger is growing now that that balance will break down, and with this the life of all humanity, not only our generation, meaning those of us that are here today, but all the other generations that won't be able to be born to a generation that's been extinguished.

What we are talking about, therefore, is not only the

destruction of civilization, the art, the buildings, the books, the knowledge, but the death of the people and the environment that sustains life on the planet, and this for all time to come.

Now that is the final and ultimate danger that has been in our minds for many years, but which has taken on a new and alarming dimension in recent months. While the nuclear threat has been known to us since August of 1945, the accession of the present Administration has brought it to its greatest acuteness and intensity. And the reason for this is that for the first time since Hiroshima, our destiny is in the hands of leaders who openly defy the realities of the nuclear age. The most dangerous present threat to human civilization is the incredible fact that the present Administration in Washington believes that it is possible to fight and to win a nuclear war at acceptable cost. Every previous President of the nuclear age, from Truman to Carter, Republicans and Democrats alike, either acknowledged the unprecedented changes wrought by nuclear weapons, or at least they were ambivalent about the continuing applicability fo the old methods of settling conflicts.

But now for the first time I think it is clear we have leaders who either deny the threat to human existence posed by the use of nuclear weapons or they believe that we can continue to settle the disputes among the great powers by the same methods that have been used in the past, methods that always in previous times have led, sooner or later, to military conflict.

Now, to be completely fair about this, it should be pointed out that in August of 1980 President Carter issued Presidential directive number 59, which spelled out the beginning shift in American strategic doctrine toward the notion that a limited nuclear war might be a feasible instrument of national policy. So this was not entirely original with the present Administration, although I think it's fair to say they have pushed it to an unprecedented level. In total disregard of the realities of nuclear power, the President and his top advisers are conducting foreign policy on the basis of a doctrine which holds that a nuclear war can be fought and can be limited, under certain conditions that they believe they can control. Now, that is far and away the most ignorant and dangerous of all the Reagan policies.

As a consequence, I have decided that in 1982, the public interest group which I head, that I referred to earlier, will shift its major focus from the danger of the new Right to the vastly greater danger of nuclear annihilation. The two dangers, of course, are not unrelated in that the new Right is among those forces that are fueling the arms race, and impelling toward the nuclear abyss. But the new Right, it is important to keep in mind, is only one small piece of the peril that threatens our survival. And if that larger peril is not addressed soon, and more effectively than it's being addressed today, then there won't be any new Right, or any old Right, or any Left, or any center, or any other place on which to stand, only oblivion.

So I am asking all the members and supporters of Common Sense, and all other Americans, to join in the most important campaign, and that is the campaign to reverse the arms race so that we have some hope of saving the human race. It is my hope that if we can find ways of making the nuclear peril better understood, and the required remedies better accepted, that we can yet enlist in that effort people who are conservative, or liberal, or left, or right, or moderate, or whatever, because presumably all of us must have a common yearning for survival, and some interest in maintaining a chance for life among those who will make up future generations, if we can preserve that future.

Now, we may be able to give new force to that effort if we understand the significance of a recent Gallup poll taken in the United States, which indicates that forty-seven per cent of the American people believe that a nuclear war is coming. Beyond this,the overwhelming majority of that forty-seven per cent, something like seventy-five per cent, believe that if nuclear war comes, their chances of survival are not very good.

I was startled a few days ago after I read that poll, without making any reference to it, when I asked a nine-year-old and an eleven-year-old grandsons of mine if they thought we would have a nuclear war some day. I was startled that they both said they did. They both also think that that's the way they'll die.

Now, I remember President Carter was ridiculed for mentioning the anxiety of his daugher Amy on this question

of nuclear annihilation, but the fact is that these children and countless others are reflecting the view that's in the back of the minds of most Americans, as indicated by this poll, that if nuclear war comes, they will die in that conflict. And nearly half of the people believing that this is the future that's ahead of us. Now, that's a shocking condition of life, but it can also be encouraging in that it means that a majority of Americans already see the prospect of nuclear annihilation unless something is done to reverse the present course that we're on. There's a terrible kind of realism here. Maybe with some people a kind of fatalism, but it also may be the basis for wisdom and salvation.

It is difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to conceive what it would be like if a nuclear war happened. That task is made more difficult by our natural tendency to put it out of our minds, a tendency that psychologists call disassociation. In other words, faced with something wholly outside of our experience, especially something too horrible to contemplate, we tend to disassociate our thoughts from it. And besides, it's the government's responsibility, and there's nothing we can do about it anyway.

Now, it's a painful but essential fact,if we are to break that mood of resignation, and recover our ability to act, to look honestly, however painfully, at what a nuclear exchange would be like. And to do that, I think we have

to translate the kind of antiseptic abstraction of the war planners into human individual terms, because terms like megaton and megadeaths are abstractions that are beyond our experience. We don't know what it means to incinerate millions of people in a few moments' time. When we suffer or when we fear, we usually fear as individuals. And when we grieve, ordinarily, it is for a single child, or for a single parent or a brother or sister, whatever. Consider then the following:

Not long ago, a young man about the age of most of the people in this auditorium was burned in an automobile explosion, and was brought into the Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, one of the best-equipped and best-staffed hospitals in the world. That patient was provided with five hundred pints of blood in an effort to keep him alive. He underwent six operations under the best surgery in the world, in which eighty-five per cent of his entire body surface was covered with skin grafts, and was kept all the time on artificial respiration because his lungs had been scorched out by the flaming gasoline in this auto accident. On the thirty-third day, he died. His treatment having stretched the resources of that great hospital, especially the burn unit, to the limit. Now, consider what might happen in that same city of Boston if a fairly small hydrogen bomb were dropped on Boston--by a small one I mean one with a killing capacity of a million tons. By conservative estimates that one bomb would kill a half-million people outright, just in one

blinding explosion, five hundred thousand people who would die instantly in the city of Boston. Another half-million would be painfully, if not fatally, burned, many of them along the lines of the young man I just talked about. Few if any of the survivors, however, would receive any treatment, because the medical personnel of the city, under the law of averages, would probably be gone in the first casualties, and the Massachusetts General Hospital, in all probability, would have been destroyed, along with the other hospitals. So these half-million burned and dazed survivors would be condemned to a slow, agonizing death.

The dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, Dr. Howard Hyatt, has said, those people who talk about winning or surviving a nuclear war apparently never considered the medical consequences. For a period extending from the mid-fifties, when the Soviet Union began to acquire a nuclear capability, capable of our own, certainly not by any means equal to the United States, in the nineteen-fifties and the nineteen-sixties, but at least a beginning of an effort to approach American nuclear power, from that time until the advent of the Reagan Administration in 1981, the peace of the world hung on a precarious balance of terror, as Winston Churchill described it, or what the strategists called Mutual Assured Destruction, for which the acronym is MAD. The Reagan Administration has now introduced a new strategic concept, based on the theory that nuclear weapons can be surgically used in selected circumstances against carefully designated targets in such

a way as to limit a war with the Soviet Union over an extended period of time. There would be a certain amount of release of nuclear weapons on each side, but under a very carefully controlled scenario. Now, that doctrine has been designated by two leading strategic arms experts, Birch and Keeney, and Wolfgang Spenovsky(?) of Stanford, as the doctrine of nuclear utilization target selection, for which the acronym is NUTS.

The basic thesis of NUTS has been exposited by Administration officials from the President on down. The President said, as many of you will recall, in the fall of last year, 1981, that he could conceive of a limited nuclear war without, quote, bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button for an all-out nuclear exchange.

Vice-President Bush said during his campaign for the Presidency in 1980, if my memory is right, he said that here in California, that he believed the United States could fight and win a nuclear war.

Eugene Rostow, the director of the Arms Control Agency, has said that he thinks it is naive to suppose that one use of a nuclear weapon would immediately lead to detonating the whole arsenal. And as though he were preparing us for an inevitable future of war, Professor Rostow has urged us to recognize, in his words, that we are now living in a pre-war era, not a post-war era.

There has also been speculation coming out of the so-called think tanks, in some cases I think these people

have been in the tank too long.

[GAP IN TAPE OF APPROXIMATELY 15 seconds]

--has contended that it is crazy to quote him to regard nuclear war as suicidal. And then Professor Kahn urges us to,quote, distinguish between an unpleasant experience and a thing you can survive.

And then on a final note of good cheer, Mr. Kahn observes, if twenty million Americans were killed, there would still be two hundred million survivors.

The premise of all of this, of a winnable, or limited nuclear war, where you could tell who the winner was, and who the loser was, is that the most insane of all human conflicts will be managed with a cool logic and exquisite precision. In a manner that our strategic experts have not yet explained, leaders on both sides who lack the judgment to cooperate to prevent nuclear war would cooperate once the war began, to keep it under control like a kind of a soccer game, conducted in the antiseptic surroundings of strategic planning rooms in the Kremlin and in our own capitol. Now, all that we know of human experience forces us to a different conclusion. I am not going to take the time to quote a long list of people who have said that it's nonsense to think about a limited nuclear war, but they include President Eisenhower's science adviser, Professor Kistiakowsky(?), they include former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, they include Ambassador, now Professor George Kennan, and

many others, who have said there is no limiting the impact of million-ton weapons if nuclear exchanges begin.

Well, the strategists who are now outlining these new scenarios would say, well and good, peace is fine, so is disarmament, but what about the Russians, with their massive arms buildup? Are they not going for a first-strike capability against our land-based missiles? And what does the presence of the SS-20s and other intermediate range missiles in Europe mean, unless the Russians are thinking about a limited nuclear war? Now the Soviet leaders, we should note first of all, strenuously deny this. It may only have been propaganda. But while President Reagan and his advisers have been speculating publicly on the win-ability of limited nuclear war, President Brezhnev responded with an invitation to President Reagan to join him in, quote, rejecting the whole idea of nuclear attack as nothing but criminal conduct. In a written reply to questions submitted by the German magazine, Der Spiegel, Brezhnev in November of last year commented on nuclear war as follows, and I quote: A limited nuclear war cannot exist at all. Once begun, in Europe or somewhere else, a nuclear war would irrevocably take on a world-wide character. End of quote.

Now here too is an excerpt from an official Soviet publication issued in November of 1980, in which the authors say: The Soviet Union holds that nuclear war would be a universal disaster, and that it would most

probably mean an end to all of civilization.

The document goes on to say it may lead to the destruction of all humankind. There can be no victor in such a war, and it can solve no political problems.

Now, how do we know that such statements are not designed to deceive us, or more plausibly, to encourage pacifism and neutralism in Western Europe? A leading authority on Soviet strategy, Professor Simms of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies writes, and I quote: Soviet leaders rarely lie when explaining fundamental directions of their foreign policy. The Politburo has to keep in mind not only the West, but also its own subjects and the elites of client states. And it cannot mislead them without considerable cost. Then Professor Simms says: I could find nothing about victory in a nuclear war in modern Soviet writings.

Now, the Reagan Administration and some prominent Democrats as well, pointing to the Soviet missile buildup in the nineteen-seventies, claim that the Soviets are, on the basis of what's happened, what has happened in the last ten years, obviously bent on leaving us behind, in the nuclear race. But a close look at a comparative, at the comparative nuclear forces of the two sides, I think points to a different conclusion. The United States, in short, achieved in the nineteen-sixties a dramatic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, in the deployment and development of land, air, and sea-based missiles, notwithstanding the late President

[SIC] [SIC]
Kennedy's talk in the nineteen-eighty Presidential campaign about the missile gap that was supposed to be against us. Once in power, he quickly discovered that the missile gap which was there was in our favor, rather than in favor of the Soviet Union.

I don't know anyone who any longer disputes that, that we began the nineteen-sixties and went through the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, with an overwhelming superiority over the Soviet Union.

In the nineteen-seventies, with the experience of the Cuban missile crisis in their minds, the Soviet Union sought desperately to catch up to the clearly superior posture of U.S. nuclear forces. And I think it's fair to say that they have now achieved a rough parity, or equality. They don't have anywhere near as many nuclear warheads as we have, but they have a heavier payload. So that the destructive power on both sides is roughly equal. Now, that doesn't mean too much when you consider that each side long ago achieved the point of being able to absorb a first strike from the other side and still respond with a nation-destroying retaliation.

Writing in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Review, in January of this year, Richard W. Johnson, one of our defense experts, says flat out, and I quote: Soviet missiles will merely be capable of doing in the nineteen-eighties what the American missiles could do in the nineteen-sixties, which means that we are now roughly equal. So the decision to proceed with yet another nuclear escalation is not a catch-up maneuver on

our part, if we proceed with that, but an effort to move from a position of rough equivalency, which both President Ford and President Carter recognized in negotiating the terms of the SALT II agreement, to move from that position of approximate equivalency to a new position of superiority, which of course the Soviets will feel constrained to match again.

A far better course for both sides is an agreed-upon verifiable armed ceiling against further deployment on either side, as provided by the SALT process. Now, it is of course possible that either the United States or the Soviet Union or both could achieve a first-strike capability. In other words, the ability to launch so many missiles with such accuracy that by striking first you could knock out the capacity of the other side to retaliate. If such a first-strike capability were ever achieved, by either the Soviet Union or the United States, the danger of nuclear war would then be infinitely greater. Furthermore, the country to achieve such a first-strike capability would be the one in greatest danger of being hit first. Why? because the country most vulnerable to a first-strike attack would not dare to be hit first.

Suppose the U.S., to imagine a scenario here, were the first country to achieve a first-strike capability, which some authorities believe we are now trying to accomplish. Suppose that the Soviets believed that we had such a capability. Suppose further that a dangerous international crisis developed between the two nations, that indicates the very real possibility of conflict.

Something like the Cuban missile crisis of twenty years ago. Under these circumstances, the Soviet planners would probably move to a launch on warning posture. Now, I think you know that there have been several false alarms where we believed, or our strategic defenders believed that a Soviet missile force had been launched. In each case, we were able to identify the mistake before we retaliated. Doubtless the same kind of false alarm had taken place in the Soviet Union. There is no reason to think that their detection methods are any more foolproof than ours. Imagine how much more likely the Soviets would be to launch their nuclear weapons under those circumstances, if they believed that failure to do so quickly would make it impossible for them to retaliate. So instead of increasing our security,to achieve a first-strike capability is to put a hairtrigger on the nuclear monster that moves all of us much closer to doomsday. And it's the movement in that direction, I think, that led the editors of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, who have maintained that clock on the cover of that magazine for nearly forty years, to move the hands up this year to about four minutes before midnight.

Suffice it to note here that the two superpowers have joined together on a common road to--

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SIDE II OF TAPE:

McGOVERN (CONTINUES): --ruin, if not in nuclear holocaust, the in a self-impoverishing arms race. And anyone who no longer recognizes the enormous economic price we are paying

for this arms race has their eyes closed. But with only brief and limited interruptions, the arms race has sustained itself now for some thirty-eight years in a vicious, spiraling circle of mistrust. In a moment of private candor at Camp David, back in 1959, President Eisenhower turned to Chairman Khrushchev, and he said: Whenever I try to restrain military spending, I end up backing down before military advisers who warn me that the Soviets are developing new weapons systems that will reduce the United States to a second-rate power.

Khrushchev, according to his memoirs, replied that for me, it is just the same. Some people, he said, from our military department come and say, Comrade Khrushchev, look at this, the Americans are developing such and such a system. And we take the steps which our military people have recommended.

And so the people from the military departments, whether the Kremlin or the Pentagon have come and kept coming, and the missiles have piled up on both sides to a grotesque redundancy. Well, is there a way out? What are we waiting for?

Deep reductions in arms may seem like a radical unrealistic notion in the wake of the failure of the United States Senate, of which I was a part, even to ratify the modest SALT II treaty in 1979. But in truth, the idea of very substantial reductions in nuclear arms is radical only in terms of our ingrained habits of thought. In terms of our, of the realities of the world around us, it is only common sense and common sense of the commonest variety.

Now, paradoxical as it might seem, and I am nearing the end of my remarks here, during the Senate debate over

the SALT II treaty there was one area where the so-called hawks and the so-called doves found a common ground. They both thought that the cuts in nuclear weapons on both sides should be deeper than the ones provided in the SALT II treaty, and when I introduced a resolution before the Foreign Relations Committee, providing that we would ratify that treaty as a committee, vote for ratification, but only with the understanding that our negotiators should come back with substantially deeper cuts in the SALT III treaty. To my surprise, that resolution was adopted unanimously in the Foreign Relations Committee, and it had the public support of senators as diverse as Jesse Helms, and Henry Jackson, and Frank Church, and Jack Javits. The first major step to bring the arms race under control now, I believe, is to seek a United States-Soviet Union agreement for a freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. And I want to endorse very strongly these grass-roots efforts that are moving in California that now have a half a million signatures, favoring a freeze on the further production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. And that process, as you know, took a considerable jump in New England just in the past week, with hundreds of town meetings endorsing the concept not only of a nuclear freeze, but follow-on steps to negotiate downward the nuclear weapons on both sides.

In the final weeks of his life, Albert Einstein, whose formula first made the nuclear bomb possible, joined in a collective appeal against the further development of nuclear weapons. It read in part, and I close on these words: We

appeal as human beings to human beings, remember your humanity and forget the rest.

Thank you very much. Thank you, thank you. As you may have noticed, I am having a little throat problem tonight. But I think I can go for another ten or fifteen minutes on questions if you want to raise some questions.

Q: UNINTELLIGIBLE

McGOVERN: Well, the, that of course is a logical question. It may not speak to the fears and paranoia that exist on both sides, but you are quite right, if there's anything to the theory of deterrence, once you have the capability, even if you are hit first, of responding with a society-destroying blow against the other side, that's enough. And so we achieved that many, many years ago, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States. So I think we've added nothing to the concept of deterrence. In fact, we may have been destabilizing the concept of deterrence by piling on more and more and more of these nuclear weapons. I remember many years ago when I first came to the Senate, we asked Secretary McNamara, who was then the Secretary of Defense, what he thought was an acceptable deterrence. And he said, well, it's probably possible with even half a dozen nuclear weapons to deter an attack, because what country would attack us, knowing that we could destroy Moscow and Leningrad and Kiev and the other great cities? And what American President would launch an attack knowing that the Soviets could take out Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, Chicago, Washington, and so on. But, he said, to be on the safe side, some of our scientists have recommended that you would need as many as a hundred nuclear

warheads in the arsenal. Andhe said, I'd multiply that by four, and my figure is four hundred. Well, of course we are now sitting here with ten thousand strategic nuclear weapons, and another twenty or thirty thousand tactical weapons, depending on how you define tactical. So that today in all the nuclear stockpiles around the world, there are some fifty thousand strategic and tactical weapons, most of them in the Soviet Union and the United States. But we're way beyond anything that could be described as a reasonable deterrent. Yes.

Q: Unintelligible

McGOVERN: Well, I think you have to pose it in terms of bilateral negotiations, but the point that Americans keep forgetting is that the Soviets are ready for that. They are not the ones that are holding up the SALT II treaty. That treaty was very carefully negotiated by President Ford and President Carter over a period of five or six years, and the Soviets signed off on it essentially way back in 74. It got caught up in domestic American politics in the 76 elections and again in 1980. But I think no matter how much one points to the Soviets' sins, and God knows there are many of those, the fact is on arms control they showed a greater willingness to negotiate reasonable arms reductions than we have. Maybe it's because they don't have the political cross-currents,that they are an authoritarian system, where they can seek their own selfish interests with less pressure from special-interest groups than we do here in the United States. But whatever reason, there's no question in my mind that the Soviets are ready to negotiate

reductions in strategic weapons. They have been for many years. I would also argue that every single acceleration in the nuclear arms race has begun right here on this side of the pond. All the new systems have begun here.

Q: Unintelligible.

McGOVERN: Well, I think it's very hard. The power, the military-industrial complex, as the late President Eisenhower reminded us so many years ago, is enormous. It may be the strongest single and best organized political force in the country. But what, the only way you can do it is the way it, I think, it's now being done, through grass-roots citizen activity of a kind that is taking shape here in California. There's no question that for good or ill, Proposition 13 was an example, a grass-roots organizing, where the individual citizens took over the politicians. Maybe it wasn't entirely well-grounded, but the fact is that it demonstrated it could be done. And it is possible that while the military decisions are more far-removed from us than tax decisions, that the same kind of tactics can be used. I believe that the California initiative on nuclear arms freeze will have some impact, as will these efforts that are going forward in other states. Politicians may begin to get the message. There's another reason why they might, and that is that the arms budget is dislocating both the economy and the federal budget to a point where you find even one-time hawks saying that the military budget has gotten out of hand. It has to be scaled back. And that

may be a strong temptation to President Reagan to move forward on arms negotiations.

Q: Unintelligible

McGOVERN: This is still another nightmare. The only reason I, that I simply referred to it tonight rather than discussing it is that I think it's the subject of a separate lecture, is the problem of proliferation. What do you do with the expected arrival of ten, twelve, fifteen countries in the nuclear club before the end of this century? You already have three or four, in addition to the superpowers, and we have seen one nuclear installation bombed in a pre-emptive strike in the Middle East already. That is a problem of horrendous dimensions. I would only answer here quickly tonight that I don't think either the Soviet Union or the United States is in a position to provide much leadership on that issue until they get their own house in order. Everybody wants to duplicate the prestige of the superpowers. It used to be that you wanted four-lane highways and steel mills, and bombers and airlines and hotels, and things like that, but now these developing countries want a nuclear capability, even a country like India, Pakistan, and others, they want their own independent nuclear force. And it's very difficult for us to exert much moral and political and diplomatic leadership in that area, if we are steaming full head on a nuclear escalation that is, as this first question implied, is way beyond anything we need, even for nuclear deterrence. So I think the first order of business has to be to put our own house in order in terms of some

discipline there.

Q: Unintelligible

McGOVERN: Could you repeat that again, I did't get it. Yeah. Well, I think that's what we have to do. We did that at the end of the Second World War. There was a general belief, based on prior experience, that we would have a recession after World War II. Always had had recessions after all previous wars. But some intelligent planning was done during and after World War II, and we were able to make the transition to peacetime production without major dislocations. As a matter of fact, we did not have either unacceptable inflation or unacceptable unemployment after World War II, notwithstanding the fact that in twelve months' time, we went from allocating forty per cent of our entire GNP to the military, down to eight per cent in about twelve months' time. We discharged a military force of twelve million men, mostly men, to an army of about a million in a year's time. Maybe we did it too fast, that's something you can debate. But the point is we did it without serious economic disloc ation. I think it's possible to do that again. And as a matter of fact, and here again this ought to be the subject of a separate lecture from some knowledgeable person, I believe that the reliance on, that is, the use of so much of our scientific and research and development personnel, to say nothing of money, on the military, is hurting us as a country, it's weakening us in terms of industrial productivity and the capacity to trade. And I believe it's aggravating the

inflationary and high interest problems in the country. So I think it's not only possible, but essential. It's probably true with the Soviet Union, too, that we begin moving away from such a heavy reliance on military production and research and development into doing some of the other things that are so urgent. I was glad to see Governor Brown say on this campus a few days ago that education is a very important part of both our productivity and our capacity to defend ourselves. I think that's true. It makes no sense at all, even in terms of pure national defense, to lay aside the cultural matters. But just in terms of national defense, and productivity, it makes no sense to allocate funds to build an MX missile and then say we can't afford student loans. So this, obviously that would be applauded here, but it ought to be applauded at the Pentagon. And it ought to be applauded by our industries and our corporate leaders. And I think they are beginning to see that, that if we really want to increase productivity, which is one of the essential answers to inflation, you have to concentrate more on research and education and development factors of that kind.

Q: Unintelligible.

McGOVERN: Yes, I do believe we need to move to alternative sources of energy, especially the development of solar power. I don't think that the march toward nuclear war, though, is fundamentally an outgrowth of the nuclear power industry as such. It's one of the paradoxes of this country that we never really worried about nuclear waste and what

to do with it as long as we were producing nuclear bombs, which is what has produced most of the nuclear waste. We started worrying about it after it became a source of electric power. And while I don't favor the expansion of the nuclear industry in the power field, I think that's a minor problem in comparison with the danger of nuclear war. Even if half a dozen of these nuclear plants were to blow up, the damage would be an eyedropper compared to what a nuclear war would do. So you have to keep your eye on the real danger, which is the danger of political and strategic leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union, who are calmly going about the business of planning how to conduct a nuclear war. They are the real danger. I recognize there are dangers in nuclear power plants, too. I don't want to be misunderstood on this. But I have always been puzzled at people who get all exercised about the mortal danger of an accident in a nuclear power plant who seem to think well, you know, and you talk to them about nuclear war, they say, well, there's not much you can do about it, it's always, always had wars, you know, what are you going to do with these politicians, anyway. Kind of a resignation about nuclear war, which I would submit to you is the real danger that we ought to be looking at.

Q: Unintelligible

McGOVERN: Well, I think the ABM is really a nonsensical device. It depends for its effectiveness in a sense on developing the skill of being able to hit an incoming rifle bullet with another rifle bullet. And I never did think the ABM was a dependable device. I think we were

wise in scrapping plans for that. In nuclear war, the defensive systems can always be overwhelmed by the offensive systems. Let us suppose that Santa Barbara had ten anti-ballistic missile systems in place that are capable of knocking down ten incoming nuclear missiles. Let's assume that the gunners are one hundred per cent accurate. And that with those ten missiles, you knock down ten incoming missiles. What do you do with the eleventh one? One missile will take Santa Barbara out completely. And so when you are dealing with a country that has nine or ten thousand warheads, they are not going to be discouraged by the fact that you claim to have an antiballistic missile system that might knock down a few hundred incoming missiles. Besides, what happens to those missiles when they explode overhead? Or in the ionosphere? Or wherever it is they explode. I will take one more question, then I, if I am going to be talking tomorrow, I am going to have to quit and flee this place.

Q: Unintelligible.

McGOVERN: Well, I wouldn't think that was in order until we've had a lot more serious efforts than we've had so far to use the traditional methods. I mean, if after you marshal public opinion in this country and utilize the initiative and the referendum and the Congress and the various other things that are open to us, then it seems to me it's, it's only after you've tried that, and if it should fail, that you begin to think about desperation measures. I don't see anything useful at this point in talking about desperation measures when we have a real educational task to perform in

this country to get the citizenry as activated as they should be on this, on this question. I don't mean that there's no role for protest and for these more exotic methods, but they probably wouldn't get very far at this point until you enlarge the understanding of the electorate as to what the nuclear peril is all about.

Thank you very much for your--

CAPPS: Just a kind of closing word. Last year George McGovern was here for a lecture. This year he came back and gave two lectures, and was listed as co-instructor of this course. I hope that by now he has received a message from us that we appreciate it very much when he comes to Santa Barbara, and we are hoping, of course, that he will do this again and again. Thank all of you.

END OF MEETING